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Abstract 
 
In the context of renewed academic and public interest in Britain’s relationship with 
slavery in the post-emancipation era, this thesis looks beyond the political borders of 
the British empire to Brazil, where individual Britons and British enterprises 
continued to own and invest in slave property for long periods after 1833. In fact, the 
last vestiges of Britain’s entanglement with slavery in the Americas were only 
extinguished upon abolition in Brazil in 1888. Though this fact has been recognised 
by historians, much of what we know relates to the use of slave labour in the British-
owned mines of Minas Gerais. This thesis explores the material basis of this 
entanglement outside of these exclaves, exposing British slaveholding in a variety of 
rural and urban contexts. The exploitation of slave labour is only part of the story. 
British banks and other creditors were also deeply entangled in the form of mortgages 
secured by human collateral. Though financial entanglement can appear innocuous in 
the abstract, this thesis pieces together fragmentary evidence of their potential for 
devastating consequences on the lives of the enslaved. 
 
Restoring these overlooked British connections with Brazilian slavery is surely a 
worthwhile cause in its own right. Nevertheless, this thesis is also concerned with what 
the persistence of this entanglement, over the course of over half a century, can tell us 
about the limits of anti-slavery policy and legislation. The failure of the state to curb 
even the most obvious complicit practices cannot solely be attributed to the practical 
difficulties of investigating allegations and enforcing British law across political 
borders. Rather, ambivalence codified in legislation and embodied in British officials 
also facilitated the types of entanglement discussed here. 
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Introduction 
 
In February 1888, just three months before the abolition of slavery in Brazil, Irishman 
Richard Gumbleton Daunt made one last and unsuccessful attempt in the courts of Rio 
de Janeiro to secure the return of his fugitive slave, Godofredo. Under the guidance of 
members of the Confederação Abolicionista, Godofredo had escaped his master’s 
residence in Campinas and travelled to Rio de Janeiro where he found refuge in a 
community of other escaped slaves in the Quilombo do Leblon, on the outskirts of the 
city. Perhaps recognising the inevitability of abolition, the judge dismissed the case 
on a legal technicality, leaving Godofredo free and his former master, a self-
proclaimed pro-slavery advocate, embittered and irate.1  Just under a year earlier, 
enslaved labourers on a coffee plantation some 100km from Campinas had been less 
successful in winning their freedom. Eager to placate his workforce during a period of 
heightened slave resistance in the region, the Baron de Grão-Mogol promised to 
liberate his 70 remaining slaves after a maximum period of five years. According to 
the Baron, their immediate emancipation was not possible due to their status as human 
collateral for a mortgage the Baron owed to the New London and Brazilian Bank. 2 
While such cases had become rare occurrences by this period, both Daunt’s 
slaveholding and the bank’s slave mortgage are important reminders that Britons’ – 
and hence Britain’s – exploitative relationship with slavery did not end with the 
                                                        
1 E. Silva, As camélias do Leblon e a abolição da escravatura: uma investigação de história cultural 
(São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2003) p.112. For a record of the legal proceedings see Ricardo 
Gumbleton Damites [sic] (Autor) vs. José de Seixas Magalhães (Réu), 1887, AN, Acervo Judiciário, 
Processo n. 1320, caixa 1039, galeria A. See also O Paiz, 13 February 1887, for a report on a speech 
made by Gumbleton Daunt in which he references the escape of Godofredo, the on-going court case 
and his pro-slavery views. For more on the life and career of Daunt since his arrival in Brazil in 1843, 
see A.G. García Alaniz, ‘Dr. Ricardo Gumbleton Daunt: O Médico, o Homem e a Cidade (Campinas 
1843-1893)’ (Unpublished PhD Thesis, Universidade de São Paulo, 1999). 
 
2 W. Dean, Rio Claro: A Brazilian Plantation System, 1820-1920 (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1972), p. 144.  
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Emancipation Act of 1833 nor any other piece of British anti-slavery legislation. 
Though this fact has been well recognised in important studies of the British-owned 
goldmines of Minas Gerais, the material basis of this entanglement has hitherto 
remained overlooked outside of this sector. This thesis explores the extent and 
diversity of this entanglement with a specific focus on British slaveholding in non-
mining contexts and slave mortgages. By placing this entanglement within the 
historical and legislative context of British anti-slavery, this thesis explains why it was 
only abolition in Brazil itself which finally brought an end to the last vestiges of over 
two-and-a-half centuries of Britain’s relationship with slavery in the Americas.   
 
This introductory chapter outlines the scope of the thesis by defining important 
terminology in addition to the chronological and conceptual limits of this research. 
The following section will discuss the major bodies of literature with which this 
project intersects. While recognising the varying contributions each of these literatures 
has made to the topic at hand, the case will be made for the need for further research 
on both the materiality of British entanglement with Brazilian slavery and our 
understanding of the extent to which the British state was willing, and indeed capable, 
of curbing these complicit practices. The penultimate section will discuss the 
methodological approach to researching a topic that has suffered a process of elision 
and distortion, while the final section explains the structure of the thesis.   
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Chronology, definitions and conceptual boundaries: 
 
The chronology of this thesis begins in 1833 with the Emancipation Act and ends in 
1888 following the abolition of slavery in Brazil. Though the Act did not bring an end 
to slavery in all territories of the British empire, such as India and parts of Africa, it 
was after the passing of this legislation, and especially after the end of apprenticeship 
in 1838, that Britain came to define itself as what Richard Huzzey has termed as an 
‘anti-slavery nation’. Rather than entering into decline following emancipation, anti-
slavery pride permeated British culture and society, becoming a central tenet of 
national identity.3 Anti-slavery also remained a powerful force in politics, shaping the 
foreign policy of successive Victorian governments who attempted to persuade and 
coerce their foreign counterparts to follow Britain’s example. Though this process had 
begun gradually after the abolition of the British slave trade in 1807, it was after the 
settling of British emancipation that, as Huzzey remarks, this ‘“anti-slavery state” 
passed through adolescence into its prime.’4 A question at the heart of this thesis is 
how entanglement with Brazilian slavery was reconciled with a foreign policy and 
wider national identity so clearly opposed to the institution’s existence. Part of the 
answer to this lies in the definition of anti-slavery as a pluralistic ideology that captures 
the various, and at times contradictory, ways in which opposition to slavery was 
expressed and, importantly, put into practice. 5  An important element of this 
                                                        
3 R. Huzzey, Freedom Burning: Anti-Slavery and Empire in Victorian Britain (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2012) pp. 5-20.  
 
4 Ibid p. 40. 
 
5 Ibid p. 8.  
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heterogeneity within anti-slavery concerned the difference of opinion over how 
foreign slaveries should be combatted and ultimately defeated. While abolitionists, 
defined here as active civil society campaigners and often members of the British and 
Foreign Anti-slavery Society, called for immediate emancipation of slaves across the 
Americas, the ‘anti-slavery state’ preferred to tackle the root of the problem, the 
international slave trade, rather than its branches in sovereign foreign territories. As 
we shall observe in Chapter I, these alternate visions for global slavery’s ultimate 
demise had important repercussions on the state’s handling of the types of 
entanglement under consideration in this study.  
 
This leaves the important definition of what is meant by the term entanglement. In a 
recent journal article on ‘German entanglements with transatlantic slavery’ Heike 
Raphael-Hernandez and Pia Wiegmink suggest a broad range of practices as evidence 
of German participation in and profiteering from the slave trade and slavery.6 At one 
end of this spectrum are the relatively small numbers of Germans who were directly 
involved in the enslavement of Africans and their descendants as slave traders and 
slaveholders.7 One step removed were the merchant banks and manufacturers who 
financed and supplied foreign slave systems. Further removed but still entangled, the 
authors argue, were the German intellectuals and travel writers whose failure to 
condemn the institution laid the ideological groundwork for later colonial expansion 
in Africa.8  
 
                                                        
6 H. Raphael-Hernandez, P. Wiegmink, ‘German entanglements with transatlantic slavery: An 
introduction’, Atlantic Studies, 14:4, (2017) pp. 419-435. 
 
7 Ibid p. 422.  
 
8 Ibid pp. 425-428.  
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British entanglement with transatlantic slavery can also be understood in similar, 
though greatly amplified, terms. The economic component of this entanglement 
occurred across a broad spectrum that includes the role of British subjects and 
enterprises as slaveholders and investors in slave-property overseas; the financing, 
supply and facilitation of slaving voyages to and from Africa; the raising of foreign 
loans on London’s capital markets, the type of which provided affordable credit and 
stability to slaveholding governments such as Brazil’s; and finally, the consumption 
of slave-grown produce such as sugar and cotton. Though not negating the importance 
of the other areas to Britain’s wider economic contribution to the maintenance of 
foreign slaveries, this thesis is interested specifically in entanglement in the form of 
investments in Brazilian slave-property, with a specific focus on the two areas 
represented by Gumbleton Daunt and the New London and Brazilian Bank. The 
former concerns slaveholding in its most literal sense, where British subjects exploited 
the labour of enslaved people in Brazil. Slaveholding, as opposed to slave-owning, is 
the preferred terminology as it covers those who exploited the labour of slaves they 
hired from others, in addition to British subjects and enterprises that owned their own 
slaves. The latter concerns British involvement, mostly as creditors but not always, in 
transactions in which enslaved people were used as collateral.  
 
The rationale behind this focus on slaveholding and slave mortgages to the exclusion 
of other forms of entanglement is as follows. Firstly, along with the supply and finance 
of the slave trade, these links were eventually understood as complicit practices by the 
anti-slavery state which hesitantly legislated against them in 1843. Consumption of 
slave-grown produce and portfolio investment in slave economies were abstract 
connections that were never brought within the jurisdiction of the state. Though the 
12 
 
former agitated a great deal of anti-slavery opinion on both sides of the debate around 
the repeal of the sugar duties, the state never assumed responsibility for its prevention.9 
The decision to focus specifically on British investments in Brazilian slavery rather 
than complicity in the slave trade to Brazil was driven by historiographical and 
methodological considerations. Though discussed elsewhere, it is worth noting here 
that in relative terms, British complicity in the slave trade has received greater 
attention from historians than the types of involvement in slavery under consideration 
in this thesis. Though both forms of entanglement present similar methodological 
problems, the illegal nature of the slave trade to Brazil means a limited pool of sources 
are available to historians interested in the material basis of British involvement. 
Given this is an area which has received a fair amount of scholarly attention, based on 
limited source material, it was decided to focus on overlooked aspects of British 
entanglement with Brazilian slavery. Indeed, the original contribution of this thesis in 
the area of British slaveholding and financial investments in slave property, will no 
doubt complement previous work on the slave trade and provide us with a more 
complete picture of Britain’s complex relationship with slavery following abolition in 
its own empire.  
 
Literature Review: 
 
Britain’s continued relationship with slavery in the post-emancipation period has been 
the focus of renewed interest both in academic and public history during the last 
                                                        
9 The mobilisation of anti-slavery opinion on both sides of this debate supports Huzzey’s 
characterisation of anti-slavery as a heterogeneous concept. For further discussion of this debate see 
R. Huzzey, 'Free Trade, Free Labour, and Slave Sugar in Victorian Britain’ Historical Journal, 53.2 
(2010), pp. 359-379.  
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decade or so. At the forefront of this resurgence has been UCL’s Legacies of British 
Slave-ownership (LBS) project.10 This academic project, which in turn provided the 
basis for a 2015 BAFTA award-winning BBC documentary, analysed records of the 
Slave Compensation Commission to explore the varied and complex legacies left by 
former slave-owners and the £20 million-pound pay-out they received after 
emancipation. 11  The project was itself a response to a wider debate around the 
bicentenary of the abolition of the slave-trade in 2007 and the perception that much of 
the public memorialisation of this anniversary had been dominated by narratives of 
self-congratulation, which served to displace a sense of national responsibility for 
Britain’s central and long-term involvement in colonial slavery.12 In an effort to adjust 
these narratives to reflect the reality of individual and national collusion, the project’s 
organisers sought to ‘(re)write slave-ownership back into British history.’13 Inspired 
by both the aims and outcomes of the LBS project, this thesis is a logical extension of 
this process. To fully understand the continued presence and significance of slavery 
to Britain in this post-emancipation period, we must also look beyond the metropole 
and the political boundaries of its empire to the British subjects and enterprises that 
continued to hold and invest in slave-property in foreign territories, long after 1833.  
 
                                                        
10 C. Hall, N. Draper, et al (eds.), Legacies of British Slave-Ownership: Colonial Slavery and the 
Formation of Victorian Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). See also, Legacies 
of British Slave-Ownership database (hereafter LBS). [https://www.ucl.ac.uk/lbs/ accessed 12/08/18]. 
 
11 Britain’s Forgotten Slave-owners, 2015, BBC Two [TV]. It is important to note that the project 
built on the analysis of slave compensation records in N. Draper, The Price of Emancipation: Slave-
Ownership, Compensation and British Society at the End of Slavery (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009).  
 
12 C. Hall, N. Draper, et al (eds.), Legacies of British Slave-Ownership, p. 17.  
 
13 Ibid p. 27.  
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In exploring the impact of British slave-ownership on the metropole, the LBS project 
entered into a highly contested and controversial historiographical territory with its 
origins in Eric Williams’ Capitalism and Slavery. Since its publication over 70 years 
ago historians have cyclically debated William’s central thesis that colonial slavery 
financed the beginnings of the industrial capitalism that ultimately destroyed it.14 One 
of the key controversies of Williams’ economic materialism is that it relegates the role 
of humanitarian ideology in the ending of colonial slavery, insisting that anti-slavery 
was a consequence of an economic sector already in crisis.15 In a similar vein to the 
LBS project, this thesis, beginning at William’s endpoint, cannot hope to respond to 
the controversy surrounding the causes of British emancipation. Nevertheless, this 
research does speak to ongoing historiographical conversations about the relationship 
between capitalism and slavery outside of the British colonial experience during the 
nineteenth century. Over the last decade, a younger generation of scholars have sought 
to position slavery at the heart of American economic development. For this group, 
working with the concept of ‘slavery’s capitalism’, slavery in the U.S. South was not 
an archaic institution isolated from the growth of industrial and financial capitalism in 
the North. Rather slavery was integrated with and indeed central to this process.16  As 
Sven Beckert’s Empire of Cotton argues, this was a process with transnational 
dimensions. In his global history of this commodity, Beckert shows how the industrial 
                                                        
14 E. Williams, Capitalism and Slavery (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994) p. 
210.  
 
15 E. Williams, Capitalism and Slavery pp. 179-196. This aspect of Williams’ thesis has come under 
sustained criticism from authors such as Seymour Drescher who argues that the West Indian economy 
was still profitable and that abolition in fact constituted ‘Econocide’. See S. Drescher, Econocide. 
British Slavery in the Era of Abolition (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 1977).  
 
16 S. Beckert and S Rockman (eds.), Slavery’s Capitalism: A New History of American Economic 
Development (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016) pp. 1-27. See also, E. Baptist, 
The Half Has Never Been Told: Slavery and the Making of American Capitalism (New York: Basic 
Books, 2014). 
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capitalism of Europe was intimately linked with and indeed had its origins in the ‘war 
capitalism’ of the Americas, a system based on land appropriation and the violence of 
slavery.17 In the nineteenth century this created a new kind of slavery, a ‘second 
slavery’, which as an integrated component of global capitalism, flourished in the 
commodity producing zones of the Americas.18 Working in conversation with the 
concepts of ‘second slavery’ and ‘slavery’s capitalism’, over the past decade historians 
in Brazil have also sought to understand the role of Brazil’s slave-economy in the 
development of global capitalism. For authors such as Rafael Marquese and Tâmis 
Parron, the rise and fall of Brazil’s second slavery, based on coffee production, was 
inseparable in political and economic terms from the fate of the institution in the 
United States.19 Not only was the U.S a powerful pro-slavery ally until the Civil War, 
it was also the largest consumer market for Brazilian coffee.20 Though not a coffee-
drinking nation, Britain played an important role in this process as the centre of global 
trade and finance. While this thesis will not attempt to trace the macroeconomic trends 
favoured by global historians, its analysis of the entanglement of British credit with 
Brazilian coffee production on a micro-level in particular will certainly be of interest 
to their research. 
 
While the material basis of British entanglement with slavery is itself a worthy subject 
of research, perhaps more interesting is what it can tell us about British anti-slavery. 
                                                        
17 S. Beckert, Empire of Cotton: A Global History (New York: Vintage Books, 2015) pp. xv-xvi.  
 
18 The term ‘second slavery’ was coined by Dale Tomich. See D. Tomich, Through the Prism of 
Slavery: Labor, Capital, and World Economy (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004) pp. 56-71.  
 
19 R. Marquese and T. Parron, ‘Internacional escravista: a política da Segunda Escravidão’ Topoi, 
12.23 (2011) pp. 97-117; T. Parron, ‘A Política da Escravidão na Era da Liberdade: Estados Unidos, 
Brasil e Cuba, 1787-1846’ (Unpublished PhD thesis, Universidade de São Paulo, 2015).  
 
20 R. Marquese, ‘Estados Unidos, Segunda Escravidão e a Economia Cafeeira do Império do Brasil’ 
Almanack, 5 (2013) pp. 51-60.  
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Much of the work in this area has focused on popular anti-slavery activity in the period 
leading up to emancipation in the West Indies. Within this body of literature, authors 
have sought to reclaim the importance of the mobilisation of anti-slavery public 
opinion in the face of Williams’ theory of economic determinism. 21  After 
emancipation and the end of apprenticeship, the attention of some British abolitionists 
turned to ridding the whole world of slavery, with various veterans of the earlier 
campaign reconvening to form the British and Foreign Anti-slavery Society (BFASS) 
in 1839.  In Chapter I we will observe how this group achieved some moderate success 
in affecting the government’s anti-slavery policy in the early 1840s. However, the 
BFASS were less successful in their opposition of the repeal of the sugar duties in 
1846. The inability of this group to mobilise popular support and even to maintain a 
united front has been identified by Howard Temperley as a symptom of the decline in 
public interest in the anti-slavery movement.22 Echoing this notion of decline, David 
Turley’s study also stresses the organisational failures of abolitionist groups and their 
inability to rally popular support in the 1840s and 1850s.23  However, as Huzzey 
suggests, assessing British anti-slavery through the prism of abolitionist societies 
distorts the pervasiveness of anti-slavery sentiment throughout British political and 
popular culture. 24  Elsewhere Huzzey demonstrates the extent to which this was 
                                                        
21 See R. Anstey, The Atlantic Slave Trade and British Abolition, 1760-1810 (London: Macmillian, 
1975); S. Drescher, Capitalism and Antislavery: British Mobilization in Comparative Perspective 
(London: Macmillian, 1986); S. Drescher, ‘Whose Abolition? Popular Pressure and the Ending of the 
British Slave Trade’, Past & Present, 143 (1994) pp. 136-166; J. Oldfield, Popular Politics and 
British Anti-Slavery. The Mobilisation of Public Opinion Against the Slave Trade, 1787-1807 
(London, Frank Cass, 1998); C.L. Brown, Moral Capital: Foundations of British Abolitionism 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006).  
 
22 H. Temperley, British Antislavery, 1833-1870 (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 
1972) p. 166.  
 
23 D. Turley, The Culture of English Antislavery, 1780-1860 (London: Routledge, 1991) pp. 100-104.  
 
24 R. Huzzey, Freedom Burning p. 7.  
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translated into the foreign policy of the ‘anti-slavery state’. Adopting the concept of a 
‘moral geography of British anti-slavery responsibilities’, Huzzey shows that while 
the state assumed responsibility for some issues, others were left to the consciences of 
individuals. While correctly identifying that different forms of British complicity in 
foreign slaveries fell within this jurisdiction, Huzzey does not adequately explain the 
legislative context of this policy objective.25    
 
Other studies have been more successful in this respect. David Eltis’ work on the 
suppression of the slave trade includes a discussion of legislation which aimed to curb 
British involvement in the illegal slave trade. Though aware of the pivotal 1843 
legislation that was enacted in an effort to prevent the expansion of British 
slaveholding, Eltis has little to say on its implementation on foreign shores.26 More 
recently historians interested in British anti-slavery in the post-emancipation period 
have provided further detail in respect of this legislation. Chris Evans’ case study of 
slaveholding in British-owned mines in Brazil and Cuba discusses the formulation of 
the 1843 Act in Parliament and argues that concessions adopted before its enactment 
rendered it ineffective.27 The groundwork laid by Evans in his discussion of British 
mining companies immediately before and after the law’s enactment has proved 
essential to the analysis in Chapter I. Whereas Evans’ research provides a snapshot 
specifically related to the mining industry, Joseph Kelly’s recent thesis looks beyond 
this sector and places a greater focus on the anti-slavery discourse of those British 
                                                        
25 R. Huzzey, ‘The moral geography of British anti-slavery responsibilities’ Transactions of the Royal 
Historical Society 22 (2012) pp. 111-139, especially pp. 125-1127.  
 
26 D. Eltis, Economic growth and the ending of the transatlantic slave trade (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1987) pp. 82-84.  
 
27 C. Evans, ‘Brazilian Gold, Cuban Copper and the Final Frontier of British Anti-Slavery’, Slavery & 
Abolition 34.1 (2013), pp. 118-134. 
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subjects entangled with the slave trade and foreign slaveries. While other chapters of 
Kelly’s research break important new ground their treatment of the 1843 bill and 
British slaveholding and other investments in slavery in non-British colonies such as 
Cuba, St. Croix and Suriname, his analysis of these forms of entanglement in Brazil 
is restricted to the mining companies. 28 In its discussion of the British state’s policy 
towards issue of British slaveholding over a longer term and beyond the mining sector 
in Brazil, this thesis addresses the void between both these important contributions to 
the literature.    
 
The nineteenth century has been described as Brazil’s ‘British century’. 29 This 
characterisation reflects the important, at times predominant, role that Britain played 
in the political and economic life of Brazil since even before its birth as an independent 
nation in 1822. Undoubtedly, the two themes that dominated Anglo-Brazilian relations 
during this period were on the one hand, the suppression of the slave trade and its 
corollary, slavery, and on the other, the expansion of British trade and investment into 
the Brazilian market. Indeed, it would be these two priorities that Britain pressed for 
in the form of bilateral treaties from the Brazilian authorities as recompense for its 
role in securing the international recognition that the newly independent nation so 
urgently required. After a series of tense and lengthy discussions, negotiations 
produced the 1826 convention to bring an end to the slave trade by 1830, and the 1827 
                                                        
28 J. Kelly, ‘The Problem of Anti-Slavery in the Age of Capital, c. 1830-1888’ (Unpublished PhD 
thesis, University of Liverpool, 2017). 
 
29 O. Marshall, Brazil in British and Irish Archives (Oxford: Centre for Brazilian Studies, 2008) p. xi.  
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commercial treaty to guarantee favourable access to Brazil’s market for British 
products.30  
 
The overwhelming importance of these two themes has been well established in the 
literature concerning Anglo-Brazilian relations during this century. Leslie Bethell’s 
seminal study of the abolition of the Brazilian slave trade has shown how Britain’s 
efforts to suppress the illegal traffic both dominated and damaged relations between 
both countries for half a century.31 Though British anti-slavery was at its most intense 
until the effective suppression of the slave trade in 1850, Britain’s active role only 
came to an end following the repeal of the Aberdeen Act in 1869. In fact, the 
unresolved question of the liberated Africans and the related issue of the illegal status 
of slaves imported after 1831 were the basis for the acrimonious ‘Christie Affair’ 
(1863-1865) that resulted in the severing of diplomatic relations between the two 
countries.32 Though Britain’s anti-slavery role became much more of a watching brief 
                                                        
30 Both of these treaties were the heirs of previous agreements that the British had exacted from the 
Portuguese following the transferal of the Portuguese court in 1808. For a discussion of this context 
see L. Bethell, The Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade. Britain Brazil and the Slave Trade 
Question, 1807-1869 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970) pp. 27-61. A.K. Manchester, 
British Preeminence in Brazil: Its Rise and Decline (New York: Octagon Books, 1964) pp. 186-219.  
 
31 L. Bethell, The Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade. Bethell’s traditional interpretation, stressing 
the importance of increased British naval pressure and improved capacity of the Brazilian cabinet to 
undertake these measures, has been challenged by revisionists who posit other factors such as concern 
over slave resistance and epidemics. For a review of the historiographical debate on this issue, see 
J.D. Needell, ‘The Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade: Historiography, Slave Agency and 
Statesmanship’, Journal of Latin American Studies, 33.4, (2001) pp. 681-711. 
 
32 Ostensibly the result of a diplomatic disagreement over compensation for damaged British vessels 
and the treatment of British sailors, historians have argued that the real cause was the British Minister, 
William D. Christie’s frustrations over the slavery question. R. Graham, ‘Brasil-Inglaterra’ in S.B. de 
Holanda. (Org.) História Geral da Civilização Brasileira, Tomo II, Vol. 6 (São Paulo: DIFEL, 1972) 
pp. 141-152. On British policy concerning liberated Africans in Brazil, see See B. Mamigonian, ‘To 
Be a Liberated African in Brazil: Labour and Citizenship in the Nineteenth Century’ (Unpublished 
PhD thesis, University of Waterloo, 2002); R. Conrad, ‘Neither Slave nor Free: The Emancipados of 
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‘Liberated Africans in the Atlantic World: The Courts of Mixed Commission in Havana and Rio de 
Janeiro 1819-1871’ (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Leeds, 2015).  
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following the repeal of the Aberdeen Act, the question of slavery’s abolition and 
Brazil’s transition to free labour still did occasionally provoke British action in the 
institution’s final decades.33   
 
The literature has also recognized Britain’s preeminent position in Brazil’s economic 
affairs throughout the century. Alan K. Manchester’s classic discussion of the topic 
traces this dominance from Britain’s unequal economic relationship with Portugal up 
until competition from the U.S. and Germany began to challenge Britain’s primacy in 
the early decades of the twentieth century.34 Though Britain’s favourable terms ended 
with the expiration of the commercial treaty in 1844, the second half of the nineteenth 
century would in fact witness the rapid expansion of British trade and investment in 
Brazil. In addition to its continued but gradually declining dominance of the country’s 
import-export market, the turn of the midcentury also witnessed an increase of British 
investment in range of sectors linked to Brazil’s physical and commercial 
infrastructure, including railways, public works and banking institutions. 35   
 
In spite of the existence of bodies of literature which separately deal with Britain’s 
significant anti-slavery and commercial roles in Brazil, there are has been surprisingly 
                                                        
33 For instance, British diplomats quietly foiled the plans of some Brazilians to import indentured 
plantation labour from China and India. On Britain’s ‘behind-the-scenes’ role with regard to Chinese 
labour, see J. Lesser, Immigration, Ethnicity, and National Identity in Brazil, 1808 to the Present 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013) pp. 49-50. Concerning Indian labour, see J. Mulhern, 
‘Mauá’s Indians: An Experiment in Indian “coolie” Labour in Brazil, 1876-1878’ (Unpublished MA 
dissertation, King’s College London, 2013).  
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35 See M. Paiva Abreu, ‘British business in Brazil: maturity and demise (1850-1950)’, Rev. Bras. 
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little scholarly investigation at the confluence of these two major themes of Anglo-
Brazilian relations during the nineteenth century. Indeed, there are only a small 
number of studies that attempt to make any connection between British investments 
in an economy dominated by slavery and the British state’s sustained efforts to rid the 
world of the institution. The following section will survey the existing literature at this 
intersection of Anglo-Brazilian relations to show that while important work has 
addressed the issue of British entanglement in the slave trade and mining industry, 
outside of these sectors the material basis of this relationship has only been addressed 
on a piecemeal basis.     
 
An important work that attempts to connect these two strands of British interest in 
Brazil is Richard Graham’s classic treatment of Britain’s ‘modernising’ role from the 
turn of the mid-century. Graham sees evidence of Britain’s progressive influence on 
Brazil in a wide range of fields including trade and investment, culture and intellectual 
thought, and politics and diplomacy.36 In a chapter on the slave trade and slavery, 
Graham stresses the centrality of Britain’s role in the abolition of both. Graham cites 
not only diplomatic pressure and the influence of abolitionist societies on Brazil’s 
nascent campaign, or ‘direct aid’, but all of Britain’s wider influence ‘that tended to 
transform the economic and social structure of the country.’37 For the author, this 
included, amongst other things, the crucial role played by British capital and expertise 
in the expansion of the Brazil’s railways and nascent industrial sector, as well a strong 
British influence amongst the small group of Brazilians he identifies as 
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‘entrepreneurs.’38 In spite of his meticulous overview of the British presence across 
Brazilian political, social and economic life, Graham has surprisingly little to say 
about British slaveholding, never mind other investments in slave property. In the few 
lines on the issue, Graham makes references to the notorious use of slave labour by 
the St. John Del Rey Mining Co. but fails to expand on the issue.39 In the following 
section we will observe that while historians have since expanded on this case study 
and the wider issue of slavery in British-owned mines, entanglement beyond this 
sector remains largely unexplored.  
 
Before addressing the literature on slaveholding in the extractive industry it is 
important to briefly consider another body of literature that challenges the view of the 
British as agents of ‘modernisation’ in Brazil. Although admittedly falling outside of 
Graham’s periodisation, studies of the slave trade and its suppression have clearly 
identified the important role played by the British in the illegal slave trade to Brazil 
from 1830 to 1850. Though direct participation in the trade remained largely the realm 
of Luso-Brazilian ‘principals’, historians such as David Eltis, Robert Conrad and Luís 
Henrique Tavares have each identified the crucial ancillary roles played by British 
merchants in the illegal traffic.40 It is Eltis’ work that goes the furthest in attempting 
to quantify the material contribution of the British to the trade. For the author, the 
illegal traffic was the mainstay of all British trade with Brazil.41 This bold claim is 
                                                        
38 See Ibid Chapters 3, 5 and 7.  
 
39 Ibid pp. 184-185. 
 
40 D. Eltis, ‘The British contribution to the nineteenth century slave trade’, Economic History Review 
(1979), pp. 211–27; L.H. Tavares, Comércio Proibido de Escravos (São Paulo: Atica, 1988) pp. 76-
79, 129-134; R. Conrad, World of Sorrow: The African Slave Trade to Brazil (Louisiana State 
University Press, 1986) pp. 130-132.  
 
41 D. Eltis, ‘The British contribution to the nineteenth century slave trade’ p. 226.  
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based on the author’s calculation that a minimum of 90% of all manufactured goods 
used in the slave trade to Brazil (and Cuba) were British.42 British merchants in cities 
such as Rio de Janeiro and Salvador played a crucial role in funnelling goods 
manufactured in the factories of Glasgow, Liverpool and London into the hands of 
Brazil’s human traffickers. Crucially, as Eltis stresses, the sale of these goods was also 
inseparable from credit. The competitive advantage of British merchants over local 
and other foreign counterparts was their ability to offer cheap credit at the long terms 
slave traders required to complete their return journeys to Africa.43  Though far from 
as materially significant as the supply and financing of slaving voyages, without going 
into any great detail, Eltis also identifies British investment ‘in plantations or projects 
employing slave labour.’ 44 It is precisely this type of entanglement which this thesis 
seeks to explore. 
 
Since Graham published his monograph in 1972, the subject of British slaveholding 
in the goldmines of Minas Gerais has attracted significant attention from scholars with 
interests in business history, British anti-slavery, Brazilian slavery, as well as the 
country’s nascent abolitionist campaign. Marshall Eakin’s authoritative business 
history of the St. John del Rey Mining Company charts the operations of this British 
enterprise at Morro Velho from its establishment in 1830 until its demise in the 
1960s.45 Unlike Graham, Eakin does not shy away from the fact that slaves comprised 
the majority of the mine’s labour force until the early 1880s. Eakin expertly shows 
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45 M. Eakin A British Enterprise in Brazil: The St. John d’el Rey Mining Company and the Morro 
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how this British company does not fit within Graham’s model of the British as a 
progressive influence, promoting abolition and the adoption of free labour.46 Instead, 
the St. John Del Rey was at once the largest individual slaveholder in Minas Gerais 
and undoubtedly one of the most successful foreign investments in Brazil. It was this 
compatibility between industrial capitalism and slavery that attracted the attention of 
other historians such as Douglas Cole Libby.47  Other studies have given greater 
attention to labour relations and the systems of discipline, ritual and reward that the 
British instituted to control an enslaved workforce that at its peak in the late 1860s 
constituted some 1700 individuals.48 The use of slave labour by a British company did 
not escape the attention of contemporary observers. Although its labour practices had 
suffered criticism in earlier decades, it was in 1879 that it became the subject of 
sustained international scandal. After becoming aware of the fact that the British 
company had illegally kept some 385 hired labourers enslaved following the 
expiration of their contract, abolitionist Joaquim Nabuco exposed the case and in 
doing so kickstarted his own campaign for the end of slavery. This international 
scandal and its importance to the beginnings of Brazil’s abolitionist campaign has 
since attracted the attention of historians.49  
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47 D.C. Libby, Trabalho escravo e capital estrangeiro no Brasil: o caso de Morro Velho (Belo 
Horizonte: Editora Itatiaia, 1984). 
 
48 M. Childs, ‘Master-Slave Rituals of Power at a Gold Mine in Nineteenth-Century Brazil’, History 
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Beyond the mining exclaves of Minas Gerais, much less is known about the material 
basis of British entanglement with Brazilian slavery. It is not the case that the 
extractive industry was the exception to the rule. The mining companies may have 
been the largest individual British slaveholders, but as Chapter II demonstrates, at the 
mid-century at least, their collective labour force only accounted for half of the total 
number British-held slaves in Brazil. This figure, of course, does not take into account 
the many hundreds of enslaved people held under mortgage by individual British 
creditors or banking institutions. The underlying reason for this knowledge gap is part 
methodological, part historiographical. While the former will be discussed in more 
detail later, this section will consider the fragmentary treatment of British 
entanglement with slavery in non-mining contexts across a variety of literatures.  
 
Although pioneering in their own right, the handful of social histories of the British in 
Brazil in the nineteenth century do not systematically examine the relationship 
between these communities and slavery. Gilberto Freyre’s classic study of ‘the 
English in Brazil’ makes fleeting and anecdotal references to British slave-ownership 
from his extensive research of newspapers and travel literature.50 Elizete da Silva’s 
research into the Anglican and Baptist congregations in Bahia dedicates more attention 
to the ambiguous attitudes and practices which she observed in these communities. In 
a survey of wills and inventories da Silva was able to identify a handful of British 
slave-owners; information which ties in with the well-known presence of British-held 
slaves in the Malês Revolt of 1835.51 Perhaps more interesting than these individual 
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Brazil: the Muslim uprising of 1835 in Bahia (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1993). 
 
26 
 
cases of material entanglement is da Silva’s reading of the Church of England’s 
reluctance to interfere with the slaveholding practices of its parishioners in Bahia.52 
Louise Guenther’s vivid portrayal of the British merchant community in the same 
province is the most successful attempt in a social history to trace British entanglement 
with slavery. Though much of the chapter dedicated to the subject deals with 
complicity in the slave trade, Guenther exposes the presence of slaves in the domestic 
life of British merchants in Salvador in the first half of the nineteenth century.53 
Though these social histories provide telling glimpses of entanglement, their 
contribution is limited to case studies of domestic slavery in specific geographic 
locations. Rather than a result of neglect, these limitations stem from both 
methodological restraints and more importantly, the fact that the social histories of 
other British communities in Brazil remain to be written. While not an attempt to 
undertake this task, in its study of British slaveholding on plantations, farms and in a 
range of urban contexts, this thesis enhances our understanding of an important facet 
of the history of these communities. 
 
Few answers can be found in the vast literature concerned with Brazilian slavery, 
either.54 This is of little surprise owing to the fact that British-held slaves represented 
a tiny proportion of Brazil’s total slave population. British interests in more general 
terms do appear in this literature particularly concerning its aforementioned role in the 
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53 L. Guenther, British merchants in nineteenth-century Brazil: business, culture, and identity in Bahia, 
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abolition of the slave trade and links between abolitionist groups in both countries.55 
Labour histories of British-owned slave enterprises have largely been limited to the 
mining sector, although an emerging body of literature on railway construction has 
identified the presence of slave labourers in this industry.56 The relative absence of 
specific concern in the Brazilian slavery literature for evidence of British 
entanglement, does not, of course, negate its importance to this thesis. Literature on 
the social, economic and political aspects of Brazilian slavery provide the context to 
understand the world in which these British subjects and enterprises operated. As such, 
this diverse body of work will be drawn upon throughout the thesis. 
 
In a similar vein, the literature examining the basis of the business and economic 
relationship between both countries has been preoccupied with other concerns. Again, 
with the exception of Eakin’s study of the Morro Velho mine, analysis of the social 
implications of British trade and investment for a long period has been marginalised 
by other concerns. In the post-war years until the 1980s much of the debate focused 
on the related theories of dependency and informal imperialism, whereas more recent 
studies have focused on less controversial topics such as the management and 
corporate structure of British businesses in the region.57 So, while the role of British 
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merchants in Brazil and Latin America more widely has been hotly debated by 
proponents and critics of dependency theory, very little is known about their 
entanglement with slavery, outside of the slave trade.58 The same can be said about 
the social implications of the lending practices of the British joint-stock banks that 
arrived in Brazil in the 1860s. A reasonable amount has been written on the structure, 
operations and economic performance of these financial institutions but there has been 
very little interest in their direct and indirect connections to Brazilian slavery. David 
Joslin’s classic account of the London and Brazilian Bank makes mention of the 
‘trials’ the bank faced financing coffee production but the author is not aware or 
neglects to mention that human collateral was used to secure this credit.59 Likewise, 
Charles Jones’ discussion of the same bank and the ‘mortgage traps’ it found itself in, 
does not mention the nature of the property involved. 60 Indeed, the bank’s resultant 
ownership of the Angélica coffee plantation and its use of slave labour has also largely 
been overlooked. The final three chapters of this thesis critically engage with this void 
in the literature to show that British non-banking and banking credit was frequently 
exposed to varying degrees of entanglement with slavery.  
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The various gaps in the secondary literature relating to both this type of entanglement 
and British slaveholding in non-mining contexts leave ample room for research into 
these questions. Likewise, the disconnected discussions of official attitudes towards 
this entanglement across time and sector in both major bodies of literature on 
nineteenth century Anglo-Brazilian relations are surely an indication that this is a 
worthwhile exercise. The following section will discuss the types of methods 
employed and sources consulted in order to achieve this end.  
 
Methodology: 
 
As Michel-Rolph Trouillot reminds us, ‘any historical narrative is a particular bundle 
of silences.’61 This observation is particularly pertinent to the study of slavery, where 
the production of sources, curation of archives and the telling of history has been in 
the hands of slave masters and their accomplices. To a great extent, the voices of the 
enslaved have been silenced and distorted in this process. While the same cannot be 
said for the voices of slave-owners during the period of legal slavery, the picture 
becomes more complicated after 1833. As the organisers of the LBS project have 
stressed using the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography as a case in point, in the 
post-emancipation period slave-ownership underwent a process of elision to the point 
that it became virtually invisible in British history.62 This section explains how this 
problematises the research at hand and offers an alternative approach to help us 
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62 C. Hall, N. Draper, et al (eds.), Legacies of British Slave-Ownership, p. 1. 
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interpret the silences that punctuate the sources that have been most typically 
consulted in studies of Anglo-Brazilian relations.  
 
British diplomatic correspondence, and particularly that of the Foreign Office’s Slave 
Trade Department, FO84, is a rich source base that has been well-trodden by many 
historians of Brazilian slavery, British anti-slavery and wider Anglo-Brazilian 
relations. This voluminous correspondence was the written record produced by 
Britain’s official anti-slavery network in Brazil, consisting of ambassadors, consuls, 
and mixed commission judges. The correspondence remitted by these officials 
included reports concerning the administration of Britain’s suppression system, on-
going treaty negotiations, the status of anti-slavery sentiment in Brazil and the state of 
the slave-trade.63 Indeed, the reach of this network, bolstered by the use of paid in-
country informants, meant that the Foreign Office was often far better informed than 
local governments. The unrivalled coverage of this correspondence is the reason that 
FO84 has been cherished by so many historians. Indeed, its despatches and reports, 
have proved invaluable for the research into certain aspects of the types of British 
entanglement under consideration in this thesis. Chapter II, for example, would have 
been impossible without the use of an overlooked census of British slaveholders in 
Brazil. Nevertheless, without negating its importance, its use comes with some 
important caveats.  
 
Though the archival ethnography of FO84 remains to be written, it seems clear that it 
is punctuated by silences on the issue of British entanglement with Brazilian slavery. 
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Trouillot suggests that silence enters historical production at four crucial moments: 
the making of sources, the assembly of archives, the construction of narratives and the 
moment of retrospective significance. 64 Whereas the authors of the LBS project argue 
that the elision of slave-ownership in British history occurred primarily at the final 
two stages of this process, the silences that problematise our research were produced 
at the moment the sources were created.  
 
‘[A] subject dangerous and difficult in the extreme’ is how Reverend Charles Grenfell 
Nicolay described the slaveholding of his compatriots in Bahia in 1861.65 Recently-
arrived, the chaplain was very much perturbed by the practices of British members of 
his congregation in the city of Salvador. Of equal concern to Nicolay was the passivity 
of the local British consul upon whose help he could not count to scrutinise what the 
Reverend regarded as dubious legal titles held by British slaveholders in the city. 
Positive evidence of an official choosing not to act is rare, but such traces hint to the 
likely occurrence of similar cases and help to explain the silences which in FO84 are 
the rule rather than the exception. The reasons for this are developed further in Chapter 
I, but it is worthwhile noting here that the British officials writing reports to be 
remitted to London often had competing loyalties and responsibilities, beyond their 
anti-slavery duties. Often these were difficult to reconcile, and it is at these moments 
that silences were produced. The apparent frequency of these silences means that, 
though valuable, diplomatic and consular correspondence can only provide us with a 
fragmented account of the materiality of British entanglement with Brazilian slavery.  
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Another collection of sources often consulted by those interested in the British in 
Brazil are the accounts of the many foreign travellers who encountered these 
communities throughout the nineteenth century.66 In particular, travel writing provides 
a window into the private lives, personal relationships and daily routines of these 
individuals. For this reason, these narratives have provided an important basis for the 
few social histories of the British in Brazil, especially Guenther’s innovative study of 
the British merchant community in 19th century Bahia. 67  As noted previously, 
Guenther’s work offers glimpses of British slaveholding in domestic contexts without 
going into a great deal of detail. While claiming that evidence of the practice is 
abundant, Guenther makes a point to note its conspicuous absence, except for Maria 
Graham’s oft-cited account of her time in Brazil in the early 1820s, in much of the 
published British travel narratives of Brazil.68 Guenther attributes this absence to the 
performative role of these narratives to reproduce perceptions of moral superiority and 
a collective identity distinct from the local population.69 Projecting perceptions of 
oneself through contrasts with otherness was not unique to British writers but appears 
widely in European narratives of Rio de Janeiro in the nineteenth-century.70 While the 
travel literature consulted in Chapter II shows the absence of slaveholding in British 
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travel writing to be somewhat overstated, Guenther’s wider point remains valid. As 
Tim Youngs notes, travel writing is an ideological undertaking that is ‘influenced, if 
not determined, by its authors’ gender, class, age, nationality and education.’71 As we 
have seen, Britain’s national identity and moral superiority was partly built on its 
collective rejection of slavery, it is therefore of little surprise that writers imbued in 
this ideology chose to gloss over the issue of slaveholding. In this sense, British 
slaveholding in Brazil underwent the same process of elision as colonial slavery in the 
post-emancipation era.  
 
The limitations of these traditional sources in their coverage of British entanglement 
with slavery mean that we require an alternate approach. Of course, this does not mean 
a complete rejection of official correspondence or travel writing. It means that their 
fragmented narratives must be supplemented from elsewhere. At this point we can 
look to the strengths of the scholarly work on the British mining industry in Brazil. 
This literature has benefitted enormously from the wealth of extant archival material 
that some of these companies deposited, though this varies significantly by institution. 
One of the reasons that the St. John Del Rey Company has received such thorough 
attention is owing to the enormous collection of institutional records from the 
nineteenth century that are held in archives in the United States and Brazil.72 Moreover, 
owing to their formation as joint-stock companies and their accountability to their 
shareholders, these businesses produced annual reports and summaries of shareholder 
meetings were often published in the business press. As Kelly’s work on the Imperial 
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remained in Brazil at the Centro de Memória, in Morro Velho, Nova Lima.  
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Brazilian Mining Company shows, even in the absence of private correspondence, 
these sources can prove to be extremely valuable to the research of the material basis 
of British entanglement with slavery.73 
 
Not all joint-stock companies left such replete source material. Fortunately for our 
purposes, the archives of the London and Brazilian Bank (after 1871, the New London 
and Brazilian Bank), remain largely intact.74 Like the St. John Del Rey Company this 
can be partly attributed to the bank’s institutional longevity. In 1923, Lloyds Bank 
acquired a controlling stake in the business, which then operated under the name of 
the Bank of London and South America (BOLSA) for much of the 20th century. After 
a series of restructurings, in 1986 Lloyds absorbed their South American operations 
into its UK-based business.75  Though this material has been consulted by business 
historians interested in various aspects of the bank’s operations, its value for the study 
of this British company’s deep entanglement with Brazilian slavery has been 
overlooked. Though the collection of private correspondence between the bank’s 
headquarters in London and its branch managers in Brazil offers unrivalled insight 
into the portfolio of slave mortgages it held (Chapter IV) and the use of slave labour 
on its coffee plantation (Chapter V), it is not without its limitations. Firstly, neither 
complete accounts nor correspondence to and from the Angélica plantation have 
survived. In spite of these gaps in coverage, it has been possible to trace information 
regarding the management of this property from the summary reports of shareholder 
                                                        
73 J. Kelly, ‘The Problem of Anti-slavery’ pp. 205-246.  
 
74 Most of the private correspondence is held by UCL Special Collections as part of their Bank of 
London and South America archive. A much smaller amount of material, including published annual 
reports and HR records are still held by Lloyds Banking Group.  
 
75 ‘Bank of London and South America’ [https://www.lloydsbankinggroup.com/Our-Group/our-
heritage/our-history/lloyds-bank-international/bank-of-london--south-america-bolsa/ last accessed 
23/09/2018]. 
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meetings, published in the The Bankers' Magazine, Journal of the Money Market and 
Commercial Digest and other local sources. However, the use of these reports to fill 
in the gaps in the bank’s private correspondence presents its own particular problems. 
While the bank’s employees regularly referred in their private correspondence to 
unnamed slaves as collateral security for outstanding debts or as sources of plantation 
labour, the silence maintained around these matters in public is almost deafening. 
Instead, the reports of shareholder meetings refer euphemistically to ‘estates’ and 
generically to ‘labour’. The process of elision identified by Hall, Draper et al also 
played out in meeting rooms in the square mile and in the columns of the financial 
press.  
 
Of course, institutional records of joint-stock companies are not the last word on the 
material basis of their connections to slavery. There are a variety of local sources 
which, though widely consulted by historians of Brazilian slavery, have largely been 
overlooked by those concerned with British activity in Brazil. Of particular interest to 
this study, especially to Chapters III and IV, are escrituras, notary deeds which 
publicly registered a whole host of transactions, and records of judicial proceedings 
involving disputes over slave property. The benefit of these documents, though often 
written in complex legalese, is that the material basis of the entanglement is not 
obscured by the layers of elision and euphemism found in British-authored sources. 
Moreover, it is through these Brazilian documents that we are afforded details, though 
only at the most basic level, of the enslaved people who formed the basis of many of 
these transactions.  
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Though the specific limitations of using escrituras as evidence for the entanglement 
of British credit with Brazilian slavery will be addressed in Chapter III, it is worth 
noting here that both the escrituras and judicial cases consulted throughout the course 
of this research have a heavy bias towards Rio de Janeiro, to the exclusion of other 
important centres of British activity including Bahia and Pernambuco. Although it 
would of course be preferential to analyse data relating to other important British 
communities in Brazil, the decision to focus limited time and financial resources on 
Rio de Janeiro was taken firstly because of the political and economic importance of 
the city as Brazil’s imperial capital, which included it being home to highest court in 
the empire, the Supremo Tribunal de Justiça.  It was in this forum that some of the 
London and Brazilian Bank’s disputes over slave property were heard. Secondly, Rio 
de Janeiro was home to Brazil’s largest British community, who were largely attracted 
by the economic opportunities of the port’s burgeoning import-export trade; an 
expansion fueled by the expanding coffee region in the city’s hinterland. In sum, 
research in Rio de Janeiro as opposed to another region in Brazil, presented the 
greatest scope for discovering the material basis of British entanglement with slavery. 
By engaging more critically with traditional sources, while at the same time consulting 
others that have been hitherto overlooked in studies of this type, this thesis will present 
a more complete picture of the material basis of British entanglement slavery and a 
more nuanced understanding of British anti-slavery policy in Brazil.  
 
Structure: 
 
The main body of this thesis consists of five chapters. The first discusses the historical 
and legislative context of British anti-slavery policy concerning British complicity in 
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foreign slaveries, with a focus on the Brazilian context. This discussion is sub-divided 
into three chronological sections that mirror the development of this policy. From an 
absence of an official position in the 1830s, by the 1840s abolitionist scrutiny 
pressured the state to adopt a more expansive interpretation of complicity. The 
legislative outcome of this was the 1843 Act, a law that brought slaveholding within 
the state’s jurisdiction but did so in an incomplete fashion. Slaveholding interests, led 
by mining companies and merchant bankers, successfully lobbied for concessions that 
legitimised all slave property in British hands before its enactment and allowed for the 
future exploitation of slave labour in various ways. In spite of its limitations, the 
decade or so after the law’s enactment witnessed the peak of official interest in British 
entanglement with slavery. However, the effective suppression of the slave trade 
signalled the gradual dissipation of this interest and during the last three decades of 
Brazilian slavery, British officials showed very little appetite to meddle in the private 
lives and business interests of British slaveholders. Ambivalent legislation and 
ambivalent enforcement defined this aspect of British anti-slavery policy throughout 
the period in question.  
 
The second chapter takes advantage of an overlooked census taken of British 
slaveholding in 1848-49, during the peak period of official interest into these practices. 
With a focus on those Britons who largely escaped the attention of contemporary 
abolitionists and modern historians, this chapter portrays the extent and diversity of 
British slaveholding in a new light. Outside of the well-known mining sector, Britons 
exploited slave labour on plantations, in urban enterprise and in domestic contexts. 
Using the census data as a point of departure, this chapter discusses the routes to 
slaveholding, trends after the turn of the century, in addition to the ways Britons both 
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justified their slaveholding and found ways of circumventing Britain’s already limited 
legislation.   
 
The third and fourth chapters take the concept of entanglement beyond slaveholding 
in its literal sense to consider how slaves in Brazil were financially exploited by British 
capital. Each chapter uses judicial records to trace the entanglement of British finance 
and credit with Brazilian slavery. Chapter III focuses on the mostly informal 
mercantile credit networks in Rio de Janeiro in the 1830s and 1840s which show the 
participation of British subjects as debtors and creditors in transactions involving 
slaves as collateral, both in urban and rural contexts. Chapter IV adopts a similar 
approach to British actors in a credit market in the process of formalisation following 
the mid-century. It focuses mainly on the establishment of British joint-stock banks in 
Brazil and brings to light how the London and Brazilian Bank ended up financing 
coffee plantations in the West of São Paulo through a mortgage portfolio containing 
many hundreds of slaves. An examination of the foreclosure of a handful of these 
mortgages makes clear that this form of investment could, and indeed did have 
devastating impacts on the lives of enslaved people.  
 
The fifth chapter is primarily a labour history of an extensive British owned coffee 
plantation Rio Claro, São Paulo in the 1870s. It explores the overlooked case study of 
the London and Brazilian Bank’s administration of the Angélica estate following 
foreclosure on the mortgage of their biggest debtor, Vergueiro e Cia. Using detailed 
archival research in Brazil and the UK, this chapter will explain the reasons, anti-
slavery related and otherwise, behind the bank’s ambitious but ultimately flawed 
experiment in exclusively free labour plantation agriculture. Following the failure of 
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this model, the bank turned to the use of hired gangs of slave labourers. While British 
legislation was ill-equipped to prevent this exploitation, the fear of potential investor 
unrest in the metropole encouraged the bank to intentionally obfuscate its links to 
slavery. This thesis attempts to reclaim the history of British entanglement from 
beneath the layers of this type of elision and obfuscation. The concluding chapter 
discusses the success of this undertaking, its limitations and the potential for future 
research based on a similar approach elsewhere. It ends by discussing the implications 
for research of this nature in modern-day Britain, a society that has not yet fully come 
to terms with its challenging historical relationship with global slavery.   
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Chapter I: The British ‘anti-slavery state’ and British slaveholding in 
Brazil 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to explain the historical and legislative contexts which 
allowed British slaveholding and other investments in slave-property in Brazil to 
persist for so long after emancipation in Britain’s own colonies. The chapter will be 
divided into three chronological sections that mirror the shifting boundaries of what 
Huzzey has called the ‘moral geography of British anti-slavery responsibilities.’1 
Huzzey suggests that while the anti-slavery sentiment which pervaded Victorian 
Britain’s national identity was translated into an expansive foreign policy of slave 
trade suppression, the British state did not assume the same responsibility for foreign 
slaveries. This chapter will show that, consistent with this delineation, the 
responsibility assumed by the anti-slavery state for British slaveholding in Brazil was 
tied to the responsibility it assumed for slave trade suppression. British slaveholding 
was brought within the frontiers of anti-slavery’s moral geography as a function of its 
complicit role on the demand side of a burgeoning illegal trade and not as a constituent 
part of a foreign slavery. 
 
Part I will show that this expansive shift did not occur immediately and during the 
early years of Britain’s campaign to end the slave trade to Brazil, including the decade 
after it was declared illegal by international treaty (1830) and Brazilian law (1831), 
attitudes to British complicity in the slave trade as a whole remained ambivalent. 
While the prevention of some forms of British involvement in the slave trade were 
limited by weak investigative and enforcement mechanisms, in a decade in which 
                                                        
1 R. Huzzey, ‘The moral geography of British anti-slavery responsibilities.’ pp. 111-139.  
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Britain was still resolving the slavery question in its own empire, the anti-slavery state 
showed little appetite to interfere with British slaveholding in Brazil. In fact, not only 
were these practices rarely condemned, they were tacitly, and at times explicitly, 
supported by British officials based in Brazil’s port cities.  During the 1840s, the 
decade under consideration in Part II, British investments in Brazilian slavery were 
brought within the state’s jurisdiction in the context of an unrelenting illegal trade and 
growing criticism of British attempts to suppress it. Following the end of 
apprenticeship in 1838, both the suppression strategy adopted by the anti-slavery state 
and allegations of British involvement in the illegal trade came under increased 
scrutiny in parliament and civil society. As part of this process, abolitionists pressured 
the government to adopt a more expansive interpretation of complicity which included 
slaveholding.  The major development during this decade was the passing of Lord 
Brougham’s bill for the ‘more effectual suppression of the slave-trade’ in 1843. A 
decade after the Emancipation Act, British slaveholding in foreign territories was 
finally brought within the boundaries of the moral geography of anti-slavery 
responsibilities. However, important concessions granted to slaveholders during the 
bill’s debate meant its absorption into the jurisdiction of the anti-slavery state was only 
partial. Despite earnest attempts to implement its provisions throughout the rest of the 
decade, the Act’s enduring legacy was one of compromise that legitimised the various 
forms of British exploitation of slave labour that continued well into the second half 
of the nineteenth century. Though the legislation was invoked sporadically after the 
turn of the century, its proactive employment by anti-slavery officials subsided with 
the end of the illegal slave trade. With its practical and symbolical links to the trade 
severed, British slaveholding was once again treated as a constituent part of Brazilian 
slavery and as such there was very little official appetite to meddle in the labour 
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practices or investments of H.M. subjects. In Part III, we will observe that during this 
later period, 1850 until abolition in 1888, investigations were almost purely 
reactionary, with officials adopting a ‘clean-hands’ policy in line with Britain’s 
continued, albeit largely passive, anti-slavery position in Brazil.  
 
Part 1: 1826 – 1840 
 
In January 1826, Robert Hesketh, British Consul in Maranhão, wrote to George 
Canning regarding the administration of property belonging to the British hospital in 
the port-city of São Luís.2  Owing to a lack of funds the hospital had closed at the end 
of the previous year and the consul was in the process of winding up its affairs. In 
addition to an inventory including furniture and medical equipment, Hesketh informed 
the Foreign Secretary that the hospital owned two slaves, originally purchased using 
the Contribution Fund and now in the charge of the hospital’s doctor while Hesketh 
awaited instructions regarding their fate. In reply, John Bidwell, under instruction 
from the Foreign Secretary, ordered the ‘immediate and complete emancipation’ of 
Jozé and Raimundo.3 With no indication that they had been imported illegally under 
current slave-trade treaties, it is likely that Canning’s decision was at least in part 
motivated by a wider desire to protect Britain’s reputation as moral arbiter on slave 
trade abolition.4 With negotiations for a treaty to completely prohibit the trade at a 
                                                        
2 Robert Hesketh to George Canning, 2 January 1826, TNA FO 13/30 cited in I. Sargen, Our Men in 
Brazil: The Hesketh Brothers Abroad (Scotforth Books, 2009) pp. 98-99. 
3 John Bidwell to Robert Hesketh, 15 July 1826, in Correspondence on Slave Trade, 1826-27 (Class 
B), P.P. 011 p.121 
4 Indeed, in the following year a Brazilian Deputy, Raimundo José da Cunha Matos, denounced the 
conflict of interest he saw between British slave-trade suppression and British slaveholding in Brazil. 
In addition to British merchants and mining companies, Matos made specific reference to ‘consuls, 
ambassadors and ministers’ of foreign countries. See Diário da Câmara dos Deputados à Assemblea 
Geral Legislativa do Império do Brasil, Vol. 2 (1827) p. 547. For more on national reputation and 
slave trade abolition in the Atlantic, see M. Mason, 'Keeping up Appearances: The International 
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crucial juncture, it would not be appropriate for official funds to be used to promote a 
trade which Britain had been campaigning against since even before Brazil’s 
independence in 1822. 
 
While the case constitutes an early recognition of British slaveholding’s potential for 
reputational damage, it was the use of official funds which brought the fate of Jozé 
and Raimundo within Canning’s purview. It would be another decade and a half before 
policymakers made a concerted effort to bring the wider principle of British 
slaveholding within the jurisdiction of the anti-slavery state. The purpose of this 
section is to re-examine British anti-slavery policy in this intervening period, 
particularly during the first decade of the illegal trade from 1830, to help explain why 
the example of Canning’s intervention in the Maranhão case would not be replicated 
in the private interests of British subjects during a period otherwise characterised by 
intense anti-slavery activity. Though the British Legation has accurately been 
described as ‘[having] virtually assumed the role of an abolitionist society in Brazil’ 
during the 1830s, very little of its work concerned the monitoring of British 
involvement in the illegal trade.5 While the role, albeit largely symbolic, of British 
slaveholding in promoting the illegal trade was recognised by two of Britain’s most 
important agents of anti-slavery in Brazil, this issue received even less official 
attention. With the question of slavery not fully resolved in Britain’s own empire 
during most of the period under consideration, slaveholding was simply not a matter 
of concern to most British officials. In fact, British institutions in Brazil tacitly 
                                                        
Politics of Slave Trade Abolition in the Nineteenth-Century Atlantic World’ The William and Mary 
Quarterly, 66:4 (2009), pp. 809-832. 
5 Quotation from L. Bethell, The Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade in the context of the legation’s 
constant pressure on the Brazilian government to enforce the law of 1831, see p. 85.  
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supported slaveholding within the British community, British officials fraternised 
openly with slaveholders, and some even owned slaves themselves. Moreover, even 
on the rare occasion that British slaveholding was officially reported, it was 
fatalistically acknowledged that little could be done to prevent it. It was in these 
circumstances that British subjects and enterprises of various kinds were able to trade 
and invest in slaves, including those who had been illegally imported after 1830, 
without fear of censure by Britain’s anti-slavery officials in Brazil.  
 
The focus of British anti-slavery in Brazil in the 1830s 
 
The focus of British anti-slavery activity in the 1830s was concentrated in the 
administration of the suppression system and diplomatic negotiations regarding the 
treaty which underpinned it. Throughout the decade, British diplomats were locked in 
ultimately unsuccessful negotiations with the Brazilian authorities regarding the 
enforcement and strengthening of the Anglo-Brazilian treaty of 1826. From as early 
as 1827 Britain had sought the addition of an equipment clause which would extend 
the powers of British cruisers, enabling the capture of not just vessels with slaves on 
board but also those fitted out for the traffic. Although not as pressing as the need for 
an Anglo-Portuguese treaty to prevent the abuse of the Portuguese flag, diplomats 
regularly petitioned the Brazilian authorities for an equipment clause until Palmerston 
took unilateral action on both issues in late 1839.6 In addition to the negotiation of 
specific additional clauses, the British legation expended a significant amount of 
energy urging the Brazilian government to honour its obligations as per the 
                                                        
6 For a discussion of both the equipment clause see L. Bethell, The Abolition of the Brazilian Slave 
Trade pp. 111-112. Also, A.K. Manchester, British Preeminence p. 226. 
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international treaty and its own legislation of 1831. An essential component of this 
diplomatic pressure was the intelligence, often supplied by a network of paid 
informants, which British officials amassed on the state of the illegal trade across the 
country.7 While, as Bethell notes, successive Brazilian governments ‘were blind to the 
vast illegal importations and deaf to British protests against it,’ intelligence shared 
between branches of what Huzzey has termed Britain’s ‘global anti-slavery network’ 
was undoubtedly useful in coordinating its own suppression system. 8  A central 
component of this system was the Mixed Commission Court in Rio which, in spite of 
the imperfect coverage of Britain’s treaty agreements, adjudicated twenty-eight 
vessels captured by the Royal Navy during the 1830s.9 The trials of these vessels were 
complex, required a great deal of administration and could last for several months.10 
The fate of the Africans onboard these vessels became a highly contested issue which 
would only be resolved following the Christie Affair (1863-1865). While British 
concerns for these liberated Africans, or emancipados, evolved over the decades 
alongside changing attitudes to slave trade suppression and colonial labour policies, 
in the 1830s they related to an insistence that these Africans were allowed to serve 
their apprenticeships in Brazil, rather than be ‘re-exported’ as per the 1831 law, and 
that the Brazilian authorities should do more to prevent the abuses which plagued the 
                                                        
7 D. Eltis, Economic Growth p. 112. For a discussion on the sources of British intelligence, see L. 
Bethell, The Abolition pp. 310-11 and J.L. Nelson, “Liberated Africans” pp. 154-162.  
8 L. Bethell, The Abolition p. 86. On the global anti-slavery network, see R. Huzzey, Freedom 
Burning pp. 43-50. 
9 J.L. Nelson, “Liberated Africans” Appendix B. 
10 Between November 1833 and April 1838, cases lasted an average of 135 days See L. Bethell, The 
Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade p. 143. For the operation of the Mixed Commission courts in 
Rio de Janeiro and Havana, see J.L. Nelson, “Liberated Africans” pp. 46-62.  
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system. 11  British anti-slavery in the 1830s, then, was primarily concerned with 
bilateral negotiations to enhance the suppression system and did not, for reasons we 
will explore, permeate the private affairs of its subjects in Brazil.  
 
British anti-slavery and British complicity in the slave trade 
 
The British anti-slavery state began to assume responsibility for the prevention of 
British complicity in the slave trade even before the Abolition Act banned the British 
traffic in 1807. A year previously, Parliament had prohibited the advancing of credit 
and the intentional supply of goods to foreign slave traders. This legislation was 
restricted to transactions made on British territory until geographic limitations were 
removed by the Slave Trade Laws Consolidation Act of 1824. As its title suggests, 
this Act amalgamated eleven existing pieces of legislation which individually targeted 
both the direct participation and indirect involvement of British subjects in the slave 
trade.12 In a similar vein to the Anglo-Brazilian treaty, prohibition did not necessarily 
signal suppression and while British subjects seldom participated in the trade as 
‘principals’ – vessel owners, captains or crew – they were complicit in other ways. 
Indeed, as discussed in the Introduction, historians have since identified the prevalence 
of British involvement as suppliers, creditors and facilitators of the illegal trade 
throughout the 1830s and 1840s.  Despite the ubiquity of these practices and their 
potential illegality in British law, there was no serious investigation, never mind 
criminal proceedings, undertaken into any individual or firm connected to the 
                                                        
11 B. Mamigonian, “To Be a Liberated African in Brazil’ Ch. 4. On Britain’s insistence against the re-
exportation of emancipados, see Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Fox, 5 June 1833 in Correspondence on 
Slave Trade, 1833 (Class B), P.P. 471 pp. 94-95. 
12 D. Eltis, Economic Growth p. 83.  
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Brazilian slave trade during the 1830s. In a decade during which British officials 
appealed vigorously to Brazilian authorities to adhere to the letter and spirit of the law, 
their inaction and relative silence on the alleged impropriety of their compatriots is 
striking and requires further explanation.     
 
Though the issue of British complicity was only tentatively addressed on a handful of 
occasions in the volumes of official slave trade correspondence during the 1830s, its 
very presence makes clear that inertia did not stem from a state of ignorance. An 
analysis of these infrequent references also suggests that it would be inaccurate to 
attribute inaction to systemic duplicity, as Marika Sherwood has done.13  A more 
nuanced explanation can be found in what Eltis has termed the ‘ambivalence of 
suppression,’ or the uneasy balancing of the ideological mainstays of British politics 
- the rule of law, respect for property and laissez-faire - with the need to enforce 
suppression.14 One of the manifestations of this ambivalence is the 1824 Act itself, 
which attempted to balance the protection of legitimate trade and a respect for due 
legal process with a desire to prohibit British participation in foreign slave trades. The 
solution, inherited from the 1806 law, was to set a high bar of evidence to prove 
criminality. As we shall see, the addition of this requirement to already relatively weak 
investigative mechanisms made the legislation practically unenforceable in the cases 
of ancillary involvement that characterised British complicity in the illegal Brazilian 
slave trade.  
 
                                                        
13 M. Sherwood, After Abolition: Britain and the Slave Trade since 1807 (London: I. B. Tauris, 2007) 
Chapter 4.  
 
14 D. Eltis, Economic Growth, Chapter 7, especially pp. 102-114. 
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In spite of the unrivalled quality of British intelligence on the trade, the collection of 
evidence that would hold up in a court of law proved problematic. The case of 
Alexander Parry, a rare example of direct involvement in the trade, illustrates this 
point perfectly. In July 1835, Parry, a sailor from Aberdeen, requested the assistance 
of John Robillard, vice-consul at Bahia, in the recovery of wages owed following his 
service on the Spanish schooner Manoelita.15 Everything about the voyage aroused 
strong suspicions of the illegal slave trade; its voyage from Havana to Bahia via the 
coast of Africa, its initial cargo of rum and tobacco, the inflated wages promised to 
Parry (280 silver dollars for fourth months’ work), and lastly, the identity of its 
consignee as ‘a notorious owner of slave vessels.’16 Robillard’s suspicions were well 
founded; according to the Slave Voyages database, the Manoelita had in fact landed 
325 slaves on the Bahian coast just a few months earlier.17 Nevertheless, with Parry 
having signed an affidavit attesting to the legal nature of the voyage, Robillard did not 
believe his circumstantial evidence was sufficient to prove criminality and ironically, 
not only did the vice consul let Parry on his way, he also helped him recover the wages 
he was owed from the vessel’s master. 
 
The collection of robust evidence in cases of alleged indirect involvement in the trade 
was even more complicated owing to a stipulation in the 1824 Act which required that 
the accused had to have supplied goods or credit ‘knowingly and willfully’ in order to 
                                                        
15 John H. Robillard to Viscount Palmerston, 28 September 1835, in Correspondence on Slave Trade, 
1835 (Class B), P.P 006, p. 101.  
16 Robillard identifies the consignee as ‘Andrea Pinto da Silve, a Mulato.’ This is probably a reference 
to the well-known slave trader, André Pinto da Silveira. See P. Verger, Trade Relations Between the 
Bight of Benin and Bahia from the 17th to 19th Century (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1976) p. 
405. 
17 Voyages Database ID 3061, ‘Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database’ [www.slavevoyages.org 
accessed 10/07/2018] 
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be found guilty.18 The practical complexities which these words produced can be 
observed in allegations made, and then shortly afterwards retracted, by the British 
Mixed Commissioners in Rio. Without identifying those involved, George Jackson 
and Frederick Grigg informed Palmerston of ‘the indirect, if it should not rather be 
called the direct, interest which British merchants and British capital, in Brazil, derive 
from the Slave Trade.’  British merchants with connections to commission houses in 
Birmingham, Leeds, Liverpool and  Manchester supplied slaving voyages with goods 
specifically intended for the African market and did so, the Commissioners believed, 
on conditional terms – ‘[the slave trader’s] debt to be acquitted, in part or in whole, 
according as the adventure may ultimately prove successful or otherwise.’19 In what 
appeared to be a clear-cut case of complicity, Palmerston was keen to see the 
perpetrators brought to justice and responded in February 1839 asking Jackson and 
Grigg to gather as much intelligence as possible, ‘with a view to facilitate the 
identification and prosecution’ of those involved. In their reply however, while 
reaffirming the central role British merchants played as the suppliers of ‘coast goods’ 
on credit, the Commissioners declined to take their accusations any further, claiming 
their statements had given a ‘greater latitude’ than they had intended.20 A disclaimer 
they included in their initial report is helpful in attributing at least part of their 
hesitation to a lack of sufficient evidence. They stated that while ‘[they had] been 
assured’ of the prevalence of these practices, they would not ‘undertake to vouch for 
                                                        
18 ’Slave Trade Act 1824’ http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Geo4/5/113/contents/enacted [last 
accessed 23/02/2018] 
19 H.M Commissioners to Viscount Palmerston, 14 July 1838, in Correspondence on Slave Trade, 
1838-39 (Class A), P.P. 180, pp. 169-171.  
20 H.M Commissioners to Viscount Palmerston, 6 May 1839, in Correspondence on Slave Trade: 
1839-40 (Class A) P.P. 265, pp. 218-219.  
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[this] as a fact.’ 21  Like Robillard in Bahia, the Commissioners had plenty of 
circumstantial evidence but nothing near what would be required to bring a criminal 
case against those involved.  
 
Though the ambivalence codified in British anti-slavery legislation was an important 
factor in the cautious approach adopted by most officials when dealing with 
allegations of British complicity, it was not the only one. Ambivalence of suppression 
was also embodied in the multi-layered responsibilities of most British officials in 
Brazil. While most British functionaries performed an anti-slavery role, they also had 
a range of other responsibilities. Diplomats and consular representatives had an 
important role in the protection and promotion of Britain’s significant commercial 
interests in Brazil.22 This responsibility for the growth of British trade and investment 
undoubtedly influenced the way officials handled allegations of British complicity in 
the slave trade. Diplomats and consuls were well aware of the types of connections 
between British merchants and slave traders described by the Commissioners. 
However, as long as it remained nearly impossible to legally distinguish between 
legitimate trade and the intentional supply of slaving voyages, officials were even 
more reluctant than their Mixed Commission colleagues to disrupt trade and tarnish 
reputations. The difficulty in reconciling the protection of legitimate trade with anti-
slavery responsibilities can be clearly observed in an unusually candid dispatch written 
by the British Chargé d’Affaires to the Foreign Secretary in May 1839. Amongst other 
                                                        
21 H.M Commissioners to Viscount Palmerston, 14 July 1838, in Correspondence on Slave Trade, 
1838-39 (Class A), P.P. 180, pp. 169-171. 
 
22 The British Legation represented commercial interests to the central government in Rio, whereas 
consuls in Brazil’s major port-cities did the same before provincial authorities. Consular 
representatives also provided vital services to the British merchant community to facilitate trade and 
investment. On the role of British consuls during this period see C.M Platt, The Cinderella Service pp. 
16-21.  
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highly sensitive matters relating to slave trade suppression, Ouseley informed 
Palmerston of the widespread support the illegal trade found among British residents 
in Rio. He regretted that ‘very many, nay most of our countrymen in Brazil are, more 
or less openly, advocates and supporters of the slave trade’ and that some merchants 
had openly expressed their hope that the author of a bill to repeal Brazil’s slave trade 
law, Bernardo Pereira de Vasconcellos, would soon return to office. Ouseley stressed 
that this support was far more than just ideological however, citing the example of 
‘one of the principal English merchants’ who had recently brazenly declared to a 
member of the Legation that he could provide intelligence which would lead to the 
capture of many slaving vessels, but would only be convinced to do so if Ouseley, or 
the British government, could guarantee the £30,000 to £50,000 debt owed to him by 
the slave traders. Though the case appeared to be a clear-cut example of complicity, 
Ouseley was hesitant to extend moral responsibility to the merchants involved as ‘even 
with the best intentions it is difficult to avoid indirect connection with that trade, as 
goods of the same sorts as those acquired on the coast of Africa, are used here in the 
interior.’ 23 Given the difficulty in distinguishing legal from illegal commerce, any 
investigation of complicity was as unlikely to succeed legally as it was likely to 
damage both legitimate trade and Britain’s reputation. With these odds in mind, 
pragmatists such as Ouseley, unlike more zealous officials such as Richard Robert 
Madden in Cuba, handled allegations of complicity with extreme caution.24 The fact 
that the case was taken no further by Palmerston suggests that the Foreign Secretary 
concurred with Ouseley’s judgement to let sleeping dogs lie.  
                                                        
23 Mr. Ouseley to Viscount Palmerston, 21 May 1839, in TNA, FO 84/286. Kelly’s research has 
shown how British merchants were able to defend their involvement in the slave trade by adopting 
similar arguments. See J. Kelly ‘The Problem of Anti-slavery’ pp. 158-160.  
 
24 See D. R. Murray, ‘Richard Robert Madden: His Career as a Slavery Abolitionist’, Studies: An 
Irish Quarterly Review, 61:241 (1972), pp. 41-53. 
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While individual officials and authorities in London showed some appetite to 
investigate allegations of complicity during the 1830s, their efforts were curtailed by 
the ambivalence codified in British anti-slavery legislation. The difficulty to prove 
criminal intent resulted in the cautious treatment of allegations of complicity by 
pragmatic officials wary of the potential damage to the legitimate trade with which the 
illegal slave trade was entangled. The overall result was that aside from occasional 
pecuniary losses following the seizure of slaving vessels, British anti-slavery had little 
impact on the involvement of British merchants in the Brazilian slave trade during the 
1830s.  
 
The anti-slavery state and British slaveholding in the 1830s 
 
Throughout the 1830s British residents in Brazil routinely exploited slave labour and 
openly traded and invested in slave-property. In urban centres, slaves were employed 
in roles such as domestic servants, porters and manual labourers in British households 
and commercial establishments. In the interior of various Brazilian provinces, slaves 
were bought to work British-owned sugar and coffee plantations, and slave labour 
predominated in the British joint-stock goldmines of Minas Gerais.25  Whereas the 
supply and financing of slaving voyages was carried on under at least the nominal 
threat of official and legal sanction, British subjects and enterprises openly exploited 
slave labour and publicly traded in slave-property in the certainty that British anti-
slavery policy posed no risk to their investments. In this section, a review of this policy 
                                                        
25 Chapter II discusses British slaveholding in further detail, whereas Chapter III addresses other types 
of investment in slave-property during this period.  
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and an examination of the ‘on-the-ground’ relationship between slavery and British 
officials will show that not only did British slaveholding exist outside the moral 
geography of British anti-slavery responsibilities in the 1830s but that, in another 
manifestation of ambivalent suppression, British officials and institutions tacitly, and 
at times explicitly, supported the exploitation of the institution driving the demand for 
the illicit trade.  
 
In spite of its prevalence within British expatriate communities, the subject of 
slaveholding was only very infrequently broached by British officials in their 
correspondence to London. In the most part, this relative silence can be attributed to 
the fact that slaveholding in foreign territories was not legally contentious in the same 
way as other forms of complicity the slave trade. British slaveholding outside its own 
empire was not included in the Emancipation Act of 1833, nor had it been explicitly 
addressed in the Slave Trade Consolidation Act of 1824.26 The lack of clear provision 
for slaveholding in British anti-slavery legislation meant that it could be treated as 
legally distinct from the slave trade. This was the case for the majority of British 
officials in Brazil who found little reason to include it in their despatches. A notable 
exception to this general rule were the Mixed Commissioners who wrote on the subject 
on a handful of occasions throughout the first decade of the illegal trade. While 
Jackson and Grigg acknowledged the legal distinction between slaveholding and the 
slave trade, they also recognised what abolitionists and historians would later argue – 
that slaveholding and the supply and financing of slave voyages were two sides of the 
                                                        
26 D. Eltis, Economic Growth p. 83. The expanded interpretation of the 1824 legislation adopted by 
some prominent abolitionists in the early 1840s will be addressed in Part II of this chapter.  
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same coin of British complicity in the illegal trade.27 In a letter of March 1835, the 
Commissioners brought the Duke of Wellington’s attention to the fact that, 
a very considerable number of the slaves imported into Brazil are in fact 
employed in establishments conducted and supported by British agents and 
capital and that many individuals, claiming British protection, and owning 
allegiance to His Majesty, are openly seen, under the present system, buying and 
selling slaves. 
 
In an early expression of an attitude which would resurface in debates on the issue in 
the ensuing decades, Jackson and Grigg’s concern was not with slaveholding per se, 
rather the transactions which drove the demand for the illegal importation of Africans. 
They argued that British subjects who were ‘in any way concerned in the sale, 
purchase or hiring of a slave…[were] to all intents and purposes promoting the traffic.’ 
Adopting a similar, albeit expanded, interpretation of the logic used by Canning in the 
Maranhão case, the Commissioners believed that this type of involvement was a 
matter ‘immediately affecting [Britain’s] national character,’ and represented an 
inconsistency which was not lost on Brazilian observers, who often expressed 
‘incredulity… as to [Britain’s] sincerity in wishing to see the commerce altogether 
done away with.’28 In a series of letters to Viscount Palmerston in 1838-1839, Jackson 
and Grigg once again stressed the large amount of British capital invested in slave 
property in Brazil, asking rhetorically: ‘With what, but slave labour, are the works, 
originating in British capital and enterprise, carried on in this country?’ 29  Crucially, 
                                                        
27 The association of slaveholding as another form of complicity in the slave trade made by 
abolitionists in the 1840s will be addressed in Part II of this chapter. Eltis regards British slaveholding 
as one part of the British contribution to the slave trade, see D. Eltis, ‘The British contribution to the 
nineteenth century slave trade’ p. 213.  
 
28 H.M Commissioners to Duke of Wellington, 24 March 1835 in Correspondence on Slave Trade: 
1835 (Class A), P.P. 005, pp. 256-260. [Nb. The date at the top of the letter in the printed publication 
has been erroneously transcribed as 24 March 1834] 
 
29 H.M Commissioners to Viscount Palmerston, 14 July 1838, in Correspondence on Slave Trade, 
1838-39 (Class A), P.P. 180, pp. 169-171. 
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they also made an explicit connection between this capital and the enslavement of 
Africans illegally imported into Brazil, adding that a case brought to Palmerston’s 
attention, involving a British subject who had purchased a slave imported after 7 
November 1831, was ‘by no means…a solitary one.’ The Commissioners’ fatalistic 
admission that there was ‘nothing to prevent any British subject from buying or selling 
slaves in Brazil’ was recognition that slaveholding in foreign territories existed beyond 
the frontiers of British anti-slavery’s moral geography. 30 Britain’s jurisdiction was the 
high seas and its responsibilities for the fate of enslaved Africans once they reached 
foreign soil were limited to those liberated by the Mixed Commission. Nevertheless, 
the absence of any instructions, or even acknowledgement, from London on the 
subject suggests that the anti-slavery state was prepared to tolerate British involvement 
in the illegal enslavement of Africans in favour of disrupting the many significant 
investments which depended directly and indirectly on that labour.   
 
Manifestations of the ambivalence of British suppression were not limited to the 
passive tolerance of government officials in London; they can also be observed in ‘on-
the-ground’ interactions between British agents and Brazilian slavery. While most, 
though not all, functionaries publicly echoed the anti-slavery sentiments which 
permeated British national identity following the Emancipation Act, in practice, some 
continued to exploit slave labour for their own benefit. This even applied to the most 
vocal critics of British slaveholding, the Mixed Commissioners, who proved unable 
to practise what they preached. H.M. Arbitrator, Frederick Grigg admitted to hiring 
slaves as household servants and justified his actions by stressing both the scarcity and 
                                                        
30 H.M Commissioners to Viscount Palmerston, 6 May 1839, in Correspondence on Slave Trade: 
1839-40 (Class A) P.P. 265, pp. 218-219.  
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cost of employing free labour.31 Sir George Jackson, though he did not own or hire 
slaves, was lampooned in the Brazilian press for his employment of Africans liberated 
under the auspices of the Mixed Commission. 32  This ‘extremely injudicious conduct’ 
was sharply criticised by H.M. Chargé d’Affaires, William Gore Ouseley, in a series 
of private letters to the Foreign Office between 1838-1839. Ouseley was dismayed 
firstly by the fact that Jackson had not only ignored Palmerston’s instructions to refrain 
from employing liberated Africans but had since applied to hire more.33 Secondly, 
though Jackson had justified the employment of three Africans by the ‘proper care’ 
they received in his service, Ouseley’s letters are replete with allegations of the 
mistreatment the emancipados had suffered in Jackson’s household. In fact, the Mixed 
Commission judge had previously told Ouseley that he believed ‘the only way to 
manage blacks was to “lash them well,”’ and on more than one occasion, Jackson’s 
servants had sought refuge at the Chargé d’Affaires residence following 
mistreatment.34 Though Ouseley kept the allegations of misconduct to his private 
correspondence with Palmerston, he mentioned that the Brazilian Foreign Minister, 
Lopes da Gama, was fully aware of a previous case where Jackson’s conduct had 
‘proved to have been most shameful’ towards a female liberated African in his 
service.35 This very public scandal, in addition to other allegations that he had received 
                                                        
31 Mr. Grigg to Viscount Palmerston, 31 October 1840, in Correspondence on Slave Trade: 1841 
(Class A), P.P. 402, pp. 287-288.  
 
32 For coverage of the scandal in the Brazilian press, see Diário do Rio de Janeiro, 16 July 1839, 
copied and translated in Mr. Ouseley to Viscount Palmerston, 10 December 1839, in TNA FO 84/288.  
 
33 Mr. Ouseley to Viscount Palmerston, 10 December 1839, in TNA FO 84/288. For the instructions 
to which Ouseley refers, see Viscount Palmerston to Sir G. Jackson, 8 May 1839, in Correspondence 
on Slave Trade: 1839-40 (Class A) (Further Series), P.P. 188 p. 145.  
 
34 Mr. Ouseley to Viscount Palmerston, 26 September 1838, in TNA, FO 84/254; Mr. Ouseley to Mr. 
Bandinel, 18 September 1839, in TNA, FO 84/287. 
 
35 Mr. Ouseley to Viscount Palmerston, 10 December 1839, in TNA, FO 84/288. 
 
 
 
57 
bribes from slave dealers, certainly influenced the decision to transfer Jackson to a far 
less critical role as Commission judge in Surinam.36 
 
Though there is no indication that H.M. Legation employed slave labour, consuls 
Henry A. Cowper in Pará and Robert Hesketh in Rio de Janeiro, also hired slaves as 
domestic servants.37 The latter, who employed three slaves alongside seven free black 
servants, presented the hiring of slaves as somehow less pernicious than owning them 
outright. The consul justified his actions by arguing that although each hired slave cost 
him one third more than the wage of a freeman, he had found it difficult to keep enough 
of the latter in his service for any length of time. To reinforce his defence based on the 
necessity of slavery, Hesketh echoed what Grigg had also told the Foreign Secretary:  
 
It is almost needless to observe that in this country of slave labour, no provisions 
can be had, no articles of dress made, no dwellings repaired, nor any hired 
conveyances, or porterage made use of, without employing slaves. 38 
 
 
Other consular representatives owned slaves outright, often through their merchant 
business which they continued alongside their official duties. Robert Hesketh’s 
younger brother, John, vice-consul (1824-1835) and consul (1836-1838) in Pará 
owned at least five slaves on his death in 1838, whereas William Wilson, who held 
the vice-consulship in Maranhão intermittently from the late 1830s and early 1840s, 
                                                        
36 The Chargé d’Affaires and British naval offers suspected that Jackson’s ruling in the case of the 
release of the Recuperadora was influenced by bribes he was alleged to have received. See Mr. 
Ouseley to Viscount Palmerston, 20 October 1839, in TNA, FO 84/288. See also, L. Bethell, The 
Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade pp. 211-212 
 
37 Mr. Cowper to Viscount Palmerston, 12 November 1840, in Correspondence on Slave Trade, 1841 
(Class B), P.P. 403 p. 746. 
 
38 Mr. Hesketh to Viscount Palmerston, 12 December 1840, in Correspondence on Slave Trade, 1841 
(Class B), P.P. 403 p. 731.  
 
 
 
58 
freed his last slave in 1843.39 The large-scale slaveholding of William Whitaker, vice-
consul in Santos (1818-1856) raised questions about his character and suitability for 
any anti-slavery duties. Although the role was an unpaid position, Whitaker was 
expected to perform the same duties, when required, as other British consuls in Brazil. 
Although slave trade suppression seemingly did not represent much, if any, of his 
consular work in the first decade of the illegal trade, in 1839, on a return to England, 
he offered to directly report to the Foreign Secretary on the state of the slave trade to 
Brazil. Upon hearing Whitaker’s plans, the British Chargé d’Affaires wrote a private 
note to Palmerston in which he advised caution. While he had ‘no reason to doubt Mr. 
Whitaker’s perfect knowledge of that business in all its branches,’ Ouseley raised 
doubts about the vice-consul’s intentions. ‘I wish that it was equally certain that he is 
free from all interest in that trade directly or indirectly,’ Ouseley continued, citing 
Whitaker’s thirty-year residence and his ownership of plantations in Brazil. 40 
Whitaker had purchased a sugar plantation in the interior of São Paulo as early as 1830 
and by the late 1840s it was still being worked by around 35-40 slaves.41 Ouseley also 
had concerns about Whitaker’s association with José da Costa Carvalho (future 
Marquês de Monte Alegre) with whom he was travelling. A former regent (1831-
1835), Carvalho had offered to communicate confidentially to Palmerston during his 
time in Europe but Ouseley also doubted his true intentions, suggesting that the 
Brazilian had been ‘either directly engaged in slave trade speculations or had at least 
                                                        
39 Five slaves were listed in Hesketh’s will, see I. Sargen, Our Men in Brazil p. 209. On Wilson’s 
slaveholding see Mr. Corbett to Viscount Palmerston, 21 December 1848, in Correspondence on 
Slave Trade, 1848-49 (Class B), P.P 1128 p. 128.  
 
40 Mr. Ouseley to Viscount Palmerston, 21 May 1839, in TNA, FO 84/286.  
 
41 William Whitaker’s slaveholding will be discussed in further detail in Chapter II.  
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connived whilst Regent at such business.’42 Both Whitaker and Carvalho, the Chargé 
d’Affaire concluded, irrespective of the ‘plans they propose, or the story they may 
tell,’ should be treated with appropriate scepticism. Despite the concerns raised by 
Britain’s most senior diplomat in Brazil, Whitaker’s slaveholding had not caused a 
public scandal in the same way as Sir George Jackson and he retained his position 
without further comment. 
 
Aside from their own interest in the exploitation of slave labour, British officials in 
Brazil also recognised their compatriots’ right to slave property and afforded it their 
protection, without scrutinising its legality. For instance, British consuls routinely 
administered the estates of deceased British slave-owners. In the event of any disputes, 
such as the case of John Dickenson’s estate, interested parties could seek adjudication 
by the British Conservatorial Court (Juiz Conservador da Nação Britanica). The 
Conservatorial Court was a privileged forum for British subjects in Brazil and had 
been established following the opening of Brazil’s ports in 1808. It was reaffirmed by 
the commercial treaty with the independent nation in 1827 and lasted until that treaty’s 
expiration in 1844. Though the court operated within Brazilian law, its judge was 
nominated by the British merchant community and could only be removed with the 
approval of the British Minister. Its British character did not preclude the 
Conservatorial Court from ordering the public sale of slaves and in May 1838 it 
enforced the auction of the slaves listed in Dickenson’s will.43 The court also ordered 
similar sales in commercial disputes as a way for creditors to recover debt. For 
                                                        
42 Mr. Ouseley to Viscount Palmerston, 21 May 1839, in FO 84/286. For Costa Carvalho’s 
involvement in slave trade negotiations, see L. Bethell, The Abolition p. 248. 
 
43 The British consul wrote an account of the case ten years later, see Mr. Hesketh to Viscount 
Palmerston, 22 March 1848, in TNA, FO 13/260 
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example, the commercial house Maxwell, Wright & Co. were beneficiaries of the 
proceeds arising from the sale of their debtors’ slaves and other assets on at least three 
occasions during the 1830s.44 The existence of a privileged legal forum which could 
seize slave property in favour of its British patrons is surely one of the most flagrant 
examples of the dissonance which existed between British commercial ambitions and 
anti-slavery objectives in Brazil.  
 
The overriding commitment to protect British property even extended to British-
owned slaves at sea. In August 1835, as the violence of the Cabanagem Rebellion once 
again approached the city limits of Belém, Pará, vice-consul John Hesketh called for 
the intervention of the HMS Racehorse, a British sloop which had arrived in the port 
some months earlier to guarantee the lives and property of the city’s small British 
community. Initially, Commander Sir James Everard Home ordered his marines 
ashore to occupy British property along the river but after learning of the impending 
arrival of a large force of insurgents, a full evacuation of British subjects and other 
foreigners was called. In the haste to embark, much property was left to the mercy of 
the rebels, however, it appears that various slaves accompanied their British masters 
on their journey to safety in the neighbouring province of Maranhão.45 Inventories 
drawn up by Hesketh show that Mr. Philips brought Lazáro, Francisco, Luiz and João 
Dover aboard the Racehorse, and the vice-consul himself was joined by Catarina and 
Cristina. In total, 16 enslaved individuals were taken onboard and evacuated from the 
city. Perhaps appreciating the impropriety embarking slaves on a Royal Navy vessel, 
                                                        
44 see A. dos Santos Ribeiro, ‘A firma Maxwell, Wright & Co no comércio do império do Brasil c. 
1827- c. 1850’ (Unpublished MA thesis, Universidade Federal Fluminense, 2014) pp. 93-94. 
 
45 For an account of British perspectives on the Cabanagem Rebellion, see I. Sargen, Our Men in 
Brazil pp.157-182. 
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Hesketh referred to them euphemistically as ‘servants’ initially, before using the word 
‘slaves’ later in the document.46 Though little else is known about the fate of these 
individuals, it can be surmised that unlike occasional cases of fugitive slaves from 
foreign owners who found refuge and their freedom on British warships, they 
remained in bondage during and after their enforced exile in Maranhão.47 There seems 
little doubt that the Royal Navy’s complicity in the upholding of their enslavement 
was entirely related to the nationality of their masters.  
 
A second case involving a British warship, although less clear cut in terms of 
irregularity of conduct, is illustrative of the extent to which British residents could be 
certain that British anti-slavery policy would not interfere with their slaveholding 
during the 1830s. In May 1839, the Mixed Commissioners informed Palmerston that 
they had learned through a ‘casual conversation’ with Commander Smyth of the HMS 
Grecian that he had recently boarded a small Brazilian vessel carrying 70 to 80 slaves 
‘under the charge of an Englishman’ and bound for the estate of a British merchant 
called Platt.48 While not versed in the full particulars of the case, the Commissioners 
believed that Smyth had let the vessel on its way on the basis that the slaves on board 
did not appear to be ‘new blacks’ imported recently from Africa.49  Unusually, the 
Commander had not formally notified the Commissioners of the incident and had since 
                                                        
46 Letter Book VC John Hesketh, Pará, Biblioteca Nacional, Manuscritos, 10-04-009, ff. 128-132.  
 
47 R. Huzzey, ‘The moral geography of British anti-slavery responsibilities.’ p.131. Though we cannot 
be sure, the Catharina brought onboard with John Hesketh may be the same enslaved individual listed 
in an inventory following Hesketh’s death. See I. Sargen, Our Men in Brazil pp. 315-316.  
 
48 William Platt of the commercial house Platt & Reid had diverse business interests including an 
extensive sugar plantation in the Campos region of Rio de Janeiro province. His slaveholding is 
explored further in Chapter II.  
 
49 H.M Commissioners to Viscount Palmerston, 31 May 1839, in Correspondence on Slave Trade: 
1839-40 (Class A) P.P. 265, pp. 228-229. 
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declined to furnish them with a report, despite having verbally agreed to do so. One 
interpretation of this hesitance is that Smyth was aware of the potential illegality of 
Platt and the unnamed Englishman’s participation in the internal slave trade. Indeed, 
as early as 1825 a circular, based on the advice of the King’s Advocate and issued to 
consuls in Brazil, had warned of the illegality of British participation in the coastwise 
slave trade.50 Speaking in the House of Lords in 1842, Lord Brougham expanded on 
this interpretation, citing the case of Platt’s slaves as a specific example of an offence 
under the 1824 Act.51 The fact that British subjects were free to even transport their 
slaves under the proverbial nose of the Royal Navy is testament to the prevalence in 
the 1830s of an attitude which regarded British slaveholding as a separate issue to 
other types of complicity in the slave trade. 
 
Slaveholding within British communities was not just the ‘necessary evil’ argued by 
the likes of Robert Hesketh and Frederick Grigg, it was a socially acceptable norm. 
Aside for their own slaveholding, British officials reinforced its acceptability by 
fraternising and even rewarding those compatriots whose exploitation of slave labour 
went well beyond what the consul and commissioner regarded as a domestic necessity. 
Those Britons who had joined the planter class so often derided by anti-slavery agents 
were able to retain a guise of respectability and importance in the eyes of British 
officials in Brazil. One such individual and his agricultural estate was held in 
particularly high regard. George March owned in excess of 100 slaves which he 
                                                        
50 Mr. Chamberlain to Mr. Canning, 8 August 1825, Correspondence on Slave Trade, 1825-26 (Class 
B) P.P. 004, p. 61. However, it is important to note that this referred to British merchant vessels.  
 
51 Hansard, HL Deb 2 August 1842 vol 65 c. 942. Lord Brougham argued that after 1824 the legal 
coastwise trade in slaves was restricted to British colonies, hence the seaborne transport of Platt’s 
slaves, irrespective of whether they had been brought from Africa, was illegal.   
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employed on an extensive property in the mountain range which surrounds the city of 
Rio de Janeiro.52 Located within just a few day’s travel from the city, the property 
became a favourite holiday destination for foreign merchants hoping to escape Rio’s 
oppressive summer climate. Members of the British Legation were no exception. In 
December 1827, British Minister Robert Gordon and his secretaries spent time on 
March’s estate and in 1837, March received the visit of the mission’s then second-in-
command, William Gore Ouseley, who recorded his visit by producing one of the few 
extant images of March’s property.53 Later in his career, Ouseley wrote scathingly 
about European slave-owners in Brazil, commenting: 
 
It is a startling and deplorable fact, and one that is calculated to lower our opinion 
of human nature, to witness the rapid adoption, by those Europeans who leave 
their own country animated with the best and most generous principles respecting 
their fellow-creatures, of the maxims and practices of hardened slave-holders.54 
 
It is impossible to say whether Ouseley held these views before he visited March’s 
estate but they are similar to the concerns he expressed privately to Palmerston about 
William Whitaker’s slaveholding in 1839. What is certain is that Ouseley, like most 
of his colleagues, officially treated British slaveholding as a distinct entity from the 
slave trade, despite the high probability that George March was a beneficiary of the 
illegal trade (see Part II). In addition to emphasising respectability through open 
association, on one important occasion the British Legation made a very public 
distinction between British slaveholding and that of their Brazilian counterparts. In his 
study of the distribution of Africans liberated from the Flor de Loanda, Pedro Ramos 
                                                        
52 March’s slaveholding will be explored further in Chapter II.  
 
53 G. Ferrez, Colonização de Teresópolis à sombra do Dedo de Deus, 1700-1900: da fazenda March a 
Teresópolis (MEC, Rio de Janeiro,1970) p. 38 and p. 60.  
 
54 W.G. Ouseley, Notes on the slave-trade with remarks on the measures adopted for its suppression 
(London: John Rodwell, 1850) pp. 44-45.  
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argues that allocation of these apprentices to a core group of trusted British subjects 
was linked to a belief in the moral superiority of their compatriots, irrespective of their 
slaveholding practices.55 Two of this core group, Martha Moke and Robert Coats, 
were plantation owners. Despite the high probability that labour regimes and treatment 
on their estates were analogous to conditions on neighbouring properties, in the eyes 
of the Legation, Moke’s and Coats’ nationality set them apart as somehow more 
benevolent and trustworthy than their Brazilian neighbours. 56   
   
While it is clear that anti-slavery officials in Brazil recognised the link between 
slaveholding and other forms of British complicity in the slave trade, the former 
remained outside the moral geography of British anti-slavery responsibilities during 
the 1830s. Though the overall impact – or lack thereof - of anti-slavery policy on both 
these forms of complicity was similar, the absence of legislation dealing specifically 
with slaveholding meant that it was treated in a completely different fashion and 
separate to the supply and financing of slaving voyages. Not only was slaveholding 
outside the remit of Britain’s anti-slavery officials, some of the very same people 
tacitly, and at times explicitly, supported the practice through their own exploitation 
of slave labour, their protection of slave property and their close association with 
British slave masters. The authorities in London also showed no ambition to sever this 
relationship. The preference of the Foreign Office was to quietly maintain the status 
quo with the least amount of disruption to trade and minimal damage to reputation. 
Though its prevention in practical terms would undoubtedly have been complex, the 
                                                        
55 P. Ramos, ‘Homens de confiança: moral, antiescravismo e abolicionismo inglês na supressão do 
tráfico brasileiro de escravos’ (Unpublished MA Dissertation, Universidade Federal Fluminense, 
2016).  
 
56 The slaveholding of both these individuals will be discussed in Chapter II.  
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authorities chose to remain silent when informed of British involvement in the illegal 
enslavement of Africans in Brazil. Even in cases where there was a precedent set for 
intervention by London, Palmerston chose not to take a position on the slaveholding 
of vice-consul Whitaker. Only the public scandal and unwanted attention surrounding 
Sir George Jackson’s conflict of interest and abuse of liberated Africans was enough 
to force Palmerston’s hand. As long as British slaveholding managed to avoid similar 
scandal, there was no appetite to upset the applecart. However, this equilibrium only 
endured in the general absence of external scrutiny. After the resolution of the slavery 
question in the British empire in 1838, new interest groups began to question the 
inconsistencies in policy that had been tolerated by the anti-slavery state. As we will 
see in the following section, an increased level of scrutiny in the 1840s played an 
important role in the partial absorption of slaveholding in foreign territories into the 
moral geography of British anti-slavery responsibilities. 
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Part II - 1840-1850: Extending the frontiers of anti-slavery responsibilities 
 
While Britain’s efforts to suppress the illegal Brazilian trade had consumed 
tremendous amounts of diplomatic and naval energy during the 1830s, in the 
metropole these exertions largely remained background noise to the ongoing 
campaigns to end slavery (1833) and the subsequent apprenticeship system (1838) in 
Britain’s own colonies. With the resolution of the slavery question, the suppression of 
foreign slave trades came into much sharper focus in both parliament and civil society. 
As an increasingly coercive suppression system proved unable to bring an end to the 
flourishing and adaptive illegal trade to Brazil and Cuba, both the state’s overall 
strategy and its failure to prevent British complicity came under growing criticism 
during the 1840s. Though the anti-slavery state’s obstinate response to calls to 
dismantle the suppression system has been well developed in the historiography of the 
suppression of the slave trade, how it handled the criticism of British complicity, and 
slaveholding in particular, has received less scholarly attention and thus warrants 
further analysis.57  
 
This section will explore how the scrutiny which accompanied the internationalisation 
of British abolitionism in the 1840s was partly translated into official anti-slavery 
policy. The adoption of a more expansive interpretation of what constituted complicity 
in the form of new legislation in 1843 brought British slaveholding in Brazil within 
the jurisdiction of the anti-slavery state for the first time. Nevertheless, its absorption 
                                                        
57 Opposition to forcible naval suppression began in the late 1830s but gathered momentum following 
the passing of the Aberdeen Act in 1845. Successive governments vehemently defended the 
suppression system and eventually defeated the anti-coercionist movement in Parliament in March 
1850. This victory emboldened Palmerston to authorise the yet more aggressive naval suppression 
which preceded the effective abolition of the trade by Brazil later that year. See R. Huzzey, Freedom 
Burning pp. 113-124. See L. Bethell, The Abolition, Chapter 11. 
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into the moral geography of British anti-slavery responsibilities was only partial. Like 
its legislative predecessors, the 1843 Slave Trade Act reflected the ambivalence of 
suppression, as policymakers sought to reconcile a desire to prevent British subjects 
from promoting the illegal traffic with their commitment to respect for property and 
the protection of legitimate British trade and investment. The result, however well-
intentioned and earnestly implemented, was a compromise that both legitimised the 
ownership of slaves bought before the bill’s enactment and contained sufficient 
ambiguities to allow the future exploitation of slave labour and other forms of 
investment in slave property.  
 
The internationalisation of British abolitionism and slaveholding abroad 
 
Though the short-lived Society for the Universal Abolition of Slavery and the Slave 
Trade held similar ambitions as early as 1834, the internationalisation of British 
abolitionism began in earnest in 1839 with the emergence of two anti-slavery societies 
with global objectives.58 In June of that year, the Society for the Extinction of Slavery 
and the Civilisation of Africa was established by Thomas Fowell Buxton, who 
believed that slavery should be tackled at the supply end by promoting legitimate trade 
and Christianity in Africa.59 Though primarily an exposition of these views, Buxton’s 
The African Slave Trade and Its Remedy, published in 1840, also highlighted the 
connection between British commerce and the illegal trade in slaves to Brazil and 
Cuba. Drawing on published Foreign Office correspondence, including that of 
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Commissioners Jackson and Grigg in Rio, Buxton showed a key awareness of the re-
export of British manufactures in Brazil and Cuba for use on the African coast.60 
Though, as Kelly has shown, Buxton did not condemn the supplying of the slave trade 
in this way, The African Slave Trade and Its Remedy still played an important role in 
publicising these connections to a wider audience.61  
 
It would be the campaigning of another anti-slavery society, though, which would be 
of greater relevance to the anti-slavery state’s campaign to end the Brazilian slave 
trade. In contrast to Buxton’s focus on Africa, the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery 
Society (BFASS), established in 1839, believed the solution lay in the New World. 
The BFASS affirmed that ‘so long as slavery exists, there is no reasonable prospect of 
the annihilation of the slave trade’ and so favoured the promotion of the universal 
abolition of slavery in the Americas and elsewhere.62 This should be achieved, they 
believed, not through the violent means which their Quaker membership repudiated, 
but by convincing the remaining slave states of the evils of the institution.63 Unlike 
Buxton, adherents of the BFASS were horrified by British connections to the trade 
and played a crucial role in drawing the attention of the wider public and the 
government to the issue. Key to the formation of the BFASS’s position on the subject 
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was David Turnbull’s Travels in the West, published in 1840.64 The travel narrative, 
based on the Scotsman’s experiences in Cuba and Puerto Rico in 1838-1839 contains 
a scathing critique of British involvement in the slave trade. As Kelly has noted, 
Travels in the West played a central role in the dissemination of information about the 
movement of British goods into the slave trade. 65  Turnbull also exposed the 
slaveholding practices of British subjects in Cuba, finding to his ‘great regret’ that a 
British-owned copper mine employed over 450 slaves.66 Special criticism, though, 
was reserved for those British officials who exploited slave labour. Turnbull charged 
those British officials who employed slaves, or that of liberated Africans in specific 
reference to Sir George Jackson, with undermining their own government’s 
suppression campaign. 67  Turnbull’s account soon attracted the attention of the 
BFASS, to whom the Scotsman readily associated himself by participating in the 
World Anti-Slavery Convention in June 1840.68 It would be during this meeting that 
Turnbull’s observations played an important role in the formulation of the society’s 
position on British involvement in the slave trade.   
 
The Convention was the first major action of the BFASS as it sought to gather support 
and set the agenda of its campaign to internationalise British abolitionism. Amongst 
the many and varied topics covered during the 12-day conference was the issue of 
British complicity in the slave trade. The committee established to discuss the matter 
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included Turnbull and the findings it presented on 22 June owed much to his account 
of his time in Cuba. Indeed, on British involvement in the supply and financing of the 
trade, the committee’s report directly quoted Travel’s in the West.69 Their findings 
also reflected the more expansive interpretation of complicity adopted by Turnbull 
and other likeminded abolitionists. In addition to the manufacturers and merchants 
who supplied and financed the trade, the committee also extended moral responsibility 
to British slaveholders in foreign territories. Echoing the position adopted by H.M. 
Commissioners in Rio as early as 1835, the committee referred to the British-owned 
goldmines of Minas Gerais, and by extension their UK-based shareholders, as ‘the 
purchasers of the victims of the traffic.’70 In a similar vein, another delegate reasoned 
on an earlier occasion that in Cuba ‘because no slave-holder can keep up a sufficient 
number of labourers by natural increase, he must be an annual purchaser in the slave-
market, and consequently every slave-holder is a slave-dealer.’71 The position of the 
BFASS was left in no doubt; all forms of complicity in the slave trade, including 
slaveholding and other forms of investment in slave property, were to be condemned 
as not only morally reprehensible but ‘a flagrant dishonour to the British name, and 
an outrageous inconsistency with the avowed desire, the strenuous endeavours and the 
costly sacrifices of Great Britain, for the suppression thereof.’72  
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While three years would elapse before the anti-slavery state adopted, with 
concessions, the expansive interpretation of British complicity proposed by 
abolitionists in 1840, the World Anti-Slavery Convention did have one more 
immediate impact on a small but symbolically important segment of British 
slaveholding abroad. A motion, initially proposed by William Forster and J.T. Price, 
but seemingly based on a suggestion outlined by Turnbull in Travels in the West, 
called for the prohibition of slaveholding by British functionaries abroad. 73  The 
subsequent memorial addressed to the Foreign Secretary, Viscount Palmerston, stated 
the Convention’s ‘surprise and regret’ that British officials in Brazil, Cuba and other 
countries openly employ slave labour in their homes, as well as in mines and on sugar 
plantations. The ‘holding, hiring, buying, or selling of slaves in foreign countries,’ the 
memorial continued, ‘is an example which gives countenance to the perpetuation of 
slavery, and to the continuance of the clandestine importation of slaves.’74 Palmerston, 
who had chosen not to act when privately informed of vice-consul’s Whitaker’s 
slaveholding just a year earlier, changed tack in the face of overwhelming public 
criticism. Two months after its adoption at the Convention, the Foreign Secretary 
forwarded the memorial in full to consuls and commissioners in Brazil and Cuba, with 
a covering note informing officials that the government concurred with its sentiments 
and ‘especially in the opinion, that it would be unfitting that any Officer, holding an 
appointment under the British Crown, should either directly hold or be interested in 
slave property.’75  Interestingly, the memorial was not initially sent to officials in 
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slave-holding territories which were not beneficiaries of the international slave trade, 
such as the United States, Peru or Uruguay.76 The prioritising of Brazil and Cuba in 
this way was symptomatic of the interest the state developed in British slaveholding 
over the next decade. The exploitation of slave labour would be combatted in so far as 
it contributed to the practical and symbolic promotion of the illegal slave trade and not 
as a constituent part of foreign slavery.  
 
Though the BFASS would later praise the efficacy of Palmerston’s circular, it is clear 
that his instructions were not followed to the letter in all cases nor was its application 
followed up with any real vigour by Palmerston or his successor at the Foreign Office, 
the Earl of Aberdeen.77 In the Brazilian case, some officials such as consuls Hesketh 
in Rio and Cowper in Pará replied immediately to the circular, indicating that they had 
or would soon be discharging hired slaves from their domestic service.78 Frederick 
Grigg replied admitting he employed hired slaves in his household but refrained from 
committing to their release.79 Still others either acknowledged the despatch without 
referring to whether they held slaves or simply neglected to reply.80 It is not clear 
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whether it was an intentional omission, a clerical oversight or whether Palmerston 
interpreted British functionaries as only those in salaried positions, but it appears that 
William Whitaker was not forwarded the circular. Either way, the vice-consul’s 
slaveholding was not called into question again, even as he began to perform more 
anti-slavery duties throughout the decade. Indeed, it is more than likely that a report 
written by Whitaker on sugar production and slave labour in São Paulo in 1848 was 
based directly on his own experience of plantation ownership in the region.81 In a 
similar vein, slaveholding did not preclude Henry Dickenson, a plantation owner 
described by his successor as a ‘violent defender of slavery’, from briefly holding the 
office of vice-consul in Pará from 1841-1842.82 The necessity of filling the position 
and Dickenson’s previous experience in the role appears to have taken precedence 
over a strict adherence to the instructions issued a year previously. Though the 
circulation of the memorial demonstrates that Palmerston was receptive to the 
expansive interpretation of complicity adopted by the BFASS, its practical application 
was undoubtedly imperfect. As we shall see, the inability of the anti-slavery state to 
effectively police the slaveholding of its own representatives was a forewarning of 
similar issues British authorities would encounter in their attempts to enforce the 
restrictions on British slaveholding provided for by the 1843 Act.  
 
Now that the state had accepted in principle the expansive interpretation of complicity 
proposed by the abolitionists, the BFASS saw an opportunity to press for the 
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government to address the wider issue of British slaveholding. The society’s many 
veterans of previous abolitionist campaigns realised that accurate and up-to-date 
information was essential to generate the public outrage and political support that 
would result in new legislation or a change in policy.Turnbull’s Travels in the West 
and the Scotsman’s recent appointment as British consul in Havana meant the society 
were and could count on being fairly well informed about the slave trade and slavery 
in Cuba, as well as British involvement therein.83 Brazil, however, remained a less 
well-known entity. The BFASS had appreciated this even before the Convention, 
having some months earlier discretely sponsored a fact-finding mission to the country. 
Husband and wife, George and Charlotte Pilkington, arrived in Rio de Janeiro in 
February 1840 and during their year-long stay in the country were tasked with relaying 
information on the state of slavery and the slave trade in Brazil, as well as collecting 
commercial data on Brazil’s trade. They were also asked to assess the strength of 
abolitionist feeling in Brazil and establish links with individuals or groups who could 
act as correspondents for the society.84  
 
Although investigating British complicity was not one of their explicit instructions, it 
is clear from George Pilkington’s letters and other writings that British links to slavery 
and the slave trade left a marked impression. The Irishman’s correspondence arrived 
too late to be used at the Convention but it was published in the society’s journal, the 
Anti-Slavery Reporter (ASR). Three of the first four letters written following his return 
from Brazil in early 1841 outlined in detail the author’s condemnation of the role 
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British residents in Brazil played in the promotion of slavery and the illegal slave 
trade.85 In addition to exposing these practices to a metropolitan audience through the 
ASR, Pilkington also directly appealed to the British residents in Brazil. In An Address 
to the English Residents in the Brazilian Empire, a pamphlet published in English and 
Portuguese in Rio de Janeiro in 1841, Pilkington urged his countrymen to emancipate 
their slaves. Not only was slaveholding un-Christian, morally abhorrent, and ‘against 
the English principle,’ crucially the Irishman also argued that it was illegal under 
British law and had been since 1808.86  
 
Though Pilkington’s rationale represented the most extreme interpretation of existing 
legislation, his questioning of not just the morality but legality of British slaveholding 
in Brazil and elsewhere was consistent with the consensus forming within the BFASS 
on the issue. Their position, informed by the intelligence accrued by abolitionists such 
as Pilkington and, as Kelly has shown, scandal arising from shareholder meetings of 
Brazilian mining companies, was formalised in 1842 when the society entrusted the 
anti-slavery parliamentarian Lord Henry Brougham with a petition urging government 
action on British slaveholding abroad.87 The petition, presented to the House of Lords 
on 2 August, expanded on the logic of the society’s memorial of two years previous 
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by arguing that slaveholding abroad was not just against British principles and harmful 
to the nation’s reputation, but was also ‘in defiance of the laws, of Great Britain.’88 
Citing the examples of mining companies and plantation owners in Brazil and Cuba, 
the petitioners urged the government to  
assert the authority of the existing laws against the slave-trade, or should they 
be inadequate, to extend the provisions thereof, so as to bring to just 
punishment, all the subjects of this country who may be guilty of such a crime.89 
 
The presentation of the petition was followed by an impassioned speech by Lord 
Brougham in which he referenced a series of cases, drawn from parliamentary blue 
books and intelligence accrued by the BFASS, to emphasise the need for the 
government to adopt the abolitionists’ expansive interpretation of complicity. Echoing 
a similar argument to that proposed by Pilkington, Brougham suggested that the 
purchase and sale of slaves by British subjects in foreign territories had been illegal 
since the passing of the 1824 Consolidated Slave Trade Act.90 With that in mind, 
Brougham proposed that the government pass ‘an act declaratory of the true intent’ of 
the 1824 legislation in order to remove any ambiguity with regards to the illegality of 
future transactions in slave property on foreign shores.91 Nevertheless, despite the 
cordial support the suggestion received from the government benches and as the Earl 
of Ripon saw it, Brougham’s ‘great knowledge of the subject,’ we shall see that the 
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bill proposed in the following parliamentary session would inherit the ambivalence of 
its legislative predecessors.92  
 
1843 Slave Trade Act 
 
After having been introduced for debate in early July of the following year, what 
became known as Lord Brougham’s bill passed into law on 24 August 1843 as An Act 
for the More Effectual Suppression of the Slave Trade. For the first-time slaveholding, 
and other forms of investment in foreign slave property, were incorporated into the 
moral geography of British anti-slavery responsibilities. However, as this section will 
show, its absorption into jurisdiction of the anti-slavery state was both partial and 
practically problematic. Concessions adopted during the bill’s debate resulted in 
legislation which legitimised existing slave-ownership and allowed for the future 
exploitation of slave labour under different guises. As such, the law failed to live up 
to the expectations of its abolitionist sponsors and although it was earnestly 
implemented by officials in Brazil, its relevance to British anti-slavery policy there 
soon waned following the effective suppression of the illegal trade in 1850-51. 
 
Though the 1843 Act is significant in that it represents the only incursion by the state 
into the slaveholding practices of its subjects residing abroad, it was not intended, as 
some abolitionists might have hoped, to sever the links between British capital and 
foreign slaveries. The aim of the legislation, consistent with the anti-slavery state’s 
delineation between the slave trade and foreign slavery, was to suppress ‘certain 
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Practices tending to promote and encourage [the Slave Trade].’93As with previous 
legislation aimed at curtailing British complicity in the slave trade, the Act once again 
reflected the ‘ambivalence of suppression’ discussed elsewhere in this chapter. This 
ambivalence was encoded into the legislation in the form of a series of concessions 
adopted during debates on the bill’s provisions in the House of Lords. The first major 
compromise was that though British subjects were now prohibited ‘to deal or trade in, 
purchase, sell, barter, or transfer’ slaves, the law was not to be applied retroactively.94 
Despite Lord Brougham’s conviction that these transactions on foreign soil had been 
illegal since 1824, as Evans has noted, the enforced emancipation of slaves purchased 
after this date, without compensation, would be a direct affront to the respect for 
property ingrained in British political culture.95 By outlawing only future transactions 
in slaves, the Act legitimised all British-held slave property acquired before 1 
November 1843, a compromise which Kelly has argued was consistent with the 
process of emancipation in the British Empire. The fact that the Emancipation Act 
(1833) had ended slavery by compensating slave owners for the loss of their property 
meant that Brougham, to the disappointment of some of his fellow abolitionists, could 
not have hoped to declare all British-owned slave property as illegitimate.96  The 
crucial repercussion of this decision in the Brazilian context was that it legitimised 
British ownership of Africans who had been illegally imported into the country as per 
international treaty (1830) and Brazilian law (1831). This, in spite of the fact that 
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British mining operations and plantation owners had been clearly identified as 
beneficiaries of the contraband trade. It is interesting to note that this legitimisation 
occurred well before Brazilian slave-owners would employ the Eusébio law of 1850 
to defend their own rights to illegally imported slave property.97 
 
Brougham’s decision not to push for the emancipation of slaves purchased since 1824 
was an important victory for all British slaveholders but especially for the mining 
companies who collectively owned some 2000 slaves.98 As Evans has noted, these 
companies were not simply passive beneficiaries of this decision; they had in fact 
lobbied for the right to what they regarded as their legally obtained property. The 
pressure they exerted through political allies in the House of Commons, such as 
Viscount Sandon and Lord Ashburton, was crucial in the winning of further 
concessions, including the removal of a clause which stipulated the inspection and 
registration of labourers at British-owned mines.99 Of wider significance beyond their 
mining operations though was the success of their lobbying activities in guaranteeing 
access to the future exploitation of slave labour. While they would be prohibited from 
purchasing any more slaves, British subjects and enterprises were not prevented from 
                                                        
97 The authority of the 1850 law was a central tenant used in the defence of the institution during the 
‘politics of slavery in the post-contraband era,’ see. T. Parron, ‘A Polítca dea Escravidão no Império 
do Brasil’ (Unpublished MA dissertation, Universidade de São Paulo, 2009), pp. 232-233. Also, S. 
Chalhoub, A Força da Escravidão: Ilegalidade e Costume no. Brasil Oitocentista (São Paulo: 
Companhia das Letras, 2012), especially Chapter 5.   
 
98 George Pilkington estimated that five mining companies owned a total of 2078 in 1841. See ASR, 
2.15 (Jul 1841) pp. 163-164. He was likely referring to the Imperial Brazilian Mining Association 
(Gongo Soco), St. John Del Rey Mining Company (Morro Velho), Brazilian Company Ltd (Cata 
Branca), National Brazilian Mining Association (Cocais) and the Serra da Candonga Gold Mining 
Company, Ltd (Serra da Candonga). See M. Eakin, A British Enterprise in Brazil p. 17.  
 
99 C. Evans, ‘Brazilian Gold’ pp. 125-126.  
 
 
 
80 
hiring slaves from other slaveholders.100 Whereas other concessions permitted the 
acquisition of slaves through marriage and inheritance. In Chapter II we will discuss 
how both of these concessions were taken advantage of by British slaveholders in 
Brazil after 1843.  
 
It was not just mining companies who lobbied to defend their interest in slave property 
during the debate over the Brougham’s 1843 bill. Kelly has identified the presence of 
Alexander Baring, the Lord Ashburton, and his son-in-law Humphrey Mildmay MP 
as essential to the protection of other forms of investment in slave property, beyond 
the concept of traditional slaveholding. The former, a retired founding member of the 
powerful merchant bank Barings Bros., and the latter, an active partner in the same 
institution, spoke against clauses in the bill which threatened the practice of extending 
credit secured by slave property.101 Barings were deeply engaged with credit economy 
of the Atlantic world, including the slaveholding territories of the American South, 
Cuba and Brazil. The financing of the production and export of commodities in these 
regions, usually through third-party commission agents, occasionally exposed the 
bank to slave-ownership through the foreclosure of mortgages partly or fully 
collateralised by human beings. Indeed, credit relations with slaveholders had resulted 
in Barings becoming a beneficiary of compensation after emancipation in the British 
Empire.102 Outside the British Empire the bank had acquired two sugar plantations 
and 272 slaves in St. Croix, in the Danish West Indies, and would also acquire land 
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and slaves in Cuba in the early 1840s.103 Whereas the foreclosure on these debts was 
a relatively rare occurrence, the practice of extending credit secured by land and the 
slaves attached to those estates was, according to Mildmay, part of doing business 
‘with any country between Virginia and Brazils.’ 104  Parties interested in the 
legitimisation of slaveholding through mortgages echoed the defence of other British 
slave-owners by stressing the legality of the practice in the territories concerned and 
argued, as the MP John Dennistoun did, that any prohibition would no doubt damage 
British trade to the benefit of foreign competitors.105 Once again, the protection of 
British property rights and of legitimate trade were cast as obligations on an equal 
footing with Britain’s anti-slavery objectives.  
 
In a similar vein to traditional slave owners, the property rights of holders of slave 
mortgages were legitimised by Lord Brougham’s Act. Responding to queries raised 
during the second reading of the bill, the Attorney General made clear that the 
legislation would not threaten the rights of creditors to foreclose on existing debts 
secured by slave property. 106  The provisions of the legislation relating to future 
transactions though were left in a more ambiguous state. While the inclusion of a 
clause taken ad verbatim from the 1824 Act declaring unlawful the lending or 
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advancing of capital to be employed in the slave trade appeared to prohibit future slave 
mortgages, lawmakers were still uncertain under what circumstances, if any, slave 
mortgages would be permitted following the passing of the bill. 107 A statement made 
by Benjamin Hawes MP criticising the ‘very material alterations and modifications’ 
made during the previous two readings of the bill encapsulates the lack of clarity in 
the legislation: 
It was said that in no case could slaves be held under this bill except where they 
could now be legally held under the existing law, and that no mortgages or other 
transactions in reference to property in slaves could take place except in the case 
of such legal holdings; but legal holdings were not defined in the bill…108 
 
The bill passed in the same session without addressing the points of ambiguity 
raised by the MP for Lambeth. Nevertheless, two test cases remitted by consuls in 
Brazil would eventually provide some clarity on the legislation’s provisions 
regarding slave mortgages. In January 1846, Beverley Newcomen, consul in 
Paraíba, wrote to the Earl of Aberdeen about two British subjects involved in 
transactions which he was convinced were prohibited by the Act. Newcomen 
recounted how he had been ‘accidentally witness’ to the embarkation on a small 
fishing vessel of a female slave who had recently been acquired by Richard Rogers 
in payment of debt. Rogers, himself in debt to a Mr. Gibson, was in the process of 
transferring the unnamed individual to his creditor in the neighbouring province of 
Pernambuco.109 Some five months later in Pernambuco, Henry A. Cowper wrote to 
the Foreign Secretary with far less conviction than his counterpart in Paraíba about 
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a similar case involving a British merchant house in the city. The ambiguities 
identified by Hawes had left Cowper unsure whether George Kenworthy & Co. had 
violated the Act’s provisions by successfully enforcing a court ordered auction of 
seized assets, including two unnamed slaves, belonging to the firm’s debtor.110 In 
the intervening period between the two cases, the first had been sent to the Treasury 
for the opinion of William Rothery, an expert adviser on slave trade legislation.111 
Rothery’s view was clear; both Rogers and Gibson were ‘prima facie criminally  
guilty’ as the receipt of slaves for the payment of debt was no different to other 
transactions prohibited by the 1843 law.112 Specific advice about the case of George 
Kenworthy & Co. has not been located, but the principle of the case was included 
in a circular sent by Palmerston to all consular staff in slaveholding countries in 
March 1847. The instructions made clear that both taking possession or the 
transferal of slaves in lieu of payment was illegal and this included ‘slaves seized in 
execution for debts due to British subjects.’113 Palmerston’s last point confirmed 
that causation of a slave sale, as opposed to physically taking possession of a slave 
in lieu of debt, was enough to place British subjects in contravention of the law. 
While making no reference to the legality of the practice of extending credit secured 
by human collateral, the instructions informed by these test cases established that it 
was illegal under the 1843 Act to recover debts secured by slave property. 
Elsewhere in this thesis we will observe that while this provision may have had a 
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short-term impact on the lending practices of British creditors (Chapter III), it had 
faded into relative obscurity by the arrival of the London and Brazilian Bank in the 
1860s (Chapter IV).  
 
1843-1850: The implementation of the 1843 Act and inherited ambivalence.  
 
This dissipation of the Act’s impact on the practices of British residents and 
enterprises in Brazil is undoubtedly a symptom of the receding interest officials had 
in the enforcement of the legislation following the suppression of the illegal slave 
trade in 1850. This observation, along with the fact that some of the bill’s 
abolitionist sponsors soon washed their hands of it, has led Evans to characterise 
the 1843 Act as a ‘legislative orphan’ that was ‘soon forgotten.’114 While this largely 
bears true in the second half of the century it does obscure the fact that the years 
following its enactment were the high-point of official interest in the slaveholding 
practices of the British in Brazil. In this section we will observe how attempts were 
made to implement the new law and that slaveholding was investigated at the 
highest level. Nevertheless, in spite of this piqued interest, both the new legislation 
and those charged with its implementation inherited the ambivalence of suppression 
which characterised the preceding decade.   
 
Though the 1843 Act was disavowed by abolitionists who argued that the 
concessions adopted had actually rendered the legislation ‘pro-slavery in principle’, 
the anti-slavery state was quick to promote awareness of the new law to British 
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subjects abroad.115 Copies of the Act were included in a circular of 31 December 
1843 addressed to British consular agents in countries and territories where slavery 
existed. 116  The Foreign Secretary, the Earl of Aberdeen, instructed consuls to 
display the Act in their offices and to ‘take the proper measures for making its 
purport known to British residents’ in their respective consular districts. Consuls 
were also charged with reporting any potential violations of the new legislation to 
the Foreign Office.117 It is difficult to say how much was down to the efforts of 
individual consuls, but as we shall observe in Chapter II there is ample evidence 
that British residents in Brazil were aware of the legislation in the years which 
followed its enactment.    
 
As noted in the discussion of the Act’s provisions for slave mortgages, some consuls 
did write to the Foreign Secretary regarding possible infractions of the legislation 
by British subjects in Brazil. The aforementioned investigations of consuls 
Newcomen and Cowper show that at least some officials earnestly attempted to 
implement the legislation. Moreover, both instances were taken seriously by 
authorities in London who sought the advice of the Law Officers, whose legal 
interpretation provided the basis for the circular which Palmerston sent to British 
consuls on the matter in March 1847.118 That the centre of British anti-slavery policy 
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was invested in the expansive interpretation of complicity codified in the 1843 Act 
is further demonstrated by two measures taken by Palmerston following his return 
to the Foreign Office in mid-1846.  
 
The first step taken by Palmerston was to prohibit consuls from administering the 
estates of deceased slave owners. This directive of November 1846 was circulated 
to all British consulates in slaveholding territories and was prompted initially by a 
query sent to the Foreign Secretary in August of the same year by Edmund 
Molyneux, consul in Savannah, Georgia. Though Molyneux saw nothing in the 
1843 Act that prohibited him from receiving and remitting to England the proceeds 
of the sale of the slaves, he did question whether this type of involvement would 
place an official ‘at variance with Her Majesty’s Government, on the subject of 
slavery.’ 119  The circular directive confirmed that in Palmerston’s view, the 
administration of estates containing slave property brought consuls into conflict 
with both the spirit of Britain’s global anti-slavery efforts and the legislation which 
underpinned them. For the Foreign Secretary, the decision to prohibit this practice 
was a natural extension of the directive of May 1841 which forbade slaveholding 
by British officials. Like the earlier measure, this attempt to further restrict 
interaction between British agents and foreign slavery was undoubtedly driven by 
Palmerston’s desire to protect Britain’s reputation as moral arbiter on the question 
of anti-slavery. The 1843 Act added further legal substance to this effort, as shown 
by Palmerston’s reasoning that the directive would prevent consuls from falling foul 
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of the legislation’s provisions regarding the purchase and sale of slaves after 
1843.120   
 
The second indication that Palmerston in particular was serious about the expansive 
interpretation of complicity that the Act represented was his decision to commission 
a census of British slaveholding in Brazil in late 1848. This census has been 
overlooked in the literature, despite the data it contains providing an unrivalled 
snapshot of British slave-ownership in a foreign territory in the post-abolition era. 
This data will be discussed in much further detail in Chapter II. Nevertheless, it is 
worth making a few comments on the context and reasons for its commissioning. 
The original text of Lord Palmerston’s dispatch of 18 September 1848 was brief and 
not particularly revealing: 
 
I have to desire that you will transmit to me, for the information of HMG, a list 
of all British subjects within the district of your Consulate, who are owners of 
slaves, distinguishing those who have domestic slaves and those who have 
slaves employed in agriculture or in mining.121 
 
 
However, when the text and its intended recipients are considered in the historical 
context of British anti-slavery policy, Palmerston’s intentions become more apparent. 
The dispatch was sent to all British consular officials in Brazil, Cuba and Puerto Rico. 
This makes it immediately clear that Palmerston was not interested in British 
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slaveholding in all foreign slave economies, only those that maintained an illegal trade 
in Africans. Despite an intensification in British efforts to suppress the transatlantic 
trade since the beginning of the decade, by 1848 the flows of Africans continued 
largely unabated and the trade to Brazil in particular had reached peak proportions. In 
spite of the greater powers granted to the Royal Navy’s anti-slavery cruisers by the 
Aberdeen Act of 1845, the number of Africans imported illegally had increased 
significantly.122 Although Palmerston stuck steadfastly to naval suppression as the 
best way to end the illegal slave trade, these coercive methods were coming under 
increasing pressure from a cross-party coalition led by the radical Gateshead MP 
William Hutt. By February 1848 Hutt had succeeded in gaining approval for a select 
committee to investigate a system which he believed to not only be ineffective, but 
illegal and immoral.123 Although mainly a forum to discuss the future of the naval 
suppression system, the Committee also discussed the slave trade more generally and 
it is likely that the slaveholding census was part of Palmerston’s efforts to prepare 
himself for this enquiry. Indeed, as an opposition MP in 1843, Palmerston had spoken 
in favour of Lord Brougham’s bill, voicing the embarrassment he felt when foreign 
governments had pointed out that British slaveowners were upholding slavery in other 
parts of the world.  
But when the British Government, in pursuance of enactments by the 
legislature, endeavoured to obtain the consent of the Governments of other 
countries to co-operate and make sacrifices in a commercial point of view for 
the purpose of putting an end to slavery, it was but too likely to have the 
remonstrance met by that which was calculated to bring up a blush in a 
Minister's face. "How can you, who, with all your laws upon the subject, cannot 
prevent your own merchants from employing their capital in the maintenance 
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of slavery, from buying slaves and dealing in them as property, require us to 
induce our subjects to give up a traffic in which so large a portion of our 
property and population has been engaged, without restriction for many 
years?124 
 
As consumers of the illegal slave trade, the actions of some British slaveholders in 
Brazil were undermining the government’s anti-slavery battle in the Atlantic; a battle 
in which, by the time of Palmerston’s return to government, Britain was losing ground 
and whose tactics were now under significant pressure at home. In this context a 
census of British slave-owners, as possible beneficiaries of the illegal trade, can be 
seen as part of Palmerston’s wider preparation to defend the government’s position 
and its anti-slavery methods in front of Hutt’s 1848 Committee. The commissioning 
of the census undoubtedly represented the peak of official interest in British 
slaveholding in Brazil. However, as we shall observe in the Part III of this chapter, the 
suppression of the slave trade to Brazil meant that the information collected in this 
exercise soon lost its relevance, as the appetite to interfere with the slaveholding of 
British subjects dissipated following the realisation of the state’s primary anti-slavery 
objective in Brazil.  
 
The interest and action taken by the Foreign Secretary in the question of British 
slaveholding certainly dispels any notion of the systemic duplicity alluded to by 
Sherwood. 125 That being said, there is also no doubt that the legislation and its 
implementation during this period exhibited many of the same limitations which 
had characterised its legislative predecessor. Firstly, as with the 1824 Act, 
investigative and enforcement mechanisms remained relatively weak. Beverly 
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Newcomen stressed this in his correspondence with the Foreign Office in 1846. The 
consul argued that as processes for the registration of slaves in Brazil were 
inconsistent and easily avoided, any British resident wishing to conceal their 
transactions would face little difficulty. Moreover, the cooperation of the Brazilian 
authorities could not be counted on by British consuls wishing to access this 
information. For this reason, in Newcomen’s opinion, it was ‘difficult for Her 
Majesty’s Consuls, although personally convinced of the parties whom they deem 
it their duty to denounce, to furnish Her Majesty’s Government with such evidence 
as might enable them to bring to trial’.126 As the consul explicitly stated, the 1843 
law had inherited the same issue as the 1824 Act in respect of the difficulty faced 
by those charged with its implementation. In Newcomen’s opinion, the only 
effective way to implement the bill would be to afford consuls similar powers to the 
registrars in Britain’s own colonies appointed under the provisions of the 1824 
law.127 This advice was not acted upon and, though legal specialists deemed the 
British subjects involved to be ‘prima facie guilty’, it appears that those accused by 
consuls Newcomen and Cowper never faced justice. Once again, the 
implementation of legislation across political borders proved practically 
problematic for the anti-slavery state.  
 
As Newcomen alluded to, and as discussed more widely in Chapter II, British 
subjects resorted to a range of strategies to ‘carry on with impunity the illegal receipt 
and transfer of slaves’.128 It is therefore somewhat surprising that there were not 
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more investigations, even if just on an initial basis, into possible infractions of the 
1843 Act. There are indications that practical problems relating to the collection of 
sufficient evidence were not the only limiting aspect of the law’s implementation. 
It is also probable that lingering attitudes of ambivalence to this now expanded 
interpretation of complicity contributed to this end. Although positive evidence to 
explain this type of silence is difficult to ascertain, two case studies from the period 
analysed here show why this was likely the case.   
 
The first, although not directly related to slaveholding, concerns a rare written 
admission that the British Minister in Rio intended to delay, at best, or neglect, at 
worst, to report information to the Foreign Office which strongly suggested 
systemic levels of complicity in the slave trade amongst the British mercantile body 
in Rio de Janeiro. In addition to the scrutiny provided by abolitionists at home, 
Britain also faced criticism from foreign governments who queried the dissonance 
between its anti-slavery position and its inability to prevent the complicity of its 
own subjects in the slave trade and slavery. A vocal proponent of this position was 
the American President, John Tyler, who addressed the issue of British complicity 
in a speech in Congress in early 1845 on the subject of the abuse of the American 
flag in the illegal trade to Brazil. Based on intelligence from Henry Wise, the U.S. 
Minister in Rio, Tyler argued that British merchants were ‘deeply implicated in this 
inhumane traffic’ as the suppliers of coast goods and brokers and financiers of 
slaving voyages. The President also accused the British of using suppression of a 
veil for the securing of cheap labour. 129 Though it was the second allegation which 
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particularly irked the British authorities, the former provoked an internal audit of 
previous Foreign Office investigations into British complicity in the illegal trade.130 
Tyler’s public criticism also unsettled British merchants in Brazil, concerned that 
they would be caught up in any subsequent investigations into their links to the 
traffic. Kelly has shown this in the case of Carruthers, de Castro & Co., a 
Manchester firm with a branch house in Rio de Janeiro.131 As Henry Wise had 
specifically mentioned the case of the Agnes, an American vessel accused of 
supplying the slave trade with goods supplied by the firm, Carruthers felt compelled 
to defend their actions. In addition to lobbying through the Manchester Commercial 
Association, the firm also secured an audience with the Earl of Aberdeen in August 
1845. Erroneously believing that the Foreign Secretary had initiated an investigation 
into the case, Carruthers’ representatives in Rio remonstrated with the British 
consul, Robert Hesketh. In attempting to justify their own business affairs, 
Carruthers brought attention to the commercial relationship between a large part of 
the British mercantile body in the city and the notorious Portuguese slave trader, 
Manoel Pinto da Fonseca.132 In a letter of 8th October 1845, Carruthers confirmed 
that it was Fonseca who had placed the order for the goods on the Agnes and that as 
he was ‘one of the most extensive general merchants of this market’ they ‘[could] 
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not conceive that any British establishment here would refuse to take and order from 
him.’133 To add further weight to this argument, Carruthers enclosed a declaration, 
signed by 21 British merchant houses, in support of Fonseca as: 
[A] large proprietor, one of the most extensive general merchants in this 
market, and who enjoys, and has enjoys for many years past, unbounded credit 
here from his well known means to meet his responsibilities, and his 
correctness in doing so.134 
 
There is no doubt that the signatories were well aware that Fonseca’s extensive 
business and his solid creditworthiness was rooted in the slave trade. Though we 
have seen that British officials had been aware of these types of connections since 
the previous decade, this document provided a particular conundrum from the 
British Minister at Rio, Hamilton Hamilton. Britain’s principal anti-slavery agent in 
Brazil, who in the same month had initiated treaty negotiations with Brazil 
following the Aberdeen Act, did not conceal the conflict he recognised between his 
dual anti-slavery and commercial role. Writing to Hesketh on the subject of the 
declaration, Hamilton stated that he believed it to be ‘a very injudicious document’ 
and that ‘so long as [he] was able to avoid it, [he would] decline to place it officially 
in the hands of Her Majesty’s Government.’135 When he eventually did so, some six 
months later, Hamilton was remarkably candid, telling the Foreign Secretary that 
the delay was essentially due to the strength of the evidence: 
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There is not one individual among the subscribers [of the declaration] who can 
be accounted ignorant that the considerable property held by Senhor Fonseca, 
[sic] is the fruit exclusively of his extensive Slave Trade speculations.136 
 
Even with such compelling evidence, it is far from certain that any of the firms 
involved would have been found guilty. The acquittal of Pedro Zulueta only a few 
years previously had shown both the high bar of evidence required under the 1824 Act 
and the ability of merchants to successfully resist efforts for them to assume moral 
responsibility for the actions of their foreign counterparts.137 This latter defence would 
be repeated by Carruthers and it likely played a role in Hamilton’s reluctance to remit 
evidence that would damage the reputation of British commerce in Brazil without 
bringing any complicit parties to justice. For the most part, evidence for the 
ambivalence of British suppression has to be inferred from the silences in the 
diplomatic correspondence; this case is unique in that the British Minister explicitly 
stated his motivation for withholding the transmission to evidence to London. While 
this case relates specifically to complicity in the Atlantic slave trade rather than the 
sale or purchase of slaves in Brazil, it begs the question whether the silences of 
officials other than Newcomen and Cowper can be part explained by similar 
motivations. British officials in Brazil had a dual responsibility for the prosperity of 
their countrymen and the suppression of slavery; in the socio-economic context of 
Brazil, the reconciliation of these two aims was easier said than done. 
 
Another case study of the same period clearly shows how ambivalence continued to 
condition the on-the-ground relationship between anti-slavery officials and British 
slaveholding after 1843. The diplomatic incident known in Brazil as A Questão March 
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was recorded in a series of high-level correspondence between authorities in Britain 
and Brazil and was published in the Brazilian Foreign Ministry’s annual report for 
1846.138 The dispute has been cited by historians such as Alan Manchester as part of 
wider discussions about negotiations around the renewal of the Anglo-Brazilian 
Commercial Treaty.139 Whilst it is undoubtedly a significant test case in this process, 
the ‘March Question’ also demonstrates how the ambivalence of suppression was both 
codified in the 1843 Act and remained embodied in the dual role of British consuls in 
Brazil.  
 
The ‘March Question’ occurred in the aftermath of the death in early 1845 of the same 
George March discussed in Part I of this Chapter.140  Although his son later noted that 
his death at age 60 had been unexpected, March had prepared a will and had nominated 
three British subjects as executors; John Fielding, John Prince James and his old friend 
and business associate, Richard Heath. March had also nominated his two young sons, 
Jorge and Guilherme Taylor March as his heirs. 141  As had been customary in previous 
cases of deceased British subjects, Robert Hesketh, as British consul, authorised the 
liquidation of March’s estate by the executors, under his supervision. However, six 
months later, with the process of liquidation well under way, the Brazilian authorities 
determined that Hesketh and the three nominated executors had no right to interfere 
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in what was the jurisdiction of the Juiz de Órfãos in Nova Friburgo. The Brazilian 
government outlined its position in a letter to the British Minister in Rio, stating that 
as the will left by the deceased had not conformed to the ‘required formalities’ 
according to Brazilian law, it had been determined that March died intestate. 
Moreover, as his sons were both Brazilian-born minors, it was the state’s responsibility 
alone to appoint a ward and executor.142 The Brazilian government’s legal case was 
strong; the Anglo-Brazilian commercial treaty which had allowed for the intervention 
of the British consul had expired in 1844 and from that point on the administration of 
all estates would be subject to the Brazilian inheritance law, no. 160, of 9 May 1842.143 
The British authorities in Rio and in London, as well as the Brazilian Association of 
Liverpool, expressed their grave concern that the decision to implement this law would 
undermine the property rights of British subjects in Brazil and according to the British 
Minister, eventually threaten the withdrawal of great quantities of British capital from 
the country. What makes this case especially interesting to our study is the nature of 
part of the property being contested; in addition to an extensive rural estate, March 
was the owner of a considerable number of slaves.144 In order to defend the wider 
principle of future British prosperity in Brazil, it would first be necessary for officials 
to first protect British slave property, a part of which, as we shall see, was held on an 
uncertain legal basis.   
 
                                                        
142 Barão de Cayrú to Mr. Hamilton, 3 June 1846, in Relatório dos negócios estrangeiros, 1846, 
Annex, No. 95.  
143 Antonio Paulino Limpo de Abreu to Mr. Hamilton, 26 November 1845, in Relatório dos negócios 
estrangeiros, 1846, Annex, No. 92.  
144 Mr. Hamilton, to Antonio Paulino Limpo de Abreu, 2 April 1846, in Relatório dos negócios 
estrangeiros, 1847, Annex, No. 93. 
 
 
 
97 
Having been ‘strongly ensured’ by the Brazilian Foreign Minister for his unilateral 
decisions during the six months since March’s death, Hesketh wrote a letter to 
Hamilton, justifying his actions.145 His first point was that it had always been normal 
procedure to protect the property of deceased British subjects in his consular district. 
Importantly though, he made a distinction that because of the nature of the property, 
a fazenda with slaves, his intervention was particularly pertinent. Hesketh argued that 
he was compelled to act swiftly in order to restore order to ‘the state of anarchy in 
which the fazenda had fallen just two days following the death of its owner,’ stating 
that Mr. Heath’s life had already been put in great danger by ‘an armed and robust 
black owned by the fazenda.’146 Once order had been restored, Hesketh then set about 
balancing the books of the estate by authorising the sale of assets in order to pay debts 
to creditors. Crucially, these assets were enslaved people. The auction of 17 of 
March’s slaves was advertised by Rio-based auctioneer J. Bouis for 26 June 1845. The 
advert stated that the slaves were being sold without a reserve and in the presence of 
one of the estate’s administrators. Unfortunately, the advert does not offer much 
insight into the slaves themselves, other than that they included four family units and 
three individuals named João, Amaro and Anna.147 The notice for the second sale of a 
further 47 slaves, advertised to take place on 24 September 1845 provides more 
detailed information.148 Firstly, in conformity with Robert Hesketh’s testimony, the 
slaves were due to be sold to pay debts owed to creditors in Macaé. Secondly, the 
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advert lists the names, ages, professions, and crucially whether the slave was a 
Brazilian-born ‘crioulo' or had been imported from Africa. Of the 47 individuals 
listed, 25 were born in Africa, 15 in Brazil and another 7 were listed without an origin. 
In relation to the latter category, it is possible that these individuals were also African. 
As Chalhoub notes, ‘the contraband slave trade meant that thousands of slaveowners 
were continuously making false claims about the legality of their slave property.’149 
The omission of the origins of these slaves, half of whom were children younger than 
12 years old may well have been deliberate. This may have also been the case with 
three Africans listed without ages. The scale of the clandestine trade and prevalence 
of illegal enslavement means that it also reasonable to suppose that some of the 
remaining 22 Africans had also been imported since the 1831 law. The presence of 
numerous adolescent and young adult African slaves (see Table 1) ties in well with 
what is known about the demographics of the illegal trade, in spite of the fact that at 
16 years old, the youngest, Benedicto Angola, was – perhaps conveniently - just old 
enough to have been imported legally.150 
 
The ‘March Question’ illustrates two interesting points about the ambivalence of 
British suppression. Firstly, until Palmerston prohibited the practice in 1846, the same 
British agents working to end the international trade were also responsible, even 
expected, to take an active role in the sale of enslaved people, some of whom were 
likely imported illegally. This leads on to the more important point that the 1843 Act, 
                                                        
149 S. Chalhoub, ‘Illegal Enslavement and the Precariousness of Freedom in Nineteenth-century 
Brazil’ in C. Morris, J.D. Garrigus (eds.) Assumed Identities: The Meanings of Race in the Atlantic 
World (Arlington: Texas A&M University Press, 2010) p. 106. On the various fraudulent methods 
adopted by owners of illegally enslaved Africans and the blind eye of the authorities on the issue, see 
S. Chalhoub, A Força da Escravidão,  Chapter 4.  
 
150 See C. Valencia Villa, M. Florentino, ‘Abolicionismo Inglês e Tráfico de Crianças Escravizadas 
para o Brasil, 1810-1850’ História, 35 (2016), pp. 1-20. 
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in not being applied retroactively, undoubtedly legitimised the illegal slaveholding of 
British subjects. Though the 1843 Act brought British slaveholding within the 
frontiers of the state’s moral geography of anti-slavery responsibilities, this process 
was marked by the ambivalence in legislation and the conflicting responsibilities of 
Britain’s officials in Brazil. Nevertheless, this was the high-watermark of official 
interest in the slaveholding of British subjects. As we shall observe in the final section 
of this chapter, following the effective suppression of the illegal slave trade this 
interest would dissipate relatively quickly.  
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Table 1.1: Slaves of African and no stated origin owned by George March and 
included in auction notice of 24 September 1845.151 
 
Name Origin Age Profession(s) 
Leopoldina Not stated 8 Domestic Servant 
Joanna Not stated 12 Domestic Servant 
Honorio Not stated 12 Page 
Benedicto Angola 16 House and Fieldhand 
Francisco Africa (nação) 18 Fieldhand 
Maria Angola 18 Cook 
Honorio Cabinda 18 Fieldhand 
Roberto Not stated 18 Domestic Servant / Stablemaster 
Joanna Not stated 18 Seamstress / Laundress 
Agostinho Angola 20 Polisher 
Benedicto Benin 20 House and Fieldhand 
Rosa Mozambique 20 Greengrocer / Cook 
Ignacio Angola 22 Tailor 
Vicente Mozambique 22 Fieldhand 
João  Mozambique 22 Stonemason 
Joaquim Cabinda 24 Barber 
Mathilde Gulf of Guinea (Mina) 24 Seamstress / Cook 
João Not stated 24 Butcher 
Caetano Mozambique 25 House and Fieldhand 
Manoel Angola 26 Tailor 
Simão Mozambique 26 Coachman 
Luiz Cabinda 30 Fisherman / Rower 
Joaquim Cassange (Angola) 30 Fieldhand 
José São Tomé 30 Fieldhand 
Antonio Not stated 30 Fieldhand 
Domingos Mozambique 35 Fieldhand 
Josefa Calabar 40 Domestic Servant 
Fernando Angola 45 Fieldhand 
Antonio Africa (nação) 50 Domestic Servant 
José Africa (nação) - Carpenter 
Catharina Angola - Laundress 
Maria Gulf of Guinea (Mina) - Cook / Laundress / Greengrocer 
 
 
                                                        
151 Information extracted from advert in Jornal do Commercio, 24 September 1845. Translation by 
author.  
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Part III: 1850 – 1888 
 
Palmerston’s census marked a peak of active state interest in British subjects owning 
slaves in Brazil. This final section will analyse British anti-slavery policy during the 
final four decades of Brazilian slavery to show that there were two major factors that 
help explain this recession of interest. Firstly, the 1843 Act had established the legal 
boundaries for Britain’s jurisdiction in this matter. While the prohibition of future 
transactions in slaves remained in force, the Act had also legitimised the majority of 
British-held slave property and allowed for continued exploitation by other means. 
Though British subjects who strayed from these concessions were liable to 
investigation, the implementation of the Act’s legacy provisions was conditioned by 
a second crucial factor. Official interest in British slaveholding and other forms of 
investment in Brazilian slavery had always been tied to a responsibility for slave trade 
suppression. The state had been briefly concerned with slaveholding in the sense that 
it represented, tangibly and symbolically, a driver for the illegal slave trade and not as 
a constituent element of Brazilian slavery. Once this link was severed following 
effective suppression in 1850-1851, official concern dissipated accordingly. In relative 
terms, Britain’s anti-slavery agents in Brazil now had a watching brief, one of moral 
suasion rather than active suppression of slavery. This meant that there was very little 
appetite to interfere in the private lives or commercial interests of their countrymen 
unless absolutely necessary.  
 
The decline in official interest was more of a waning than an immediate cessation. 
Although the benefit of hindsight allows us to place the effective suppression of the 
slave trade at 1850-1851 following the practical application of Brazil’s second anti-
slave trade law, this was not immediately clear to British officials. Throughout the 
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1850s and even beyond, British officials continued to monitor the threat of a 
resuscitation of the illegal trade, with even the most unlikely rumours followed up 
through official channels.152  During this decade and into the early 1860s, British 
officials in Rio also continued to compel the Brazilian government to satisfy their 
demands on the unresolved issue of the liberated Africans. An extension to these 
specific requests was the unofficial pressure, especially during William D. Christie’s 
time as Minister in Rio (1859-1863), on the wider question of the fate of African slaves 
imported illegally into Brazil after 1831. Indeed, historians have argued that these 
related questions were the real cause of the so-called ‘Christie Affair’, which resulted 
in the severance of diplomatic relations between both countries.153  It was in this 
context of these residual anti-slavery concerns that there were a handful of 
investigations in possible violations of the 1843 Act, some of which resulted in minor 
victories for the abolitionists who retained an interest in the issue of British 
slaveholding. Nevertheless, as we shall observe, these cases again exposed 
deficiencies in the legislation and it was also during this period that the limits of any 
future official anti-slavery interference in British investment were definitively set.  
 
                                                        
152 Though these efforts were mostly concentrated in the 1850s, rumours of plans to resurrect the 
illegal trade continued into the early 1870s at least. A notable example that caught the attention of 
British officials was the perceived threat posed by Confederate immigrants to Brazil following the 
U.S. Civil War. On one occasion between late 1869 and early 1870 in particular, British officials took 
considerable interest in the movements of a U.S citizen called Captain Forrest, supposedly a brother 
of the Confederate general, Nathan Bedford Forrest. Though not appropriate for discussion here, this 
case study deserves further historical investigation. For a selection of related correspondence see, Mr. 
Bushby to Mr. Buckley-Mathew, 20 October 1869, in TNA, FO 128/92; Mr. Bushby to Mr. Buckley-
Mathew, 23 April 1870, in TNA, FO 128/95; Mr. Buckley-Mathew to Mr. Blow, 3 May 1870, in 
TNA, FO 128/94.  
 
153 Ostensibly the result of a diplomatic disagreement over compensation for damaged British vessels 
and the treatment of British sailors, historians have argued that the real cause was the British Minister, 
William D. Christie’s frustrations over the slavery question. See R. Graham, ‘Brasil-Inglaterra’ pp. 
142-145.  
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One of the first cases of a potential violation of the 1843 Act during this period was 
remitted to the Foreign Office by the diligent consul Cowper at Pernambuco. His 
concern related to the use of slave labour on the construction of the first British-owned 
line, the Recife and São Francisco Railway.154 As Cowper made clear in his dispatch 
to the Foreign Secretary, the Earl of Clarendon, the line’s own prospectus explicitly 
stated that ‘the Company binds itself not to possess slaves and not to employ in the 
work of construction other than free people.’ 155  This declaration was in fact a 
reproduction of a Brazilian decree of 1852, which prohibited the use of slave labour 
on the nation’s new railway lines.156 Cowper discovered that contractors employed by 
the company, Englishmen named Gardner and Lowden, had exploited a loophole in 
the law which only prohibited the owner of the line, and not contractors, from using 
slave labour.157 Although not mentioned explicitly by Cowper, by hiring slaves from 
local owners, the contractors had also taken advantage of the concession lobbyists had 
won during the reading of the 1843 bill. Gardner and Lowden may have been acting 
in contravention of the spirit of both pieces of legislation, but there was little Cowper 
or Clarendon could legally do, other than exert informal pressure through other 
channels. In the end, following guarantees from the line’s new contractors that they 
would not employ slaves and from the President of the Province that he would penalise 
the company if they did so, Cowper and Clarendon appeared satisfied and allowed the 
                                                        
154 On the history of this line see W. Edmundson, The Great Western of Brazil Railway (Oxford: 
Mainline & Maritime, 2016). 
 
155 Mr. Cowper to Earl Clarendon, 15 April 1856, in Correspondence on Slave Trade, April 1856-
March 1857 (Class B), P.P 2282, p. 234.  
 
156 On the prohibition of slave labour in railway construction see M.L. Lamounier, Ferrovias e 
Mercado de Trabalho no Brasil pp. 159-161. 
 
157 Mr. Cowper to Earl Clarendon, 16 August 1856, Correspondence on Slave Trade, April 1856-
March 1857 (Class B), P.P 2282, pp. 242-244.  
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matter to drop.158 While this may have represented a minor anti-slavery victory in this 
case, it again underlines the ambivalence built in to the 1843 Act which allowed the 
future exploitation of slave labour under various circumstances. This fact was alluded 
to by the line’s managing director, Edward de Mornay, who insisted on company’s 
legal right to employ slaves in future. It is not clear whether construction of this line 
continued on the basis of free labour, but recent research has shown that contractors 
of other British-owned lines would go on to exercise this right and there was little the 
anti-slavery state could do to prevent them.159  
 
In spite of the legislation’s limitations, abolitionists in Britain continued to call for its 
implementation as and when they received any relevant intelligence. On one of these 
occasions, the slaveholding of Samuel Vines, British consul in Pará, was called into 
question by the BFASS.160 It turned out that Vines, sensing the impropriety of the 
matter, had already written to Clarendon to seek his approval on the subject. In his 
letter of July 1855, the consul did not deny that he had recently purchased two boys 
called Jacinto and Ildefonço and a girl called Elena from a British subject called 
Alexander Dickson. However, he believed his actions were justified by the unique 
circumstances in which he found himself. Firstly, in the same way Hesketh had acted 
in the ‘March Question’, he aimed to protect Dickson’s legitimate property from 
Brazilian justice following the death of Dickson’s Brazilian wife. Secondly, believing 
                                                        
158 Mr. Cowper to Earl Clarendon, 14 January 1857 in Ibid pp. 258-259; Earl Clarendon to Mr. 
Cowper, 28 February 1857 in Ibid p. 259.  
 
159 R.S. Souza, Trabalhadores dos Trilhos pp. 31-32.  
 
160 For the correspondence between the BFASS and the Foreign Office, see ASR, 3.11 (Nov.1855) pp. 
250-251. Interestingly, the BFASS had received the intelligence from Archibald Campbell in Pará, 
himself a large-scale slaveholder. Rather than motivated by altruism, it appears Campbell resented the 
fact the Vines had disregarded a law that he had to abide by. See Treze de Maio, 2 August 1855. 
Campbell’s slaveholding is discussed in more detail in Chapter III.  
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the three slaves too young to be freed immediately, Dickson and Vines agreed for the 
slaves to be taken into the latter’s care on the condition that the boys were manumitted 
at 21 or 25 years and Elena at 18 years of age. 161  After consulting with the 
government’s solicitors and after having received a letter from the BFASS on the same 
issue, Clarendon responded to Vines making clear that however ‘benevolent and 
praiseworthy’ the motive, that the purchase of slaves had been illegal. Interestingly, 
Clarendon seemed confused about the provisions of the 1843 Act, stating that it 
‘absolutely forbids British subjects to own or hold slaves under any circumstances.’162 
Perhaps this erroneous interpretation is an early indication that the legislation’s 
relevance to the work of the anti-slavery state was starting to wane. There were other 
inconsistencies in Clarendon’s response. While he chastised Vines for his conduct, he 
did not threaten him or Dickson with criminal prosecution, stating only that ‘a 
repetition of such an act will not be lightly passed over.’163 Moreover, in the course of 
Vines’ correspondence it became clear that a fourth slave, Lazaro, had been sold by 
Dickson on similar terms to a British merchant house, Singlehurst, Miller & Co., yet 
it appears no action was taken in this case.164 Again, perhaps this leniency was a 
product of an increasing ambivalence towards slaveholding as an official concern 
following the suppression of the slave trade. Moreover, Clarendon only instructed 
Vines to free the slaves in question after the Foreign Secretary’s initial response was 
queried by Louis Chamerovzow, Secretary of the BFASS.165 While the instruction to 
                                                        
161 Mr. Vines to Earl Clarendon, 30 July 1855, in Correspondence on Slave Trade, April 1855-March 
1856 (Class B), P.P. 0.2. pp. 224-230. 
 
162 Earl Clarendon to Mr. Vines, 12 October 1855, in Ibid p. 230. 
 
163 Ibid p. 230.  
 
164 Mr. Vines to Earl Clarendon, 30 July 1855, Enclosure 6 in Ibid p. 230.  
 
165 Eight days elapsed between Clarendon’s initial reply and his instructions to free the slaves in 
question, see Earl Clarendon to Mr. Vines, 20 October 1855, in Ibid p. 230. In the meantime, the 
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manumit these three individuals represented a small victory for the Society, 
Clarendon’s handling of the case is also surely an indication that the state viewed the 
issue of British slaveholding with less urgency than it had during the previous 
decade.166 
 
While the state would act, albeit inconsistently, in the case of obvious infractions such 
as Vines’ purchase of slaves, its response to another allegation in the same year once 
again exposed British legislation as ill-equipped to deal with other types of 
entanglement, even those that the in words of the British consul at Bahia ‘create such 
a powerful interest in the preservation of slavery that it must ultimately defeat its so 
much wished-for extinction.’167 Consul Morgan was referring broadly to slave life 
insurance and specifically to the involvement of a British subject, Thomas Giolma, in 
the management of the Previdência insurance company’s recently established branch 
at Bahia. Morgan was clearly aware of the distinction that separated the slave trade 
from Britain’s position of non-interference in slavery, so he set about framing his case 
against Giolma as an accusation of complicity in the slave trade. The Previdência 
company, established in 1854 by French merchants Carlos Le Blon and Estevão 
Bernard, offered annual insurance policies against the natural death of slaves between 
                                                        
BFASS had written to the Foreign Secretary suggesting that Jacinto, Ildefonço and Elena should be 
freed. See ASR,  3.11 (Nov.1855) pp. 250-251.  
 
166 In fact, it is not clear if the individuals in question were granted their freedom. In a letter of 
January 1856. Vines confirmed that Elena would be free at 18 and said nothing more about the boys 
other than that they had been delivered Dickon’s father-in-law by way of the Brazilian authorities. 
See Mr. Vines to Earl Clarendon, 1 January 1856, in Correspondence on Slave Trade, April 1855-
March 1856 (Class B), P.P. 0.2. pp. 233-234.  
 
167 Mr. Morgan to Earl Clarendon, 10 October 1856, in Correspondence on Slave Trade, April 1856-
March 1857 (Class B), P.P. 2282 pp. 215-217.  
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the ages of 12 and 45.168 Though not a specialist insurer against maritime risk, the 
company’s decision to establish branches in Bahia, under the direction of Giolma, and 
in Pernambuco, to be managed by another British subject, Charles Nathan, was partly 
to take advantage of the growing slave trade between the provinces of the northeast 
and southeast of the country. Though Giolma insisted it was not for a policy against 
maritime risk, the company charged a premium of one percent for the transport of 
slaves from one province to another.169 It was on this basis that Morgan framed his 
allegation, believing Giolma’s involvement in this aspect of the business to be in 
contravention of the prohibitions against insuring slaving voyages, as outlined in the 
1824 Act and reiterated in the 1843 law.170 However, the Law Officers of the Crown 
were unconvinced by Morgan’s argument, stating that the Acts referred to by the 
consul referred to ‘the insurance of adventures in slaves and not in terms against 
insurance effected on their lives’.171  For this reason, Giolma could not be found 
criminally liable, even though Clarendon agreed with Morgan that Giolma was ‘acting 
against the spirit of the statute.’172 The legal limits of official interference had been 
defined and now the slave trade to Brazil had ceased, there was no ambition to push 
for an extension to these powers.  
 
                                                        
168 For the company’s articles of association, see C. Le Blon and E. Estevão, Estatuos da companhia 
de seguros contra a mortalidade dos escravos: Previdencia (Rio de Janeiro, Typ. G. Leuzinger, 1854) 
[available at http://www2.senado.leg.br/bdsf/bitstream/handle/id/242376/000093980.pdf?sequence=1 
accessed 14/08/2018]. On the slave insurance industry in Rio de Janeiro, see A.J.F. Payar, ‘A 
Escravidão entre os seguros: as seguradoras na provincia do Rio de Janeiro, 1831-1888’ (Unpublished 
MA thesis, Universidade de São Paulo, 2012).  
 
169 Mr. Giolma to Mr. Morgan, Correspondence on Slave Trade, April 1856-March 1857 (Class B), 
P.P. 2282 pp. 216-217.  
 
170 Mr. Morgan to Mr. Giolma, 10 October 1856, in Ibid p. 216.  
 
171 Earl Clarendon to Mr. Morgan, 27 January 1857, in Ibid pp. 219-220.  
 
172 Ibid p. 220.  
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In spite of these notable, albeit largely frustrated, efforts to implement the provisions 
of the 1843 Act, evidence once again suggests that some British officials in Brazil 
remained silent on other possible violations of this law. A rare critical voice to break 
this silence was that of Reverend Charles Grenfell Nicolay, a firebrand clergyman who 
arrived in Bahia in 1858 to assume direction of the British community’s Church of St. 
George.173 Only a short time after his arrival, Nicolay was shocked to discover that 
not only were there a number of slaveholders within his congregation, but that some 
may have acquired this property illegally after 1843. After initially writing to the 
Bishop of London on the issue, Nicolay was directed to request guidance from the 
Bishop of St. Helena.174 In this memorandum, the Reverend outlined his key concerns 
of what he called a ‘subject dangerous and difficult in the extreme.’175 Despite his 
objections on moral grounds, Nicolay reluctantly acknowledged that some British 
slaveholding was legal; a recognition of the 1843 Act’s non-retroactive application. 
However, in his next two points the clergyman clearly challenged the legality of a 
portion of British held-slaves in the city. According to Nicolay, there were British 
residents who purchased slaves irrespective of the legislation and there were those 
who adopted alternative strategies in order to circumvent the law, including by ‘titles 
which no one cares to dispute’.176 The Reverend later made clear that he included the 
consul, John Morgan, in this category of ‘no one’, lamenting that he could not count 
                                                        
173 For a biography of Nicolay, see P.E. Playford and I. Pridmore, 'Nicolay, Charles Grenfell (1815–
1897)', Australian Dictionary of Biography, (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1974) 
[http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/nicolay-charles-grenfell-4302/text6969 accessed 20/08/2018]. On 
the Protestant community in Bahia, see E da Silva, 'Cidadãos de outra patria: Anglicanos e batistas na 
Bahia’  
 
174 E da Silva, 'Cidadãos de outra pátria: Anglicanos e batistas na Bahia’ pp. 154-155.  
 
175 Reverend C.G. Nicolay to the Bishop of St. Helena, exact date unknown (late 1860 or early 1861), 
LPL, Tait 424, ff. 96-97.  
 
176 Ibid f. 97. These strategies are discussed in greater detail in Chapter II.  
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on his help in this matter. Given his conduct in the Giolma case four years previous, 
rather than a case of active complicity, we can view Morgan’s failure to act more as a 
passive resignation of his own weak agency and the limits of the 1843 Act. As other 
cases had shown, robust evidence was hard to come by; even if a British subject was 
deemed to be guilty, if they remained in Brazil they would not face justice; finally, as 
he himself had seen in the Giolma case, the Foreign Office showed little urgency for 
their consuls to investigate these matters following the suppression of the slave trade. 
Reverend Nicolay, newly-arrived and without any of this baggage, was not content 
with passive resignation or tolerant pragmatism; he wanted action and in a second 
letter to Lambeth Palace he proposed excluding the offending members of his 
congregation from communion.177 The Bishop of London’s return mirrored consul 
Morgan’s position on the matter, in that he refused to condemn those involved or take 
the investigation any further. The Bishop’s guidance that Nicolay should find a 
‘peaceful settlement’ through ‘personal communication and by persuasion’ rather than 
‘exclusion from the Lord’s table’ suggests he too was in favour of letting sleeping 
dogs lie.178  
 
If there was a British official in Brazil who did not let sleeping dogs lie, it was the 
arrogant maverick of a diplomat, William D. Christie.179 After all, his refusal to give 
up the question of the post-1831 Africans – a valid point but not an issue on which he 
had official instructions from London – was arguably the underlying cause of the 
                                                        
177 Reverend C.G. Nicolay to the Bishop of London, 11 June 1861, LPL, Tait 424, ff. 107-108. 
 
178 Ibid ff. 107-108.  
 
179 In addition to arrogant, Graham describes Christie as ‘at times sarcastic, sophist, and full of false 
accusations’. See R. Graham, ‘Os fundamentos da ruptura de relações diplomáticas entre o Brasil e a 
Grã-Bretanha em 1863: "A questão Christie.”’ Revista de História, 24.49 (1962), p. 121.  
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eponymous Affair and the severing of diplomatic relations. 180  In contrast to his 
intransigence towards the Brazilian government, it appears that Christie was indeed 
willing to take a more tolerant view of the slaveholding of his countrymen. There are 
three reasons that support this interpretation. Firstly, despite the fact that Reverend 
Nicolay wrote to him on the issue of slaveholding in Bahia, it appears that no further 
action, in a formal sense at least, was taken on the matter.181 The second point concerns 
the impropriety of British mining companies in their dealings with their enslaved 
labour force. It is the case that Christie showed some concern for the fate of 400 slaves 
of now defunct Imperial Brazilian Mining Company. Their sale had been initially 
postponed in 1859 after questions were raised over its legality under the 1843 Act; a 
fact which appeared to be confirmed when their proposed buyer failed in his attempt 
to push the sale through the English courts.182 However, only a year later, this decision 
was overturned on appeal and Christie was left in doubt about whether he should take 
further action so wrote to Lord Russell for guidance.183  By the time the Foreign 
Secretary’s advice, that the sale was illegal, reached Christie, it had already 
occurred.184 After learning that Santos proposed to lease the slaves to a British mining 
company, the St. John Del Rey, Christie’s attitude noticeably softened. Despite the 
                                                        
180 In correspondence with London, Christie acknowledged that he had not received instructions on 
the wider issue of the post-1831 Africans but had raised it with the Brazilian government 
nevertheless. See Mr. Christie to Lord Russell, 27 May 1861, in Correspondence on Slave Trade, 
1861 (Class B), P.P. 2959, pp. 44-46. Also, Mr. Christie to Lord Russell, 24 June 1861, in Ibid, p. 53.  
 
181 Nicolay wrote a joint letter with unnamed representatives of a ‘British mercantile house who used 
a Brazilian proxy to purchase slaves used in their establishment. This case is discussed in Chapter II.  
 
182 In his treatment of the case, Kelly characterises it as an anti-slavery victory, though he appears 
unaware of the decision having been overturned on appeal and that the slaves were indeed sold to 
Santos. See J. Kelly ‘The Problem of Anti-slavery’ p. 201.  
 
183 Mr. Christie to Lord Russell, 24 September 1860, in Correspondence on Slave Trade, April 1860-
March 1861 (Class B) P.P. 2823-l, pp. 53-54.  
 
184 Lord Russell to Mr. Christie, 8 December 1860, in Ibid, p. 55.  
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fact that an illegal sale of slaves had taken place, Christie, later with the tacit support 
of Russell, chose not to take the matter any further.185 It seems that both men preferred 
to avoid the controversy that any further action might entail. However, that would not 
ring true in the case of the St. John Del Rey Company’s illegal enslavement of 385 
labourers it had hired from the defunct Brazilian National Company. As referenced in 
the Introduction, the failure to free these slaves at the end of their 14-year term in 1859 
was, in 1879, scandalised by Brazilian abolitionist, Joaquim Nabuco. Christie had 
been aware of strong allegations of impropriety as early as 1860, yet seemingly chose 
not to push the issue, citing a lack of available evidence.186 This brings us to the point 
of illegal enslavement more generally. British mining companies had long been 
accused of having purchased Africans brought into Brazil after 1831.187 Although 
Christie brought similar cases he had found in Rio’s newspaper columns to the 
attention of the Brazilian Foreign Minister, once again he failed to broach the issue 
with the St. John Del Rey company. In truth, British officials had little room to 
manoeuver in the wider case of post-1831 Africans in British ownership. The 1843 
Act had legitimised any slaves bought before its enactment, whether legally obtained 
or otherwise. Nevertheless, Christie’s passivity in other cases is evidence that even the 
most zealous anti-slavery official could hold ambivalent attitudes when it came to the 
slaveholding of their countrymen.  
 
                                                        
185 Christie stated that he would warn the agents of the British mining companies, but this referred to 
their future conduct and not the recent sale to Santos. See Mr. Christie to Lord Russell, 24 January 
1861, in Correspondence on Slave Trade, 1861 (Class B), P.P. 2959, p. 
186 Mr. Christie to Lord Russell, 24 December 1860, in Ibid p. 33.  
 
187 George Pilkington alerted British readers to this fact in 1841. See ASR, 2.17 (Aug 1841) pp. 179-
180. 
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The period between the end of the ‘Christie Affair’ in 1865 and Brazilian abolition in 
1888 saw very little political will to interfere in the slaveholding interests of British 
subjects in Brazil. The repeal of the Aberdeen Act was symbolical acknowledgement 
of a fact long-observed by British officials in Brazil; the illegal slave trade had been 
effectively suppressed and there was little chance of its resuscitation. It was also after 
the Christie Affair that the anti-slavery state made explicitly clear its intention to limit 
its role to a watching brief. On his arrival in Brazil, the newly appointed British 
Minister was advised by the Earl of Clarendon to refrain from ‘enter[ing] upon former 
matters of controversy connected with this question.’188 Though the Foreign Secretary 
was referring specifically to the emancipados question, his advice should be 
understood in the wider context of Stephen Lushington’s Slave Instructions of the 
same year which made a clear distinction between the slave trade, ‘which Great Britain 
is determined to put down, and the system of domestic slavery, with which she does 
not claim to interfere.’189 The state’s interest in British slaveholding in Brazil had 
always been tied to its efforts to suppress the slave trade. Now that this link had been 
severed once and for all, there was less appetite than there had ever been to interfere 
in a question that had been largely resolved in 1843 anyway. Indeed, as we observed, 
it would take the agitation of Nabuco and not any anti-slavery official to expose the 
illegal practices of the St. John Del Rey company. Only when Nabuco had realised the 
scandal Christie had earlier hoped to avoid, did the Foreign Office condemn the 
company. Even then, the only punishment it faced on the part of the British 
                                                        
188 Earl Clarendon to Mr. Thornton, 25 November 1865, in Correspondence on Slave Trade, 1865 
(Class B) P.P. 3635-I p. 12.  
 
189 See Hansard HC Deb. 22 February 1876, vol. 227 c. 755. Lushington’s Instructions were quoted 
verbatim by Gathorne Hardy MP during debates over the controversial Fugitive Slave Circulars 
which instructed British naval commanders to refrain from obstructing the capture of slaves seeking 
refuge on their vessels. See R. Huzzey ‘The moral geography of British anti-slavery responsibilities.’ 
pp. 131-132.  
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government was the withdrawal of diplomatic support for a reduction in gold taxes.190 
After the state’s reluctant involvement in this controversy, there is no record of any 
further official interference or investigation into the slaveholding or investments in 
slave property.191  
 
Concluding remarks 
 
The anti-slavery state’s policy concerning British complicity in Brazilian slavery was 
characterized by ambivalence; a product of its attempts to reconcile its anti-slavery 
objectives with ambitions for the expansion of British trade and investment. This 
chapter has shown how this ambivalence was codified in legislation and physically 
embodied by British officials in Brazil over three distinct periods. In the first decade 
after emancipation in the West Indies, British investments in Brazilian slavery 
continued without fear of reprehension by the state, in spite of the fact that British 
enterprises and individuals were consumers of the illegal traffic that successive British 
governments were determined to extinguish. The most visible manifestation of 
ambivalence during this period was the slaveholding of various British officials in 
Brazil. Under pressure from abolitionists to adopt their expansive interpretation of 
complicity, the government enacted the 1843 Act and for the first time British 
slaveholding and other investments in slave property were brought within the moral 
geography of British anti-slavery responsibilities. However, the Act inherited the 
                                                        
190 M. Eakin, A British Enterprise in Brazil pp. 84-85; M. Childs, ‘A Case of “Great Unstableness” p. 
736.  
 
191 Parallel to the St. John Del Rey case, British officials briefly probed the legality of slaves in the 
possession of Mrs. Cowie, a Scottish widow in Recife. Inspired by Nabuco’s tactics, her right to own 
slaves had been questioned by abolitionists in this city. This case is explored in further detail by C. 
Campbell, ‘Making Abolition Brazilian’ pp. 521-543.  
 
 
114 
ambivalence of its legislative predecessors. On the one hand, it recognized that there 
was something inherently wrong with British investment in slavery, though only as 
this pertained to the promotion of the slave trade. On the other, it legitimised all slave 
property in British hands up to this point, without scrutinising its legality under 
international and Brazilian law, whilst also leaving open the possibility for future 
exploitation through a variety of workarounds, including hiring. The limited ambitions 
of the 1843 Act can be attributed to the state’s upholding of the traditions of 
emancipation in the West Indies, as well as the commercial lobby’s success in 
defending their right to slave labour. 
 
Even though attempts were made to implement the law during the peak period of 
official interest in British slaveholding, its effectiveness was hamstrung by two major 
issues. Firstly, the practicality of investigating with limited resources and enforcing 
British law across political borders proved problematic. Secondly, its implementation 
suffered from the ambivalence of some British officials who struggled to reconcile 
their role as both anti-slavery agents and guarantors of the prosperity of British trade 
and investment. It was these moments that produced the silences and elision that 
punctuate the historical record. During the gradual dissipation of official interest in 
the issue following the suppression of the slave trade, ambivalent attitudes lingered on 
and it took Brazilian abolitionists, not the anti-slavery state, to expose the illegal 
slaveholding of British investors. In the end as the case of Richard Gumbleton Daunt 
makes clear, it would be slave resistance and Brazil’s own abolition which finally 
extinguished the last vestiges of this exploitative relationship. 
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Chapter II - Silent Beneficiaries: British Slaveholding Beyond Brazilian 
Mines 
 
 
The British-owned goldmining companies of Minas Gerais were amongst the most 
vocal opponents of Lord Brougham’s bill to legislate against British slaveholding in 
foreign territories. As we observed in the previous chapter, through the lobbying of 
their parliamentary representatives, these companies managed to obtain important 
concessions during the bill’s reading. As a result, the final legislation neither 
dispossessed them of the slaves they already owned nor prevented them from 
exploiting hired slave labour in the future. These companies were undoubtedly the 
single largest beneficiaries of the lobbying they themselves commissioned. However, 
there were a whole host of other British slaveholders who took no part in these 
activities yet benefitted from the same concessions. Unlike enterprises such as the St. 
John Del Rey Mining Company, very little is known about the silent beneficiaries who 
exploited slave labour in a variety of urban and rural contexts. The purpose of this 
chapter is to shine new light on this diverse group who, despite collectively owning 
nearly half of all British-held slaves, have largely escaped the attention of both 
contemporary abolitionists and modern historians.  
 
A more in-depth study of this group is possible owing to the identification of 
previously overlooked quantitative data in the form of a Brazil-wide British 
slaveholding census commissioned in 1848 by the then Foreign Secretary, Lord 
Palmerston. Although not without its limitations, this data offers unparalleled insights 
into the extent and diversity of British slaveholding in Brazil. In addition to allowing 
an analysis of the sectoral and geographic distribution of British slaveholding at the 
turn of the mid-nineteenth century, the data also provides a starting point to consult 
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other sources which offer new perspectives into the social history of these British 
slave-owners and to a lesser extent those enslaved by British masters. By consulting a 
range of sources indicated by other social histories of the British in Brazil, we can 
discuss the different origins of and avenues to slaveholding amongst British residents, 
in addition to trends over time. Finally, a better understanding of the extent and 
diversity of British slaveholding in Brazil offers an opportunity to reconsider the 
limitations of British anti-slavery policy, as well as the inconsistencies inherent in 
Britain’s identity as an anti-slavery nation.  
 
 
ii. Origins and Collection of the Data 
 
As we observed in Chapter I, Palmerston’s census of 1848-1849 was commissioned 
at the peak of official interest in the question of British slaveholding and other 
investment in Brazilian slave property. In order to best analyse the valuable 
information in this census, it is important to discuss how the data was collected and 
then presented to the Foreign Secretary. Doing so will allow us to consider possible 
inconsistencies in the census’ coverage and subsequent limitations of the overall data. 
The first point to make is that this census was only collected once. So, whilst its 
coverage and detail are unparalleled, the data is only representative of short period 
between December 1848 and March 1849.192 Although this means that the data cannot 
be used in isolation to discuss trends of British slaveholding, the information it 
contains can be cross-referenced with other primary and secondary sources in an 
                                                        
192 The first returns were sent from Maranhão and Bahia on 21 December 1848 and the last return is 
dated 17 March 1849.  
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attempt to widen the window of observation to the decades either side of the mid-
century.    
 
The second observation concerning the collection and the presentation of the data 
relates to the seven British consular districts in Brazil and the officials in charge of 
collecting information on British slaveholding within these regions. Figure 1 shows 
the Brazilian provinces which had official British representation in the form of a 
consul or acting consul in the case of Rio de Janeiro. The primary role of British 
consuls was the protection and promotion of British commercial interests, as well as 
to cater for the social and religious welfare of the British community.193 In addition, 
officials in Rio de Janeiro, Bahia and Pernambuco also expended considerable 
energies in anti-slave trade activities before 1850.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
193 On the role of consuls in this period see D.C.M.Platt, Cinderella Service: British Consuls since 
1825 (London: Longman, 1971) pp. 16-21. On their anti-slavery duties see D. Eltis, Economic 
Growth pp. 111-112.  
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Figure 2.1: British Consular Districts in Brazil, 1848-1849.194 
 
 
                                                        
194 Figure 2.1 uses a modern map to represent British consular districts in the mid 19th century. 
Although there are important differences between the states of the modern Republic and the provinces 
of the Empire of Brazil, the borders of the modern map can be considered analogous to those of the 
then provinces. 
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The British communities in these regions were small, largely composed of merchants 
linked to the import-export trade and were concentrated in the major port cities which 
also served as provincial capitals. Reliable population statistics for these communities 
are scarce. Guenther estimates that there were between 120 and 150 British subjects 
residing in Bahia at the mid-century and a British visitor in Pernambuco in the early 
1850s had heard that the community numbered over 300.195 Although there are no 
figures for the mid-century, a visitor to Rio de Janeiro in 1825 estimated the British 
population to be around 600 and census figures from 1872 show 966 British subjects 
living in the urban and rural parishes of the city.196 Somewhere between these two 
figures is likely a best guess. The smaller communities at Maranhão, Pará and Rio 
Grande do Sul probably did not number many more than 50 individuals each and it is 
unlikely that Paraíba had in excess of a handful of British residents.197  
 
Drawn primarily from the resident merchant body, consuls would have been well 
acquainted with most British subjects in the port cities where they were based. 
Nevertheless, the districts they were in charge of were geographically vast and 
although there were few British subjects living in the interior of these regions, there is 
evidence that the coverage of the census did not extend to some of these isolated 
individuals. The example of the consular district of Rio de Janeiro is particularly 
illustrative of this point. This district not only included the city of Rio de Janeiro 
(muncípio neutro) and Rio de Janeiro province but also incorporated the neighbouring 
                                                        
195 L. Guenther, British Merchants in nineteenth-century Brazil p. 62.; C. B. Mansfield, Paraguay, 
Brazil, and the Plate: Letters written in 1852-1853 (Cambridge: Macmillan, 1861) p.74.  
 
196 Geyer, P.F., (ed.) Diários do Almirante Graham Eden Hammond (Rio de Janeiro: Editora JB, 
1984) p. 24; L.C.Soares, 'Urban Slavery in Nineteenth Century Rio de Janeiro’ (PhD Thesis, 
University of London, 1988) p. 466.  
 
197 In 1826, the British community in Maranhão and Pará numbered 57 and 45 respectively. See I. 
Sargen, Our Men in Brazil p. 84 and p. 133.  
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provinces of Minas Gerais and São Paulo. Acting Consul Westwood’s return includes 
British slaveowners from all these regions including the mines of Minas Gerais and a 
sugar planter in São Paulo but omits known examples such as John Rudge, owner of 
plantations in both Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, and British-owned foundries in the 
Campos region of Rio de Janeiro.198 It is therefore plausible that there are similar 
omissions, albeit probably small in number, of other British slave owners in the 
interior who left no trace in the historical record.  
 
The varying competency of individual consuls and the stringency, or lack thereof, of 
their methods of data collection also contribute to inconsistencies in coverage of the 
nationwide census. The returns were not completed on a standardised form and across 
the different districts there is a wide range in the level of detail submitted. The most 
detailed return was from H. Augustus Cowper, British Consul at Pernambuco, a 
district which included the Brazilian provinces of Pernambuco and Alagoas. The 
information is presented in tabular form and includes a fair amount of detail about 
both the slave-owners and their slaves. In addition to the name of the individual or 
firm, Cowper also lists twenty different professions or business areas including 
merchants, engineers, doctors, planters, publicans and stable keepers. In terms of the 
slaves they employed, the table includes three sectors of activity: domestic, agriculture 
and foundry. The Consul also recorded the number of male and female slaves in each 
sectoral category as well as a section for observations on individual slaveowners. One 
                                                        
198 Both John Rudge’s properties in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo were called Morumbi. For details 
on Rudge’s property in Rio de Janeiro, see E.D. Cardoso, ‘O Capital Imobiliário e a Produção de 
Espaços Diferenciados no Rio de Janeiro: o Grajaú’ Revista Brasileira da Geografia, 51.1 (1989) pp. 
92-93. In São Paulo, Rudge used slave labour to produce tea on his Morumbi estate, see D. Kidder 
and J. Fletcher, Brazil and the Brazilians: Portrayed in historical sketches (Philadelphia: Childs and 
Peterson, 1857) p. 421. British owned foundries are discussed in further detail in the ‘Urban 
Slaveholding’ section of this chapter.  
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such observation makes clear that Cowper had contacted all 46 individuals or firms 
specifically on this matter.199 We know that Consul R. Falconer Corbett at Maranhão 
had a similar approach as he enclosed a copy of the survey he sent to all British 
subjects in his district.200 As a result, the slaveholding census from this district has a 
similar level of detail to Pernambuco. The same can be said of Edward Porter’s return 
from Bahia and John Morgan’s from Rio Grande do Sul.201 
 
 
At the opposite end of the scale in terms of detail are the returns from Pará and Paraíba. 
Consul Beverly Newcomen’s reply from Paraíba lists three British slaveowners in his 
province, but does not provide the number of slaves, only to add that all three British 
subjects employed their slaves in both domestic and agricultural contexts. When it 
comes to analyse the data, these entries will be considered as one slave per owner as 
it has not been possible to obtain more accurate figures from other sources. 202 
Similarly, the return from Richard Ryan in Pará only consists of one paragraph which 
explains the trouble he had faced acquiring the relevant data from British subjects in 
his district. One planter made a return of 35 slaves but as 11 of the 13 individuals he 
addressed on the matter had not replied, he goes on to estimate that one British subject 
                                                        
199 Mr. Cowper to Viscount Palmerston, 21 December 1848, in Correspondence on Slave Trade, 
1848-49 (Class B), P.P, 1128, pp. 139-140 (Hereafter referred to as Census Return – Pernambuco). 
 
200 Mr. Corbett to Viscount Palmerston 21 December 1848, in Ibid pp. 128-131 (Hereafter referred to 
as Census Return – Maranhão) 
 
201 Mr. Porter to Viscount Palmerston, 16 February 1849, in Correspondence on Slave Trade, 1848-49 
(Class B), P.P, 1291 p. 107 (Hereafter referred to as Census Return – Bahia); Consul Morgan to 
Viscount Palmerston, in Ibid p. 165 (Hereafter referred to as Census Return – Rio Grande do Sul). 
 
202 This is almost definitely an underestimate but with no way of verifying exact numbers this was 
deemed the fairest estimate. See Mr. Newcomen to Viscount Palmerston, 30 November 1848, in 
Correspondence on Slave Trade, 1848-49 (Class B), P.P, 1291 p. 131 (Hereafter referred to as Census 
Return – Paraíba).  
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held between 50 and 60 slaves and the rest held approximately 20 between them.203 
Ryan makes clear his belief that this lack of cooperation was intentional on the part of 
these British slaveowners. The same issue is also noted by the Consuls at Pernambuco 
and Maranhão. The reasons for such reluctance is not stated explicitly, but it is 
possibly related to a fear on the part of some British slaveowners that they could be 
accused of contravening British slave trade legislation. As we observed in Chapter I, 
the 1840s was the peak period of official interest in British slaveholding and only two 
years previously the transactions of British residents in Paraíba and Pernambuco had 
been investigated for potentially breaching the provisions of the 1843 Act. Whatever 
the reason, their reluctance forced Consuls to make estimations which inevitably 
affects accuracy of the overall data. 
 
The census return from the consular district of Rio de Janeiro presents its own 
particular idiosyncrasies and as it was the region with both the largest British 
community and British-held slave population it deserves special mention. Of all seven 
returns, the census compiled by Acting Consul John J.C Westwood provides the most 
information about British slaveholders. In addition to the name of the individual or 
enterprise and their area of business, Westwood’s tabular return also includes their 
‘place of residence.’  This will prove particularly useful to our analysis as 15 out of 
the 16 entries completed by Westwood concern establishments outside the confines of 
the city of Rio de Janeiro.204 These include three British mining companies in Minas 
                                                        
203 Consul Ryan to Viscount Palmerston, 17 March 1849 in Ibid p.127 (Hereafter referred to as 
Census Return – Pará).  
 
204 This includes two entries for coffee plantations in Tijuca. Although Tijuca is well within the 
confines of the modern city of Rio de Janeiro, Westwood describes it as being ’12 miles from the 
city.’ See Mr. Westwood to Viscount Palmerston, 28 December 1848, in Correspondence on Slave 
Trade, 1848-49 (Class B), P.P, 1128, p. 152 (Hereafter referred to as Census Return – Rio de 
Janeiro). 
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Gerais as well as various plantations and other agricultural concerns. The one entry 
relating to British slaveholding in the city of Rio de Janeiro is a grouping of ‘about 
sixty British subjects owners and managing British commercial houses and other 
establishments.’205 Unfortunately for our purposes, unlike his counterparts in Bahia, 
Pernambuco, Maranhão and Rio Grande do Sul, Westwood did not list the names of 
these individual establishments and more importantly their collective slaveholding 
was given as an estimate. Estimates, rather than accurate figures, also account for eight 
of the other 15 entries in the Acting Consul’s return. This suggests that in the majority 
of cases individual slave owners were either not directly consulted or did not provide 
the information requested. Either way, these estimations reduce confidence in the 
overall accuracy of Westwood’s return. While a similar issue in Pará only affects a 
small proportion of the countrywide survey, the consular district of Rio de Janeiro 
accounts for around three quarters of all British slaveholding in 1848. In order to 
mitigate for these possible inaccuracies, wherever possible, the data in all consular 
returns will be cross referenced with other available source material. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
205 Ibid  
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iii. Analysis of the data 
According to Palmerston’s census of 1848 the number of slaves held by British 
masters totaled approximately 3400 individuals.206 Though this number is clearly a 
tiny proportion of the two million or more slaves in Brazil at the mid-nineteenth 
century, it represents more than double the estimate given by Viscount Sandon in the 
House of Commons just five years earlier.207 Like other contemporary discussions of 
British slave-ownership abroad, it is likely that Sandon’s estimate was based largely 
on what was known about British mining companies. Using the data in the 1848 
census, this section will analyse the facets of British slaveholding in Brazil which 
seemingly appeared less readily in the minds of politicians and anti-slavery 
campaigners in Britain. The analysis will bring to light the diversity of geographic, 
sectoral and demographic distribution of the unknown half of British slaveholding in 
Brazil. In turn, this offers new perspectives on the complex and often inconsistent 
relationship between anti-slavery identity and foreign policy forged on metropolitan 
shores and the business interests and everyday lives of British subjects abroad.  
 
Perhaps the most unsurprising finding of the census is that British slaveholding is 
present across all seven consular districts. As Robert Conrad notes, slavery in Brazil 
was of ‘extraordinary economic and social importance even in non-coffee areas.’208 
                                                        
206 In cases where returns gave estimates between two numbers, a mid-point was used for this total. 
For example, Consul Westwood estimates the number of slaves to be held by the National Brazilian 
Mining Company at ‘300 to 400.’ A total of 350 was taken. Likewise, the figure for the grouping of 
60 establishments in Rio de Janeiro ‘who employ domestic Slaves, averaging from 3 to 6 to each 
establishment’ was taken at 4.5. In the case of Paraíba where the number of slaves was omitted, a 
figure of one slave per individual was used.  
 
207 On population estimates, see R. Graham, ‘1850-1870’, in ed. L. Bethell (ed.) Brazil Empire and 
Republic, 1822-1930 (Vol. 3) (Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 113. For Viscount Sandon’s 
estimate of British slaveholding in Brazil see Hansard, H.C. Deb., 18 August 1843, vol. 71 c. 947. 
 
208 R. Conrad, The Destruction of Brazilian Slavery, 1850-1888 (University of California Press, 1972) 
p. 5. 
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All of Brazil’s major exports relied to some extent on slave labour and slaves were 
also used in production for the domestic market.  Moreover, in the first half of the 
nineteenth century in particular, slaves were prevalent in urban centres and were 
employed in a wide range of professions.209 What Conrad calls the ‘omnipresence of 
slavery’ is represented in the demographic data for Brazilian provinces covered by 
British consular districts in 1854 (see Table 1). Whilst the table reflects the 
concentration of slavery in the coffee producing southeast of the country - a trend 
which would intensify in the following decades - it also shows significant slave 
populations in all provinces which had British consular representation. 
 
Table 2.1: Estimates of free and slave populations in Brazilian provinces 
covered by British consular districts in 1854.210 
 
                                                        
209 Discussed in a section in this chapter on urban slaveholding.  
 
210 Compiled using data from T. R. Botelho, ‘População e espaço nacional no Brasil do século XIX,’ 
Cadernos de História 7.8 (2005) p. 78.  
 
Consular District Province  Free Population Slave Population Total Population 
   Number % Number %  
Bahia Bahia 904,615 82.24 195,385 17.76 1,100,000 
Maranhão Maranhão 262,177 72.83 98,823 27.17 360,000 
Pará Pará 173,750 83.78 33,650 16.22 207,400 
Paraíba Paraíba 187,767 89.71 21,533 10.29 209,300 
Pernambuco Pernambuco 780,422 82.15 169.578 17.85 950,000 
  Alagoas 170,175 83.34 34.025 16.66 204,200 
Rio de Janeiro Neutral 
Municipality 
(Corte) 
103,294 68.06 48,482 31.94 151,776 
  Rio de Janeiro 524,206 50.01 524,018 49.99 1,048,224 
  Minas Gerais 966,419 74.34 333,581 25.66 1,300,000 
  São Paulo 379,379 75.88 120,621 24.12 500,000 
Rio Grande do Sul Rio Grande 
do Sul 150,802 74.91 61,148 30.38 201,300 
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iii.a Regional distribution of British slaveholding 
 
Figure 3 shows the geographic distribution of British-held slaves in Brazil across the 
seven consular districts. Whilst this distribution does not correlate precisely with the 
data in table 1, it does show an overwhelming concentration of slaves employed by 
British masters in the Rio de Janeiro consular district. 2501 slaves, 76% of the 
nationwide total, resided in the three provinces of Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo and Minas 
Gerais, as well as the município neutro (city of Rio de Janeiro). There are various 
factors which explain this high concentration. Significantly, this region, or the 
province of Minas Gerais specifically, was home to three British mining companies 
who employed 50% of all the slaves covered by the 1848 census. Nevertheless, even 
without the 1650 slaves of the St John Del Rey, Imperial Brazilian and National 
Brazilian companies, the Rio de Janeiro region still accounts for more than the 
combined total of the six other consular districts. One reason for this is 
straightforward; as Brazil’s political and commercial capital, the city of Rio de Janeiro 
was home to Brazil’s largest British community. Perhaps unsurprisingly the biggest 
community also accounted for the largest number of individual slaveholders. This is 
represented in Figure 4, a visualisation of all non-mining entries included in the 
consular returns. Each quadrant represents an individual slave-owner and the size of 
the quadrangle represents the number of slaves held by the individual concerned. The 
entries have then been grouped by colour to represent consular district. The graphic 
shows that not only did the Rio de Janeiro region contain the most slaves it also was 
home to more individual British slave owners than any other region.   
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Figure 2.2: Geographic Distribution of British Slaveholding, 1848-1849. 
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While the aforementioned doubts over population sizes make it impossible to calculate 
a ratio of slaves to British residents, the data visualised in Figure 4 shows that the two 
largest communities, Rio de Janeiro and Pernambuco respectively, were home to the 
greatest number of individual slaveholders and slaves owned. However, this 
correlation does not appear across the rest of the consular districts. The figure for 
Maranhão, for example, is slightly larger than Bahia, despite the latter having a much 
larger British community. This case can be explained by the presence of large-scale 
slaveholders responsible for a high percentage of total slaves. In fact, across all 
consular districts, twenty-two medium and large-scale slaveholders, i.e. those 
possessing between 20 to 49 and 50 to 99 slaves respectively, held 62% of the total 
number of non-mining British-owned slaves with the remaining 38% split between 
157 small- (5 to 19) and micro-scale (1 to 4) proprietors.211 While all regions aside 
from Paraíba were home to at least one British subject with 20 slaves or more, it is the 
concentration of medium and large-scale owners in Rio de Janeiro which accounts for 
the region’s overrepresentation in the nationwide figures. The concentration of 
slaveholding within a small group of individuals is strongly related to the economic 
activities of these British subjects, with all but two of them involved in agricultural 
production. The reasons for this will be discussed in the following sections which 
analyse the sectoral distribution of British held slaves in agricultural and urban 
contexts.  
 
 
 
                                                        
211 The categorisation of Brazilian slaveowners by the number of slaves owned is proposed by 
Ricardo Salles in his study of Vassouras. See R. Salles, E o Vale Era o Escravo: Vassouras, Século 
XIX. Senhores e Escravos no Coração do Império. (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2008) pp. 
155-171. 
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iii.b Sectoral distribution of British slaveholding 
 
As Figure 2.4 indicates, when considered together, the agricultural and urban sectors 
represent just over half of all British slaveholding recorded in the 1848 census, yet 
unlike the mining sector very little is known about them. Each following subsection 
will use the census data to survey the extent of slaveholding in each sector and, where 
the historical record permits, this analysis will be complemented with qualitative 
research into individual case studies. 
 
 
 
 Figure 2.4: Sectoral distribution of British Slaveholding 
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First though, it is important to make a number of points about the categorisation 
employed. To a large degree, the chosen categories were informed by the language 
used in the consular returns.  In most cases entries were recorded using these exact 
terms or similar vocabulary, for example predial for agricultural. Though the returns 
referred to slaves employed in cities as ‘domestics’, these individuals have been placed 
in a broader ‘urban’ category to better reflect the varied roles many performed outside 
British households. In other instances, the relevant categories for individual 
slaveowners were determined by their respective professions, for example planter, 
farmer and so on. This method was used in cases such as Rio de Janeiro where the 
consul did not categorise by industry. The one case where no profession was listed, 
that of slaveowner Archibald Campbell in Pará, it was possible to determine the most 
suitable category by cross-referencing with other primary sources. Whilst categorising 
by the occupation of the slaveholder is the most appropriate alternative in cases where 
the returns do not itemise by slave profession, we will observe in the following 
sections that it does not adequately account for a considerable blurring between the 
agricultural and urban sectors.  
 
iii.b.i Agriculture 
 
According to the census, 938 slaves were employed by 25 British masters on 
agricultural establishments across Brazil. From the outset it should be stated that while 
a few of these establishments were of regional importance, overall British 
participation in Brazilian agriculture as a whole is negligible. Nevertheless, this 
section will argue that their existence at all is symbolic of the disconnect between 
British policy and the business interests of its subjects abroad.  Prominent  members 
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of the British merchant community and even a British vice-consul became part of the 
very same Brazilian planter class whose economic interests drove and whose socio-
political influence defended the illegal slave trade in defiance of increasing British 
pressure.212 Circumstantial evidence suggests that at least some of the 900 slaves 
working on British-owned agricultural establishments were imported illegally under 
both Anglo-Brazilian treaty obligations and Brazilian law. As observed in Chapter I, 
while British diplomats and consuls implicated Brazilian planters, amongst others, in 
their investigations, the very same agents of British anti-slavery policy seemingly 
turned a blind eye towards similar involvement by their countrymen. Lastly, in 
addition to new perspectives on this facet of British anti-slavery, case studies of 
British-owned agricultural establishments in Brazil also offer new insights into the 
social implications of this overlooked aspect of British investment in Brazil.  
 
This section adopts the use of ‘agricultural establishment’ as an umbrella term to 
reflect the wide variation in size and type of operation - from small semi-rural farms 
with a handful of slaves, to large specialised establishments supplying the domestic 
market and, lastly, to plantation complexes with up to 90 slaves producing typical cash 
crops, such as sugar and coffee, for export.  Figure 6 shows that 10 of the 25 British 
subjects with agricultural interests were micro- and small-scale slaveowners, i.e. 
possessing 19 slaves or less. The occupations listed by consuls and biographical 
information found in other sources suggest that, in the majority of these cases, 
agricultural production was not necessarily the primary economic interest of this group 
of individuals. Though that may have been the case for smallholders George Blandy 
                                                        
212 Tâmis Parron has termed this alliance ‘the politics of slavery in Brazil.’ See T. Parron,  
A política da escravidão no Império do Brasil, 1826-1865 (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 
2011) Also, J. Needell, The Party of Order: Conservatives, the State, and Slavery in the Brazilian 
Monarchy, 1831-1871 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006). 
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of Bahia and Richard R. Noble of Pernambuco, both listed as ‘planters,’ others had 
different professions. For example, Robert Landell of Rio Grande do Sul census was 
a doctor who led vaccination programmes in Porto Alegre, whereas William Wilson 
of Maranhão and Thomas Messiter of Rio Grande do Sul were merchants of long 
standing in their respective provinces.213 In Bahia, Henry S. Marback was a listed by 
the consul as a ‘ship-chandler’ [sic] though subsequent research has shown his firm 
had diverse interests, including the illegal transatlantic slave trade.214 The background 
of Richard Rogers, a British merchant in the small port of Paraíba, gives us an idea of 
the types of small agricultural establishments owned by the British residents 
elsewhere. In 1839, the American missionary, Daniel Kidder, visited Paraíba and 
stayed for a short time at the sítio of an Englishman he called ‘Mr. R.’ Kidder describes 
the estate as being ‘a farm in the city’ with a ‘large and airy house’ surrounded by an 
orchard, a yard of cows, a vegetable garden, fine springs and ‘many coffee trees.’215 
Although Kidder does not make reference to labour, it is very likely this estate on 
which Rogers employed the undefined number of slaves recorded by Consul 
Newcomen in 1848. Although this sítio has long disappeared, its legacy lives on in the 
leafy neighbourhood of Roger in the modern city of João Pessoa, Paraíba. 
 
                                                        
213 On Dr. Landell see J.C. de Miranda Castro, Relatório do vice-presidente da Província de São 
Pedro de Rio Grande do Sul (Porto Alegre: Typ. Porto-Alegrense, 1848) Table 17; William Wilson 
was one third of the the frim Hesketh, Wilson & Co. See, London Gazette, 27 March 1827; According 
to Census Return – Rio Grande do Sul, Messiter had lived in Brazil for over 30 years by 1848.  
 
214 P. Verger, Fluxo e refluxo do tráfico de escravos entre o Golfo do Benin e a Bahia de Todos os 
Santos, dos séculos XVII a XIX (São Paulo: Editora Corrupio, 1987) pp. 453-355. 
 
215 D. Kidder, Sketches of Residence and Travels in Brazil: Embracing Historical and Geographical 
Notices of the Empire and its Several Provinces, Volume II (Philadelphia: Sorin & Ball, 1845) pp. 
183-184 
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Kidder mentions that this type of an estate known in Paraíba as a sítio was known in 
Bahia as a roça and a chácara in Rio de Janeiro. Travel accounts of Rio de Janeiro in 
this period by the likes of Maria Graham and Charles Bunbury describe the chácaras 
of the suburban neighbourhoods of Laranjeiras, Catete and Botafogo, as well as the 
semi-rural districts of Engenho Novo and Tijuca, as being home to the city’s elite 
including its British residents.216 Kidder describes a chácara owned by an affluent 
Portuguese as resembling a ‘miniature plantation’ possessing 8 or 9 slaves.217 
 
The most well-known of these British country estates was probably that of Scotsman, 
Joseph Maxwell in Andaraí Grande, some 10km from the centre of the city. Maxwell 
had amassed a great fortune in trade between the United States and Brazil, and his 
firm, Maxwell, Wright & Co. were known to have maintained significant interests in 
the illegal slave trade.218 Regular visitors to Maxwell’s country estate included the 
young emperor, Dom Pedro II and the future Visconde do Rio Branco, who described 
the property as ‘an immense plain, on which stands a superb building whose grandeur 
competes only with the steep mountains which surround it.’219 
 
 
 
                                                        
216 L.C. Soares, ‘Urban Slavery in Rio de Janeiro’ p. 33.  
 
217 D. Kidder Sketches of Residence and Travels in Brazil: Embracing Historical and Geographical 
Notices of the Empire and its Several Provinces, Volume 1 (Philadelphia: Sorin & Ball, 1845) p. 158. 
 
218 See A. dos Santos Ribeiro, 'A firma Maxwell Wright & Co. no comércio do império do Brasil (c. 
1827- c. 1850)’ (Unpublished MA Dissertation, Universidade Federal Fluminense, 2014), in 
particular p. 88. Maxwell’s entanglement in the slave-economy i salso discussed in Chapter III of this 
thesis.  
 
219 B. Gerson, História das Ruas do Rio de Janeiro, 6th ed, (Rio de Janeiro: Bem-Te-Vi, 2015) p. 400. 
Translation by author.  
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Interestingly, neighbouring properties to Maxwell were well-established plantations, 
such as Fazenda do Macaco which had been gifted to Duchess of Bragança after her 
marriage to Dom Pedro I.220 Another, the Fazenda Morumbi, had been purchased by 
Maxwell’s English son-in-law, John Rudge in 1845.221 While there is no evidence to 
suggest that Maxwell’s estate was anything like the neighbouring plantations, in an 
interview with Gilberto Freyre in 1921, one of Maxwell’s nieces described growing 
up on her uncle’s property in a ‘solid mansion’ surrounded by a ‘great number of 
slaves…of all types.’222 Maxwell’s slaveholding did not feature specifically in the 
census data; neither did that of other British merchants who owned chácaras in Rio 
de Janeiro. The residential nature of these estates, as well as the likely mixed 
professions of the slaves attached to them, meant that the less-than-meticulous Consul 
Westwood included them all in a non-itemised domestic entry. 
 
The blurring of categories in the context of these country estates can best be observed 
in the case of Thomas Carroll of Pernambuco. He is listed in Consul Cowper’s return 
as owning ten domestic slaves, yet his profession is given as ‘gentleman farmer,’ 
meaning that he farmed primarily for status, deriving his main income from other 
sources. In a report of British merchant houses in Pernambuco in 1842 John Carroll & 
Co. is listed as a ‘victualers’.223 Newspaper reports of import manifests support the 
                                                        
220 L. Rose, Vila Isabel de rua em rua, (Rio de Janeiro: Ed. Rio, 2005) p. 20. 
 
221 Joseph Maxwell had acted as proxy in the purchase of this estate from the Viscondessa d’Alcantra. 
See E.D. Cardoso, ‘O Capital Imobiliário’ pp. 92-93.  
 
222 G. Freyre, Tempo de aprendiz: artigos publicados em jornais na adolescência e na primeira 
mocidade do autor, 1918-1926, Vol.1, (Instituição Brasileira de Difusão Cultural, 1979) pp. 175-176. 
 
223 Mr. H.A. Cowper to Lord Palmerston, 28 November 1848, TNA, FO 13/260. 
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view that as early as the late 1820s, Carroll’s main source of income was derived from 
selling imported foodstuffs.224 The same list from 1848 includes this business in the 
name of his son, John Carroll Jr, which seems to suggest that Carroll was, by that 
point, concentrating his efforts on the management of his estate on the outskirts of the 
city.225 Carroll had owned the sítio at Manguinhos since the late 1820s, which in the 
mid-1830s was described as being about 4 acres in size and planted with lime, orange, 
and breadfruit trees as well as coconut palms and coffee bushes.226 Although for sale 
and runaway-slave newspaper adverts placed by Carroll in the 1840s indicate that he 
employed a variety of domestic slaves, another advert for an overseer (feitor) who 
understood the grafting of orange trees indicates that slave labour was also used on his 
estate.227 
 
The example of John Carroll and his evolution from merchant to farmer is also 
indicative of the origins of many of the British owners of agricultural establishments 
with 20 slaves or more. In the Rio de Janeiro consular district William Platt, George 
March, Robert Coates, and William Whitaker were all merchants or had been in the 
past.228 The same is true for Archibald Campbell in Pará and Wellstood & Co. in 
                                                        
224 Diário de Pernambuco, 1830-1850.  
 
225 Mr. Cowper to Viscount Palmerston, 28 November 1848, TNA, FO 13/260. 
 
226 Diario de Pernambuco, 10 February 1835; Diario de Pernambuco, 23 February 1835. 
 
227 Advert for the sale of two slaves, a laundress and a shoemaker, Diario de Pernambuco 2 August 
1843. Notice that Manoel Caçange, a butcher, has runaway, Diario de Pernambuco,12 September 
1844 For overseer advert see Diario de Pernambuco 2 June 1846. 
 
228 Platt and March are both feature separately in a list of English merchants in Rio de Janeiro in 
1816, see ‘Almanaque do Rio de Janeiro de 1816’, Revista do IHGB 268 (1965) pp. 272-275. Coates 
(as part of the firm Coates Mackay & Co. is listed in a similar directory for 1827, see Almanak do Rio 
de Janeiro do Anno 1827, (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Imperial e Nacional, 1827) p. 169.  
 
 
 
138 
Maranhão.229 Of the others from whom we have reliable biographical information, at 
least two were medical doctors, Dr. George Reid and Dr. McCormack in Rio de 
Janeiro, whereas another two, Charles de Mornay of Pernambuco and Robert Falconer 
of Bahia, were engineers.230 The following section will attempt to explain how and 
why this group of merchants and professionals left the hubs of British activity in 
Brazil’s port cities to establish agricultural establishments with large numbers of 
slaves in the interior. Where the sources permit, individual case studies will be 
analysed to show why the economic activity of this group exposed the inconsistencies 
in British anti-slavery policy as it was administered ‘on the ground.’ 
 
While Guenther noted the limited nature of intermarriage in the British community in 
Bahia, within this small group of large-scale agricultural slave-owners unions with 
Brazilian women were common.231 In some cases, it is not clear whether the marriage 
had anything to do with their status as slave-holders. For example, it is not clear 
whether William Platt’s marriage to Luiza Eugênia de Carvalho was linked in any way 
to his coffee plantation and 90 slaves in Ilha Grande, which by the time of the census 
was in the hands of his heirs. In a similar vein, it is unclear whether William 
                                                        
229 On the commercial activity of Archibald and James Campbell, see H.L. Maw, Journal of a 
Passage from the Pacific to the Atlantic: Crossing the Andes in the Northern Provinces of Peru, and 
Descending the River Marañon Or Amazon (London: John Murray,1829) p. 380; the merchant firm 
Wellstood & Co arrived in Maranhão as Wellstood & Bingham around the year 1812, see J. de 
Viveiros, História do Comércio do Maranhão: 1612-1895 (São Luís: Associação Comercial do 
Maranhão, 1954) p. 122.  
 
230 ‘Dr. George Reid, Deceased’ London Gazette, 22 November 1870 p. 5195. McCormack is listed as 
a doctor resident on Ilha Grande in 1847, see Almanak Administrativo, Mercantil e Industrial do Rio 
de Janeiro para o Anno 1847 (Rio de Janeiro: Laemmert, 1847) p. 68. On Charles de Mornay’s long 
career in the northeast of Brazil, see F.R.A. de Barros, ABC das Alagoas: dicionário biobibliográfico, 
histórico e geográfico de Alagoas (Brasília: Senado Federal, 2005) p. 304. On Falconer, see O 
Crepúsculo, 10 December 1845 p. 144.  
  
231 The author does note that intermarriage may have occurred more frequently than shown in the 
sources she consulted. See, L. Guenther, British Merchants in Nineteenth-Century Brazil p. 68-69 
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Whitaker’s marriage to Angela da Costa Aguiar had any effect on his ownership of a 
sugar plantation and between 35 and 40 slaves in São Paulo. However, the subsequent 
marriages of their Brazilian-born offspring into rich landholding families, such as the 
Vergueiro and Souza Queiroz clans, resulted in the Whitakers and Platts holding 
important political positions in West of São Paulo from the 1860s onwards.232 Jeffrey 
Needell has noted the importance of marriage as a strategy for social ascension in 
Imperial Brazil, commenting that unions between the planter class and merchants were 
the most enduring method to join wealth with socio-political power. Planters married 
their daughters to merchants or merchants’ sons in order to acquire capital for 
investment and influence in the ports through which their produce passed. Similarly, 
merchants married into planter families in order to ‘integrate into the established, 
protected, and prestigious landholding class.’233  
 
In other cases, there is more explicit evidence that marriages into powerful, 
landholding families had a direct impact on the status of British residents as 
slaveholders. Archibald Campbell had been a merchant in Pará since as early as 1828 
and according to the explorer Henry Lister Maw, he and his brother James ran one of 
the most important commercial houses in the port of Belém.234 At some point between 
the visits of Maw in 1828 and 1845, Campbell had married Mariana Leocádia da Silva 
Pombo, the sister of the Barão de Jaguarari. The Silva Pombo family were extensive 
                                                        
232 Guilherme Platt married Maria Izabel Vergueiro Bonamy. He settled in Rio Claro where he 
became a town councillor (vereador). See Almanak de S. João de Rio Claro para 1873, facsimile, 
(São Paulo: Convênio IMESP/DAESP, 1981) p. 6.  On the exploits of various generations of the 
Aguiar Whitaker family, see E. A Whitaker, A Família Aguiar Whitaker (São Paulo: Ed. do Autor, 
1950).  
 
233 J. Needell, The Party of Order p. 24.  
 
234 H.L. Maw, Journal of a Passage p. 380. 
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landholders in Pará and by the visit of amateur naturalists George and Emma Smith to 
Pará in 1845, Campbell had taken possession of Ilha Mexiana, a 1500km2 island in 
the mouth of the river Amazon. Smith notes that Campbell also owned another 
property called Cajueiro on the opposite island of Marajó.235 In 1847, the British 
consul confirmed Campbell also owned a pottery and 80 slaves on yet another estate 
to the south of Belem called Fazenda Tautau. Consul Vines credited the ownership of 
this property to Campbell’s marriage to a ‘rich Brazilian,’ daughter of a ‘large slave-
owner.’236  
 
A survey of local newspaper reports indicates that the three properties were owned by 
the firm Campbell & Pombo, an association between Campbell and his brother-in-law, 
João Florencio Henriques da Silva Pombo.237  The firm had business interests in cattle 
ranching as described by Emma Smith who, on a visit to Mexiana in 1845, witnessed 
cattle running wild on the island being caught by ‘blacks with a lasso.’238 Interestingly 
during the retreat of the British community from Pará during the Cabanagem Rebellion 
in 1835, Archibald Campbell was accompanied only by one male slave named 
Belchior.239 Under a decade later, Campbell was part-owner of various extensive rural 
                                                        
235 Emma Juliana Smith to Sophie Smith, Pará, 27th January 1845, Emma Juliana and John P. Smith 
Letterbook, 1843–1845, Rare Book, Manuscript, and Special Collections Library, Duke University 
(hereafter RBMSCD). 
 
236 See I. Sargen, Our Men in Brazil pp. 152-153. 
 
237 The firm as owners of Ilha Mexianna, see Treze de Maio 16 May 1854; the firm as owners of 
Fazenda Cajueiro, see Treze de Maio, 13 May 1854; the firm as owners of Fazenda Tautau, see Treze 
de Maio 24 October 1854. The firm also owned a warehouse and butchers in the city, see Treze de 
Maio 22 July 1854. 
 
238 Emma Juliana Smith to Sophie Smith, Pará, 27th January 1845, Emma Juliana and John P. Smith 
Letterbook, 1843–1845, RBMSCD. 
 
239 Letter Book VC John Hesketh, Pará, 1835-1836, BN, Manuscritos, MSS 10-04-009, f. 130. The 
escape of the British community from Pará is discussed in Chapter I.  
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estates and, in 1848, his slave-holding was estimated at between 50 and 60. Whilst the 
exact arrangement of Campbell’s marriage into the Silva Pombo family remains a 
mystery, there is no doubt that this union resulted in his further integration in the 
regional slave-economy.  
 
Other cases of marriage resulting in slave-ownership are even more clear-cut. The 
British consuls in Rio Grande do Sul, Pernambuco and Maranhão each made 
references to British subjects in their districts who had married Brazilian wives and 
became slave-owners. While Consul Morgan in Rio Grande do Sul did not record any 
further information about Benjamin Aveline's and William Barker’s slave-holding as 
they were considered only part-owners, his counterparts in Pernambuco and Maranhão 
did so with annotations of the specific circumstances. In Maranhão, Consul Corbett 
noted that the 51 slaves associated with the entry of Augustus Garcia were ‘in right of 
his wife.’ The same observation was made for the 14 slaves listed in William Wilson’s 
entry.240 In the case of Pernambuco, consul Cowper noted that two British residents 
had made returns for ‘slaves [as] belonging to their wives, having been received as 
marriage dowry.’241 In the early 1840s British engineer and railway surveyor Charles 
de Mornay married Isabel Carolina de Carvalho, whose dowry included her family’s 
sugar plantation (engenho) in the province of Alagoas as well as the 80 slaves attached 
to it. Whilst the property legally remained his wife’s, in the context of Brazil’s 
patriarchal society, de Mornay was its de facto owner - a reality reflected by his listing 
                                                        
240 Census Return - Maranhão 
 
241 Census Return – Pernambuco.  
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in the 1883 Almanack of Alagoas as the Senhor de Engenho (owner) of the Jenipapo 
sugar plantation.242  
 
The case of the only female agricultural slaveholder named in the census also appears 
to be the result of a marriage. According to the acting-consul Westwood, Mrs. Moke 
was the owner of 80 slaves on a coffee plantation in Tijuca. Martha Moke (neé 
Matherson) was the English wife of Dutchman Charles Alexander von Moke, who is 
often credited as being one of the pioneers of coffee production in Brazil.243 Though 
the early success of the Nassau plantation is attributed to her husband, there are a 
number of factors which indicate Mrs. Moke’s involvement went beyond a passive 
role. Firstly, as well as being listed in the census by Westwood, she is also specifically 
named in a subsection entitled ‘An English lady’s plantation’ by George Pilkington in 
a letter to the ASR  in September 1841.244 Pilkington also re-published an advert which 
Mrs. Moke had placed in a newspaper for a runaway slave and there are further 
examples of adverts instructing caught slaves to be returned to her specifically.245 One 
such advert from as far back as 1833 states that a 40 year-old slave, Lucas Congo, had 
escaped from Mrs. Moke’s Fazenda (‘a fazenda da Sra. Moke.’)246 Given that her 
                                                        
242 Almanak Administrativo, Mercantil e Industrial do Império do Brazil para 1883, vol. 3 (Rio de 
Janeiro, H. Laemmert, 1883) p. 94. 
243 G. Ferrez, Pioneiros da cultura do caféé na era da independência, (Rio de Janeiro: IHGB, 1972) 
pp. 60-61. 
 
244 ASR, 2.18 (Sept. 1841) pp.185-186. 
 
245 Jornal do Commercio 12 February 1840; Jornal do Commercio 22 July 1842. 
 
246 Diário do Rio de Janeiro, 13 August 1833. 
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husband lived until 1852, these factors indicate that Mrs. Moke had some level of 
private financial involvement in the Nassau plantation and the slaves attached to it.247  
 
Although all of the aforementioned marriages seem to have taken place before the 
enactment of the Slave Trade Act in November 1843, even if they had not, slave-
ownership in this form was perfectly legal. Clause VI of the legislation is very clear 
that slave-ownership through marriage was exempt from the global ban on British 
subjects dealing in slaves.248 Another exemption contained in the legislation was the 
inheriting of slaves. The ‘heirs of Mr. Patt (sic)’ and the ‘heirs of Dr. McCormack’ are 
explicit examples of slaveholding by inheritance but there are other cases where 
British subjects were bequeathed agricultural establishments and slave property. A 
well-known example of this is Lewis William Lecesne, who had inherited the St. Louis 
coffee plantation from his French father via his Anglo-American mother in 1824.249 
Like the neighbouring Nassau estate owned by the Moke’s, the Lecesne plantation 
had been a pioneering site in the first wave of coffee production in Brazil. Rafael 
Marquese notes how the coffee plantations in the Tijuca hills had been strongly 
influenced by knowledge and production techniques which reached Brazil from Saint-
Domingue, via Cuba, in the decades following the arrival of the Portuguese court in 
                                                        
247 The exact date of Charles Alexander von Moke’s death is not certain, but there was an auction 
announced for the sale of the deceased’s personal effects in December 1852. See Diario do Rio de 
Janeiro 3 December 1852.  
 
248 see Office of Public Sector Information, ‘Slave Trade Act 1843’, The UK Statute Law Database, 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Vict/6-7/98 [accessed 16 July 2016] 
 
249 Hobkirk, LeCesne, Selby story: written in 1881 by Frances Mary Hobkirk, 1881 in Tasmania, and 
addressed to her daughter, Louisa Hobkirk Fooks (n.d.) 
http://www.hopkirk.org/hopkirk/HobkirkPhotos/Hobkirk.JF.westminster/HobkirkFrancesMaryLecesn
e1881.letter.re.typed.doc [accessed 4 August 2018] This document clarifies that Lewis William and 
his sister became guardians of the British Minister in Rio upon the death of their parents. 
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Rio in 1808. 250  Louis William’s father, François Lecesne was the physical 
embodiment of this knowledge transfer. Following revolution in Saint-Domingue, 
Lecesne had fled to Cuba where he applied his expertise and remaining fortune in 
coffee plantations but upon Napoleon’s invasion of Spain, he was again forced to 
move on. After a period of time spent in France, Britain and the U.S., Lecesne found 
his way to Rio de Janeiro, where in 1816 he established a plantation of 60,000 coffee 
bushes using techniques developed by Pierre-Joseph Laborie in Saint-Domingue.251 
Although the dynamic centre of Brazilian coffee production had long since moved to 
the Paraíba Valley, in 1848 Louis William Lecesne was still recorded in the census as 
owning 35 slaves. 
 
The afterlife of the Lecesne plantation is a useful example of how the legality of the 
transferal of slave property through family relations could be used to allow British 
subjects to bypass British legislation long after 1843. In 1853, Lecesne sold the St. 
Louis estate to fellow British subject Henry Greenwood who just two years later sold 
the property to the Scottish homeopathic doctor and railway entrepreneur, Thomas 
Cochrane. 252  Using some of the compensation money he had received from the 
government from his failed efforts to organise Brazil’s first railway, Cochrane 
purchased Lecesne’s former plantation in 1855. Whilst we do not have all the details 
of that transaction, Aroldo de Azevedo informs us that, crucially, the purchase was 
made in the name of his wife.253 It is likely that part of the initial purchase included 
                                                        
250 R. Marquese, ‘Luso-Brazilian Enlightenment and the circulation of Caribbean slavery-related 
knowledge: the establishment of the Brazilian coffee culture from a comparative perspective’, 
História, Ciências, Saúde – Manguinhos,16.4 (2009), pp. 870-871. 
 
251 Ibid p. 870. 
 
252 G. Ferrez, Pioneiros da cultura do café p. 62. 
 
253 A. de Azevedo, Os Cochranes do Brasil (São Paulo: Editora Nacional, 1965) p. 83. 
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slave property, as upon the deaths of the couple in 1873, 10 of their 21 field slaves 
were attached to the estate.254 Moreover, upon the partilha (division of assets), it 
became clear that all of the slaves, and indeed most of their property, were registered 
in the name of his wife.255 The circumstantial evidence of this case points to a strategy 
which allowed British subjects to stay on the right side of the 1843 Act whilst still 
exploiting slave labour. It is also possible that this strategy could provide a partial 
explanation for the distinct lack of a recognisable British presence in the records of 
slave sale records, observed by Guenther in Bahia and by my own research in notary 
records in Rio de Janeiro.256 
 
De Azevedo reasons that Thomas Cochrane’s decision to invest some of his 
compensation money in the old Lesence estate was in order to ‘secure the future of his 
family.’257 Though Cochrane’s slaveholding is not captured in the 1848 census, his 
decision to invest in land and slaves is representative of other British slave-owners for 
whom agricultural production was one of a range of possible investment opportunities 
for surplus capital they had accumulated in the import-export trade or elsewhere. 
While others invested into areas such as the slave trade, mining, public works, banking 
or simply remitted any surplus wealth back home, a handful of other British merchants 
viewed their direct participation in agricultural production as a viable and worthwhile 
investment opportunity. It seems that the majority of these cases involved British 
merchants who had been established in Brazil for a significant period and had made 
                                                        
  
254 Ibid p. 85.  
 
255 Ibid p. 102. 
256 L. Guenther, British Merchants in nineteenth-century Brazil, p. 54. 
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their fortune exploiting the very favourable commercial terms secured for British trade 
enshrined in the treaties of 1808 and 1827 (expired 1842). One firm, Wellstood & Co. 
arrived in Maranhão no later than 1812 under the name of Wellstood & Bingham and 
by 1821 were owners of a sugar plantation called Camacaóca from whence the slaves 
Manuel Jorge, Bonifácio and Luís had escaped in November of that year.258 The 
plantation may have even been in British hands before this date as its establishment is 
attributed in later documents to a Royal Navy officer called Henry Heatherly.259 
Though very little information concerning the British-owned Camacaóca estate 
remains, it was certainly of some regional importance as the first plantation with a 
steam-powered mill in the whole of the province.260  It appears that Wellstood & 
Bingham managed the plantation alongside their merchant house, through which they 
sold the produce of their estate.261 The census entry for this plantation with 78 slaves 
suggests that by 1848 the firm now known as Wellstood & Co. had come into difficulty 
and the Camacaóca estate had been foreclosed on by an unknown creditor.  
 
Though Patrick Lennon does not feature in the census data, Charles Darwin’s brief 
account of his encounter with this merchant-cum-plantation-owner is particularly 
illustrative of mercantile investment in agriculture. On a visit to Macaé in April 1832, 
the renowned naturalist encountered this ‘regular Irishman’ who had resided in Brazil 
over 20 years. Darwin recounts that Lennon had made a large fortune by selling 
                                                        
258 J. de Viveiros, História do Comércio do Maranhão, p.122 and O Conciliador, 23 February 1822 
cited in J. de Viveiros, História do Comércio do Maranhão, p. 366. 
259 C.A Marques, Diccionario historico-geographico da provincia do Maranhão (Maranhão: Typ. do 
Farias, 1870) p. 131.  
 
260 Ibid p.131.  
 
261 Wellstood & Bingham advertised the sale of sugar and rum in local papers. See Farol 
Maranhense, 5 August 1828. 
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‘spectacles, Thermometers &c &c’ and in around 1824 had ‘purchased a tract of forest 
country on the Macae (sic) & put an English agent over it.’262 Lennon’s estate was two 
and a half miles long and was worked by an undetermined number of slaves under the 
stewardship of a Mr Cowper.263 It is not clear whether Lennon maintained his absentee 
ownership of the plantation until his death in 1846, but this case is useful to indicate 
the limitations of the census data in capturing the possible fluctuating extent of British 
plantation ownership in Brazil.264 The census does show that in 1848 there were at 
least two other British owned coffee plantations in the Macaé region - Robert Lawrie’s 
with around 80 slaves and Dr. George Reid’s with 60. Darwin makes mention of the 
former, stating that Lawrie had married ‘a handsome Brazilian lady, daughter of a 
large landed proprietor’ and that his father-in-law owned a plantation at Socêgo (sic), 
only a day’s ride from Lennon’s estate.265 As we shall see in the following section, 
this small cluster of British plantation ownership in Rio de Janeiro was not unique to 
Macaé.  
 
George March and other British pioneers in the Serra dos Orgãos 
 
George March’s ownership of a large agricultural establishment in the Serra dos 
Orgãos mountains exhibits similar characteristics to the investment made by Lennon 
in Brazil’s agricultural economy. Significantly though, the contemporary importance 
of March’s establishment as a centre of specialised production, an area of interest for 
                                                        
262 R.D. Keynes (ed.), Charles Darwin's Beagle diary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1988) p. 52. 
 
263 Ibid p. 58. It is not clear whether this Mr. Cowper was any relation to the future British consul in 
Pernambuco 
264 The exact date of Lennon’s death is unknown, but the public sale of part of the deceased property 
on 21 October 1846 suggests he died around that time. See Jornal do Commercio, 19 October 1846. 
 
265 R.D. Keynes, (ed.), Charles Darwin's Beagle diary p. 52. and pp. 56-57.  
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foreign naturalists and a summer vacation destination of the British community in Rio 
means that it is the establishment which left the greatest imprint in the historical 
record. Notably, the record of interactions of British officials with this large-scale 
slave-owner allow a unique insight into the relationship between the enforcers of 
British anti-slavery policy in Brazil and their fellow countrymen who had invested 
significant sums into slave property, at least a part of which had been imported 
illegally under the Anglo-Brazilian Treaty of 1826 and/or the Brazilian law of 1831. 
 
Before analysing these interactions and what they say about the ambivalence inherent 
in British anti-slavery policy in Brazil, it is important to consider the origins of what 
was at a time one of the most important and certainly the best known British 
investment in Brazilian agriculture. The 1848 census entry for George March, a farm 
owner with 34 slaves belies the grand scale of the Fazenda do March up until just a 
few years prior to the commissioning of the census. The ‘Mr. George March’ listed by 
acting-consul Westwood was in fact the son of the founder of the vast agricultural 
establishment which covered much of what is now the modern city of Teresópolis. 
Like Patrick Lennon, George March senior, a British subject who had been born and 
educated in Lisbon, had arrived shortly after the opening of Brazil’s ports to foreign 
trade. In partnership with his brother Thomas, March established an import firm which 
dealt in a diverse variety of British manufacturers and other products such as steel, 
iron, wheat and coal.266 Although the firm March & Irmãos continued operations until 
at least 1838, George March had already begun his search for investment opportunities 
elsewhere. While his attempt to establish a mining company in the 1820s would 
                                                        
266 G. Ferrez, Colonização de Teresópolis. Many of the travel accounts to follow were consulted 
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ultimately end in failure, his earlier investment in agriculture would be a lot more 
successful.267 
 
In 1818, March leased four sesmarias, an area of around 70 square kilometres which 
contained virgin forest, pastures, rivers and waterfalls.268 Over the following years 
visitors, mainly foreigners, described the establishment March had created in the 
mountains. Their accounts would be of a different type of establishment to other 
British plantation owners in Rio de Janeiro who produced coffee for export, as March 
focused his efforts almost entirely on production for the domestic market. On a visit 
in 1828, Irish clergyman Richard Walsh described an estate measuring 16 miles in 
length and five or six miles wide, a great deal of which had been cleared of virgin 
forest and replaced by pasture for horses, mules, cattle, sheep and pigs, as well as 
plantations of indian corn.269 The English botanist George Gardner visited March’s 
establishment in 1836 and in addition to the pastures for livestock, described smaller 
farms for French beans and potatoes and orchards and gardens which produced all 
manner of European fruits and vegetables in large quantities. These items were highly 
valued by Rio’s foreign population and were sent weekly to the city for sale.270 Aside 
from a wide range of produce and livestock for the domestic market, March also 
                                                        
267 For documents relating to the failed mining company, see ‘Requerimento a S.M.I. solicitando 
licença para formar uma companhia de mineração com capitais ingleses’, 1828-1829, BN, 
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268 G. Ferrez, Colonização de Teresópolis p. 35. 
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unsuccessfully attempted to grow coffee on his estate. In partnership with his estate 
manager, Richard Heath, March purchased the neighbouring Constância plantation 
from the Swiss Johann de Luze in August 1838.271 According to Gardner, the Swiss 
had encountered difficulties in producing a mature crop and had sold his plantation in 
order to reinvest in more promising lands in the Paraíba Valley. Gardner attributed 
this difficulty to the altitude of the plantation and noted that March also faced similar 
issues, stating that although the coffee bushes grew well, the fruit never ripened 
properly.272 An anonymous watercolour discovered by the historian Gilberto Ferrez 
also suggests that March had a tea plantation on his grounds.273 
 
The British community not only valued March’s fazenda because of the home 
comforts it produced, but also because of its cooler location in the mountains. The 
farm regularly received British residents in Rio seeking to escape the hot and humid 
summer months in the city. Using the unpublished diaries of British merchant Edward 
Winnie Fry, Ferrez notes that as early as 1826, March had built small residences for 
his compatriots. Fry noted the presence of prominent Rio merchants such as William 
Harrison, Joseph Tully, and Robert Nielson Tennent, amongst others.274 Still others 
such as the ‘debilitated Mr. Anderson,’ as described by the U.S. Naval Doctor 
Gustavus Horner in 1842, came to the estate hoping the ‘purity of the airs’ would cure 
them of their ailments.275 
                                                        
271 G. Ferrez, Colonização de Teresópolis p. 89. 
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In addition to the Serra dos Órgãos’ summer visitors, some British subjects were more 
permanent fixtures in the region. In close proximity to March’s property were other 
British slaveowners with agricultural establishments - some of whom feature in the 
census and some who do not. Richard Heath bought out George March’s share in the 
Constância plantation in October 1844 and by the time of the census in 1848 he was 
the owner of 25 slaves. His census entry, as well as other travel accounts from the 
period, indicate that he had given up on coffee growing by this point and had instead 
modelled the estate on March’s property, with fruit and vegetable gardens and 
outhouses for guests.276 Another plantation in the region was owned by the brothers 
Constantine and Albert Fischer. The property called Soledade features in the census 
under Constantine’s name, who was the owner of 45 slaves according to acting-consul 
Westwood. The Fischer brothers were Swiss by birth, but as they received a pension 
from the British government, following service as officers in the British army, they 
were considered British subjects.277 Indeed, on a visit to the area in 1856, British 
reverend Hamlet Clark referred to Albert ‘Fisher’ as an Englishman and following his 
death, Clark read the ‘English Burial Service’ at the funeral.278 Westwood describes 
the nature of their business as ‘farming’, but travel accounts suggest that he may have 
been mistaken. Hamlet Clark and Daniel Kidder both visited Soledade and describe 
                                                        
 
276 The nature of Heath’s business is described as ‘farming’ by Westwood. See Census Return – Rio 
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the property as a coffee plantation.279 The case of Vice-Admiral John Taylor, owner 
of the Piedade coffee plantation, was the opposite of that of the Fischer brothers. 
Though he was born in Great Britain and served in the Royal Navy, his decision to 
serve in the Brazilian Navy seems to have been the reason why acting-consul 
Westwood did not include him in the census return. Taylor’s service in the War of 
Independence alongside Thomas Cochrane earned him great favour in Brazil and was 
rewarded by a sesmaria of land to the south of March’s property. On his death in 1855, 
Taylor’s plantation had 120,000 coffee bushes (including 40,000 immature bushes) 
and 40 slaves.280 
 
Of all the British slaveholders in the Serra dos Órgãos region, no individual held more 
people in bondage than George March. Although his heir would feature in the 1848 
census with a still considerable 34 slaves, the extent George March’s slave-ownership 
before his death in 1845 was significantly greater. Throughout the decades, visitors to 
the Fazenda do March made estimates as to the number of slaves on the property. All 
give numbers of 100 or more - Walsh estimated 100 on his visit in 1828281, Moore 
thought as high as 170 in 1831,282 in 1836 Gardner estimated 100,283 and in 1841 
March’s nephew gave a figure of 130.284 As noted in Chapter I, the presence of such 
a large number of British-held slaves was no secret to the British authorities in Rio de 
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Janeiro. George March, and later Richard Heath, would have been well known to the 
British community in Rio due to the popularity of their properties as summer resorts. 
In the year the census was commissioned, 1848, British Minister Lord Howden spent 
time at Richard Heath’s property in the company of the Captain of the HMS Comus.285 
 
The presence of large numbers of slaves on the metaphorical doorstep of Britain’s 
anti-slavery operations in Brazil is not necessarily an accusation that George March, 
or indeed other British plantation owners in Brazil, had broken any British laws. After 
all, emancipation in the British Empire had not been fully resolved until 1838 and 
British slave ownership abroad would only be regulated in 1843. Nevertheless, it is 
likely that British plantation owners were purchasing illegally imported Africans, as 
defined by international treaties and Brazilian Law of 1826 and 1831 respectively. 
George Pilkington made this accusation about an unnamed British planter in letters he 
sent to the BFASS in 1841, stating that: 
the proprietor of one of these [English plantations] is on such good terms with 
the slavers, that they occasionally land their cargo go human beings on his 
estate, which being on the seaside, offers a convenient receptacle for them.286 
 
The coastal location of this particular plantation owner makes it clear that Pilkington 
was more than likely accusing one of the British planters in either Ilha Grande 
(McCormack, Platt), Macaé (Lawrie, Reid) or Itaguaí (Coates) - all locations which 
received clandestine slave importations after 1831.287 Although Pilkington did not 
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implicate March in this sort of activity, we observed in Chapter I that March owned a 
number of young African slaves who were probably imported into Brazil illegally.  
 
George March’s journey to slaveholding is representative of the majority of the 25 
British owners of agricultural establishments identified in the census. Unlike foreign 
colonies close to the British Caribbean, such as Cuba, Suriname and the Danish West 
Indies, there is no evidence of a migration of colonial slaveholders to Brazil following 
British emancipation in 1833.288 Instead, these slaveholders initially arrived in Brazil 
for other purposes, mostly as merchants but also as professionals such as doctors and 
engineers. We have seen how some of this group, merchant-cum-planters such as 
William Platt and Henry S. Marback, were allegedly involved in the illegal slave trade 
as well. For most of these individuals, agriculture, particularly coffee and sugar 
production, represented an investment opportunity for the excess capital they had 
acquired in trade or the exercise of their profession. Some, such as March, then made 
these investments their primary source of income, whilst others such as Thomas 
Carroll maintained smaller properties whilst continuing their main line of business.  
For others, slaveholding was a by-product of their social relationships. Some, such as 
Archibald Campbell, expanded their slaveholding significantly following marriages 
into the families of local elites, while William Lescene inherited his plantation and 
slaves from his French father.   
 
The collective slaveholding of these British investors in the rural economy represented 
a tiny proportion of the total number of enslaved people working on plantations and 
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other types of agricultural establishments across Brazil. Indeed, the 25 individuals 
recorded in the census data were a small, though prominent, minority within the wider 
British population living in Brazil. Nevertheless, it is easy to imagine why this group 
in particular would have been a source of the type of embarrassment Palmerston had 
described when foreign governments brought his attention to British slaveholding 
abroad. A handful of these British subjects were owners of the large coffee, and to a 
lesser extent, sugar plantations which drove the demand for the illegal slave trade 
throughout the 1830s and 1840s. Rather than their importance in actually stoking 
demand for the trade, these slaveholders were symbolically problematic, especially 
since the 1843 Act had been unable to remove this British presence from Brazil’s most 
dynamic and slave-labour-dependent sector.  
 
Urban Slaveholding  
 
In the previous section we observed how inconsistencies in the collection of the census 
data mean that a significant number of slaves employed in tasks not related to 
agriculture might be included in the that category. Likewise, there were slaves working 
on semi-rural chácaras who were categorised as domestic, owing to their masters’ 
primary location and profession. Whilst acknowledging the fluidity between these two 
categories, this section will discuss slaveholding in urban contexts, where British 
masters held some 750 slaves. We will observe that slaveholding was a feature across 
all the major British communities in Brazil and was present at all levels of society, 
from affluent merchants and business owners to lowly artisans, laundresses and stable 
keepers.  
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Before analysing this data, it is important to note that clearly not all British residents 
living in Brazilian cities were slaveholders. Though the majority of the census returns 
only include information on those who owned slaves, Consul Corbett’s reply from 
Maranhão includes the replies from a handful of individuals and firms positively 
confirming that they did not own slaves.289 However, Corbett’s inclusion of the replies 
of non-slaveholders is an exception to the rule. Given these inconsistencies in data 
collection and the lack of precise population data for Brazil’s British communities, it 
is impossible to assert the ratio of slaveholders to non-slaveholders. Moreover, as 
acting consul Westwood’s reply from Rio suggests, it is clear that some British 
residents not listed in the census hired slaves from other owners.  That being said, 
there was almost certainly a minority of individuals who rejected slaveholding on the 
grounds of morality and a perceived duty to uphold the anti-slavery identity of their 
mother country. As discussed in Chapter I, George Pilkington, the abolitionist who 
spent a year in Brazil on a fact-finding mission for the BFASS in 1840-1841, was the 
most vocal critic of British slaveholding in Brazil.290 In his letters home recounting 
the prevalence of slaveholding amongst his countrymen, Pilkington makes a fleeting 
reference to one British resident who chastised a compatriot for flogging his slave, 
stating that ‘an Englishman has no right to hold slaves, much less to punish them.’291 
Despite the publication of a pamphlet imploring British residents to free their slaves 
on these grounds, as we shall observe, the census data indicates that his plea largely 
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fell on deaf ears as slaveholding remained a prominent and routine feature amongst 
the British in urban areas at the end of the 1840s.292 
 
The prevalence of slaveholding was not unique to the British community, of course. 
Rather it reflected slavery’s predominance as an economic and social institution in 
their host country. In general terms, source material on specific British slaveholders 
in urban contexts is even more scarce than information regarding their rural 
counterparts. Nevertheless, by analysing the census data within the context of urban 
life in Brazil during this period, we can begin to understand the reasons why British 
subjects employed slave labour and the diversity of roles and occupations their slaves 
performed. Before the end of the illegal trade, slaves were abundant in Brazil’s major 
cities and slaveholding was a feature in all but the very poorest strata of society.293 
Though Luiz Carlos Soares’ categorisation of urban slave-ownership in this period is 
based on inventories of residents of Rio de Janeiro alone, it is still useful in helping us 
identify slaveholding at all levels of the British communities in port-cities across 
Brazil.294 Using total slave-ownership as an indication of an individual’s social status, 
Soares proposes three broad categories. The first group, owners of between one and 
five slaves, included individuals employed in the ‘humblest’ occupations, as well as 
some members of the ‘liberal professions.’ The second strata consists of individuals 
in more ‘comfortable circumstances’, who owned between six and ten slaves. The last 
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category is the ‘wealthiest strata’ composed of individuals who owned over ten 
slaves.295 Using the census returns that itemise the slaveholding of all individuals - 
Bahia, Maranhão, Pernambuco and Rio Grande do Sul - Figure 7 clearly shows that 
most city-based British slaveholders fall within this first category.296  
 
An analysis of the two census returns which list slaveholder profession, in Bahia and 
Pernambuco suggests that while a person’s occupation and wealth had a bearing on 
their ability to own slaves, we should be cautious in any attempt use total slaveholding 
to determine social hierarchies within Brazil’s British communities. Guenther has 
shown that British residents in Bahia arrived with their own conceptions of class 
distinctions and their community was stratified by the prestige of their occupation. At 
the top of this social hierarchy were the most successful wholesale merchants and their 
families, followed by professionals such as doctors and diplomats. Below these were 
the less successful merchants and at the bottom were the unmarried clerks who worked 
in these firms. Outside of this structure were a small number of retailers, engineers 
and working-class immigrants.297  
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While slaveholding was present at all levels of this hierarchy, the census data suggests 
it cannot be used as a positive indicator of social class in the same way as Soares has 
done in his study of Rio de Janeiro. While we find holders of the least prestigious 
professions amongst the first category, owning one to five slaves, also present are 
those occupying a more elevated position in the social hierarchy of the small expatriate 
communities. Those with the humblest occupations in this group include a laundress, 
a stable keeper, two publicans and a variety of artisans such as a shoemaker, tinsmiths 
and a cabinet maker. A number of liberal professionals such engineers and doctors 
were also owners of a small number of slaves. However, also present in this group are 
various reputable merchants. Moreover, while merchants account for just over half of 
British residents in Bahia and Pernambuco who owned 6-10 slaves, also present in this 
category are holders of apparently less prestigious occupations such as a shopkeeper, 
baker, tailor and clerk. Though the largest slaveholders, with ten or more slaves, were 
all wealthy merchants and one foundry owner, the makeup of the other two categories 
75%
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is a lot more mixed. In sum, we can say that while the largest individual slaveholders 
were mostly wealthy merchants, not all wealthy merchants were large slaveholders.  
 
The professions and business activities of these British slaveholders can also give us 
an insight into the types of labour they extorted from their slaves. In the context of low 
levels of immigration and the distain for physical work held by many of the free 
population, slaves performed much of the manual and some skilled labour in the city. 
Mary Karasch’s and Luiz Carlos Soares’ studies of urban slavery in Rio de Janeiro in 
the nineteenth century have shown the enormous diversity of occupations they 
performed.298 Their presence was ubiquitous in the domestic life of the city, where 
slaves were employed in all manner of household tasks.299 There is no doubt that many 
of the slaves listed as ‘domestic’ in the census were performing these duties. We can 
surmise that many British subjects justified this slaveholding as a necessity in the 
absence of free servants, in the same way as Robert Hesketh and Frederick Grigg had 
done to Palmerston in 1840.300 In the homes of the most affluent British residents, 
such as Richard Latham of Bahia or Thomas Messiter of Rio Grande, who owned 
twelve and thirteen ‘domestics’ respectively, slaves would probably have performed 
specialised roles. Whereas the single slaves owned by the likes of A. Short, a publican 
in Pernambuco or Joshua Guntson, a sexton of the British church in the same city, 
would have performed a range of domestic duties.301  
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Many domestic slaves, especially those whose masters owned only one or two slaves, 
would have had to perform these duties alongside whatever occupation they held in 
the business premises of their owners. For those owned by British wholesale 
merchants, it is likely that porterage was one of their central roles outside of the home. 
In the absence of draft animals, slaves were essential to the movement of goods and 
people in Brazilian cities in the first half of the nineteenth century.302 Indeed, a British 
visitor to Brazil in 1844 expressed her incredulity that abolitionists in Britain wanted 
to deny British merchants the slave labour which was so essential to the movement of 
their goods in Brazil’s ports. Referring to the recently passed 1843 Act, Emma Juliana 
Smith remarked: 
 
Talking of slaves puts me in mind what an impossible law they have been making 
in England not only to prevent the English holding slaves but even making use of 
them!!! Why all our Brazil trade would at once cease, not a case of sugar, or a 
bale of cotton would be able to be lifted from the ground or put on board a ship 
and the condition of the slaves not one atom improved.303 (emphasis in original) 
 
The presence of artisans and craftsmen amongst the slaveholders listed in the census 
suggests that some British-held slaves had more skilled occupations. The slaves 
owned by Thomas Purcell, a cabinet maker in Pernambuco or Bernard Byrne, a tin-
plate worker in Bahia may well have been apprentices in their masters’ trade. Though 
rare, other slaves were employed in larger workshops and factories owned by British 
subjects. For example, Augustus Gibson employed 23 slaves in a soap factory situated 
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on the Ilha do Governador island in Rio de Janeiro. Not a great deal else is known 
about this establishment, other than it began operations in 1834. 304  Given its 
establishment after the law of 1831 and Karasch’s assertion that slaves in these types 
of operations were principally African males, it is entirely plausible that some of the 
factory’s workforce had been imported illegally. 305  Slightly more information is 
available concerning the use of slave labour by Christopher Starr in his foundry called 
Aurora in Pernambuco. Arriving in Pernambuco around the time of Independence, 
Starr first tried his hand at the construction of a mechanised cotton mill. After that 
enterprise failed, in 1829 the Scotsman opened an ironworks that would eventually 
attain regional importance through its manufacture of steam engines for sugar mills in 
the area. 306  The census entry for Starr shows that in 1848 a total of 28 male slaves 
were employed in the foundry.. A commercial report written by the same British consul 
a month before the census gives us an idea of the foundry’s total workforce; 35 British 
foundrymen and 42 free Brazilians laboured alongside Starr’s slaves.307 The same 
document also makes clear that Starr was not the only British subject in the city to 
employ slaves and free national and foreign labour in an ironworks. A smaller 
establishment owned by Messrs. Bowman and McCallum employed eight British 
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foundrymen, 25 free Brazilians and 12 slaves.308 Though Bowman featured in the 
census as an owner of one slave, the commercial report states that those employed in 
the ironworks were hired; a further example of how a census of slave-ownership does 
not show the true extent of British slaveholding.  
 
Moreover, although not reflected in the census data, British ironworks were not 
restricted to Pernambuco, with other known examples in Bahia and Rio de Janeiro. In 
the former province in 1859, Dom Pedro II visited a foundry owned by two British 
engineers called Cameron and Smith, though it appears they did not employ any 
enslaved labour. 309   However, in the 1850s three British foundries used slaves 
alongside free labourers in the sugar-producing Campos region of Rio de Janeiro. Like 
the establishments of Starr and Cameron & Smith, the ironworks owned by Alexander 
Davidson, John MacTavish and Roberts produced steam engines and other parts for 
sugar mills. All three relied on slave labour to some extent; 22 slaves were employed 
in Davidson’s establishment and seven each in the other two foundries. 310  Of 
Davidson’s slaves, four were iron smelters, two bronze casters, and six blacksmiths.311 
These skilled roles confirm Soares’ affirmation that slaves regularly performed 
specialised labour in industrial contexts and were not merely tools for brute force.312 
The presence of specialised slave labour is also apparent in the largest privately-owned 
ironworks in the country, the Ponte D’Areia complex in Niterói. In 1857 this 
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establishment employed 162 slaves alongside 505 free national and foreign 
workers.313 Although by this point its operations had been expanded substantially 
under the ownership of the Baron de Mauá, the ironworks had been originally founded 
by the British merchant Charles Coleman who, in 1846, sold the property along with 
28 slaves to its new owner for a total of 60:000$000.314 Though these British-owned 
establishments were few in number, their very presence shows that, like the larger 
scale example of mining, British technology and capital was not always transitioning 
from agrarian slavery to free-labour industry in a linear fashion.    
 
In her study of slavery in the city of Rio de Janeiro, Karasch stresses the importance 
of slaves as far more than just a source of labour; they were status symbols and sources 
of wealth and capital.315 On the first point, though we have seen how slave-ownership 
may not have been recognised as a sign of social status in the same way within British 
communities, it is possible that some British subjects drew prestige from the size of 
their slaveholding. This may have been true for those who were less socially dependent 
on the British community, such as Joseph Maxwell, or for those who had naturalised 
as Brazilians, such as Mr. Stepples Snr., an owner of five slaves in Pernambuco who 
‘declined any longer being considered a British subject.’ 316  Whereas a British 
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resident’s slaveholding did not distinguish his social class in the same way as a 
Brazilian, its prevalence in the census shows that at the very least, the ownership of 
slaves did not have a negative impact on a member’s position in the social hierarchy 
of British communities in Brazil. 
 
Concerning slaves as a source of wealth and capital to their owners, Karasch highlights 
the use of slave property as security for loans and as dowries upon marriage. As we 
shall observe in chapter 3, British merchants did occasionally offer their slaves as 
human collateral for debts and loans. As for dowries, we have seen how marriage 
facilitated rural slaveholding, but it was also present in urban areas. There are various 
examples in the census returns of British men who had become slaveholders through 
marriage into local families. In Pernambuco, Consul Cowper noted that Henry 
Gibson’s nine slaves and Edward H.J. Fox’s four slaves had been received following 
their marriages to local women. Similarly, the British consul in Maranhão noted that 
William Wilson’s 14 slaves ‘were in the right of his wife.’317 In Rio Grande do Sul, 
consul Morgan decided against enumerating the slaves held through marriage by 
Benjamin Aveline and William Barker as he did not regard them as ‘absolute 
owners.’318 The fact that this information is included in the returns is an indication that 
these men were seeking to justify their slaveholding under the provisions of the 1843 
Act which permitted ownership through inheritance or marriage. In doing so, they 
declared their exploitation of slave labour to be passive and not a fault of their own 
making.    
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In addition to their value as property from which equity could be released or 
transferred, slaves created wealth for their owners. Masters often rented out or 
apprenticed their slaves to a whole host of employers, including artisans, tradesmen 
and factory owners.319 Emma Juliana Smith observed that the apprenticing of their 
slaves was common amongst English owners looking to recoup their initial outlay at 
which point, according to the writer, they would be freed.320 Aside from their day jobs, 
the slaves referred to by Smith would presumably perform domestic duties in British 
householders. Escravos de ganho, or money-earning slaves, would have been a 
common site in Brazilian cities at the time the census was commissioned. In order to 
sell their labour around the city, these slaves were afforded a greater degree of 
autonomy than most, with some living independently of their masters.321 As Soares 
has shown, in Rio de Janeiro these slaves found employment in a whole range of 
sectors, paying a fixed rate of their wages to their owners.322 One of the most visible 
occupations of escravos de ganho was as pedlars of all sorts of foodstuffs, clothes, 
household items and other wares. We can easily imagine that the slaves owned by 
British shopkeepers such as Albert H. Curry (six slaves) and Mary Ann Sullivan (two 
slaves) in Bahia were involved in such activities. Masters at all levels of society lived 
on the earnings of their slaves. For some poorer slaveholders though, the earnings of 
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their few slaves were often their only reliable source of income.323 This may have been 
particularly true in the case of F.H. Mitchell (four slaves) in Alagoas and Ellen 
Adamson (two slaves) in Bahia who were the only British slaveholders in these 
consular districts without a listed profession.  
 
As Guenther’s study of their community Bahia has shown, most British made a 
conscious and collective effort to distinguish themselves from a host society which 
they regarded as morally and culturally inferior.324 They conserved many traditions of 
their homeland including the practice of their religion, social rituals and their pastimes. 
They even strictly maintained an outwardly stereotypically ‘British’ appearance 
despite its unsuitability to tropical climes.325 As well as keeping a distance from their 
Brazilian hosts in a social sense, they often also removed themselves geographically, 
preferring to live away from their places of work in the centre of town.326 However, 
as the census shows, slaveholding was clearly one of the Brazilian customs exempt 
from this general rule. As we shall discuss in the following section, in adopting this 
Brazilian practice, British residents found ways of reconciling their slaveholding with 
their own conceptions of moral and cultural superiority.  
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The Myth of the Benevolent British Slaveholder 
 
Justifications for British slaveholding in foreign territories after 1833 rested on three 
central pillars: property rights, necessity and moral superiority.327 All three of these 
had their roots in the ‘anti-abolitionist’ arguments employed by the West India interest 
in defence of colonial slavery after 1807.328 In Chapter I we observed how lobbyists 
successfully invoked their property rights in order to keep hold of slaves they had 
purchased before 1843 and the necessity justification in order to remove a clause 
prohibiting the hiring of slaves from Lord Brougham’s draft bill. A third defence, 
based on conceptions of moral superiority, argued that British slaveholders were more 
benevolent than their foreign counterparts. Proponents of this position argued that 
slaves benefitted morally from their paternalistic British masters who protected them 
from the perils of re-enslavement until they were deemed ready for their freedom. The 
use of this argument has been well documented in research on the British mining 
industry in Brazil. 329  As we shall observe, other British slaveholders, the silent 
beneficiaries of the 1843 Act, echoed the very same rhetoric. Using contemporary 
sources and literature on Brazilian slavery, this section will argue that the benevolent 
British master was a myth perpetuated primarily by this very same group in order to 
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reconcile their conceptions of moral and cultural superiority with the prevalence of 
slaveholding in their communities.   
 
The image of the benevolent British slaveholder was in fact constructed upon a similar 
myth which characterised Brazilian slavery as a more humane institution than its 
Anglo-American counterparts in particular. For proponents of this proslavery 
viewpoint, Brazilian paternalism mitigated the cruelties witnessed in other slave 
systems, creating a benign institution that was beneficial to both master and the 
enslaved.330 To the disbelief of George Pilkington, British residents in Brazil largely 
subscribed to this position. The abolitionist wrote to the BFASS:  
 
It is surprising to me that the English residents in Brazil, who are generally the 
apologists of the system, can entertain the belief that the slaves there are better 
treated than those of any other nation.331 
 
Not only did Britons believe in the benevolence of Brazilian slavery, they 
‘consider[ed] themselves the best of slave-masters’ added the abolitionist in another 
letter to the society. 332  The same visitor who expressed her concern about the 
‘impossible law’ of 1843 echoed these views about the superiority of the benevolent 
British slaveholder. Evoking the trope of the ‘grateful slave’ that had been used by 
proslavery advocates in the British empire, Emma Juliana Smith informed her sister 
that she had recently come across a slave on bended knee in front of one of her 
countrymen pleading to be purchased, adding that ‘the unfortunates themselves are 
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always delighted to be bought by an Englishman.’333 The author then reinforced the 
image of the humanitarian British slaveholder by adding ‘the English too nearly 
always free their blacks if well behaved, and able to maintain themselves otherwise it 
would be no act of kindness’.334 This characterisation is juxtaposed with Smith’s 
portrayal of Brazilians in the same letter as being ‘sank deep in every vice and crime 
except drunkenness.’335 In the census returns one slaveholder in Rio Grande do Sul, 
Holland, Davies & Co. was so sure of the benefits of British ownership that they added 
their four slaves were the ‘same as free, never to be sold again into servitude.’336 
 
Credence in the exceptionalism of Brazilian slavery as a benign institution endured 
well into the twentieth century, in large part due to its usefulness in providing the basis 
of the construction of a national narrative that painted Brazil as a racial 
‘democracy’.337 Historians from the school of São Paulo played an important role in 
critiquing both of these narratives, with Emília Viotti da Costa asserting that the 
characterisation of Brazilian slavery as benign was a myth ‘created by a slaveholding 
society to defend a system which that society regarded as indispensable.’338 For Viotti 
da Costa, just because Brazilian masters employed positive incentives as a form of 
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social control, ‘this should not blind us to the ultimate violence of a system which 
made slaves the property of their masters - a property that could be bought and sold 
and whose fate depended on the master’s whim.'339 Violence was an essential feature 
of a system in which physical punishment was a universally accepted, both in society 
and by law, as a method of coercion.340  
 
Despite their attempts to create an identity apart from their Brazilian counterparts, 
British slaveholders did not exist in a vacuum; they were agents in the same violent 
system. George Pilkington was keen to reinforce this point to his abolitionist 
readership in Britain. In a series of letters, he provided evidence, based on things he 
had witnessed and interviews with his countrymen, to dispel any notion that the British 
were the most benevolent masters in an already benign institution. Starting with the 
mining industry and alluding to a control system based around positive incentives, 
Pilkington acknowledged that British managers occasionally deviated from the 
‘severity’ that was the ‘inseparable companion’ of largescale slaveholding. 341 
Nevertheless, Pilkington made absolutely clear that this system, based on incremental 
rewards eventually leading to manumission, co-existed alongside physical 
punishments. The employees he interviewed made no attempt to hide this fact, with 
one telling Pilkington ‘“we feed them well, clothe them well, and flog them well.”’342 
The most regular form of punishment was the use of the palmatória, a wooden paddle 
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with holes to reduce air resistance that was commonly used by Brazilian slaveholders. 
Slaves at the mines would be struck on the palms by the instrument up to four dozen 
times. For more serious incidents, slaves were punished by flogging after which they 
usually required medical attention.343 For persistent offenders, particularly runaways, 
slaves were placed in irons and as a last resort ‘bad characters’ were sold ‘out of the 
province’, effectively meaning that the individual was ‘transported for life.’ 344 
Pilkington finished his letter by concluding that positive incentives used to control the 
enslaved labour force at British mines were ‘at best, but an attempt to gild over a 
vicious and life-destroying system.’345 
 
These forms of punishment were not limited to slaves owned by the mining 
companies. In a separate letter, Pilkington attributed similar behaviour to British 
slaveholders in rural and urban areas. Referring to an unnamed English planter, 
believed to be George March, Pilkington contrasts his reputation as a ‘polished 
gentleman’ with his notoriety as a ‘master-like slave-owner.’346 This plantation owner 
reportedly seldom resorted to flogging but when he did ‘he [laid] it on so severely as 
to terrify all his slaves.’ On one occasion when this punishment did not deter the 
persistent escape of one of his slaves, he resolved to burn the offender’s cheek with a 
hot iron.347 In this case the characterisation of the benevolent British slaveholder is not 
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only undermined by the planter’s cruelty, but his slave’s resistance surely dispels any 
notion of the ‘grateful black’ that was part of the same myth. Many forms of resistance 
employed by British-held slaves have not registered in the historical record, but cases 
of escape are not uncommon. Pilkington’s letter included a transcription of a runaway 
slave advert placed in the local paper by Mrs. Moke.348 Other instances of escape can 
be found in the newspapers of the period.349  
 
Cruelty at the hands of British masters was also suffered by slaves employed in the 
city. Pilkington alleged that one unfortunate individual was murdered by an English 
overseer in a British mercantile house in Rio de Janeiro. After a disagreement, a ‘Mr. 
Richard’ – almost certainly Richard Heath – struck a slave with a rolling pin over the 
head before hurling him down the stairs. To discourage an enslaved witness from 
reporting the murder, the overseer first ‘bribed [him] by kindness to conceal it’ before 
eventually administering a ‘severe flogging.’350 Like their Brazilian counterparts, the 
apparent benevolence shown by British masters was conditional, a control mechanism 
which was ultimately underpinned by violence.  
 
Another form of violence committed against the enslaved by their British masters was 
sexual assault and rape. Lamonte Aidoo’s recent study has shown how sexual violence 
was a key feature of master/mistress-slave relations throughout the history of Brazilian 
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slavery.351 Though omitted by Pilkington, other sources reveal glimpses of British 
actors in this form of exploitation. During Darwin’s visit to the plantation of Patrick 
Lennon in April 1832, the naturalist observed a tense argument between the property’s 
owner and his British overseer, Mr. Cowper. Seemingly in an act of spite, Lennon 
threatened to remove all the women and children from the estate and send them for 
sale in Rio de Janeiro. Included in this group was ‘an illegitimate mulatto child to 
whom Mr. Cowper was much attached’ and whom Lennon threatened to sell at a 
public auction.352 Irrespective of his emotional connection to the child, there is no 
doubt that this child was the product of the rape of his enslaved mother. Though not 
recognised in the same terms then as now, in a system based on violence in which a 
slave is not the owner of their own body, sexual relations with a master or his proxy 
cannot be described as consensual.353  
 
Sexual exploitation of enslaved women was also present in the other cluster of British 
planation ownership in Rio de Janeiro. Following in the footsteps of many a foreign 
traveller in the region, in early 1844 Melchior-Honoré Yvan, a French doctor, visited 
the vast agricultural establishment owned by George March. Whilst in the mountains 
he chanced upon a property owned by an Englishman called ‘Braone’ (probably a 
corruption of Brown). There, his new acquaintance introduced the Frenchman to two 
black female adolescents, probably African, one around eighteen years old and the 
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other even younger still. 354  Much to the surprise and hilarity of the doctor, the 
Englishman introduced both young women as ‘Madame Braone’, insisting that he had 
married both. Growing concerned about the sinful state of this polygamous individual, 
Yvan asked whether his host considered himself a Christian, to which Braone replied 
that in London or Paris he was, but in Brazil he was ‘a patriarch.’ Asked whether he 
understood the responsibility of that role, the Englishman, confirming the enslaved 
status of the women, unhooked a whip from the back of the door and said he was well 
aware. 355  If Yvan needed any further indication that Broane was in a sexual 
relationship with these women, it was at this point that he saw five or six ‘brown’ 
children in another room. Broane claimed to have the best interests of his offspring at 
heart, proudly asserting that once he has three more young boys, he was going to leave 
them his whole property and emigrate to Sydney. 356 Nevertheless, like Mr. Cowper’s 
illegitimate child, there is little doubt that Broane’s children were the result of rape.   
     
Sexual violence apart, acts of physical cruelty administered by British slaveholders 
were, according to Pilkington, ‘generally known and openly talked of.’ However, ‘as 
a palliative,’ British slaveholders would defend their reputation by claiming that 
manumission was common amongst their community. 357  On investigating this 
assertion, Pilkington found that there while individual cases may well exist, ‘it is no 
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means a matter of frequent occurrence.’358 Unfortunately, it has not been possible to 
corroborate this claim from other sources. Manumission as a reward for good 
behaviour was, of course, a common method employed by mining companies as a 
method to reduce social conflict amongst their large enslaved work force. Between 
1834 and 1882, the St. John Del Rey company voluntarily freed some 278 slaves, an 
average of just under six slaves per year. Though as Eakin duly notes, nearly 450 died 
while still enslaved by the company. 359 There is evidence of British owners freeing 
their slaves in other contexts, but the sources do not permit us to say whether 
manumission occurred with any greater frequency than it did in Brazil more generally. 
A small number of cartas de alforria (freedom letters) located in the State Archive of 
Bahia relate to slaves manumitted by British masters in the second-half of the 
nineteenth century. Some individuals, such as Richard Latham’s slaves Luiz da França 
(1855) and Miguel Africano (1860), appear have been freed on unconditional terms.360 
However, others paid their owners for their freedom; Latham and James Hogg 
received 400 mil réis before freeing Nicolão Nago in 1859, while Dr. George E. 
Fairbanks liberated his African slave, Mathildes Calabar upon receipt of 300 mil-réis 
in the same year. 361  Though only a small number of wills made by British 
slaveholders were located during this research, they show that for some slaves, even 
the death of their masters did not signal their freedom. James Kenny, an Irish merchant 
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in Rio de Janeiro, had very different plans for each of the two African slaves 
mentioned in his will of 1847. One, a boy named José Congo, would be freed after a 
period of five years, during which time he would serve an apprenticeship. Of the other, 
João Cabinda, Kenny stated that 
 
[he] has given me so much trouble and annoyance for the last five years, I do not 
give him his freedom. I have watched him in illness and treated him with kindness 
for all this he has shown ingratitude and other indications of a bad negro.362  
 
In this case, freedom was only conferred, conditionally at that, on slaves who reflected 
the supposed British benevolence back to their masters. Slaves, of course, were 
valuable property which could be bequeathed to an individual’s heirs, a practice which 
appears to have happened with some frequency in the British community. For instance, 
at least four individuals in the return for Rio de Janeiro had inherited large numbers 
of slaves from deceased relatives.363 While British residents in Brazil did occasionally 
free their slaves without condition, they did so when it was convenient to them and 
there is little evidence, other than their own declarations, to indicate that having a 
British master increased a slave’s chances of emancipation.   
 
The image of paternal British masters granting freedom to their grateful slaves is also 
significantly undermined by the fact that Britons were known to have been involved 
in illegal enslavement. Putting aside the clear evidence of the purchase and possession 
of illegally imported Africans, there is evidence that some British subjects ignored the 
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legal freedoms of former slaves. The most notorious case of this was the deceitful 
actions of the St. John del Rey Mining Co., who intentionally denied the freedom of 
385 slaves hired from the defunct Cata Branca mine. As Matt Childs and others have 
shown, when it was discovered in 1879 that the company should have freed them 
twenty years earlier, Brazilian abolitionists created a scandal that would be the first 
cause célèbre of their nascent campaign.364 However, Pilkington draws our attention 
to a less well-known case of illegal enslavement by British residents in Brazil. Quoting 
a former employee of a mining company, the abolitionist alleged that upon freeing 
their slaves for the purpose of taking them on journeys to England, some British 
residents had been known to re-enslave their free servants when returning to Brazil. 
Pilkington then claimed to personally know of a shocking case of re-enslavement 
committed by an English wine merchant in Rio de Janeiro.365  
 
Pilkington may have been referring to the injustice committed by Arthur Moss against 
his former slave John Eden, a case which was eventually referred to the Earl of 
Aberdeen and the government’s solicitors. In a transcribed statement, John Eden 
recounted that he had been a slave in Brazil and eventually became the property of 
Arthur Moss or the firm Charles Tross & Co. After nine years in his ownership, Moss 
freed Eden in the British consul’s office and took him as a free servant back to 
England. After spending a year there, both men returned to Brazil in March 1836 and 
soon afterwards, Moss fraudulently sold Eden back into slavery. Eden spent around a 
year in Minas Gerais before his new master brought him back to the capital where he 
was able to seek the protection of the British consul. Nevertheless, after a period as a 
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wage labourer in a British commercial house and then onboard a steam vessel, Eden 
was captured by a capitão do mato (slave catcher) who once again brought him back 
to Moss’ residence. From there he was put in irons and sent to prison where he was 
put to hard labour for six months. Following this, Moss sold him illegally for a second 
time to a Brazilian in Nitéroi and only after four months was he able to once again 
seek the protection of the British authorities in Rio who allowed him to seek refuge 
on the HMS Crescent.366 Upon learning of Eden’s case in early 1843, Lord Aberdeen 
consulted the law officers to ascertain whether Moss could be prosecuted by the 
government for violation of British anti-slavery legislation. Despite the clear and 
multiple injustices committed against Eden, the government’s solicitors determined 
Moss was not liable to criminal proceedings for violating the slave trade laws. Though 
Aberdeen offered to ‘afford facilities’ to Eden in any case he may wish to take up 
against Moss (presumably in Brazil), the inability to prosecute under British law is yet 
another example of the limited scope of British anti-slavery during the 1830s and early 
1840s.367 John Eden was the victim, on more than one occasion, of what Sidney 
Chalhoub has called the ‘precariousness of freedom’ experienced by black people in 
nineteenth century Brazil 368  Just as their Brazilian counterparts did, British 
slaveholders took advantage of the type of institutional and political engineering that 
blurred boundaries between freedom and captivity and facilitated the illegal 
enslavement of many Africans and Brazilians during this period.  
                                                        
366 Mr. Hamilton to Earl Aberdeen, 20 April 1843, in Correspondence on Slave Trade (Class B), 
1844, P.P, 574, pp. 231-232.  
 
367 Earl Aberdeen to Mr. Hamilton, 2 August 1843, in Ibid pp. 241-242. 
 
368 S. Chalhoub, ‘Illegal Enslavement’. See also, S. Chalhoub, A Força da Escravidão, particularly 
chapter 4.  
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The myth of the benevolent master was a common defence of the institution in an era 
of abolition. It featured in the rhetoric of slaveholders in Britain’s colonies and in 
nineteenth-century Brazil. The British residents listed in the 1848 census were no 
different. In their case, this positive stereotype was perpetuated in order to defend a 
practice which they regarded as essential while still upholding a collective perception 
of moral superiority over their host society. A superiority which ironically was part 
built upon their own government’s projection as Britain as the world’s moral arbiter 
on anti-slavery. The evidence considered in this section serves to undermine the self-
identification of the British as Brazil’s most benevolent slave masters. It may have 
been the case that there were British residents who, comparatively speaking, subjected 
their slaves to less physical and emotional cruelty, but there were clearly a significant 
number who were violent, abusive and vindictive. More importantly, as Pilkington 
and the literature on Brazilian slavery remind us, even the most humanitarian masters 
were complicit in an exploitative system which was ultimately based on violence and 
brutality.  
 
British slaveholding in the second-half of the nineteenth century. 
 
Any discussion of British slaveholding in the second half of the nineteenth century is 
limited by the availability of source material. While the census data has proved crucial 
in painting a picture of British slaveholding at the mid-century, no other exercise of 
this nature was attempted in the following decades. As we observed in chapter 1, 
following the effective suppression of the Brazilian slave trade in 1850-1851, official 
interest in British slaveholding dissipated rapidly. Although abolitionists such as the 
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BFASS continued to take an interest in what they regarded as the hypocrisy of British 
slaveholding abroad, their ability to create a public scandal was much reduced by the 
fact that the majority of slave property held by their countrymen had been legitimised 
by the 1843 Act. The fact that government officials and abolitionist groups largely 
stopped writing about British slaveholders means we must rely on a range of patchy 
sources in the second half of the decade. Of course, the largest individual British 
slaveholders in Brazil, the mining companies, are an exception to this rule. Their 
structure as joint stock companies meant they reported to their British-based directors 
and shareholders about the labour force employed in their operations. Moreover, the 
scandal created by the illegal enslavement of the Cata Branca labourers by the St. John 
Del Rey Company produced a range of contemporary reports and other source 
material. By and large, however, this is not the case for other British slaveholders, the 
trace of many of whom is lost after the 1848 census. Nevertheless, by analysing the 
disparate sources which refer to some of these individuals in the context of modern 
studies on both the demographics of Brazilian slavery and the character of British 
investment in that country, it is still possible to give a broad assessment on the 
evolution of British slaveholding in non-mining contexts in the second half of the 
nineteenth century.  
 
Though impossible to quantify, we can surmise that British slaveholding entered into 
numerical decline after the mid-century. Though one slaveholder, the St. John Del Rey 
Company, would significantly expand its enslaved workforce in the 1850s and 1860s, 
this was an exception to the general trend.369 In fact, part of that business’s growth in 
                                                        
369 M. Eakin, British Enterprise p. 34.  
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slaveholding was made possible by the demise of other British mining companies, 
such as the Imperial Brazilian, from whom the St. John Del Rey hired large numbers 
of labourers. This meant that the overall number of slaves working in British-owned 
mines never exceeded much over the total recorded in the 1848 census.370 Though far 
less information exists on slaveholding in agricultural and urban contexts, the 
evidence that is available strongly suggests that the decline in these sectors was even 
more pronounced than in the mining industry. As we shall observe, the underlying 
cause of this was the significant structural changes in Brazil’s economy following the 
effective abolition in the slave trade in 1850-1851. A diversification of investment 
opportunities and the regional concentration of slavery in the decades that followed 
had considerable implications for the overall size and make-up of British slaveholding 
in Brazil. Although of secondary importance, we will also see how British anti-slavery 
legislation complicated the proliferation of slaveholding despite its characterisation as 
a long-forgotten dead-letter.  
 
The turn of the mid-century signalled the beginning of a process of diversification in 
Brazil’s economy. This occurred both in spite and because of the suppression of the 
illegal slave trade in 1850-1851. The continued expansion of Brazil’s coffee industry 
on the basis of large slave-worked estates had been bolstered by the Land Law (Lei 
das Terras) of 1850 and the significant internal slave trade which replaced the 
international traffic.371 In turn, this growth placed increasing demands on Brazil’s 
                                                        
370 At its peak the company owned or hired a total of around 1700 slaves, some 50 more than the total 
recorded in the census. See M. Childs, “A Case of “Great Unstableness” p. 722. 
 
371 On the Lei das Terras, see E.V. da Costa, The Brazilian Empire: Ch. 4. On the strong prospects for 
slave-worked coffee plantations in this period see R. Marquese, ‘Capitalismo, Escravidão e a 
Economia Cafeeira do Brasil no Longo Século XIX’ Saeculum – Revista de História, 29 (2013) pp. 
301-303. 
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strained physical and financial infrastructure. These demands were met in part by the 
deployment of large amounts of capital, hitherto employed in the illegal trade, into a 
range of sectors connected to the burgeoning import-export complex. This investment 
into areas such as banking, trading houses, transport and public works was facilitated 
by the creation of a new Commercial Code (1850). The code replaced centuries-old 
colonial legislation and established the rules and procedures under which this type of 
economic activity took place. Thus, Brazil’s growing and newly regulated economy 
presented a range of new investment opportunities beyond the traditional deployment 
of excess capital in land and slave property.  
 
British investors were attracted to this diversifying economy, especially in sectors 
which required large levels of financing and technical expertise, such as railway and 
public works construction. Of course, these sectors were not immune from 
entanglement with slavery. Though not usually directly owned or employed by the 
railway companies, slave labour was occasionally sub-contracted in the construction 
of British-owned railway lines in Brazil.372 Moreover, despite the scarcity of source 
material relating to the workforce of British public works companies, slaves were 
certainly employed by the Rio de Janeiro Gas Company during the 1870s.373 As we 
                                                        
372 See Chapter I.  
 
373 The Rio de Janeiro Gas Company was established in London in 1865 for the purpose of purchasing 
the property and concession owned by A Companhia de Iluminação a Gas do Rio de Janeiro, which 
had been in operation since 1851 under the control of the Baron de Mauá. Though the contract 
between these two companies makes no specific mention of the transferal of slave labour, newspaper 
articles in this period refer to the imprisonment of slaves employed by the gas works. It is likely that 
some of the 70 slaves employed by Mauá’s company were subsequently hired by the British firm. For 
examples of these references, see ‘Prisões’ Diário do Rio de Janeiro, 19 October 1870, 22 July 1873, 
15 November 1873, 31 October 1875, 16 October 1876. On the establishment of the company and the 
contract of transferal of various types of non-slave property, see ‘An Agreement between the Baron 
de Mauá and the Rio de Janeiro Gas Company Limited’, 1865, in TNA, BT 31/1064/1912C pp. 44-
47. See also, M. de Azevedo, Rio de Janeiro: sua história, monumentos, homens notáveis, usos e 
curiosidades (Rio de Janeiro: B.L. Garnier, 1877) pp. 327-341; I. E. de Souza, Exposição do Visconde 
de Mauá aos credores de Mauá & C e ao Publico (Rio de Janeiro: J. Villeneuve, 1878) pp. 12-15.  
 
 
 
184 
shall observe in Chapters IV and V, British banks were also exposed to Brazilian 
slavery through the acceptance of human collateral as security for debts. In spite of 
these important instances of entanglement, these new areas of investment help explain 
why there was not a second wave of British investment in Brazilian agriculture to 
replace the first generation of plantation owners captured by the census data. Though 
some of these properties continued in the hands of their British owners or Anglo-
Brazilian heirs, there is little evidence for new investment in this sector, with the 
exception of Angélica estate (Chapter V), in the second-half of the century.374 After 
the mid-century, British merchants who may have considered investing their excess 
capital in agriculture during the 1820s, 1830s and even 1840s, now opted for less risky 
ventures such as shares in British-owned railways, banks and public works. British 
agricultural slaveholders, an already small group in the 1848 census, became an even 
rarer species in the second half of the nineteenth century.  
 
Though individual urban slave-owners are even more difficult to track than their rural 
counterparts, we can fairly safely assume that British slaveholding in Brazil’s cities 
also entered into decline during the same period. Studies of urban slavery have 
highlighted the changing demographics in Brazilian cities in the second half of the 
century. Soares has observed a considerable negative shift in the pattern of slave-
ownership in the city of Rio de Janeiro, whereas Mattoso noted a similar decline in 
                                                        
374 Most of the British-owned plantations disappear from the historical record after the census. 
However, some of these slaveholders and their heirs continue to feature in regional almanacks in the 
following decades. For example, Charles de Mornay was still listed as the owner of the Jenipapo 
engenho in Alagoas in 1883. See Almanak Administrativo, Mercantil e Industrial do Império do 
Brazil para 1883, vol. 3 (Rio de Janeiro, H. Laemmert, 1883) p. 94. Similarly, Roberto de Figueiredo 
Lawrie and Roberto de Figueiredo Reid, heirs of Robert Lawrie and George Reid respectively, 
continued to own plantations in Macaé. See Almanak Administrativo, Mercantil e Industrial da Corte 
e Provincia do Rio de Janeiro inclusive a cidade de Santos, da Provincia de S. Paulo para o anno de 
1875, vol. 2 (Rio de Janeiro: Eduardo & Henrique Laemmert, 1875) p. 158.  
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the city of Salvador, Bahia.375 The principal reasons for this are two-fold. Firstly, the 
diversification of the economy after 1850 offered new investment opportunities for 
capital that in earlier decades would have been used to purchase slaves. 376  City 
dwellers were not only purchasing fewer slaves; following the end of the transatlantic 
trade, elevated prices saw large numbers of urban slaves sold to agricultural producers, 
in particular the expanding coffee regions in the southeast of the country.377 In the case 
of Rio de Janeiro, a decrease in the enslaved workforce was counterbalanced by an 
influx of Portuguese immigrants who performed many of the roles previously held by 
slaves.378 There is no evidence to suggest that British slaveholding in Brazil’s cities 
would differ from this broader demographic shift. Indeed, Richard Burton, writing in 
1869, remarked that British subjects in Brazil’s cities were able to hire free servants 
instead of slaves.379 While data is impossible to obtain, perhaps the decline in slave 
labour in Christopher Starr’s foundry, 28 in 1848 to 10 in 1859, is representative of 
the downward trend in the slaveholding by British residents in Brazil’s cities.380  
 
                                                        
375 See. L.C. Soares, ‘Urban Slavery in Rio de Janeiro’ pp. 105-112; K. M. de Queirós Mattoso, To Be 
a Slave in Brazil pp. 61-63.  
 
376 Mattoso noted that a decrease in slave-ownership in Salvador by the 1870s was accompanied by an 
increase in capital invested in urban real estate, shares and government bonds. See K. M. de Queirós 
Mattoso, To Be a Slave in Brazil p. 61. 
 
377 On the internal slave trade see R.W. Slenes, ’The Brazilian Internal Slave Trade, 1850-1888: 
Regional Economies, Slave Experience and the Politics of a Peculiar Market’, in W. Johnson (ed.), 
The Chattel Principle: Internal Slave Trades in the Americas (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2004) pp. 325-353. In the case of the city of Rio de Janeiro, see L.C. Soares, ‘Urban Slavery in Rio de 
Janeiro’ p. 105.  
 
378 L.C. Soares, ‘Urban Slavery in Rio de Janeiro’ p. 105. 
 
379 R. Burton, The Highlands of Brazil, vol I, (London: Tinsley Brothers, 1869) p. 272. 
 
380 The first figure is taken from the census data and the second from a diary entry made by Dom 
Pedro II during a visit to the foundry, see Dom Pedro II, Viagem a Pernambuco em 1859. Cópia, 
introdução e notas de Guilherme Auler. (Recife: Arquivo Público Estadual, 1959) p. 69.  
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Although not as central as the diversification of investment opportunities or wider 
trends in the demographics of Brazilian slavery, we should not completely dismiss the 
impact of the 1843 Act on British slaveholding in the second half of the nineteenth 
century. Evans has correctly characterised this piece of legislation as ineffective; much 
to the disappointment of its abolitionist sponsors, it respected the property rights of 
British subjects to slaves purchased before its enactment and did not outlaw the future 
exploitation of slave labour through hiring.381 However, the same author’s assertion 
that the act was ‘soon forgotten’ belies the strategies adopted by British subjects in the 
subsequent decades to evade or circumvent its provisions. As Evans himself notes, the 
St. John Del Rey Mining Company hired slaves not just because it was a quick and 
cost-effective way of adding to their workforce in times of need, but because it kept 
them on the right side of the 1843 Act.382 Indeed, Kelly has highlighted the fact that 
the company initially proceeded cautiously, seeking legal opinions in England and 
Brazil on the question of slave hiring.383 As we shall observe in Chapter V, the London 
and Brazilian Bank hired slaves to work its coffee plantation, knowing that any 
purchase would constitute a violation of the legislation. In both the case of the mining 
companies and the bank, there was a direct connection between the decision to hire 
slaves and a desire to remain on the right side of the law. With this in mind, we can 
surmise that other British subjects, the merchants listed in the return for Rio de Janeiro, 
who hired slaves after 1843 were driven, at least in part, by similar motivations.384  
 
                                                        
381 C. Evans, ‘Brazilian Gold’ pp. 126-127. 
 
382 Ibid p. 126.  
 
383 J. Kelly ‘The Problem of Anti-Slavery’ p. 200.  
 
384 Census Return – Rio de Janeiro.  
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Hiring was the most common method employed to circumvent the spirit and letter of 
British anti-slavery legislation, but it was not the only one. As we observed in Chapter 
I, in 1861 the recently-arrived chaplain in Bahia complained that an unnamed British 
mercantile house in that city had purchased slaves by proxy. The slaves were 
nominally the property of a Brazilian clerk employed by the firm, but this individual 
had no control over them, was not in possession of the slaves’ papers and never 
actually paid any money for their purchase; ‘his name as a cover could be for any other 
changed at the pleasure of the firm.’385 Some four years later, vice-consul William 
Wilson in Maranhão reported that the German manager of the Montes Aureos Mining 
Company had purchased slaves in his name to allow this short-lived British firm to 
exploit their labour without falling foul of the 1843 Act.386 As discussed in the case of 
Thomas Cochrane earlier in this chapter, it is also possible that proxy purchases of 
slaves were made in the name of the Brazilian wives of British subjects for the same 
reason.  
 
Another strategy, or at the very least a defence, employed by British slaveholders after 
1843 was naturalisation as a Brazilian subject. We have observed how a Mr. Stepples 
in Pernambuco refused to be acknowledged as a British subject during the collection 
of the census data there.  Likewise, we have seen how the exclusion of John Taylor 
from the Rio de Janeiro return may well have been linked to his naturalisation as a 
Brazilian subject. In 1861, when challenged about his slaveholding by a particularly 
                                                        
385 Reverend C.G. Nicolay to the Bishop of London, 11 June 1861, LPL, Tait 424, ff. 104-106.  
 
386 Mr. Wilson to Mr. Blandy (and enclosures), 28 March 1865, TNA, FO 84/1244 ff. 236-251. See 
also, Mr. Layard to Consul Blandy, 7 June 1865, in Ibid ff. 194-195. For a brief history of this 
company see D. Cleary, Anatomy of the Amazon Gold Rush, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1990) pp. 
36-38. See also, I. E. de Souza, Exposição do Visconde de Mauá p. 49.  
 
 
 
188 
zealous British consul at Rio, John McGinty argued that his adoption of Brazilian 
citizenship meant he was ‘at perfect liberty to purchase or sell a slave.’387 McGinty, 
like Taylor and Stepples, was in the service of the Brazilian navy so this profession, 
rather than circumventing British legislation, was likely his primary motivation for 
naturalisation. Nevertheless, McGinty’s reply to consul Vereker clearly shows that he 
perceived slaveholding to be a collateral benefit to the renunciation of his allegiance 
to the British crown. This was not restricted to Brazil; Kelly has shown how British 
subjects in Suriname were prepared to adopt foreign citizenship in order to protect 
their slaveholding from interference by the authorities after 1843.388 Slaveholding was 
of such importance to some British subjects that they were prepared to forgo their 
nationality in its defence.  
 
Though the 1843 Act proved ineffective at preventing those that really wanted to from 
exploiting slave labour, there were also cases where its presence on the statute books 
and in public consciousness did hinder the proliferation of British slaveholding by 
some joint-stock companies. While its exact provisions may not have been well-
known, that British subjects could not purchase new slaves was understood to the 
extent that at least three companies in industries synonymous with slavery publicly 
resolved to operate with free labour. Two mining companies established in London in 
1861, the East del Rey and the Montes Aureos, both committed to using free labour, 
with the prospectus of the latter stating that ‘no slaves will be held by the Company or 
their servants.’389 Likewise, as we shall see in Chapter V, the Brazilian Coffee Estates 
                                                        
387 Mr. Vereker to Earl Russell, 9 December 1861, Correspondence on Slave Trade, 1862 (Class B), 
P.P, 3160 pp. 127-128.  
 
388 J. Kelly, ‘The Problem of Anti-slavery’ pp. 167-169.  
 
389 Daily News, 19 Dec 1861, cited in J. Kelly, ‘The Problem of Anti-slavery’ p. 202.  
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Company of 1872, also publicly committed to a free labour operation. In these three 
cases it was not simply a desire to stay on the right side of the law that influenced their 
labour policy, but a realisation that an association with slavery would make these 
companies impossible to sell to British investors. Of course, in spite of these public 
declarations, the Montes Aureos and the bank behind the Coffee Estates Company 
would ultimately find ways to exploit slave labour during their short-lived operations. 
Nevertheless, the 1843 law and its incorporation into British anti-slavery identity is at 
least partly responsible for the lack of new joint-stock slaveholders in mining and 
agriculture in the second half of the nineteenth-century. In this sense, the Act did not 
ultimately prevent the new exploitation of slave labour, but it did complicate it. 
 
Concluding remarks:  
 
This chapter has shown that British slaveholding was far more diverse across 
geography and sector than acknowledged by the literature. Beyond the mines of Minas 
Gerais, there were a similar collective total of slaves employed by silent beneficiaries 
of the 1843 Act in a whole range of agricultural and urban contexts. While numerically 
insignificant in the wider Brazilian context, the prevalence of slaveholding in British 
expat communities has important implications for our understanding of the limits of 
British anti-slavery. Anti-slavery may have pervaded the national identity of Victorian 
Britain, but as this chapter has clearly shown, it did not travel well when it encountered 
the social and economic realities of Brazil’s slaveholding empire. As much as British 
masters may have protested to the contrary, on the whole, they employed their slaves 
in similar contexts and treated them in much the same fashion as their Brazilian 
counterparts. That the British anti-slavery state could not rely on nor enforce their 
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subjects to embody the same virtues they impressed upon foreign governments, is 
testament to legislation and policy that was both limited in scope and ill-equipped in 
practical terms. As we shall see in the following chapters, this not only applied to 
British slaveholding for labour in mines, agriculture, and urban enterprise, but also in 
the case of financial entanglement with Brazilian slavery.  
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Chapter III: British Merchant Credit and Brazilian Slavery, 1830-1850. 
 
 
Lord Brougham’s 1843 legislation was not only a threat to British subjects who 
employed slaves in goldmines, on plantations, in workshops and their own households. 
As we observed in Chapter I, lobbying alongside those representing traditional 
slaveholders during the bill’s debate were a handful of MPs intent on nullifying the 
threat they believed the legislation would pose to Britain’s significant commercial 
relations in territories where slavery prevailed. At the crux of the matter were elements 
of the proposed legislation that aimed to restrict credit relations between British 
merchants and foreign slave-owners. According to the lobby’s parliamentary 
representatives Humphrey Mildmay MP and Lord Ashburton, the extension of credit 
secured by slave property and the occasional requirement to foreclose on these debts 
was part and parcel of doing business in ‘any country from Virginia to [the] Brazils’. 
As such, any attempt to interfere with these practices would undoubtedly be damaging 
to British trade in these regions.1  The efforts by Mildmay and Ashburton to protect 
what they regarded as legitimate trade were grounded in their own experience as 
partners of Baring Bros., a powerful merchant bank whose credit relations with 
slaveholders resulted in it becoming a beneficiary of British slave compensation and 
the owner of plantations and slaves in both Cuba and the Danish West Indies.2 Though 
Barings did not become a slaveholder in Brazil, we have observed elsewhere that other 
                                                        
1 Hansard, HC Deb 18 August 1843 vol 71 c. 936. 
 
2 On St. Croix, see L. Brown, ‘The Slavery Connections of Northington Grange’ (English Heritage, 
2010) [https://www.english-heritage.org.uk/publications/slavery-connections-northington-
grange/slavery-connections-northington-grange.pdf [last accessed 25/04/2018] pp. 65-73. On Cuba, 
see I. Roldan de Montaud, ‘Baring Brothers and the Cuban Plantation Economy, 1814-1870’, in A. 
Leonard and D. Pretel (eds), The Caribbean and the Atlantic World Economy: Circuits of Trade, 
Money and Knowledge, 1650-1914 (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015) pp. 238-262. Both cases are 
examined in the context of parliamentary debates about Brougham’s bill in J. Kelly, ‘The Problem of 
Anti-Slavery’ pp. 173-190.  
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British merchants in places such as Rio de Janeiro, Pernambuco and Paraíba did 
foreclose on debts secured by human collateral.3 Though these cases are evidence of 
the credit relations in Brazil that the Baring’s commercial lobby sought to defend, the 
fact remains that very little is known about British involvement in slave mortgages 
and similar transactions identified by the 1843 bill’s sponsors as another form of 
British complicity in the promotion of the illegal slave trade.  
 
The purpose of this chapter, then, is to survey the relationship between British 
merchant credit and Brazilian slavery during the two decades of the contraband trade 
and to determine whether the anti-slavery legislation introduced in 1843 had any 
noticeable impact on the way British merchants conducted their business in the years 
following its enactment.  This survey, based on an analysis of publicly recorded slave 
mortgages involving British merchants in the city of Rio de Janeiro, reveals that 
British merchants were financially entangled with Brazilian slavery in a variety of 
ways; both as creditors and debtors, with Brazilians and within their own community, 
and in rural as well as urban contexts. While slave mortgages involving British 
subjects were not particularly prevalent, during the 1830s they were openly and 
routinely conducted in the context of minimal scrutiny that characterised British anti-
slavery attitudes towards British slaveholding in this decade. Anti-slavery legislation 
did seem to have an immediate, if short term, impact in the sense that it does not appear 
to have been brazenly ignored.  Nevertheless, as happened in the case of slaveholding, 
legislation could not prevent this form of financial entanglement with Brazilian 
slavery; determined creditors found ways to observe the letter of the law without 
abandoning their investments.  
                                                        
3 Discussed in Chapter I, Part II.   
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As stressed in the Introduction, the historiography of the British in Brazil has not 
adequately addressed the relationship between these communities and slavery. This 
includes the entanglement of British merchant credit and human property. One aspect 
of this financial connection has, of course, been well developed in the literature; 
historians of the slave trade and its abolition have described the important role that 
British merchants played as suppliers, facilitators and financiers of illegal slave 
voyages.4  Although involving many of the same actors, these links to the contraband 
trade were not the credit relations that the 1843 Act was designed to target specifically, 
nor what the lobby organised by Baring Bros. sought to protect. Rather than credit 
relations with slave traders, Ashburton and Mildmay defended the right of British 
merchants to extend credit and recover debts in territories where dealers commonly 
offered human beings as collateral. The major reason that historians of the slave trade 
and anti-slavery have overlooked these connections is that they constituted a minor 
theatre of the state’s attempt to prevent British complicity. Unlike the types of direct 
and indirect connections with slave traders – legislated against as early as 1806 – 
official concern surrounding the promotion of the trade through investments in 
domestic slavery only gathered traction in the early 1840s and had largely dissipated 
by the turn of the midcentury.   
 
Credit relations with slaveholders have also been largely overlooked by the business 
history literature concerning the British firms involved in these transactions. While 
recognising the connections between British merchants and the illegal slave trade, the 
                                                        
4 D. Eltis, ‘The British contribution to the nineteenth century slave trade’ pp. 219–221; L.H. Tavares, 
Comércio Proibido de Escravos pp. 76-79, 129-134; R. Conrad, World of Sorrow: The African Slave 
Trade to Brazil, pp.130-132. 
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primary focus of these studies has tended to be the structure, organisation and 
networks of individual firms. 5 Whereas others have been more concerned with the 
collective performance of the British commercial body as evidence for or against 
dependency theory.6 The absence of research on the financial connections between 
British merchants and domestic slavery is also partly explained by the fact that the 
British were not direct financiers of the most dynamic sector of Brazil’s slave 
economy; British credit circulated primarily within the import-export complex and 
generally only reached the agricultural sector indirectly. 7  Nevertheless, as the 
lobbyists against the 1843 bill were aware, there were a whole myriad of ways that 
British credit could be exposed to slavery in a country whose economy was so 
dominated by the institution. Understanding the processes involved in the 
entanglement between British credit and domestic slavery is a worthy exercise on its 
own, but perhaps what is more important is what it can tell us about the limits of British 
anti-slavery policy on foreign shores.  
 
Another factor contributing to the scarcity of information on British credit relations 
with slaveholders has to do with the availability of source material. Firstly, as this 
form of complicity was only a policy concern for a short period, it only features briefly 
                                                        
5 See C.G Guimarães, ‘O Comércio Inglês no Império brasileiro: a atuação da firma inglesa 
Carruthers & Co, 1824-1854’, in Anais do Seminário Interno do CEO/PRONEX Nação e Cidadania 
no Império: Novos Horizontes, (2006); C.G Guimarães, A Presença Inglesa nas Finanças e no 
Comércio no Brasil Imperial: Os casos da Sociedade Bancária Mauá, MacGregor & Cia (1854-
1866) e da firm inglesa Samuel Phillips & Cia (1808-1840) (São Paulo: Alameda, 2012) pp. 221-252.  
 
6 See Introduction.  
 
7 British merchants were the last step in the marketing chain of Brazilian coffee. They were an 
important source of international credit in the economy, as emphasised by work on their role in the 
slave trade, see D. Eltis, ‘The British contribution to the nineteenth century slave trade’ pp. 220-222. 
Nevertheless, in general terms they did not lend directly to plantation owners, a role dominated by 
Luso-Brazilian coffee factors, see J. Sweigart, ‘Financing and marketing Brazilian export agriculture: 
the coffee factor 1850-1888.’ (Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Texas, 1980).  
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in the official F.O. correspondence and abolitionist writings upon which historians of 
the slave trade have relied. Secondly, unlike the British joint-stock banks of later 
decades that left published annual reports, recorded shareholder meetings and archived 
correspondence, British merchant houses operating in the first half of the century left 
far fewer traces of their activity in the historical record.8 The general absence of 
records relating to the firms in question is further complicated by the commercial 
activities which British merchants were involved in. Most ‘English houses’ operating 
in Brazilian port cities during the 1830s and 1840s were involved in the import of 
British manufactures and the export of Brazilian commodities, such as coffee and 
sugar.9 As Eltis has noted in his study of the involvement of these firms in the illegal 
trade, the import and sale of British goods in Brazil was almost inseparable from 
credit. 10  These transactions were based on the circulation of different types of 
commercial paper that although not formally regulated until the passing of the 
Commercial Code in 1850, were widely accepted in a system characterised by 
informal and personalistic credit relations.11 Crucially, in the absence of surviving 
accounts and ledgers, transactions of this nature left little trace in the historical record.  
 
                                                        
8 An exception to this general rule is Robert Greenhill’s study of the firm of E. Johnston & Co, which 
drew on correspondence in private collections. See R. Greenhill ‘E. Johnston: 150 Anos em Café’ in 
E. Bacha & R. Greenhill (eds.) 150 Anos de Cafe (Rio de Janeiro: Marcelino Martins & E. Johnston, 
1992) pp. 137-280. 
 
9 Of 48 ‘English houses’ in Rio de Janeiro included in a consular register of 1848, 37 were listed as 
‘general merchants’ while a further 5 were described as ‘merchants’ alongside another activity such 
as auctioneering. The remaining firms included one banking house and brokerage firms. See: Mr. 
Westwood to Viscount Palmerston, 28 December 1848, in TNA FO 13/260.  
 
10 D. Eltis, ‘The British contribution to the nineteenth century slave trade’ p. 220.  
 
11 A. Hanley, Native Capital: Financial Institutions and Economic Development in São Paulo, Brazil, 
1850-1920 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005) pp. 31-32.  
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While the majority of British activity in the Brazilian credit market remains invisible 
to the historian, some transactions were publicly recorded in notarial offices in the 
form of escrituras. These contracts recorded various types of transactions including 
the purchase, sale, transfer of property, probate inventories and even marriages and 
divorce. Importantly for our study, these notarial records also contain escrituras de 
dívida e hipoteca (debt and mortgage deeds). These were a form of public contract 
between two or more parties which generally followed a standardised format 
containing information about the debtor and creditor, the basic agreement between 
them (amount loaned, repayment terms) and importantly a description of any property 
offered as security for the loan, including human collateral. 12  The information 
contained in these deeds, although not without limitations, provides a unique 
opportunity to better understand the business activities of the British in Rio de Janeiro 
and trace the types of transactions which the parliamentary lobbyists sought to defend. 
Moreover, in cases involving slave mortgages, they also offer an opportunity to begin 
to piece together the social implications and the human stories behind British 
investment in Brazil’s slave economy. 
 
Whilst the findings of this chapter will bring to light new empirical evidence 
concerning the entanglement of British mercantile capital and Brazilian slavery, it is 
worth making two brief points about the limitations of the methodology employed. 
One relates to the historical intangibility of financial transactions in the context of the 
practices and conditions of the Brazilian credit market in the first half of the nineteenth 
century. Although this source base can undoubtedly provide a window into the 
                                                        
12 For the format and information typically contained in a deed of this type, see J.J. Ryan, ‘Credit 
Where Credit is Due: Lending and Borrowing in Rio de Janeiro, 1820-1900 ‘ (Unpublished PhD 
Thesis, University of California, 2007) pp. 42-49.  
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entanglement of British credit and slavery in the absence of other sources, it should be 
recognized that they only represent a small proportion of all credit transactions 
involving British merchants. This fact restricts the types of conclusions that can be 
drawn from such data. Despite having been inspired by Bonnie Martin’s use of similar 
documents to understand the role that slave mortgages played in the economy of the 
U.S. South, this research cannot hope to make similar conclusions about the overall 
importance of British credit to slavery in Rio de Janeiro and its surrounding region.13  
 
As alluded to previously, the slave mortgages identified in a survey of escrituras de 
dívida e hipoteca do not record every time that a lender extended credit to a slaveowner 
directly or indirectly. As this chapter will show, they occur most commonly in three 
scenarios. Firstly, when a debtor missed a payment deadline that originated in a 
commercial transaction. In this circumstance, one option open to the creditor was to 
agree to an extension, where the debtor offered his property as security in the event of 
further defaults on the loan. It is important to note that not all creditors pursued this 
course of action; if he was unwilling to extend the deadline for payment, he could take 
his debtor to court. These legal processes, which for British subjects were conducted 
until 1844 under the auspices of the British Conservatorial Court, could result in the 
seizure and sale of slave property. These cases are not considered in this chapter.14  
The second scenario involves the contracting of a purchase-money mortgage, where 
                                                        
13 B. Martin, ‘Slavery's Invisible Engine: Mortgaging Human Property’ Journal of Southern History 
76 (2010) pp. 817-866. 
 
14 I had initially hoped to use court records to complement the mortgage deeds analysed here but was 
unable to locate sufficient numbers of cases to consult. Although a small number of processes are 
held at the Arquivo Nacional in Rio de Janeiro, I have since discovered that other documents relating 
to the British Conservational Court may be held at the Arquivo da Justiça in the same city. If located 
and in good condition, these documents represent an important, and thus far overlooked, source for 
research on the British in Brazil in the first half of the nineteenth century. 
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the buyer wished to purchase a property including slaves but could not afford the cash 
price so instead made a down payment and mortgaged the property to the seller as 
security for future instalments. The last scenario for the contracting of a slave 
mortgage was for an equity loan, where a debtor released equity in their slave property 
in order to raise funds for whatever purpose.  
 
The second methodological limitation relates to the geographic focus and gaps in 
coverage of the sample used. Firstly, due to the availability of readily accessible data, 
the sample used in this study is limited to deeds registered in notary offices in Rio de 
Janeiro included in the database of Brazil’s National Archive.  It should also be noted, 
however, that this sample is limited by gaps in coverage on the database. For example, 
of the four notarial offices in existence in the 1830 - 1850, the records of Second 
(Segundo Ofício de Notas) and Fourth (Quarto Ofício de Notas) are not held by the 
Brazilian National Archive and are not included in the sample. Moreover, not all of 
the deed books from the First and Third notarial offices have been included in the 
Archive’s database.15  Nevertheless, the fact that the First Ofício in particular has a 
fairly complete dataset is important as it was located in the commercial district near 
the port, where most British merchants maintained their offices and warehouses. 
Lastly, as the database contains no information about the nationality of the contracting 
parties, cases involving British subjects had to be identified by unsystematically 
scanning the database for ‘English-looking’ names and then cross-referencing these 
names with other sources to confirm their nationality. Human error, both of the 
complier of the database – transcription errors with English names are common – and 
                                                        
15 For coverage of the Brazilian National Archive’s ‘Ofícios de Notas da Cidade do Rio de Janeiro’ 
database see http://www.arquivonacional.gov.br/acervos-mais-consultados-titulo/oficio-de-notas.html 
[Last accessed 8/11/2016]. Gaps for the time period concerned are negligible for the First (Primeiro 
Ofício de Notas) but the Third only contains data from 17/02/1844. 
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my own in scanning lists, mean that entries are likely to have been overlooked. In spite 
of the limitations of this methodology and in the absence of other sources, a survey of 
these mortgage contracts provides important glimpses of the entanglement of British 
credit and Brazilian slavery in the context of British anti-slavery policy. 
 
British merchants and mortgage deeds 1830-1850 
 
Before discussing the individual case studies found in Rio de Janeiro’s notary office 
records, it is worthwhile noting that those British merchants partaking in transactions 
involving human collateral were replicating a long-held practice in both the context of 
Brazil and the pre-emancipation British Empire. Studies of credit markets in the 
British Atlantic during the long eighteenth century have described a mature and 
complex credit system involving planters, local merchants, commission houses and 
bankers in Britain.16 Although scholars disagree over the relative importance of local, 
short-term commercial credit or longer-term metropole financing, it is clear that the 
use of slave property as collateral for financial transactions was a routine and legal 
practice in the British colonies before the Emancipation Act of 1833.17 Using the Slave 
Compensation Commission records, Nicholas Draper and the LBS Project have clearly 
demonstrated that at the time of emancipation ten London banking houses and a whole 
host of merchants from across Britain – including Baring Bros. – had claims in the 
                                                        
16 R. Pares, ’Merchants and Planters,’ Economic History Review Supplement 4 (1960) pp. 1-91; S.D 
Smith, ‘Merchants and Planters Revisited,’ Economic History Review, new ser., 55 (2002), pp. 434-
65; D. Hancock, ‘"Capital and Credit with Approved Security:” Financial Markets in Montserrat and 
South Carolina, 1748-1775,’ Business and Economic History, 23 (1994), pp. 61-84. 
 
17 The practice was legally formalised under the Colonial Debts Act (1732) in which slaves were 
defined as personal property and thus could be used as security for debts. See S.D. Smith ‘Merchants 
and Planters Revisited,’ p. 455. 
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compensation process following loans they had made against slaves in British colonial 
possessions.18 
 
Despite a certain ambiguity about slaves in Brazilian law, giving them the status of 
being simultaneously both ‘thing’ and ‘person’, their use as property to guarantee a 
loan saw them treated as bens semoventes – semi-moveable objects in the same way 
as livestock.19 In their respective studies on the agricultural credit in Rio de Janeiro 
province and non-bank lending in the city of Rio de Janeiro, both Joseph Sweigart and 
Joseph Ryan have shown that slaves were routinely offered as guarantees for loans in 
these intimately linked credit markets.20 Given the types of loans that Rio’s notary 
offices recorded and known the size of the slave population - estimated at 43% and 
41% of the city’s total in 1838 and 1849 respectively - Ryan’s findings that it was 
‘individual slaves, used as domestic servants within the city’ which made up the bulk 
of slave collateral in the first half of the 19th century is not surprising.21  Perhaps more 
surprising is his finding that slaves were ‘not used all that frequently to secure credit,’ 
appearing in 18% of the loans which listed collateral between 1820-1890 in his sample. 
As a proportion of total value of credit secured, Ryan does note that slave collateral 
was at its most important in 1830 (in his decennially sampled data), representing 18%. 
So, while it was at its most significant during the period under consideration in this 
chapter, the overall importance of human collateral was still marginal in comparison 
to urban property for example, which in the 1830 and 1840 decennial represented 58% 
                                                        
18 N. Draper, The Price of Emancipation, Chapter 7; UCL Legacies of Slave Ownership, 
https://www.ucl.ac.uk/lbs/ [last accessed 6th May 2015] 
 
19 K. Grinberg, Código civil e cidadania. (Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Zahar, 2001) pp. 52-53 
 
20 J. E. Sweigart, Financing and marketing Brazilian export agriculture p. 123.  
 
21 J. Ryan, ‘Credit Where Credit is Due: Lending and Borrowing in Rio de Janeiro, 1820-1900’, p. 46  
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and 49% of all credit secured. 22  In spite of its relative infrequency, it was the 
possibility and legality of the collateralisation of slave property in Brazil which the 
likes of Ashburton and Mildmay were defending.  
 
Given Ryan’s findings about the relative importance of other types of property offered 
as collateral, it is perhaps worthwhile making some comments on those mortgages 
identified in our survey that were secured by non-slave property, in so far as they give 
us an insight into the commercial activity and social relations of members of the 
British community in Rio de Janeiro. Given the majority of the British involved in 
transactions located in the notary records during this period were merchants linked to 
the import-export complex, it is not surprising that many of the mortgage deeds in 
question arose from an initial transaction involving commercial paper and that 
merchants would often offer their commercial or residential properties as security for 
repayment. For instance, in April 1845 Brazilian debtor Reignaldo José Cardeira 
agreed that following the expiration of two commercial bills totalling 12 contos, he 
would mortgage his two-storey house on Rua da Violas to John LeCoq, a merchant 
from the Channel Islands with extensive interests in the coffee trade.23 Due to the 
common practice of discounting amongst the commercial community, deeds 
sometimes involved more than two parties. In December 1837 British firms Naylor 
Brothers and Francis Le Breton signed a deed to confirm that American merchant 
James Birkhead had paid off the mortgage, guaranteed by commercial property, which 
                                                        
22 Ryan admits that his classification of types of collateral mean slaves are occasionally grouped with 
other types of property are thus systematically underrepresented. See Ibid pp. 122-124.  
 
23 Reignaldo José Cardeira x João LeCoq, 16/04/1845, AN, 3o Oficio de notas, book 196, f.18 
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he had first agreed in June of the same year for 17 contos.24 The British were not 
always the creditors in these urban property mortgages. For example, in December 
1847 British merchant and sugar planter William Whitaker agreed to mortgage a house 
in Santos, São Paulo, following his failure to repay eight contos of credit which João 
Duarte Lisboa Serra, future President of the Bank of Brazil, had extended to him.25 
 
On the few occasions the deeds do not have their origins in merchant bills, they were 
for equity loans where credit was offered to allow the borrower to expand their 
operations. For example, in April 1838, James Birkhead contracted a 12-month loan 
worth 16 contos from Baring Brothers of London, through their Rio based agent, 
Henry Bellamy Webb. The loan was guaranteed by his chácara in Engenho Velho, a 
semi-rural district on the outskirts of the city. Though this mortgage did not contain 
human collateral, it shows that Barings were active, however marginally, in Rio de 
Janeiro’s credit market - a business environment where, as their partner Humphrey 
Mildmay argued in parliament, exposure to slavery was perfectly possible.26 In April 
1848, British merchant James Hartley also raised an equity loan with the infamous 
slave trafficker José Bernardino de Sá.27 As well as commercial property near the port, 
Hartley offered as security his cotton textile factory in Andaraí.28 Although urban 
                                                        
24 Naylor Irmãos, Francisco Le Breton x Diogo Birkhead, 14/12/1837, AN, 1o Oficio de Notas, book 
243, f. 60r. 
 
25 Guilherme Whitaker x João Duarte Lisboa, 01/12/1837, AN, 1o Oficio de Notas, book 258, f. 32. 
 
26 Diogo Birkhead x Baring Irmãos e Cia. de Londres, 10/04/1838, AN, 1o Oficio de Notas, book 244, 
f. 28r.    
 
27 Joaquim Diogo Hartley x José Bernardino de Sá, 29/04/1848, AN, 3o Oficio de notas, book 201, f. 
53. 
 
28 Interestingly, this loan came only seven months after Hartley had successfully raised 100 contos in 
government finance for the very same establishment. See Senado Federal, Decreto nº 491, 
28/09/1847. http://legis.senado.gov.br/legislacao/ListaTextoIntegral.action?id=64892&norma=80800 
[last accessed 13/11/2016] 
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property was predominant – whether houses, a factory or even a saw mill – on one 
occasion rural fazendas (plantations) were accepted as security in a purchase-money 
mortgage by British creditors. In February 1840 a group of British merchants 
including David Stevenson and Henry Burn, the latter as administrator the estate of 
the late Alexander Milne, sold a plantation called Serparagui only to then take the 
very same estate as security over five years for 75% of the 10 contos (£1292) purchase 
price agreed with José Narcizo Coelho.29 However, it seems that Coelho struggled to 
pay the amount in full and some nine years later the plantation was put up for public 
auction to satisfy Coelho’s debt to Stevenson.30 No slaves were identified as part of 
this transaction but this case adds further weight to the observation made in Chapter 
II that British plantation ownership was more common than had previously been 
recognised. 
 
British Merchants and Human Collateral: 1830 - 1850 
 
Of the loans guaranteed by slave property a very similar picture emergences of lending 
- and indeed borrowing - within and outside the British community, on the basis of 
commercial bills, equity loans and purchase-money mortgages. Moreover, as all but 
one of the mortgages concerned were collateralised only in part by slaves, they can 
also be categorised into urban and rural contexts. In terms of loans collateralised by 
human and some sort of urban property, again we can observe a mixture of commercial, 
residential and personal assets. For example, on various occasions Joseph Maxwell 
                                                        
29 David Stevenson, Henrique Burn x José Narcizo Coelho, AN, 1o Oficio de Notas, book 246, ff. 51-
52r. 
 
30 Diário do Rio de Janeiro, 25 January 1849. 
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was involved in slave mortgages arranged with small business owners in the city.31  
Maxwell was a founder partner of the firm Maxwell, Wright & Company whose main 
area of activity was in the export of coffee to the US and the importation of mid-
Atlantic flour on the return journey.32 The sale on credit of this import to bakers in the 
city is the reason Maxwell appears in the notary records. In June 1836, following his 
failure to pay the one conto (£160) owed for a consignment of flour, Franciso José 
Pinheiro Braga mortgaged his two bakeries, equipment and four African slaves, João 
Congo, João Inhambame, Elias Moçambique and Paulo Benguela, to Maxwell. 33 
Almost a decade to the day later, Maxwell’s firm agreed a mortgage with Arnaldo 
Pinto de Castro who in very similar circumstances offered his bakery plus 16 slaves, 
all of African origin, as collateral for the 10 contos (£1122) he owed for the purchase 
of flour.34 Although these are the only occasions he appears as slave mortgagee in the 
notary records concerned, Alan dos Santos Ribeiro’s research has shown that on at 
least two other occasions in 1834 and 1836 Maxwell, Wright & Co. brought debtors 
before the British Conservatorial Court (Conservatoria Inglesa) in Rio where the 
judge ordered for their assets including slaves to be sold at auction to pay the 
outstanding debt.35  
                                                        
31 Joseph Maxwell’s country estate is discussed in more detail in Chapter II.  
 
32 For more information on the diverse activities of this Anglo-American firm, including in the illegal 
slave trade, see A. dos Santos Ribeiro, 'A firma Maxwell Wright & Co. no comércio do império do 
Brasil (c. 1827- c. 1850)’ See also L. Jarnagin, Atlantic Crossings: A Confluence of Transatlantic 
Networks: Elites, Capitalism, and Confederate Migration to Brazil (University of Alabama, 2008) p. 
112. 
 
33 Francisco José Pinheiro Braga x José Maxwell, 04/06/1836, AN, 1o Oficio de Notas, book 241, ff. 
83r-84. 
 
34 Arnaldo Pinto de Castro x Maxwell, Wright & Cia, 17/06/1846, AN, 1o Oficio de Notas, book 256, 
ff. 56r-57. 
 
35 A. dos Santos Ribeiro, 'A firma Maxwell Wright & Co.’ p. 93. While Maxwell Wright & Co. has 
often been considered as a U.S. in the literature, it is clear that it was willing to exploit its British 
connections when this meant taking advantage of the privileged forum of the British Conversatorial 
Court. 
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On other occasions British residents in Rio were debtors in these transactions and 
offered their slaves as collateral for money owed. In November 1838, following the 
expiration of a private credit instrument worth a considerable 31 contos (£3261) 
British merchant Richard Foster mortgaged all of his property to his creditor José 
Alves Corrêa. There is scant record of Foster’s activities in the 1830s, but port entries 
and departures published in the Jornal do Commercio in the 1840s show him linked 
to the Rio de la Plata as well as Brazilian coastal trade.36 The size of his debt as well 
as the inventory of mortgaged property show the importance of his firm as a going 
concern. In addition to 14 slaves and their six children, Foster mortgaged his 
commercial offices near the port as well as two country estates in the semi-rural 
Engenho Velho district which neighboured the properties of other affluent merchants 
such as the American Birkhead.37 In another case involving household slaves and 
domestic property, in April 1845 the Marquess de São João da Palma was able to 
release 14 contos (£1483) worth of equity from her personal property, including some 
20 slaves, in a mortgage with the Scotsman, Dr. Thomas Cochrane.38  
 
The economic importance of Rio de Janeiro meant that it was also on occasion the 
source of credit for commercial ventures outside its immediate vicinity. The next case 
study we will analyse concerns a sugar refinery that received large amounts of credit 
guaranteed by human collateral by two different British merchants. These transactions 
                                                        
36 Jornal do Commercio, 2 January 1843 shows Englishman Ricardo Foster as having departed for 
Buenos Aires and Montevideo on 30 December 1842. 
 
37 Ricardo Foster x José Alves Correa, 14/11/1838, AN, 1o Oficio de Notas, book 244, ff. 111-112. 
 
38 Marquesa de São João da Palma x Thomas Cochrane, 05/04/1845, AN, 3o Oficio de Notas, book 
196, ff. 37v-38.  
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will be used to highlight the highly personal nature of Brazil’s credit market of the 
first half of the nineteenth century and to show how British credit networks were not 
just limited to Atlantic facing urban centres, but at times extended directly into the 
rural economy. On 11th August 1837, David Stevenson, who may have already been 
the owner of the Serparagui plantation by this point, arrived at First Notary Office to 
sign a mortgage deed with two other foreign merchants. In the document Frederico 
Fomm and Augusto Millet recognised that they were Stevenson’s debtors to the 
considerable sum of 40 contos (£4926) and in collateral they offered their sugar 
refinery in the port city of Santos, São Paulo, along with the 25 slaves who worked in 
that establishment.39 A document registered in the same notary office almost two years 
later declared that the outstanding debt had been satisfactorily cleared.40 However, in 
February 1840 Fomm and Millet returned to the same office to register another 
mortgage agreement, this time with British merchant Dr. Henry Coates. Once more, 
they were debtors to the tune of 40 contos and again they offered the same property as 
collateral, although by this time their slave labour force had grown to 32. Importantly 
however, the size of the debt and collateral offered in guarantee were not the only 
similarities between the two mortgage deeds signed by Millet and Fomm. Both 
documents state that the owners of the refinery had initially received credit in the form 
of commercial paper (letras aceitas) by another British merchant firm called Platt & 
Reid. The association of this firm suggests that this flow of credit - from Stevenson 
and Coates to Fomm and Millet by way of Platt & Reid – may have been associated 
                                                        
39 Frederico Fomm and Augusto Millet x David Stevenson, 11 August 1837, AN, 1o Oficio de Notas, 
book 242, ff. 142-142r. Their sugar refinery had been in operation since at least October 1835 when 
they petitioned the customs house for privileges regarding the importation of the refinery’s 
equipment. See O Paulista Official, 29 October 1835. 
 
40 Frederico Fomm and Augusto Millet x David Stevenson, 13 May 1839, AN, 1o Oficio de Notas, 
book 245 ff. 46-46r.  
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with the first, but ultimately unsuccessful, attempt to construct Brazil’s first railway. 
Fomm was the partner in the Santos firm of Casa Aguiar Viúva e Filhos, which along 
with Platt & Reid had been granted concessions by the São Paulo provincial 
government in 1836 and 1838 for the construction of a railway connecting Santos with 
the sugar producing regions of the interior.41 It is therefore plausible that Platt & Reid 
originally intended to employ the capital in this ultimately fruitless endeavour.  
 
A mortgage deed in the notary records from June 1837 is helpful in tracing this initial 
loan. Two months before he signed the mortgage deed with Fomm and Millet, David 
Stevenson agreed another mortgage with William Platt of the firm Platt & Reid.42 It is 
fair to say that Stevenson probably knew Platt, perhaps through their mutual 
association with Alexander Milne.43  This familiarity between both parties is likely the 
reason that Stevenson felt comfortable enough to loan Platt 50 contos (£6157) which 
the latter stated was to shore up his merchant house. However, Platt did not offer any 
of his firm’s property as collateral, instead he mortgaged his sugar plantation called 
Fazendinha near the city of Campos. The use of the Portuguese diminutive ‘-inha’ 
was somewhat ironic as it was a substantial estate worked by 200 slaves, who were 
also mortgaged to Stevenson. Unfortunately, the document does not give more details 
about these people aside to say that their number contained adults and children of both 
sexes. British involvement in an equity loan of this type and size is certainly unusual; 
in general terms, British credit only reached plantation owners through third party 
                                                        
41 M.L. Lamounier, Ferrovias e Mercado de Trabalho p. 157.  
 
42 Guilherme Platt x David Stevenson, 08/06/1837, AN, 1o Oficio de Notas, book 242, ff. 100r-101r. 
 
43 Platt had been part of the firm Platt, Reid and Milne. References to this firm can be found in o 
Jornal do Commercio between 1828 and 1832. For example, see Ibid 01/02/1828 and 27/12/1832.  
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factors or commission agents.44 Moreover, this type of transaction was not typical of 
the credit relations lobbyists were seeking to defend. Nevertheless, its existence shows 
there were exceptions, and in this case of considerable monetary value, to this 
generalisation. The involvement of David Stevenson as creditor in a number of these 
mortgages also allows us to make a comment about ambivalent attitudes towards anti-
slavery during the 1830s and early 1840s. Stevenson was not a regular merchant, he 
was a lawyer who throughout this period represented Royal Navy captors as their 
proctor in the Mixed Commission court. He also acted as an ‘unofficial legal adviser’ 
to the British legation on slave trade questions and his reports on treaty negotiations 
were occasionally sent ad verbatim to London.45 The dissonance between his public 
role in support of slave trade suppression and his private investments is reflective of 
the restricted view of complicity that characterised British anti-slavery policy before 
1843.  
 
While William Platt’s mortgage is certainly the largest in terms of value and human 
collateral involved, the records present a handful of other occasions where British 
credit made its way directly to a rural slave owner. In the case of the mortgage agreed 
between the British firm Carruthers & Bros. and Luis Manoel Pereira we again observe 
the most common reason for British parties to publicly record a debt owed - the 
expiration of commercial paper. In July 1832 following non-payment of two bills 
worth just under 9.5 contos, Pereira entered into a mortgage agreement with his 
creditor offering as collateral his plantation situated in Guapiaçu, some 120km from 
the city of Rio, along with the eight African slaves who worked the estate. No record 
                                                        
44 J. E. Sweigart, ‘Financing and marketing Brazilian export agriculture’ p. 128.  
 
45 L. Bethell, The Abolition p. 158 n.1 and p. 242.  
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has been found of Pereira’s profession other than as a planter, but more is known about 
his British creditor. Cumbrian brothers Richard and Isaac established Carruthers & Co. 
sometime around 1829, and throughout the 1830s and 1840s they established a 
reputation among the most important importers and wholesalers of English 
manufactures and cotton goods. Carlos Gabriel Guimarães and Luis Tavares have 
linked this trade as well as their close association to traffickers such as the Baron de 
Ubá, José Ignácio Tavares and Manoel Pinto da Fonseca to participation in the illegal 
slave trade as suppliers of goods and credit.46 Whether connected to the legal or illicit 
branches of their business, Ashburton and Mildmay had defended the commercial 
transaction where this debt originated.    
 
The final two examples of rural slave mortgages involve purchase-money loans 
originating in British plantation ownership. In October 1833 the British firm Naylor 
Bros. and merchant Richard Bancroft decided to sell their plantation located in Suruí, 
Rio de Janeiro, along with the 19 slaves attached to their estate. They had been in 
possession of the property since 1821 following a ruling in the British Conservatorial 
Court which awarded them their debtors property. Although nothing else is known 
about the original debt, the journey of these merchants to land and slave ownership 
seems to share the same characteristics as Barings’ foreclosure on estates in Cuba. The 
sale price was ten contos (£1558), two (£312) for the land and eight (£1246) for the 
slaves. As the purchaser, Luiz Pires Garcia was only able to pay two contos in cash up 
front, Naylor Bros and Bancroft agreed to a three-year payment plan secured by the 
                                                        
46 C.G Guimarães, ‘O Comércio Inglês no Império brasileiro: a atuação da firma inglesa Carruthers & 
Co, 1824-1854’ p. 14. See also, L.H.Tavares, Comércio Proibido, pp. 131-132; R. Conrad, World of 
Sorrow pp. 131-132. 
 
210 
19 slaves as well as the Garcia’s other plantation.47 A deed from just under three and 
a half years later indicates that Garcia had been unable to pay his creditors who instead 
of foreclosing decided to restructure the mortgage, this time including 30 slaves. 
Interestingly, the slaves were described as ‘todos de nação’ meaning they were all 
African in origin rather than Brazilian born.48 The likelihood is that some of these 30 
– like many slaves included in these mortgage contracts – had been imported illegally 
as per international treaty and Brazilian law. Upon his death in 1839, Garcia’s estate 
was still in seven contos worth of debt to his British creditors who decided to sell and 
transfer the mortgage to a third party, Bento José Velozo.49 It is probable that it made 
more business sense to Naylor Bros and Bancroft to transfer the mortgage given the 
legal uncertainties and costs of foreclosing on rural mortgages in 19th century Brazil.50 
 
The final slave mortgage under consideration is unique in the sense that the only 
property offered as collateral for the loan were the debtor’s slaves. The mortgage deed 
signed by George Harvey and his countryman John Denby was the formalisation of a 
contract which the pair had already agreed verbally. In October 1846, Harvey, owner 
of a plantation called Jacaré in Itaípu, contracted an equity loan from export merchant 
Denby to the value of 13 contos payable over four years. The only security listed in 
the deed were eight slaves, who in the event of their death or escape, could be replaced 
                                                        
47 Naylor Irmãos and Ricardo Bancroft x Luiz Pires Garcia, 21/10/1833, AN, 1o Oficio de Notas, 
book 239, ff. 17v-18v.  
 
48 Luiz Pires Garcia x Naylor Irmãos and Ricardo Bancroft, 09/03/1837, AN, 1o Oficio de Notas, 
book 242, ff. 47-47v. 
 
49 Naylor Irmãos and Ricardo Bancroft and Bento José Velozo, 10/04/1839, AN, 1o Oficio de Notas, 
book 245 f. 17v. 
 
50 J. E. Sweigart, Financing and marketing Brazilian export agriculture. p.125. 
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by any other slaves attached to Harvey’s estate.51 The second unique characteristic of 
this loan agreement it is the latest example of a British contracted slave mortgage in 
our survey and one of only three identified following the enactment of 1843 Slave 
Trade Act. While the small size and unsystematic nature of the survey does not allow 
us to draw definitive conclusions, the following section will consider whether this 
legislation changed how British creditors approached transactions involving human 
collateral after 1843.  
 
The impact of anti-slavery legislation on British slave mortgages 
 
In Chapter II we observed that though Lord Brougham’s Act did not prevent the 
continued exploitation of slave labour, the law did modify how most British subjects 
did so. The most common strategy, adopted by mining companies, was to hire 
labourers from other slaveholders on lengthy contracts. Others purchased slaves in the 
names of their non-British wives or employees and at least one British resident 
defended his right to slave property through his naturalisation as a Brazilian subject. 
Though much less information exists about attitudes to slave mortgages in a post-1843 
context, this section will draw on glimpses of evidence from the notary records and 
other narrative sources to suggest that anti-slavery legislation also influenced, in the 
short-term at least, the way British subjects dealt with debts secured by human 
collateral.  
 
The first indication of the impact of the 1843 law on financial transactions involving 
British subjects is contained in a consular report condemning the practice of 
                                                        
51 Jorge Harvey x João Denby, 20/10/1846, AN, 3o Oficio de Notas, book 199, ff. 90-90r. 
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transferring slaves in lieu of payment for debts.  In January 1846 in a note to the 
Foreign Secretary, the British consul in Paraíba lamented that ‘every expedient is 
resorted to by British subjects for the purpose of enabling them to carry on with 
impunity the illegal receipt and transfer of slaves.’52 British merchants, in this consular 
district at least, were aware of the Act’s provisions and had responded by finding ways 
to circumvent them, rather than desisting from the practices now made illegal. As we 
observed in Chapter I, it was as a result of this case in Paraíba and another in 
Pernambuco that Palmerston issued a circular in 1847 to clarify the illegality that the 
foreclosure on debts secured by human collateral, in so far as they caused the sale or 
transfer of slaves.   
 
The account of two British visitors to Rio de Janeiro in 1852 suggests that their 
compatriots there were also aware of the implications of the circular. Following their 
audience with Dom Pedro II, Quaker abolitionists John Candler and William Burgess 
spent eight days in the Tijuca mountains. As discussed in Chapter II, this region had 
witnessed some of the earliest cultivation of coffee in Rio de Janeiro and was still 
home to various slave-worked plantations, including a handful owned by British 
families. Though some of estates that the pair visited were still productive and 
profitable, others were showing signs of soil degradation and had become a financial 
burden for their owners. One ‘candid slave-owner,’ whose thirty-six-year-old coffee 
bushes were now in a state of decay, had decided to cut his losses and planned to try 
his luck in Australia.53 The planter had sold some of his slaves but the remaining thirty 
                                                        
52 Mr. Newcomen to Earl of Aberdeen, 24 January 1846, in Correspondence with Foreign Powers on 
Slave Trade, 1846 (Class B), P.P 855 p. 279. 
 
53 It is possible that this unnamed plantation owner was in fact Lewis William Lecesene, whose 
slaveholding is discussed in Chapter I. His Tijuca plantation with around 50,000 coffee bushes was 
advertised for sale some months after Candler and Burgess had visited the region. See Jornal do 
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were mortgaged along with the land to an English merchant. Though the creditor was 
‘resolved to foreclose,’ Candler and Burgess inform us that ‘English law’ complicated 
the recovery of the debt in question.54 While the unnamed merchant was cautious not 
to fall foul of its provisions, he was also not prepared to abandon his investment 
because of anti-slavery legislation. Instead of foreclosing directly and risking 
attracting the unwanted attention of British officials, the merchant planned to ‘shift 
the whole estate, by some Brazilian stratagem, to other shoulders.’55 Just as British 
subjects found ways to continue to exploit new slave labour after 1843, others 
continued to be able to earn interest on and then liquidate their investments in slave 
property whilst staying on the right side of anti-slavery legislation.    
 
It is not clear what particular type of Brazilian ‘stratagem’ was employed by the 
merchant and how it impacted the thirty enslaved individuals whose lives were part 
collateral for the debt. However, a case identified in the notary records provides an 
indication of the type of strategy that British creditors could adopt to protect their 
investments while adhering to the letter of the law.  In February 1851 Hugh and Maria 
Hutton met with the creditors of the bankrupt Anglo-American firm Coleman, Hutton 
& Co. in the third notary office of Rio de Janeiro.56 The purpose of the meeting was 
so that the couple’s creditors – two British merchant houses, Carruthers & Co. and 
Hobkirk, Weetman & Co., as well as an individual called Manuel Maria Bregaro. – 
                                                        
Commercio, 4 May 1853. Moreover, though Lescesne seemingly did not follow them, his sister Mary 
Frances, her husband John Peter Hobkirk and their children did emigrate to Australia in 1852. See J.F. 
Hobkirk, Reminiscences of J.F. Hobkirk (Hobart: Examiner Office, 1904).  
 
54 J. Candler and W. Burgess, Narrative p. 21.  
 
55 Ibid p. 21.  
 
56 The firm was composed of Charles Coleman, Hugh Hutton, both British subjects, and John 
Gardner, a U.S. citizen.  
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could obtain legal recognition that the Huttons accepted legal liability for the defunct 
firm’s debts. 57 Hugh and Maria signed two mortgage deeds in which they listed 
personal property that could be seized and auctioned in the event that the liquidation 
of the firm’s assets did not cover the amount of debt owed. One contract, signed by 
the couple and the three creditors, included their house and chácara in Botafogo and 
an agricultural estate called Sant’Anna de Paquequer in the Serra dos Órgãos 
mountains, valued together at 52 contos (£6311).58  The other deed was between the 
Huttons and a certain Ireneu Evangelista de Souza, the future Baron and Viscount 
Mauá, to whom the couple mortgaged their eight slaves to the value of four contos.59 
It is important to recognize that de Souza was not exactly a distinct creditor in this 
case; he was managing partner of Carruthers & Co. and had no doubt signed the firm’s 
name on the other deed. The separation of slave and non-slave assets in this way can 
be interpreted as a strategy by the Brazilian de Souza to protect his British firm from 
violating anti-slavery legislation in the event that all of the Huttons’ assets needed to 
be seized. 60  The registration of the mortgage deed in the name of a Brazilian 
representative is not too dissimilar to the strategy adopted by those British subjects 
                                                        
57 Interestingly, all three creditors had previously been implicated in the illegal slave trade in the 
1840s. On Carruthers & Co. and Hobkirk, Weetman & Co. see R. Conrad, World of Sorrow pp. 131-
132 and L.H. Tavares, Comércio Proibido p. 138. Bregaro was an associate of Rio’s most notorious 
slave-trade, Manoel Pinto da Fonseca, see J.H. Rodrigues, Brazil and Africa (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1965) p.181 
 
58 Hugh Hutton – Manuel Maria Bregaro, Carruthers & Co, Hobkirk & Weetman, 04/02/1851, AN, 3o 
Oficio de Notas, Book 206, ff. 106-106v. On the acquisition of the fazenda in the Serra dos Orgãos, 
see G. Ferrez, Colonização de Teresópolis p. 94.  
 
59 Hugh Hutton – Ireneo Evangelista de Souza, 04/02/1851, AN, 3o Oficio de Notas, Book 206, ff. 
105v-106. 
 
60 In the end it appears that only their house and land in Botafogo were sold to settle the debt. For the 
auction listing of the property see, Jornal de Commercio, 19 September 1851. In an “Exposition” 
detailing the particulars of the firm’s liquidation, Hugh Hutton mentions that his house was seized as 
it his most valuable asset. See Jornal do Commercio, 23 September 1852 (Supplement).  
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who registered their slaves in the names of their Brazilian wives or employees. Like 
those slaveholders, de Souza and Carruthers, as well as the unnamed English creditor 
of the Tijuca plantation, were able to find ways to observe the letter of the law, if not 
its spirit.  
 
Concluding remarks 
 
The records analysed in this chapter enable us to trace the diverse circumstances in 
which British merchant credit became entangled with Brazilian slavery. Examples 
from Rio de Janeiro’s notary offices have shown that British subjects contracted slave 
mortgages in a variety of circumstances; as a result of commercial transactions, equity 
loans and purchase-money mortgages, and in urban and rural contexts. While the 
practice may not have been particularly widespread the important point to make is that 
it was, as the parliamentarian lobbyists argued, part and parcel of doing almost any 
type of business in Brazil’s slave economy. British subjects accepted, and indeed 
sometimes offered, human collateral as security for credit, they earned interest on 
these loans and when their debtors defaulted, they occasionally foreclosed on that 
collateral, taking ownership of slaves or enforcing their sale.  
 
The nature of our survey makes it impossible to draw any definitive conclusions as to 
whether British subjects avoided entering into slave mortgages because of the 1843 
Act or whether the scarcity of cases should be attributed to another cause. What can 
be asserted with a greater degree of certainty is that those who wished to contract slave 
mortgages were able to find ways and means to stay on the right side of the law without 
having to abandon their investments. In the same way that this ambivalent piece of 
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legislation had failed to impede Britons from exploiting new slave labour after 1843, 
it was also unable to prevent the entanglement of British credit and Brazilian slavery. 
As we shall see in the following chapters, this entanglement would continue, albeit it 
in the form of joint-stock banking rather than mercantile credit networks, until the 
abolition of slavery in 1888. 
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Chapter IV: British Banking and Human Collateral 
 
For the New London and Brazilian Bank, the Baron de Grāo-Mogol’s mortgage, 
guaranteed by ’80 strong negroes’, was the last remnant of an entanglement with 
slavery which had begun shortly after the bank’s establishment in 1862 and would 
only end on the eve of abolition in Brazil.1 The purpose of this chapter is to trace this 
complex relationship between British banking and Brazilian slavery in the second half 
of the nineteenth century. Using the bank’s own archive as well as a variety of notarial 
and judicial records in Brazil, the chapter will discuss how a commercial bank, 
established with ambitions to finance trade and infrastructure, ended up entangled in 
Brazil’s agricultural economy as the holder of a portfolio of rural mortgages and 
eventually, as the owner of an extensive coffee plantation.  
 
These overlooked connections to the most dynamic sector of Brazil’s economy also 
offer an opportunity to reflect on the limits placed on Britain’s anti-slavery objectives 
following the suppression of the slave trade. By the time the bank arrived in Brazil, 
the anti-slavery state’s brief interest in slave mortgages had been and gone. While 
credit relations with plantation owners were not viewed as desirable from a business 
perspective, the bank showed little concern that this activity could result in it violating 
British anti-slavery legislation. In this sense, decades after British mortgagees were 
compensated following abolition in the Caribbean, the London and Brazilian Bank 
continued the long-held practice of treating enslaved people as collateral assets against 
whom money could be lent, interest charged and as property that, if required, could be 
seized and sold to settle debts.   
                                                        
1 Rio de Janeiro branch to London HQ, 30 April 1881, BOLSA G18/5. 
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The post-1850 credit market and the expansion of commercial banking in Brazil 
 
At the turn of the mid-century a number of important legislative changes coincided 
with auspicious economic conditions to stimulate the expansion of the commercial 
banking sector in Brazil. Buoyed by an upswing in global commodity prices after 1848, 
Brazil’s coffee industry was in rude health in the 1850s. The continued expansion of 
the coffee economy on the basis of large, slave-worked estates had been consolidated 
with the passing of the Land Law (Lei das Terras) in 1850 and in spite of the end of 
the slave trade, coffee planters in the country’s southeast were still able to find 
sufficient labour through the internal trade to take work their estates.2 The growth of 
coffee production and the accompanying expansion in international trade led to a 
marked increase in commercial activity, especially in Rio de Janeiro where large 
amounts of capital hitherto employed in the slave trade were redeployed in the import-
export complex; in trading houses, coffee factorages and infrastructure projects. All 
of this activity was conducted on the basis of the new Commercial Code (Código 
Comercial) of 1850 which replaced centuries-old colonial legislation and established 
the rules and procedures under which financial transactions could take place.3 The 
Code also provided the legal framework for the creation of banking institutions whose 
investors were keen to take advantage of the increased credit demands of the 
expanding import-export sector. In Rio de Janeiro thirteen of these establishments, 
                                                        
2 On the Lei das Terras, see E.V. da Costa, The Brazilian Empire: Myths & Histories (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2000), Ch. 4. On the strong prospects for slave-worked coffee 
plantations in this period see R. Marquese, ‘Capitalismo, Escravidão e a Economia Cafeeira do Brasil 
no Longo Século XIX’ Saeculum – Revista de História, 29 (2013) pp. 301-303.  
 
3 A. Hanley, Native Capital: Financial Institutions and Economic Development in São Paulo, Brazil, 
1850-1920 (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2005) pp. 30-31.  
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including joint-stock banks and private banking houses were founded in the 1850s 
alone.4  
 
By the early 1860s Brazil’s commercial banking sector had caught the attention of 
investors in Britain. Brazil’s macroeconomic stability and the growth of British trade 
and investment there presented opportunities which bankers in the City of London 
were keen to exploit. 5 This coincided with changes to legislation in both countries that 
favoured the entrance of British banks into the Brazilian market. In Britain, the 
liberalisation of company law with respect to joint-stock banks from 1857 stimulated 
a boom in the establishment of British overseas banks in the city of London.6 Whereas 
in Brazil, as Guimarães notes, the banking reforms of the Impediments Law (Lei dos 
Entraves) of 1860 favoured British interests with regard to the convertibility of 
currency whilst at the same time it placed restrictions on the operations of existing 
banks.7 In May 1862 the London and Brazilian Bank was incorporated in London and 
by February of the following year it had opened its doors for business in Rio de Janeiro. 
                                                        
4 See Table 14, C.G. Guimaraes, A Presença Inglesa p. 180. These included two incarnations of the 
Banco do Brasil (1851-1853 and 1853-), Banco Rural e Hipotecário do Rio de Janeiro (1853) and the 
Banco Comercial e Agrícola (1857), as well as the transatlantic banking partnership, Mauá, 
Macgregor e Cia. For more on the banking policy at the turn of the mid-century and the creation of 
these banks, see A.A. Villela, ‘The Political Economy of Money and Banking in Brazil, 1850-1870’ 
(Unpublished PhD Thesis, LSE, 1999) Ch. 2 & 3. 
 
5 Up until the early 1870s, Britain supplied half of Brazil’s imports and despite losing ground to U.S 
and German competition, it still remained the chief supplier of goods to Brazil by the turn of the 20th 
century. By 1871 the British share of Brazilian exports stood at around 40% and although Britain 
would be of decreasing importance as an export market, British merchants played a key role in the 
reexport of Brazilian produce to Europe and the United States. Moreover, Britain was ‘practically the 
only supplier of capital’ to Brazil during this period’ which saw the beginnings of a surge in British 
foreign direct investment in Brazil in sectors such as railways and public works. See, M. de Paiva 
Abreu, ‘British business in Brazil’ pp. 389-392.  
 
6 P.L. Cottrell, ‘The Coalescence of a Cluster of Corporate International Banks, 1855-1875’, in G. 
Jones (ed.), Banks and Money: International and Comparative Finance in History (London: Frank 
Cass, 1991) p. 32.  
 
7 For a discussion of the reforms, see C. G. Guimarães, A Presença pp. 197-203.  
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It was soon followed in July of the same year by the Brazilian and Portuguese Bank 
(later the English Bank of Rio de Janeiro) whose early history, according to the 
Joslin’s classic account of history of both institutions, was ‘much less eventful and 
spectacular’ than its older competitor. Part of the reason for this is that this younger 
institution managed to remain far less exposed to credit relations with the rural 
economy than the London and Brazilian Bank. It is the turbulent early operations of 
the latter and its entanglement with slavery which constitute the major focus of this 
chapter.   
 
The role of commercial banks 
 
Before discussing the establishment and operation of the London and Brazilian Bank 
in greater detail, it is important to understand the credit market it entered and the role 
of commercial banks in the decades following the mid-century. These banks were 
primarily involved in the provision of short-term credit to facilitate trade. The most 
common method adopted by these banks for extending credit was through discounting 
commercial paper, a long-held practice which had recently been regulated in the 
Commercial Code. This form of lending based on a future commercial transaction was 
essential to facilitate trade in a largely illiquid economy. These three-way transactions 
involved the bank purchasing short-term loans from other creditors, typically export 
merchants and urban traders, to whom the bank advanced cash to the value of the bill 
minus a commission fee. The bank would then keep hold of the bill until its maturity, 
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usually after 60 or 90 days, at which time they would collect payment from the original 
drawer.8    
 
Commercial banks were not, as a general rule, directly involved in longer-term 
mortgage lending to agricultural producers. These banks regarded the provision of 
credit to coffee planters as high-risk and avoided it except in exceptional 
circumstances.9 They viewed it as undesirable for three major reasons: the lengthy 
repayment terms required by the lender, the unsatisfactory nature of collateral offered 
as security for loans and the difficulties creditors faced foreclosing on this type of 
property in the event of non-payment.10  In an effort to encourage lending to the 
agricultural sector, the government passed a Mortgage Law (Lei Hipotecário) in 1864 
and dedicated mortgage lending began with the opening of a mortgage department 
within the Banco do Brasil in 1866. A few specialised mortgage banks followed but 
even then, access to their loans was restricted to the most creditworthy of coffee 
planters.11 In sum, the extension of credit at long terms and at low interest rates to 
coffee planters did not represent a good investment for commercial banks who 
preferred lower risk alternatives with higher short-term profits.  
 
                                                        
8 For a discussion of discounting and other forms of short-term credit provision, see A. Hanley, Native 
Capital pp. 33-37. Also, W. Summerhill, Inglorious Revolution: Political Institutions, Sovereign 
Debt, and Financial Underdevelopment in Imperial Brazil (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015) 
pp. 186-187.  
 
9 J. Sweigart, ‘Financing and Marketing Brazilian Export Agriculture’ pp. 125-126.  
 
10 R.L. Marcondes, A Arte de Acumular na Economic Cafeeira: A Vale do Paraíba, Século XIX 
(Lorena: Stiliano, 1998) pp. 222-224.  
 
11 W. Summerhill, Inglorious Revolution p. 188. Renato Leite Marcondes study of mortgage finance 
in the Paulista Paraíba Valley arrives at a similar conclusion. See R.L. Marcondes, ‘O Financiamento 
hipotecário no vale do Paraíba Paulista (1865-1887)’ Rev. Bras. Econ. 56.1 (2002) pp. 147-170.  
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Though commercial banks rarely lent directly to agricultural producers, their credit 
did reach the rural economy through the hands of intermediaries.  As shown in Figure 
4.1, credit from commercial banks flowed through at least one middleman before 
reaching plantation owners. As Sweigart has demonstrated, the comisário or coffee 
factor played a crucial role in connecting the agricultural economy to the urban credit 
market. 12 Coffee factors were the elite of Rio’s merchant community who provided a 
range of financial and marketing services to plantation owners in the interior, to whom 
they were often linked by ties of marriage and kinship. 13  The factor received 
consignments of crop and provided the first link in a complex marketing chain that 
extended to the industrialised world. He also shipped foodstuffs, manufactures and 
luxury goods to plantations in the interior, and some coffee factors also played an 
important role in the internal slave trade.14 Crucially, in an illiquid economy with only 
a nascent commercial banking sector, the coffee factor provided a range of financial 
services to the planter. These included the payment of taxes, insurance and other debts 
and most importantly they were, for the vast majority of planters, their principal source 
of credit.15 Factors drew this credit from a number of sources including the sackers 
and exporters who had purchased their client’s crop. As Figure 4.1 demonstrates, 
factors could also access credit from private banking houses or directly from 
                                                        
12 J. Sweigart, ‘Financing and Marketing Brazilian Export Agriculture’ p.5.  
 
13 On the social relations between coffee factors and plantation owners, see Ibid Ch. 3. Stanley Stein 
also observed this coalescence between planters and factors in his study of the coffee economy in 
Vassouras, highlighting the Teixeira Leite family in particular, see S. J. Stein, Vassouras, a Brazilian 
Coffee County, 1850-1900: the Roles of Planter and Slave in a Plantation Society. (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1985) pp. 18-19.   
 
14 J. Sweigart, ‘Financing and Marketing Brazilian Export Agriculture’ Ch. 2.  
 
15 Ibid, Ch. 4 
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commercial banks, who could be more confident in the creditworthiness of this 
financial middleman than his client in the interior.16  
 
Similar to commercial transactions between merchants, this flow of credit was based 
on discounting bills. The planter, in need of money, would agree terms with his factor 
and sign a bill which stipulated its value, interest rate and repayment terms. His agent 
would endorse the bill with his own signature and discount it at a bank where he would 
receive a cash advance, minus a commission fee.17 If discounted at a private banking 
house, the holder would then repeat the process at a commercial bank. These credit 
flows often remain largely invisible to the historian when payment terms were met. 
However, as we shall see in the case of the London and Brazilian Bank, when one or 
more of the entities in this credit pipeline ran into financial difficulties, the connections 
are exposed in the form of mortgage contracts and legal disputes. It is also in these 
circumstances that this British bank became significantly entangled in the rural 
economy and with the slave labour that underpinned it. However, before examining 
this, it is important to show how British capital flowed through another, non-British 
bank. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
16 Ibid, pp. 117-120. Joseph Ryan highlights the importance of private banking houses as a second 
intermediary, funnelling credit from commercial banks to coffee factors. See. J. Ryan, ‘Credit Where 
Credit is Due’ pp. 69-72.  
 
17 Endorsed drafts would often require a second signature of a reputable merchant or private banking 
house before being discounted at a commercial bank. See J. Sweigart, ‘Financing and Marketing 
Brazilian Export Agriculture’ pp. 120-121.  
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Figure 4.1: Credit Flows from Commercial Banks to the Rural Economy18 
 
 
 
Mauá MacGregor & Co.  
 
Although the main focus of this chapter is the London and Brazilian Bank’s 
entanglement with slavery, it is important to note that this bank does not represent the 
first British presence in the post-1850 credit market. While not a joint-stock bank 
registered in London, Mauá, MacGregor & Co. (1854-1866) was a ‘foreign-partnered 
bank’ based in Rio with a branch in London.19 Its founder, the Baron de Mauá, was 
managing partner of Carruthers & Co. and another of the controlling partners, 
Alexander Donald MacGregor was a British broker based in Rio. The partner 
nominated to oversee its operations in London, José Henrique Reynell de Castro was 
an old acquaintance of Mauá and partner in the Manchester firm Carruthers, de Castro 
                                                        
18 This diagram is based on Figure 4.4 in J. Sweigart, ‘Financing and Marketing Brazilian Export 
Agriculture’ p. 119.  
 
19 The term, ‘foreign-partnered bank,’ used by Summerhill reflects the transatlantic operations of this 
establishment. See W. Summerhill, Inglorious Revolution p. 197. The establishment, operations and 
eventual demise of this bank are discussed in detail in C.G. Guimarães, A Presença Inglesa pp. 57-
219.  
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& Co.20 Guimarães has also identified a strong presence of British merchants amongst 
the bank’s shareholders, drawing a connection between some of these firms and 
British complicity in the slave trade.21  
 
Like other commercial banks founded in the 1850s, Mauá, MacGregor & Co. was 
established primarily to capture the business of expanding trade and infrastructure 
projects and not as a mortgage-lender to agricultural producers.22  Nevertheless, a 
survey of deeds registered by the firm in notarial offices in Rio de Janeiro demonstrate 
that this type of banking could occasionally expose lenders to slave mortgages and the 
possibility of foreclosure on human collateral. On two instances identified, a break-
down in the credit flow shown in Figure 1 resulted in the bank having to deal directly 
with planters. In one case, Manoel Rendon de Souza Frazão mortgaged his two coffee 
plantations in Estrela along with 47 slaves for a debt of 52 contos to the bank. Souza 
Frazão had originally loaned the money from the firm of A. J. Domingues Ferreira 
who had then discounted the planter’s acceptances in Mauá, MacGregor & Co.23 
When this intermediary went bankrupt in 1859, the bank was forced to deal directly 
with Souza Frazão.24 On another occasion it was the death of the middleman which 
left the bank exposed to direct contact with an agricultural producer. The deceased, 
                                                        
20 For more information on the controlling partners and the management structure of this bank, see 
C.G. Guimarães, A Presença Inglesa pp. 147-152. 
 
21 Ibid pp. 153-161.  
 
22 Ibid p. 175.  
 
23 Manoel Rendon de Souza Frazão x Mauá, MacGregor & Cia, 07/05/1860 AN, 1o Oficio de notas, 
book 280, ff. 67v – 68; Manoel Rendon de Souza Frazão x Mauá, MacGregor & Cia, 21/06/1860, 
AN, 3o Oficio de notas, book 232, ff. 79v-80.  
 
24 This mortgage was a small part of wider legal dispute with the administrators of the bankrupt firm, 
A.J. Domingues Ferreira. The bank ended up losing the battle and suffered loses of 500 contos as a 
result. See C. G. Guimarães, A Presença Inglesa p. 200.  
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Major João Luís da Costa had discounted bills in the bank which had been originally 
drawn by Major Joaquim José Antunes. The latter was now liable for the debt of 28 
contos for which he offered his sugar plantation in Itaboraí and 51 slaves as security.25 
Both these cases show the mechanism through which British capital could eventually 
find its way to Brazil’s slave-based agricultural sector.  
 
Other slave mortgages involving Mauá, MacGregor & Co. were the result of credit 
relations with those behind infrastructure projects or industrial enterprises. One such 
individual was Francisco José de Mello Souza whose firm owed a debt to the bank of 
the considerable sum of 1286 contos as a result of a number of expired bills and a 
current account of 400 contos. Aside from being a director of recently formed Banco 
Comercial e Agrícola, Mello Souza also owned a tannery in São Christóvão and it was 
this ‘vast establishment’ and 134 slaves that he offered the bank as collateral for his 
debt.26 This mortgage deed may be the beginning of the unhappy relationship Mauá 
would go on to have with the Companhia de Curtumes, an enterprise that the Baron 
would later recall as being ‘one of the greatest financial disasters’ he was ever involved 
in.27 A mortgage deed signed just after the bank began operations in late 1854 is 
perhaps another example of Mauá using the bank as a vehicle to finance large projects. 
The bank provided an equity loan of 70 contos over six months to Joaquim Francisco 
Alves Branco Muniz Barreto, who offered his newspaper business, the Correio 
                                                        
25 Major Joaquim José Antunes x Mauá, MacGregor & Cia, 25/01/1866, AN, 3o Oficio de notas, book 
247, ff. 90-90v.  
 
26 Mello Souza & Cia. x Mauá, MacGregor & Cia, 31/10/1860, AN, 3o Oficio de notas, book 234, ff. 
27v - 29v. On the Banco Comercial e Agrícola, see C.G. Guimarães, ‘O Banco Commercial e 
Agrícola no Império do Brasil: o estudo de caso de um banco comercial e emissor (1858-1862)’ 
Saeculum – Revista de História, (2013) p. 231-259. 
 
27 I. E. de Souza, Exposição do Visconde de Mauá aos Credores de Mauá & C e ao Publico (Rio de 
Janeiro: J. Villeneuve, 1878) p. 47.  
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Mercantil and a plantation and 32 slaves as collateral.28 It is likely that this loan was 
related to the concession granted to Muniz Barreto in December of the previous year 
for the construction of a railway from Salvador to Juazeiro, Bahia.29 Mauá briefly 
mentioned this enterprise in his ‘Exposição,’ adding that the loan he made to a ‘yet 
another friend’ was eventually repaid when the concession was bought by a British 
company.30 The use of the bank to loan money to the Baron’s friends reflects the 
continued importance of personal relationships in Rio de Janeiro’s credit market 
during this period. 31  Whereas Muniz Barreto’s multiple interests in agriculture, 
publishing and infrastructure are representative of the blurred divisions between the 
rural and urban elite, a factor we will return to in the study of the London and Brazilian 
Bank.32 The final case identified in the notarial records is another example of both of 
these characteristics. In August 1859 Mauá, MacGregor & Co. signed a deed with 
Antonio de Souza Ribeiro and his wife which identified the couple as owing 1235 
contos to the bank.33 Mauá would later claim that he entered into this mortgage, 
secured by urban and rural properties and an undefined number of slaves, at the behest 
                                                        
28 The endorsers of the bill, Francisco Octaviano d’Almeida Rosa and José Custodio Alves Branco 
Moreira Barreto also offered unspecified property as security. Joaquim Francisco Alves Branco 
Muniz Barreto x Mauá, MacGregor & Cia, 25/01/1866, AN, 3o Oficio de notas, book 214, ff. 14v-
15v.  
 
29 See Senado Federal, Decreto n.1299 
[http://legis.senado.leg.br/legislacao/PublicacaoSigen.action?id=392032&tipoDocumento=DEC-
n&tipoTexto=PUB last accessed 10/06/2018] 
 
30 The value of the total loan claimed by Mauá is much larger than the amount mentioned in this 
particular mortgage deed. See, I. E. de Souza, Exposição p. 44.  
 
31 According to Guimarães, commercial banks of this era showed a preference for doing business with 
their own shareholders, C.G. Guimarães, ‘O Banco Commercial e Agrícola no Império do Brasil’ p. 
258.  
 
32 On the coalescence of commerce and agriculture, see J. Sweigart, ‘Finance and Marketing’, Ch. 3.  
 
33 Antonio de Souza Ribeiro x Mauá, MacGregor & Cia, 25/01/1866, AN, 3o Oficio de notas, book 
227, ff. 141-143.  
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of the bank’s lawyer. 34 The ‘vast loan’ had been granted, claimed the Baron, to allow 
Souza Ribeiro to settle the outstanding claims on the inheritance of his in-laws, the 
Viscount and Viscountess de Vila Nova do Minho.35 The debtors’ failure to repay the 
mortgage resulted in just under a decade of litigation, at the end of which time the 
Baron, as representative of now defunct bank, took possession of some seized property 
including three plantations. 36  
 
It is not clear how many, if any of the slaves attached to these three properties were 
seized as a result of the foreclosure on this mortgage. The point of interest from this 
and other cases explored here is that Mauá, MacGregor & Co. accepted human 
collateral as security for loans. Of course, this occasional practice was nothing unique 
for commercial banks operating in an economy where slave labour predominated; 
even in cases of the financing of infrastructure or industry, the bank was exposed to 
the possibility of foreclosure on slave property. These cases do, however, stand in 
contrast to the caution that the Baron de Mauá had shown when negotiating a mortgage 
including slaves on behalf of Carruthers & Co.37 After all, despite its strong links to 
Britain and the presence of British partners and shareholders, Mauá, MacGregor & Co. 
                                                        
34 I. E. de Souza, Exposição pp. 155-157.  
 
35 The late Viscount was José Bernardino de Sá, one of the most active slave traders of the 1840s. In 
1860, Antônio de Souza Ribeiro re-opened a claim for compensation for what he regarded as the 
illegal seizure of vessels consigned to his father-in-law by British cruizers acting under the Aberdeen 
Act. See A.E. de Biase Albuquerque, Relatório final de atividades relacionadas ao projeto “Navios 
negreiros e negociantes de escravos atuantes em Pernambuco, 1831-1855.” (2012) 
[http://estatico.cnpq.br/portal/premios/2012/ic/pdf/ganhadores/aline_albuquerque_2012.pdf last 
accessed 10/06/2018] 
   
36 E. da Silva et al., Mauá: o desafio inovador numa sociedade arcaica (Brasília: Fundação Ulysses 
Guimarães, 2013) p. 208 n. 176. Nb. This publication reproduces the text of Mauá’s Exposição with 
the annotations of Claudio Ganns from C. Ganns, Visconde de Mauá – Autobiografia (Rio de Janeiro: 
Zélio Valverde, Livreiro-editor, 1942).  
 
37 Discussed in Chapter III. 
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was still a Brazilian bank and therefore had little need to worry about British anti-
slavery legislation. That would not be the case for the London and Brazilian Bank, 
whose British identity was in no doubt. Their decades-long entanglement with slavery 
will be discussed in the following section.   
 
The London and Brazilian Bank 
 
Recognising the opportunities for commercial banking in Brazil, on 1 May 1862 a 
group of investors met in the offices of Messrs. Robert Benson & Co. to discuss the 
formation of the London and Brazilian Bank. 38 A little over two weeks later, a board 
of directors drawn from a mixture of city financiers and merchants incorporated the 
bank. Of the latter, Liverpool merchants Edward Moon and Edward Johnston had 
longstanding commercial connections in Brazil. Johnston first arrived in Brazil shortly 
after independence and his eponymous firm, active from 1842, was by 1870 the second 
largest exporter of Brazilian coffee.39 Less is known about Moon, except that he 
represented Liverpool’s Brazilian Association in 1841 and may have been connected 
to the house of William Moon & Co. which operated in Maranhão and Rio de 
Janeiro.40 According to Joslin another board member, W.F. Scholefield, was also a 
Brazilian merchant.41 Amongst the bankers on the board was Pascoe C. Glyn whose 
family bank has been described as the ‘midwife to British corporate overseas banking,’ 
                                                        
38 D.  Joslin, A Century of Banking in Latin America p. 64.  
 
39 On Edward Johnston & Co. see See R. Greenhill ‘E. Johnston: 150 Anos em Café’.  
 
40 First Report of the Commissioners for Inquiry into the Collection and Management of the Revenue, 
1842. Appendix E, P.P. 400 p. 23. William Moon & Co. featured in the slaveholding census 
discussed in Chapter II. 
 
41 D. Joslin, A Century of Banking in Latin America p. 65. 
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having been involved in the creation of three other ‘Anglo-international’ banks, such 
as the Ottoman Bank.42 Glyn, Mills & Co were also bankers to the railway industry 
and held the accounts of some of the recently established Brazilian railways.43 The 
Brazilian connections, if any, of other board members are less clear, though Dutch 
financier Henri-Louis Bischoffsheim had been involved in raising foreign loans in 
Latin America.44  
 
Interestingly, at least two of the ten board members were former slave owners in the 
British Empire and a third was the direct descendant of a claimant.45 According to the 
Legacies of Slave Ownership database, John Bloxam Elin was awarded compensation 
for emancipated slaves in four separate claims in Jamaica, including from his own 
plantation, Wakefield. Aside from the London and Brazilian Bank, Elin went on to 
invest extensively in colonial and foreign banks as well as various British railways. 46 
Likewise, John White Cater, of the merchant bank Robert Benson & Co and the 
‘leading spirit’ in support of the bank’s creation, was an awardee of at least five claims 
in Jamaica where he owned a coffee plantation.47 Cater became chairman in 1862 and 
                                                        
42 P.L. Cottrell, ‘The Coalescence of a Cluster of Corporate International Banks, 1855-1875’ pp. 31-
33.  
 
43 D.  Joslin, A Century of Banking in Latin America p. 65.  
 
44 P. Thane, ‘Bischoffsheim, Henri Louis (1829–1908)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
online edn, (Oxford University Press, 2004) [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/38343, accessed 
5 May 2015]. 
 
45 Board member Philip Charles Cavan, though not a slaveholder himself was the son of a 
compensation awardee, John Cavan. See ‘Philip Charles Cavan’ 
[https://www.ucl.ac.uk/lbs/person/view/601442442 last accessed 13/06/2018] 
 
46 Elin also acted as a trustee or executor in four further claims and was unsuccessful in another. See 
‘John Bloxam Elin’ [https://www.ucl.ac.uk/lbs/person/view/17590 last accessed 13/06/2018] 
 
47 ‘John White Cater’ [https://www.ucl.ac.uk/lbs/person/view/15548 last accessed 13/06/2018]; ‘John 
White Cater’ [https://www.ucl.ac.uk/lbs/person/view/43007 last accessed 13/06/2018]; It is unclear 
whether the entry associated with John W. Cater is the same individual, see ‘John W. Cater’ 
[https://www.ucl.ac.uk/lbs/person/view/21880 [last accessed 13/06/2018]. When chairman of the 
bank during the transferal of the Angélica estate to the bank, Cater professed to being ‘an old coffee 
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somewhat ironically, in over two decades in that role, oversaw of the bank’s costly 
and bitter legal disputes with coffee producers in São Paulo. Though Brazil may not 
have witnessed the same migration of former slaveholders from British colonies as did 
Cuba and Surinam, the presence of compensation awardees on the board of a bank 
which would become embroiled with slavery reinforces the argument that Britain’s 
legacy with slavery did not end with emancipation in its own colonies.  
 
Despite the slaveholding past of its chairman and the expectations of Brazil’s ruling 
elite, the London and Brazilian Bank’s intention when it first opened for business in 
February 1863 was not to invest directly in slave-worked coffee plantations.48 As 
Guimarães has noted, the bank was established as a discount and deposit bank which 
privileged short-term lending to import-export businesses.49 Like other commercial 
banks this lending was based on the discounting of commercial paper such as letters 
of exchange and merchant bills, though the London and Brazilian Bank’s guidelines 
for this practice were more prudent than their Brazilian competitors. 50  This 
conservative approach is reflected in the bank’s ‘Instructions for the Management of 
the Affairs of the Bank at Rio de Janeiro’ which stressed that discounting should be 
restricted to paper with terms of no longer than three months; that bills should be 
                                                        
planter.’ See ‘New London and Brazilian Bank’ Daily News 28 September 1872. On Cater’s role in 
the creation of the bank, see D. Joslin, A Century of Banking in Latin America p. 65. 
 
48 On the expectations of local elites in Brazil and Argentina upon the arrival of British banks, see C. 
Jones, ‘Commercial Banks and Mortgage Companies’ pp. 36-40.  
 
49 C.G Guimarães, ‘O Estado Imperial brasileiro e os bancos estrangeiros: o caso do London and 
Brazilian Bank (1862 – 1871)’ in XXVI Simpósio Nacional de História – ANPUH – 50 anos. (São 
Paulo: ANPUH, 2011) 
[http://www.snh2011.anpuh.org/resources/anais/14/1298818435_ARQUIVO_TextoLBBnovo.pdf last 
accessed 14/06/2017]. 
 
50 A.A. Villela, ‘The Political Economy of Money and Banking in Brazil, 1850-1870’ Ch.4 p. 17.  
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endorsed by two reputable names; that the renewal of discounted paper be discouraged 
as much as possible and that officials should refrain from lending too large an amount 
which depended on the security of one firm, irrespective of their reputation. Moreover, 
if goods were offered as security, no advance was to exceed two-thirds of their market 
value. Finally, to stress the bank’s intention to not deal directly with planters, under 
no circumstances were advances to be made on growing crops.51 As we shall see, 
managers in Rio did not always strictly observe these conservative guidelines, 
especially in the early years of the bank’s operation. In general terms, it was as a result 
of these episodes of divergence that the bank became entangled with slavery.   
 
The difficulties the bank faced during the 1860s which eventually led to its 
reconstruction as the New London and Brazilian Bank in 1872 have been 
acknowledged in business histories of British banking in Brazil. Guimarães in 
particular has stressed the detrimental effects emanating from the Souto Crisis of 1864, 
the failure of Overend Gurney in London in 1866 and the impact of an expensive war 
with Paraguay (1864-1870).52 However, the practical operation of the bank under 
these testing macroeconomic conditions has been less well developed in the literature. 
In particular this literature fails to address how the bank’s entanglement with 
agricultural production, and thereby with slavery, contributed to its difficulties in its 
early years of operation. Charles Jones notes that the London and Brazilian Bank had 
                                                        
51 London and Brazilian Bank, Instructions for the Management of the Affairs of the Bank at Rio de 
Janeiro (London: W.F. Mitchem, n.d) in BOLSA G37/1 pp. 13-15. Nb. This handbook is marked 
‘proof’ and contains a number of amendments made in pencil suggesting it was printed before the 
bank opened for business in Brazil. One comment in parenthesis changes the wording of a clause 
regarding renewals of discounted bills from ‘should be discouraged’ to ‘are prohibited unless under 
very special circumstances.’ 
 
52 C.G Guimarães, ‘O Estado Imperial brasileiro e os bancos estrangeiros’ pp. 12-20. Joslin also 
mentions these difficult economic conditions. See D. Joslin, A Century of Banking in Latin America 
pp. 71-72.  
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fallen into a ‘mortgage trap, locking up large amounts of capital to the detriment of its 
business and profits,' though he fails to develop on this point, citing a lack of available 
sources.53 Joslin develops on the idea of ‘locked-up’ capital and on a few occasions 
mentions the ‘Angelica estate,’ referring to it as ‘one of the bank’s major 
encumbrances from the early years,’ which ‘served as a reminder of the perils of 
Brazilian banking.’54 Nevertheless, he fails to explore the origins of this account in 
any great depth, claiming ‘just what happened cannot now be accurately 
reconstructed.’55 The most complete evaluation of this particular case is provided by 
Levy and Saes, though the focus of these authors is the case study as evidence of 
foreign lending to Brazilian agriculture and not the wider issue of slave mortgages.56 
The account which resulted in the seizure of the Angélica plantation was no doubt the 
most important in terms of value and the number of slaves held under mortgage, 
however it is not the only one. An analysis of overlooked records such as mortgage 
deeds and court cases, alongside traditional business history sources, not only permits 
a more detailed understanding of this major case study, but also presents new evidence 
of this bank’s varied forms of entanglement with Brazilian slavery.  
 
This section will analyse three case studies to show that the Bank not only held this 
type of human collateral intermittently from shortly after its establishment in Brazil in 
1862 until 1888, but that on occasion it legally enforced the seizure and sale of 
enslaved people to settle outstanding debts. These are the Gavião Ribeiro Gavião and 
                                                        
53 C. Jones, ‘Commercial Banks and Mortgage Companies’ p. 38.  
 
54 D. Joslin, A Century of Banking in Latin America p. 73, p. 76, p. 159. 
 
55 Ibid p. 73.  
 
56 M.B. Levy, F.A.M Saes, ‘Dívida externa brasileira 1850-1913: empréstimos públicos e privados’, 
História Econômica & História de Empresas 4.1 (2001) pp. 52-58.  
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related Vergueiro debts (1866-1881), valued at 230:000$000 (£200,000) in 1871; the 
Baron de Turvo default (1867-1870) valued at around (£8,000) in 1869; and the debt 
of Lourenço Gomes e Cia (1877-1878) valued at 1:437$325 (£122) in 1878.57 The 
main criteria used for selecting the three case studies was the availability of extant 
source material, but correspondence in the bank’s archive and reports of shareholder 
meetings suggest that the first two examples represent two of the three major cases of 
‘locked-up’ capital during the early operations of the bank.58 Unfortunately, source 
material was not available to fully analyse the other major case cited by the bank’s 
chairman in 1870.59 The three individual case studies analysed here are all similar in 
that they resulted in the bank’s entanglement with slavery. However, in their diversity 
they show a number of different routes to exposure to slave property; from credit 
relations with private banking houses, the discounting of planter drafts, and even as a 
result of orthodox commercial banking with a merchant firm as clients. In all of these 
scenarios we will observe that though the bank may have viewed slave mortgages and 
                                                        
57 Average annual exchange rates, mil-réis to pound sterling taken from N. Leff, Underdevelopment 
and development in Brazil, Volume 1: Economic Structure and Change, 1822-1947 (London: George 
Allen & Unwin, 1980) p. 247 
 
58 At the half-yearly shareholders meeting on 18 July 1870 the Chairman stated talked of three major 
accounts which the bank was attempting to liquidate. The Chairman does not name those involved but 
it is possible to infer to what he is referring using the values and other contextual information. The 
first of over £200,000 for which the bank held ‘a collateral lien’ refers to the Vergueiro debt. The 
third debt he mentions, ‘of a much smaller amount,’ about which the courts had ruled in the bank’s 
favour concerns Baron de Turvo.  There is another debt, ‘of between £30,000 and £40,000’ which I 
believe to refers to the mortgage of Antônio Alves da Silva Pinto agreed in June 1866. This debt of 
300 contos corresponds to the value referred to in the shareholder meeting. The bank’s 
correspondence shows that this debt remained unpaid in 1870. See The Bankers' Magazine, Journal of 
the Money Market and Commercial Digest, vol. 30 (London: Groombridge and Sons, 1870) p. 679.  
 
59 The original mortgage contract was located in notary office records in Rio de Janeiro on 
30/06/1866. At that time the debt stood at 300 owing to a current account Antônio Alves da Silva 
Pinto had with the bank. Many urban properties were offered as collateral. See Antônio Alves da 
Silva Pinto x London and Brazilian Bank, 30.06/1866, AN, 1o Oficio de notas, book 298, ff. 26v-28. 
Unfortunately records of the lengthy court case which followed upon death of Silva Pinto were 
unavailable for public consultation at the Arquivo Nacional during the time of this research. For the 
document in question, see Os Administradores da Massa Falida de Silva Pinto Melo & Cia vs. 
London and Brazilian Bank, 1869-1870, AN, Acervo Judiciário, Supremo Tribunal da Justiça, 
BU.0.RCI.1106.  
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their occasional foreclosure as undesirable, it was because they were a risky 
investment and not because it brought their banking practices into conflict with British 
anti-slavery legislation.  
 
Case Study I Part I: Gavião Ribeiro Gavião / Vergueiro e Cia Debts. 
 
The first case study to be considered undoubtedly represents the most important and 
varied example of the London and Brazilian Bank’s entanglement with Brazilian 
slavery. Beginning with the extension of an unusually large line of credit to Gavião 
Ribeiro Gavião, a private banking house in São Paulo in 1863, it would take until 
abolition in 1888 for the Bank to rid itself of its association with slavery.  It was this 
account which resulted in the bank taking ownership of a large coffee plantation, 
which after a decade it sold to the Baron Grão-Mogol on a purchase-money mortgage 
which included the buyer’s 80 slaves. Although the Angélica plantation was the only 
property seized by the bank, this account involved a diverse asset portfolio, including 
mortgages and planter bills guaranteed by upwards of 800 slaves owned by 
representatives of the political and socio-economic elite of Brazil’s fastest growing 
province. Moreover, the difficulties in liquidating this significant account played an 
important role in the decision to reconstruct the bank as the New London and Brazilian 
Bank in 1872. Fortunately for the historian, the sheer size of the sums loaned as well 
as the status of the elites involved, means that, in the absence of complete detailed 
accounts, it is still possible to piece together a coherent narrative from a variety of 
extant sources to explain the importance of this case study.  
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In December 1863 the managers of the recently established London and Brazilian 
Bank accepted a request by the banking house, Gavião Ribeiro Gavião to open a 
current account in their Rio branch with a line of credit (linha de crédito) to the value 
of 1500 contos de réis (1500:000$000) for the ‘purposes of conducting their mercantile 
business.’60 In addition to interests in coffee factorage and exporting, Gavião Ribeiro 
Gavião had been operating from the beginning of the decade as one of the province’s 
most important private banking houses. 61  Although the London-based board and 
shareholders would ultimately chastise the bank’s mangers in Rio for not obeying the 
principles of orthodox commercial banking, an understanding of the economic context 
of São Paulo province may provide an insight into their managers’ logic in making 
what turned out to be a high risk transaction.62  In extending credit to an entity which 
was largest financier of São Paulo’s agriculture, the Bank’s managers were betting on 
the future of Brazil’s most dynamic province. According to Dean, from the 1850s 
onwards the West of São Paulo was Brazil’s fastest growing region in terms of 
population and wealth.63 In 1860 work began on the British owned São Paulo Railway 
which would quicken the expansion of coffee production into the fertile lands of the 
New West (to the north of Campinas) and by around 1870 São Paulo province 
surpassed Rio de Janeiro in coffee production.64 Although some planters in the region 
                                                        
60 New London and Brazilian Bank vs. Barão Souza Querioz, 1873-1878. AN, Acervo Judiciário, 
Supremo Tribunal da Justiça, BU.0.RCI.3016 (hereafter known as NLBB vs. BSQ, 1878) f. 30v. 
Souza Queiroz had initially represented the London and Brazilian Bank in its negotiations with 
Gavião Ribeiro Gavião but they had since accused him of negligence. This case relates to the bank’s 
effort to sue for damages.  
 
61 A. Hanley, Native Capital p. 39. 
 
62 The Bankers' Magazine, Journal of the Money Market and Commercial Digest, vol. 29 (London: 
Groombridge and Sons, 1869) pp.171-173. As a result of these lock-ups and other losses on the 
exchange, the directors decided to replace Mr. Crewse as the Rio branch manager with Mr. Gordon. 
See Ibid p. 168. 
 
63 W. Dean, Rio Claro p. xi.  
 
64 A. Hanley, Native Capital p. 39. 
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had flirted with experiments with free labour in the 1840s and 1850s, the expansion 
of coffee in this region was based largely on a buoyant internal slave trade. In fact, the 
Bank’s new clients, Gavião Ribeiro Gavião, were heavily involved in this lucrative 
trade with the major partner, Bernardo Avelino Gavião Peixoto ‘one of the great slave 
merchants, active in the interprovincial purchase and sale of slaves, principally 
involving transactions between the northeast and southeast of the country.’65 Despite 
the effect the American Civil War had on coffee prices, all in all, when the Rio bank 
authorised the loan in late 1863, the future of São Paulo’s agriculture and thus its 
financiers seemed assured. 
 
Nevertheless, while São Paulo would go on to become the dynamic centre of Brazil’s 
coffee industry, some of its financiers would suffer the effects of banking crisis which 
began in Rio de Janeiro in September 1864 before emanating across the country.66 The 
liquidity crisis caused by the collapse of the private banking house of A. J. Souto was 
then exacerbated by inflation and credit squeeze caused by the Paraguayan War which 
began two months later and continued until 1870.67 The chairman of the London and 
Brazilian Bank would later refer to this unfavourable economic climate as ‘the adverse 
circumstances which have recently prevailed in connection with banking in Brazil.’68 
                                                        
 
65 M.A.R Ribeiro, C. de Campos, ‘História da riqueza na economia cafeeira brasileira: a família 
Arruda Botelho. 1854-1901’ in II Congreso Latinoamericano de Historia Económica (2010) 
[http://www.economia.unam.mx/cladhe/registro/ponencias/440_abstract.doc last accessed 
15/06/2018] p.13.  
 
66 J.F Normano, Brazil: A Study of Economic Types (New York: Biblo & Tannen Publishers, 1968) p. 
175. 
 
67 C.G Guimarães, ‘O Estado Imperial brasileiro e os bancos estrangeiros’ pp. 10-13.  
 
68 The Bankers' Magazine, Journal of the Money Market and Commercial Digest, vol. 28 (London: 
Groombridge and Sons, 1868) p. 116.  
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With this macroeconomic context in mind, the loan made to Gavião Ribeiro Gavião 
which was not necessarily risk-laden in 1863, by as early as mid-1865 represented a 
serious liability to the bank. The major problem was the type of collateral that the 
Paulista firm offered as security for their line of credit. To the later frustration of the 
bank’s directors and shareholders, its managers in Rio had opened the account with 
only promissory notes of the firm Vergueiro & Cia as guarantee.69 Though the bank 
would later demand further collateral from Gavião Ribeiro Gavião, the decision to 
accept what was essentially the transferal of third-party debt would prove to be a 
terrible business decision when Vergueiro & Cia entered administration in September 
1865.70  
 
Vergueiro & Cia was formed in 1846 by Senator Nicolau Pereira de Campos 
Vergueiro and is best known in the literature for its leader’s pioneering but ultimately 
largely unsuccessful efforts to introduce European immigrant labour on the family’s 
coffee plantations, Ibicaba and Angélica, in São Paulo.71 According to Levy and Saes, 
Nicolau Vergueiro’s commercial ventures were more important to the firm than his 
estates. In addition to contracts with the government for the introduction of immigrants, 
Vergueiro & Cia had an import-export business in the port of Santos and held interests 
in road construction, mule transport and the slave trade.72 Upon Nicolau Vergueiro’s 
                                                        
69 This initial agreement of 3rd December 1863 was referred to in a mortgage agreement between 
Bernardo Gavião Peixoto and the London and Brazilian Bank in May of the following year. See 
Bernardo Gavião Peixoto x London and Brazilian Bank, 02/05/1864, AN, 1o Oficio de notas, book 
291, ff. 75-76. 
 
70 F.A.M. Saes, Crédito e Bancos no Desenvolvimento da Economia Paulista 1850-1930 (São Paulo: 
USP, 1996) p. 74. 
 
71 E. Viotti da Costa, The Brazilian Empire pp. 100-103 
 
72 M.B. Levy, F.A.M Saes, ‘Dívida externa brasileira 1850-1913’ pp. 52-54. 
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death in 1859 his son José took over management of Vergueiro & Cia and it was under 
his leadership that the firm established credit relations with Gavião Ribeiro Gavião. 
As with many financial transactions during this period, this relationship was based on 
family and social connections as well as business ties. Both families represented the 
Paulista elite and were interlinked through José Vergueiro’s marriage to Dona Maria 
Umbelina, the sister of Bernardo Avelino Gavião Peixoto.73 These interrelationships 
represent a coalescence of regional elites who simultaneously performed the role of 
planter, merchant and banker and at the same time exerted the political power to 
protect their interests and prosperity. 
 
The combined reputation, political power, apparent economic solidity and 
interrelationships of the Gavião and Vergueiro firms might have given the appearance 
of a low risk investment in 1863. However, as the Souto crisis had shown, even the 
biggest firms were vulnerable to collapse and, in the aftermath of 1864, Vergueiro 
would become a case in point. As early as 31 January 1865 the warning signs of 
Vergueiro’s problems became apparent to all. In a letter to the Emperor of Brazil, 
Vergueiro e Cia requested a loan of 2200:000$000 (£229,166) over three years 
guaranteed by the company’s plantations and slave workforce, as well as its urban 
properties in São Paulo. A condition for the loan was that the company would cease 
all commercial activities and focus exclusively on agriculture. In reply, the Bank of 
Brazil stated they would be unable to accede to the request, but as a compromise 
Bernado de Souza Franco (later Visconde Souza Franco), the President of Rio de 
Janeiro, intervened and stated that a loan of 1000:000$000 (£104,167) would be made 
                                                        
73 C.E Marcondes de Moura, Vida cotidiana em São Paulo no século XIX: memórias, depoimentos, 
evocações (São Paulo: UNESP, 1999) p. 263.  
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available to avoid the potential ruinous consequences of Vergueiro e Cia’s bankruptcy. 
Souza Franco worried that if Vergueiro e Cia suspended its payments, it would 
seriously threaten the solvency of the province’s largest banking house, Gavião 
Ribeiro Gavião and the São Paulo branch of the Banco do Brasil. The knock-on effect 
of this would be ‘a tremendous commercial crisis in the province, and the ruin of its 
agriculture’ and that government intervention would save the province from a ‘fatal 
catastrophe.’74 
 
The government loan of 23 June 1865 was not enough to prevent Vergueiro & Cia 
from entering into what was termed a concordata judicial, a type of court-approved 
voluntary administration, following an agreement with the company’s creditors. The 
assessment of the firm’s accounts as part of this progress show the national and global 
reach of its business interests. In addition to all manner of clients in his home province 
and in Brazil’s capital, Vergueiro maintained links with banking houses and 
commercial firms in cities such as Lisbon, Amsterdam, Hamburg and London.75. 
Moreover, the accounts show the enormous value of his coffee plantations, Ibicaba 
and Angélica which all told (land, coffee bushes, slaves, animals and machinery) were 
valued at 1724:470$000 (£174,189) and 1777:350$000 (£185,141) respectively.76 As 
the holder of the firm’s promissory notes, the London and Brazilian Bank now had the 
right to assume Vergueiro’s debt with Gavião Ribeiro Gavião which in January 1866 
was valued at 1619:151$315 (£168,661) and guaranteed by the mortgages of the 
                                                        
74 F.A.M. Saes, Crédito e Bancos p. 74. 
 
75 London and Brazilian Bank vs. José Vergueiro, 1875-1877, AN, Acervo Judiciário, Relação do Rio 
de Janeiro (hereafter known as LBB vs. Vergueiro, 1875-1877) ff. 230-237.  
 
76 Ibid f. 230.  
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Ibicaba and Angélica plantations as well as 400 slaves, in addition to urban properties 
in Santos, Limeira and Rio Claro.77 On 28th March 1866 Gavião Ribeiro Gavião 
officially transferred their rights as creditors to the London and Brazilian Bank.78 If 
Vergueiro’s debt remained unpaid after a grace period of five years, the bank would 
be able to foreclose on this mortgage.  
 
It was not until the following year that the Bank’s London board became aware of 
locked-up capital resulting, in the chairman’s opinion, from the managers in Rio de 
Janeiro ‘[having] not pursued the business on which banking principles with which 
we have advocated.’79 In an effort to ascertain the value of the collateral and assist the 
Rio branch with recoveries, the Board sent their London secretary, John Beaton, on a 
special mission to Brazil in early 1868. The Board reported that while there, Beaton 
visited Vergueiro’s property in São Paulo and reported favourably about the value of 
the collateral and the ‘honourable and energetic character’ of their debtor.80 Given the 
grace period contained in the concordata, the bank would have to rely on José 
Vergueiro’s word that the debt would be cleared using proceeds from the coffee 
harvests of his estates, which Beaton conservatively estimated as being worth £75,000 
per year.81 
 
                                                        
77 Ibid ff. 113-119. 
 
78 Ibid f. 170.  
 
79 The Bankers' Magazine, Journal of the Money Market and Commercial Digest, vol. 27 (London: 
Groombridge and Sons, 1867) p. 164. 
 
80 The Bankers' Magazine, Journal of the Money Market and Commercial Digest, vol. 29 (London: 
Groombridge and Sons, 1869) p. 168.  
 
81 The Bankers' Magazine, Journal of the Money Market and Commercial Digest, vol. 28 (London: 
Groombridge and Sons, 1868) p. 116.  
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Vergueiro did not keep his word and by 1870 the bank had not received any of the 
installments promised by their debtor. Beaton was once again sent to Brazil to see if 
the account could be settled without recourse to legal action, as foreclosure on debts 
secured by land and slaves was expensive and laden with risk.82 The frustrations that 
the bank had faced in a drawn-out legal case against the Baron de Turvo certainly 
influenced their decision to pursue a friendly arrangement with Vergueiro. In relation 
to another account, the bank’s London manager remarked in July 1869:  
 
What are we to do in case the present negotiations fall through, and no remittances 
come forward is a matter of grave consideration. Legal proceedings would we fear 
only do harm. The result of legal action in these cases is very aptly illustrated by 
the Baron de Turvo’s sale!83 
 
On 6 February 1871 both parties agreed a private accord (convênio particular) which 
would see Vergueiro’s debt of nearly 1792 contos liquidated over the course of the 
next four years. 1000 contos was to be cleared with the transfer of Vergueiro’s 
plantation, Angélica, in Rio Claro. Crucially, the 134 slaves attached to this estate 
were not included in the deed which detailed this payment in kind (dação em 
pagamento).84 There is no indication as to whether Vergueiro was willing to include 
these people in the transferal of Angélica, but even if the bank did forgo their right to 
the slaves, there is little evidence to suggest that anti-slavery motives influenced the 
bank’s decision. After all, the bank had only recently enforced the seizure and sale of 
the Baron de Turvo’s slaves and still held other mortgages secured by slave property.85 
                                                        
82 On the risks of foreclosure and particularly the issue of forced adjudication, see J. Sweigart, 
‘Financing and Marketing Brazilian Export Agriculture’ pp. 192-194. 
 
83 London HQ to Rio de Janeiro branch, 2 July 1869, BOLSA G1/2. 
 
84 LBB vs. Vergueiro, 1875-1877 ff. 171-171v.  
 
85 To be discussed in following sections of this chapter.  
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Indeed, under the second half of the February 1871 agreement, which established a 
repayment schedule for the remaining 792 conto balance, the bank accepted as 
collateral the Ibicaba plantation and the slaves that worked it.86 Though the slaves 
continued under mortgage to the bank, a clause in the agreement gave Vergueiro the 
right to remortgage his slaves plus a property called Itaporanga in order to raise funds 
to clear the payment installments he had agreed with the bank. By June 1871 
Vergueiro raised 200 contos in mortgage finance from the coffee factorage firm 
Furquim, Lahmeyer & Cia. and on the 26th of that month the bank signed a public 
contract acknowledging the transfer of this part of the mortgage to this firm. However, 
in the event that Furquim, Lahmeyer & Cia. seized Vergueiro’s slaves or they were 
removed from the plantation for whatever reason, the bank retained the right to 
immediately foreclose on the lien they held over the rest of the Ibicaba estate. 
Moreover, although the bank ceded its rights as first mortgagee over the slaves and 
Itaporanga, the contract stipulated that in the event Vergueiro failed to pay on time, 
the whole arrangement would be null and void and the agreement would revert to the 
terms agreed under the March 1866 mortgage. 87  The transferal of the slave mortgage 
made business sense to the bank. It received a significant down payment without the 
risk of leaving Ibicaba without the labour force it required. At this point the bank was 
still confident in Vergueiro’s willingness and ability to pay the remaining balance of 
592 contos (see table 1) using the proceeds of Ibicaba’s annual coffee harvest. 
 
                                                        
86 Ibid f. 185v.  
 
87 London and Brazilian Bank x Vergueiro & Cia, Furquim Lahmeyer & Cia, 26/06/1871, AN, 1o 
Oficio de notas, book 316, ff. 136v-141. 
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Table 4.1: Vergueiro & Cia Repayment Schedule to London and Brazilian Bank 
(1871)88 
 
Instalment due date Amount (contos de réis) 
31 July 1872 136:875$000 
31 July 1873 144:375$000 
31 July 1874 151:875$000 
31 July 1875 159:375$000 
  
Total: 592:000$000 
 
Despite the assurances he gave the bank, Vergueiro did not keep to the terms of their 
agreement.  Though he made three separate payments in July 1873 (30 contos), 
December 1873 (40 contos) and January 1874 (100 contos), by the end of 1874 
Vergueiro’s debt with the bank stood at a significant 427 contos. A fire on Ibicaba, 
failed harvests and heavy rains were put forward by Vergueiro in his defence but by 
December 1874 the bank’s directors had grown tired of their debtor’s excuses, 
especially considering Vergueiro had managed to pay off the mortgage that Furquim 
Lahmeyer & Cia. held over Itaporanga and his slaves.89 The consistent failure to 
adhere to their agreement meant Vergueiro had, according to the bank’s London 
secretary, ‘forfeited the last atom of any confidence’ the board had in his willingness 
to clear his debts.90 After consulting a trio of legal experts as to their right to foreclose 
on the Ibicaba plantation and its enslaved workforce, the bank initiated a legal suit 
                                                        
88 These figures relate to four acceptances of 125 contos plus interest at 6% per annum. For a history 
of the debt from the perspective of John Beaton, see Jornal do Commercio, 1 May 1877.  
 
89 For José Vergueiro’s account of the debt and response to Beaton’s publication, see Jornal do 
Commercio, 29 May 1877. 
 
90 London HQ to Rio de Janeiro branch, 23 November 1874, BOLSA G1/2. For the recission of this 
mortgage worth 495 contos see Furquim Lahmeyer & Cia x Vergueiro & Cia, 22/11/1873, AN, 1o 
Oficio de notas, book 334, ff. 49v-50.  
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against Vergueiro & Cia. Although the eminent lawyer José Tomás Nabuco de Araújo 
Filho affirmed the bank’s ‘undoubted’ right over the whole estate and slaves, it appears 
a lack of consensus on the issue influenced the bank’s decision to concentrate their 
efforts on the seizure of Ibicaba’s current and future coffee crop.91 The suit was filed 
in early 1875 and by May of that year the court had ordered that Ibicaba be placed 
under the administration of a third-party agent (depositário) to ensure the remittance 
of the estate’s produce to the bank. Wielding his significant regional influence, José 
Vergueiro, or the ‘Sovereign of Ibicaba’ as he was nicknamed by the bank’s Rio 
manager, employed a number of legal and extra-legal measures to protect his 
property.92 During a bitter and protracted battle in court, the bank accused their debtor 
of withholding the vital slave labour needed to work the estate and of inducing ‘illegal 
practices’ amongst the local judiciary.93 On his part, Vergueiro, playing on the fears 
of the slaveholding elite, publicly complained that the bank’s ‘tempestuous and 
imprudent’ decision to attempt to seize Ibicaba had destabilised the local region and 
fomented a ‘spirit of insubordination and rebellion’ amongst his slaves. 94  After 
unsuccessfully appealing for the British minister’s intervention in the face of 
‘extraordinary feats of the Judges’ in Limeira, the bank admitted defeat in their efforts 
to legally impose repayment on Vergueiro. 95  In November 1878, through the 
mediation of British railway engineer Daniel M. Fox, the bank once again privately 
agreed to a staggered repayment plan. In a letter of the 29th of that month, Vergueiro 
                                                        
91 London HQ to Rio de Janeiro branch, 18 November 1874, BOLSA G1/2. 
 
92 Rio de Janeiro branch to London HQ, 17 April 1875, BOLSA G18/2. 
 
93 Ibid; Rio de Janeiro branch to London HQ, 29 March 1875, BOLSA G18/2. 
 
94 Jornal do Commercio, 9 July 1877.  
 
95 London HQ to Rio de Janeiro branch, 18 August 1877, BOLSA G2/5; M.B. Levy, F.A.M Saes, 
‘Dívida externa brasileira 1850-1913’ p. 57.  
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agreed to repay the outstanding balance of 350 contos in six instalments over a period 
of two years. On the bank’s part, the agreement authorised Vergueiro to raise capital 
through the sale of all or part of his plantation, which remained under mortgage to the 
bank. 96 
 
Table 4.2: Vergueiro & Cia Repayment Schedule to London and Brazilian Bank 
(1878)97 
 
Instalment due date Amount  
1 January 1879 50:000$000 
1 May 1879 50:000$000 
1 September 1879 50:000$000 
1 January 1880 50:000$000 
1 May 1880 50:000$000 
1 September 1880 50:000$000 
  
Total: 350:000$000  
 
Despite Vergueiro’s assurances, his debt to the bank was not liquidated until 1887, 
over two decades since the bank initially inherited his account from Gavião Ribeiro 
Gavião.98 Though the bank did not attempt to foreclose on Vergueiro’s slaves during 
this whole ordeal, this decision cannot be attributed to a desire to adhere to British 
anti-slavery legislation. After all, the issue was put under serious consideration at the 
time the bank initially launched judicial proceedings. Instead, this decision was more 
                                                        
96  London and Brazilian Bank vs. José Vergueiro, 1877-1878, Juíz Municipal de Limeira, ff. 345-
347v. At the time of research this document was stored in a temporary archive facility in the city of 
Limeira, São Paulo. I am grateful to José Eduardo Heflinger Jr. for allowing me access to this archive.  
 
97 Ibid ff. 345-347v. 
 
98 On 8th December 1887, the bank’s London secretary sent a message to the manager in Rio 
congratulating him that the Vergueiro account had finally been closed. See M.B. Levy, F.A.M Saes, 
‘Dívida externa brasileira 1850-1913’ p. 57.  
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likely influenced by the fact that their legal claim to Ibicaba’s crop was more clearly 
defined in their June 1871 mortgage and a belief that the sale of the seized coffee 
harvest would raise sufficient funds to clear Vergueiro’s debt. Moreover, after their 
recent experience with the Baron de Turvo, there was little appetite to foreclose on 
slave property when other options remained viable. Though the seizure and sale of 
enslaved people was not pursued by the bank on this particular occasion, the fact that 
it remained an option, however remote, is testament to the bank’s disregard or 
ignorance of the 1843 Act.   
 
Case Study I Part II: Remaining Gavião Ribeiro Gavião Debt  
 
Although the primary purpose of John Beaton’s visit to Brazil in 1868 was to shore 
up uncertainties regarding the Vergueiro e Cia debt, he also had an important task to 
perform regarding the line of credit which remained active on the current account 
opened by Gavião Ribeiro Gavião in December 1863. Following the administration of 
Vergueiro e Cia, the promissory notes became invalid as security and given the 
economic climate of the on-going Paraguayan War, Beaton decided to demand further 
guarantees from Gavião. At this point the only other collateral on the account, which 
was added in March 1864, were urban mortgages on seven properties in São Paulo 
valued at 505:000$000 (£56,299).99 As was the case with Vergueiro e Cia, Beaton 
once again accepted guarantees which would expose the Bank to closer contact with 
Brazilian slavery. Table 4.3 shows two types of security transferred to the Bank by 
Gavião. The first are five mortgages of rural properties in São Paulo, included in which 
are 425 slaves. The second type involves the transfer of discounted bills, likely in the 
                                                        
99 NLBB vs BSQ, 1873-1878 ff. 30-33. 
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form of planter drafts, which essentially meant the transferal of plantation debt from 
Gavião Ribeiro Gavião to the bank. 
 
The transferred rural mortgages and discounted planter bills may not have caused the 
bank anywhere near as much frustration as Vergueiro had, but they were still far from 
straightforward. The transferal of four of the rural mortgages was envisaged by Beaton 
as a short-term measure; once the bank had been paid at the expiry of three planter 
drafts, the mortgages of José Maria de Cardoso Vasconcellos, José Maria Gavião 
Peixoto and both in the name of Antônio Pereira Pinto would be transferred back to 
Gavião Ribeiro Gavião.100 In the end, these rural mortgages were quickly removed 
from the bank’s balance sheet but not in the way it had intended. An error made by 
the bank’s power of attorney, the Baron de Souza Queiroz, resulted in the bank losing 
its claim to these mortgages in spite of the fact that Gavião Ribeiro Gavião was still 
in debt to the bank’s London headquarters.101 In contrast, at least two of these accounts 
remained on the books as locked-up capital for longer than the bank had planned. The 
mortgage of João Tobias d’Aguiar and the discounted acceptance of Francisco 
Teixeira Vilela warrant further comment.  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
100 Rio de Janeiro branch to Gavião Ribeiro Gavião, 30th March 1868, BOLSA G5/1. 
 
101 The bank sued Souza Queiroz for negligence in an attempt to recoup the outstanding balance of 
£5000 which they were now unable to claim from Gavião Ribeiro Gavião. See NLBB vs BSQ, 1873-
1878, especially f. 1 and ff. 20-22. 
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Table 4.3: Asset Portfolio Transferred from Gavião Ribeiro Gavião to London and 
Brazilian Bank (1863-1868)102 
 
Name of debtor Date of 
Transfer 
Type Value (contos 
de réis) 
Location/ 
Name of 
Property 
No of 
Slaves 
Vergueiro e Cia 
(1) 
02/12/1863 
Promissory Note/ 
Mortgage (after 
March 1866) 
1619:150$313 
Rio Claro / 
Angélica 
(SP) 
133 
Vergueiro e Cia 
(2) 
Limeira / 
Ibicaba (SP) 
283 
Gavião Ribeiro 
Gavião 
02/03/1864 Mortgage 
(Urban) 
505:000$000 São Paulo 
(Capital) 
0 
José Maria de 
Cardoso de 
Vasconcellos 
25/04/1868 Mortgage (Rural) 24:439$900  Mogi Mirim 
(SP) / 
Fazenda 
Bem Fica 
24 
José Maria 
Gavião Peixoto 
25/04/1868 Mortgage (Rural) 105:952$310 São Carlos 
do Pinhal 
(SP) 
36 
Antônio Pereira 
Pinto (1) 
25/04/1868 Mortgage (Rural) 154:750$000 Atibaia (SP) 30 
Antônio Pereira 
Pinto (2) 
25/04/1868 Mortgage (Rural) 38:737$107 Araraquara / 
Fazenda São 
Joaquim 
(SP) 
35 
João Tobias 
d’Aguiar 
30/05/1868 
Mortgage (Rural) 
unknown Rio das 
Pedras 
 
300 
Francisco 
Teixeira Vilela 
28/03/1868 Planter Bill 200:000$000 Campinas not listed 
Camillo José 
Pires 
28/03/1868 Planter Bill 77:257$360 Belém de 
Jundiaí (SP) 
not listed 
Manoel Antonio 
Gurjão Cotrim 
28/03/1868 Planter Bill 52:670$200 Mogi Mirim 
(SP) 
not listed 
 
                                                        
102 For the transfer of the Vergueiro account, see LBB vs. Vergueiro, 1875-1877 ff. 70-87. For the 
urban mortgage of March 1864, see NLBB vs BSQ, 1873-1878, ff. 30-33. The transferal of mortgages 
and bills in is detailed in a letter to Gavião Ribeiro Gavião on 28/03/1864. From Rio de Janeiro 
branch to Gavião Ribeiro Gavião, 30th March 1868, BOLSA G5/1. A copy of the deed of transfer can 
be found in BSQ, 1873-1878, ff. 24-28. This deed does not include the mortgage of João Tobias 
d’Aguiar which was transferred to the bank on 30/05/1868. This contract is cited in London and 
Brazilian Bank x Antonio Aguiar de Barros, 28/02/1871, AN, 1o Oficio de notas, book 313, ff. 132v-
133.  
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Like Vergueiro and Gavião Peixoto, João Tobias d’Aguiar came from a prominent 
Paulista family. His father, Brigadeiro Rafael Tobias d’Aguiar was an important 
figure in the Liberal Revolution in São Paulo in 1842 and a key capitalista, or financier, 
in the province. In this sense he was similar to the fathers of both José Vergueiro and 
Bernardo Gavião Peixoto and it is little surprise that their sons continued to operate in 
the same social and commercial networks.103 The mortgage Gavião Ribeiro Gavião 
held over d’Aguiar’s two coffee plantations and 300 slaves was transferred in May 
1868 and it appears the bank began to demand payment from their new debtor not long 
afterwards.104 After receiving remittances in October 1868 and October 1869, by early 
1870 the bank’s London secretary began to voice his frustration at the delays on this 
account.105 By March of that year London approved the Rio branch’s decision to 
initiate foreclosure on d’Aguiar’s mortgage but that advice does not seem to have been 
acted upon.106 Instead, both parties found another way to settle the account and in 
February 1871 the bank transferred its claim to the mortgage, now worth 65 contos, to 
Antônio Aguiar de Barros, the future Marquis de Itú and brother-in-law to João 
Tobias.107  
                                                        
103 E. Hörner, ‘A luta já não é hoje a mesma: as articulações políticas no cenário provincial paulista, 
1838-1842.’ Almanack Braziliense 5 (2007): pp. 67-85. 
 
104 D’Aguiar’s mortgage was transferred separately from the other four from Gavião Ribeiro Gavião 
and therefore does not appear in the records relating to the bank’s case against Souza Queiroz. 
Nevertheless, as noted above, the transferal of the mortgage is cited in London and Brazilian Bank x 
Antonio Aguiar de Barros, 28/02/1871, AN, 1o Oficio de notas, book 313, ff. 132v-133. 
 
105 London HQ to Rio de Janeiro branch, 23 October 1868, BOLSA G1/1(a); London HQ to Rio de 
Janeiro branch, 7 October 1869, BOLSA G1/2; London HQ to Rio de Janeiro branch, 8 February 
1870, BOLSA G1/3(a).  
 
106 London HQ to Rio de Janeiro branch, 19 March 1870, BOLSA G1/3(a).  
 
107 London and Brazilian Bank x Antonio Aguiar de Barros, 28/02/1871, AN, 1o Oficio de notas, 
book 313, ff. 132v-133. 
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It appears that the bank adopted a similar approach with the debt of Francisco Teixeira 
Vilela, whose relationship with Gavião Ribeiro Gavião give us a possible insight into 
what sort of ‘mercantile business’ the London and Brazilian Bank’s credit had been 
used for. In the year previous to the transfer of Vilela’s acceptance to the bank, this 
Campinas-based coffee planter had made a one-time purchase of 186 slaves from 
Gavião Ribeiro Gavião who had in turn acquired them from Carmelite monks in the 
province of Paraná.108  It is possible that Vilela’s acceptance, originally drawn in 
October 1867 with a validity of six-months was connected to this transaction in human 
property. The bank’s correspondence makes clear that Vilela failed to pay the 200 
contos he owed on the expiry of the bill on 30th April 1868. 109  A mortgage deed from 
1871 suggests that in the intermittent period the bank had renewed Vilela’s bill with 
the endorsement of the firm Teixeira Leite & Sobrinhos. With this coffee factorage 
now in liquidation, the bank moved to publicly register the 130 conto debt which 
Vilela still owed them.110 Vilela mortgaged his coffee plantation, Santa Maria, and 
288 slaves but as Maria Ribeiro has shown, the London and Brazilian bank was just 
one of many creditors with a claim over the same assets.111 In the case of a highly 
indebted planter with multiple mortgage claims over the same collateral, the bank was 
left with little room for movement. With no further trace of this debt located, it is 
                                                        
108 M.A.R. Ribeiro, ‘Riqueza e endividamento na economia de plantation açucareira e cafeeira: a 
família Teixeira Vilela-Teixeira Nogueira, Campinas, São Paulo, século XIX.’ Estudos Econômicos 
45.5 (2015) pp. 551-552.  
 
109 London HQ to Rio de Janeiro branch, 23 December 1868, BOLSA G1/1(a).  
 
110 London and Brazilian Bank x Francisco Teixeira Vilella, 24/08/1871, AN, 1o Oficio de notas, 
book 316, ff. 136v – 141. 
 
111 M.A.R. Ribeiro, ‘Riqueza e endividamento na economia de plantation açucareira e cafeeira’ p. 
555.  
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plausible that the bank followed the example of Vilela’s many other creditors, 
including Banco Mauá & Cia and Gavião Ribeiro Gavião in transferring their claim 
to the Banco Rural e Hipotecário do Rio de Janeiro in the following years.112  
 
Rural mortgages were not an asset the London and Brazilian Bank wanted to see on 
its balance sheet. Its experience liquidating the debt originating in Gavião Ribeiro 
Gavião has shown that this was for good reason. In the case of the mortgages 
considered here, the bank was either able to transfer them back to their original holders 
or in the cases of João Tobias d’Aguiar and Francisco Teixeira Vilela shift the liability 
to third parties. However, as two next case studies clearly demonstrate, in the event 
that this option was not available, the London and Brazilian Bank would pursue the 
seizure and sale of slave property to settle outstanding accounts.  
 
Case Study II: Baron de Turvo Debt (1867-1870) 
 
In July 1867 the managers of the London and Brazilian Bank in Rio de Janeiro made 
a decision that would not only have an impact on their balance sheet, but also on the 
lives of 106 enslaved people who had been offered as collateral by their indebted 
owner. Its credit relations with the Baron de Turvo are clear evidence that, if deemed 
necessary, the bank was willing to press for the seizure and sale of slaves, an act which 
was a clear violation of the 1843 legislation. In fact, as alluded to earlier, it was the 
difficulties encountered in this case, and not concern for British law, that would inform 
the bank’s future handling of debts secured by human collateral.   
 
                                                        
112 Ibid pp. 555-557. 
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On 4th July 1867 the bank discounted a bill signed by the Baron de Turvo and endorsed 
by Antônio Tavares Guerra e Cia to the value of 86:740$089. 113  As explained 
previously, discounting was the most common form of short-term lending performed 
by commercial banks such as the London and Brazilian. However, for a number of 
reasons the decision to discount this particular bill ran contrary to the conservative 
lending guidelines which the bank had advocated upon its establishment some four 
years earlier. Firstly, the six-month repayment period stipulated on the Baron’s 
acceptance was double the maximum 90-day term outlined in the bank’s ‘Instructions’ 
handbook. 114  Moreover, when it expired without payment, the bill was renewed for 
a further six months; a practice which was also strongly discouraged in the bank’s own 
guidelines.115 The second and most important issue though concerned the Baron de 
Turvo himself. José Gomes de Souza Portugal was an important coffee planter in the 
Barra Mansa and Piraí regions of the Paraíba valley. Aside from his plantation 
ownership, he also served as an alderman, national guard officer and as provincial 
deputy for Rio de Janeiro.116 Notwithstanding the Baron’s elevated social and political 
standing, he does not appear to have been involved in any of the types of commercial 
activity which the bank typically financed. In fact, the bill specifically mentioned that 
the reason it was being drawn was for the purpose of ‘supplying [the Baron de Turvo’s] 
plantation.’117 Whereas the bank’s dealings with Gavião Ribeiro Gavião could at least 
                                                        
113 London and Brazilian Bank vs. Barão de Turvo, 1867-1870, AN, Acervo Judiciário, Supremo 
Tribunal da Justiça (hereafter referred to as LBB vs. Turvo, 1869-1870) ff. 5v-6.  
 
114 London and Brazilian Bank, Instructions for the Management of the Affairs of the Bank at Rio de 
Janeiro p. 13.  
 
115 Ibid p. 13; LBB vs. Turvo, 1869-1870) ff. 5v-6. 
 
116 E. Pang, In Pursuit of Honor and Power: Noblemen of the Southern Cross in 19th century Brazil 
(Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1988) p. 167. 
 
117 LBB vs. Turvo, 1869-1870 f. 6. 
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be explained in part by the diversified business interests of that firm, credit relations 
with the Baron de Turvo are more difficult to reconcile with the form of orthodox 
commercial banking advocated at its establishment. The decision to extend credit to 
the Baron, via his coffee factor Antônio Tavares Guerra e Cia, is a further example of 
what the chairman would later refer to as ‘mismanagement in Rio during the early 
days of the institution.’118  
 
Following the expiry of the renewed note, the bank began legal proceedings against 
the coffee planter in August 1868.119 After an initial hearing in the capital, the case 
was sent to the Baron’s home district of Piraí, where on 7th November 1868 the judge 
ruled in favour of the bank.120 With payment still not forthcoming, on 16th March 1869 
the courts ordered a penhora judicial, a lien or attachment order, over the debtor’s 
assets to the value of the original loan plus interest, 96:712$006.121 Two days later, in 
compliance with that order, the Baron de Turvo nominated 106 slaves, amongst whom 
were married couples and family groups with children as young as one year old.122 
After a series of unsuccessful protests on the part of the Baron and his children, the 
judge ordered the public auction of the slaves to take place at the gates of his own 
residence on 2nd June. At this point the bank’s entanglement with slavery, usually 
                                                        
118 The Bankers' Magazine, Journal of the Money Market and Commercial Digest, vol. 31 (London: 
Groombridge and Sons, 1871) p. 138. 
 
119 LBB vs. Turvo, 1869-1870 f. 4. 
 
120 Ibid f. 17. 
 
121 Ibid f. 35-35v.  
 
122 Ibid f. 36-37v.  
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concealed in account ledgers and private correspondence, was made public with the 
auction advertised in the capital’s major newspaper over a number of days.123 
 
Much to the bank’s frustration, just two days before the sale, the agent (depositário) 
in charge of bringing the slaves to auction wrote to the judge claiming that there had 
been a mass exodus from the Baron’s Boa Liga plantation and only 29 of the 
nominated slaves remained on the property.124  Although possibly an act of slave 
resistance, there is likely truth in the bank’s allegation that, in a similar vein to 
Vergueiro, the Baron exerted all his influence on local officials to corroborate his 
claim of escaped slaves in order to delay the public sale.125 The sale was indeed 
delayed and, after another series of protests and counterclaims by other creditors, the 
public auction of 103 slaves was rescheduled for 23rd September 1869.126 This time 
the slaves were brought to auction but for reasons that are not quite clear, only 30 were 
sold.127 For all the London and Brazilian Bank’s entanglement with slave mortgages 
during its early operations, this was the first time it clearly violated the provisions of 
the 1843 Act by causing the sale of slave property in order to recover debt.  
 
                                                        
123 The public auction was advertised in the newspaper over a number of days. For example, see 
Jornal do Commercio, 23 May 1869. 
 
124 LBB vs. Turvo, 1869-1870 ff. 89-89v.  
 
125 The bank’s lawyer claimed that the slaves were still working on Boa Liga. See LBB vs. Turvo, 
1869-1870 f. 101.   
 
126 The reduced number of slaves was due to the death of three individuals in the intermittent period. 
See LBB vs. Turvo, 1869-1870 ff. 129-131. The auction was once more advertised in Rio’s 
newspapers. See Jornal do Commercio, 21 September 1869.  
  
127 LBB vs. Turvo, 1869-1870 ff. 207-210. 
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In the meantime the Baron de Turvo continued to appeal and on 18 November 1869 
the judge overturned the original sentence against him.128  This decision left the bank 
perplexed and irate in equal measure, with the London secretary later commenting that 
Brazilian law ‘seems to favour every description of delay and annoyance.’129 The 
following month, while awaiting the verdict of their counterappeal in Brazil’s highest 
court, Supremo Tribunal de Justiça, the bank’s chairman relayed a similar message 
about the quality of Brazilian justice, commenting that, 
 
A third claim, of a much smaller amount, had also been given in favour of the 
bank, the court having decided that so far as the law was concerned the bank was 
right, but law and justice did not seem always to run together; and although 
the law had declared that they were entitled to recover they had not yet received 
the money.130 [emphasis mine] 
 
It was around this time that the bank considered the possibility of attempting to settle 
the account out of court. Echoing the approach that they would eventually adopt with 
Vergueiro, the Rio branch were asked whether they could not compel the Baron to pay 
through the influence of ‘some mutual friends.’131 Though it appears that this proved 
fruitless, in November 1870, the Supremo Tribunal ruled in the bank’s favour and 
ordered the suit be sent back to the court in Piraí.132 Unfortunately, after this point 
references to the case in the bank’s correspondence dry up, making it impossible to 
                                                        
128 Ibid ff. 292-293. 
 
129 London HQ to Rio de Janeiro branch, 2 June 1870, BOLSA G1/3(a).  
 
130 The Bankers' Magazine, Journal of the Money Market and Commercial Digest, vol. 30 (London: 
Groombridge and Sons, 1870) p. 679. 
 
131 London HQ to Rio de Janeiro branch, 30 March 1870, BOLSA G1/3(a).  
 
132 LBB vs. Turvo, 1869-1870 ff.3-3v. 
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say whether this debt was eventually liquidated and if this was achieved through the 
sale of the Baron’s slaves. 
 
Further research may still cast light onto the eventual resolution of this account and 
the fate of the enslaved people whose lives became inadvertently caught up in this 
transaction.133 Nevertheless, what is abundantly clear from the sources available is that 
while the bank viewed foreclosure on human collateral as undesirable, this had nothing 
to do with a fear of falling foul of British anti-slavery legislation or a moral objection 
to this business practice. Instead, it was a business decision based on the risks involved 
in attempting to recover debts guaranteed by land and slaves. A comment by the 
bank’s London secretary encapsulates this sentiment, with his reference to ‘other 
property’ a euphemism for slaves:  
 
In our opinion it is high time that some declaration is made of the insecurity of 
advancing money in Brazil except in the discount of [merchant] bills, the law 
offering little or no security in mortgages whether of land or other property, 
leaving you at your debtor’s sense of honour.134 
 
While the bank remained entangled with rural slavery until emancipation, it did not 
attempt to foreclose on any of the residual rural mortgages it held; the frustrating 
experience with the Baron de Turvo certainly contributed to the bank’s future 
preference for finding alternative solutions. Nevertheless, as the next case study will 
demonstrate, the seizure and sale of enslaved people remained an option even after the 
crisis-hit years of its early operations. 
                                                        
133 Since the time of research, it has been suggested that the Arquivo Público de Piraí may hold 
material related to this case. I am grateful to Prof. Ricardo Salles for bringing this to my attention.  
 
134 London HQ to Rio de Janeiro branch, 8 November 1869, BOLSA G1/2.  
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Case Study III: Lourenço Gomes e Cia (1877-1878) 
 
By the late 1870s the New London and Brazilian Bank had emerged from the crisis 
years of its predecessor bank and was undergoing a period of expansion and 
prosperity.135 Though it still held the troublesome Vergueiro account and still owned 
the Angélica plantation, conservative banking and increased oversight from London 
meant the bank avoided falling into the ‘mortgage trap’ from which the London and 
Brazilian Bank had suffered from in the previous decade.136 Nevertheless, as this case 
study shows, although seemingly rare, even the most orthodox banking with merchant 
firms could lead to entanglement with slavery.   
 
In October 1877 the bank once again found themselves in court pursuing the seizure 
and sale of slave property in order to recover an outstanding debt. This time they were 
not foreclosing on the account of one Brazil’s slave-owning elite, but a small merchant 
firm called Lourenço Gomes e Cia.137 The firm had failed to pay a letra de cambio, or 
bill of exchange, within its 60-day term. The bill was valued at 1:207$140 and had 
been drawn to pay a firm in Hamburg.138 A short court case found in the Bank’s favour 
and the commercial firm was given 24 hours to pay 1:437$325, the original bill plus 
                                                        
135 D. Joslin, A Century of Banking in Latin America pp. 77-79. 
 
136 A conservative policy of high reserves and stable deposits meant the bank emerged relatively 
unscathed from the 1875 which saw the closure of two of its rivals, the Banco Mauá and the Deutsche 
Brasilianische Bank. See Ibid pp. 77-79. 
 
137 New London and Brazilian Bank vs. Lourenço Gomes e Cia, AN, Acervo Judiciário, Juizo 
Especial do Comercio da 2a Vara, 1877-1878 (Hereafter referred to as NLBB vs LGC, 1877-1878); 
Jornal do Commercio (Rio de Janeiro) 25 March 1877 lists Lourenço Gomes e Cia as merchants of 
articles such as tea, wax and tobacco. 
 
138 NLBB vs LGC, 1877-1878 f. 8.  
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interest.139  After this period had elapsed, the judge ordered an attachment order, 
penhora, be declared which would force Lourenço Gomes e Cia to nominate assets 
for public sale. In what appears to be a unique case involving the bank, their debtor 
offered their 38-year-old slave, Paulo, a boxmaker, in payment.140 As with the Baron 
de Turvo case, there is no indication that the bank had any moral or legal issue with 
this and on 25 May 1878 the judge ordered Paulo to be detained in the municipal 
depository.141 Lourenço Gomes & Cia immediately launched a series of legal protests 
which were again rejected by the judge.142 Unfortunately, the court case ends with a 
request by the debtors to have an appeal heard in a superior tribunal and no record of 
that case could be located in the judicial archives nor in newspaper reports. For this 
reason, it is not possible to determine whether Paulo was eventually sold to pay his 
owner’s debt to the bank. Nevertheless, the conclusion of the court case did at least 
show that the bank was willing to enforce Paulo’s sale as a matter of course. To the 
bank the liquidation of outstanding debts, even of relatively insignificant values such 
as that owed by Lourenço Gomes & Cia, was more important than the impact this 
decision could have on the lives of people like Paulo. Moreover, this case also serves 
to highlight the disregard or ignorance the bank had for the 1843 Act which had clearly 
prohibited British subjects from the foreclosure on human collateral.  
 
 
 
                                                        
139 Ibid, ff. 20-21.  
 
140 Ibid ff. 24-27. A survey of other court cases involving the bank and indebted merchant firms 
during this period did not involve slave property.  
 
141 Ibid f. 28.  
 
142 Ibid ff. 33v-34.  
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Concluding remarks 
 
By using a source base that has been typically overlooked by business historians, this 
chapter has shed light on the entanglement of British banking and Brazilian slavery in 
the second half of the nineteenth-century. While the London and Brazilian Bank 
arrived without the intention of directly financing coffee production, their credit 
relations with intermediaries such as private banking houses and coffee factorages 
resulted in direct exposure to human collateral. Capital locked up in land and slaves 
became a serious problem for the bank in the context of unfavourable economic 
conditions in the first decade of its operation.  The account of Gavião Ribeiro Gavião 
involved a significant injection of capital into a region that was becoming Brazil’s 
most important coffee producer. An analysis of the portfolio of mortgages and planter 
drafts transferred to the bank showed that its line of credit reached the plantations of 
some of São Paulo’s elite and was likely used to finance the internal slave trade. This 
account and the credit extended to the Baron de Turvo challenge the characterisation 
of British banks as being cautious and conservative lenders, certainly in the London 
and Brazilian Bank’s early years. Even when the bank truly adhered to these orthodox 
banking principles in later decades, the third case study of the Lourenço Gomes & Cia 
debt, demonstrates that even short-term, cautious lending could result in entanglement 
with slavery.  
 
This entanglement was viewed as undesirable not because it placed the bank in conflict 
with British anti-slavery legislation, but because it represented risky business. As the 
Vergueiro case showed, it could result in the long-term immobilisation of capital as 
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well as expensive and ineffective legal proceedings. Whereas the Baron de Turvo case 
opened the bank’s eyes to the perils of foreclosing on slave property. The fact that the 
bank even contemplated foreclosure is evidence that it felt under no threat of censure 
by British officials in Brazil. It is difficult to say whether this was a blatant disregard 
or ignorance of the provision of the 1843 Act which forbade the foreclosure on debts 
secured by slave property. What appears clearer is a lack of appetite on the part of 
British officials to interfere in the affairs of a significant British investor in Brazil. 
Though much of the bank’s entanglement remained hidden from public view, the 
notoriety of the Vergueiro account and the public advertisement of the auction of the 
Baron de Turvo’s slaves indicate that British officials were likely aware to some extent. 
The end of the slave trade had greatly reduced the relevance of the 1843 Act and 
official interest in slave mortgages and other forms of financial entanglement had 
dissipated by the time the London and Brazilian Bank was established in 1862. 
Nevertheless, while the bank showed little fear of reprehension in Brazil, it appears 
they were more cautious when broaching the subject with their shareholders and the 
wider public. Despite the fact that the ‘lock-ups’ were a constant discussion topic in 
shareholder meetings, the fact that the bank held mortgages secured by slave property 
and had attempted to seize the Baron de Turvo’s slaves was never mentioned in the 
published reports. As we shall see in the next chapter, this caution to disclose the 
bank’s relationship with slavery in Brazil continued throughout their administration 
of the Angélica coffee plantation.  
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Chapter V: The London and Brazilian Bank’s Administration of the 
Angélica Plantation.  
 
 
On 3rd July 1871 the Angélica estate was signed over to the London and Brazilian 
Bank by their debtors, Vergueiro e Cia.1 This British bank was now in possession of 
an extensive plantation just to the north of the town of Rio Claro in the mature coffee-
producing region of the west of São Paulo province. Much like its credit relations with 
plantation owners, the bank’s ten-year experience as a coffee producer would be beset 
with frustration as it struggled to reconcile an adherence to British anti-slavery identity 
with a regional labour market dominated by slavery. Despite the previous scholarly 
characterisation of the bank’s administration as an experiment in free labour, this 
chapter will show that the London and Brazilian Bank’s entanglement with slavery 
extended to the use of enslaved labourers on its own coffee plantation.  
 
The London and Brazilian Bank’s decade-long experience as owners of the Angélica 
estate has largely been overlooked in the literature. In spite of its importance during 
the institution’s early years, business historians have shown very little interest in this 
facet of the bank’s operations.2   Though Joslin’s classic study acknowledges the 
burden the estate placed on the bank, the author provides very little information about 
its management, only to add that the bank attempted to recruit German labour in 
                                                        
1 A transcription of the original contract signed in Santos can be found in LBB vs. Vergueiro, 1875-
1877, pp. 169-172.  
 
2 Discussion of the Angélica plantation does not feature in Guimarães’ or Jones’ study of the bank. 
See C.G Guimarães, ‘O Estado Imperial brasileiro e os bancos estrangeiros: o caso do London and 
Brazilian Bank (1862 – 1871)’; C. Jones, ‘Commercial Banks and Mortgage Companies’. The 
plantation is mentioned in passing in B.R. de Magalhães, ‘Investimentos ingleses no Brasil e o Banco 
Londrino e Brasileiro’, Revista Brasileira de Estudos Políticos, 49 (1979) p. 245. 
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Hamburg. 3  Levy and Saes go into more detail about Angélica under the bank’s 
administration, noting the difficulties it faced managing an agricultural property in 
Brazil’s interior and the failed attempts to sell the estate to a third-party.4 The authors 
also mention the bank’s commitment to a ‘totally free labour force,’ though unlike the 
rest of their observations gleaned from the bank’s archives, this appears to be based 
exclusively Warren Dean’s seminal study of plantation agriculture in Rio Claro. Dean 
briefly observes the ‘extraordinary novelty’ of the bank’s use of an ‘entirely free 
labour force’ and the failure of this experiment due to the incompetency of the estate’s 
English managers.5 Despite the author’s observation that ‘only two or three other free 
plantations existed in the province [of São Paulo],’ no labour history of this experiment 
has been attempted since.6 Using the bank’s archive in addition to local sources, this 
chapter will explain the reasons, anti-slavery related and otherwise, behind the bank’s 
short-lived attempt to run the estate exclusively using free labour from a variety of 
both domestic and international sources. As we shall observe, it was during the bank’s 
attempts to mitigate the financial burden of this failed experiment that its managers 
resorted to the use of gangs of hired slaves. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
3 D.  Joslin, A Century of Banking in Latin America p. 76 and p. 159.  
 
4 M.B. Levy, F.A.M Saes, ‘Dívida externa brasileira 1850-1913’ p. 57. 
 
5 W. Dean, Rio Claro pp. 117-118. 
 
6 Brief references to Angélica under British-ownership have appeared since but are based on Dean’s 
observations. For example, see V. Stolcke, Coffee Planters Workers and Wives: Class Conflict and 
Gender Relations on São Paulo Plantations (London: Macmillan, 1988) p. 254, n. 53.  
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Part I: Transferal of the Estate and its Early Operations  
 
With the transferal of the estate the bank had inherited one of the jewels in the crown 
of ‘the Sovereign of Ibicaba.’ While not as developed and with a far smaller productive 
area than Ibicaba, Angélica was still a substantial property covering 130km2 and 
containing 300,000 coffee bushes and a cotton plantation. Only a small portion of the 
estate, around 3km2, was planted with the rest containing ‘extensive woods’ and other 
virgin land watered by two rivers.7 While the transferal of an agricultural property as 
payment in lieu of cash was far from ideal from the bank’s perspective, its managers 
and board were quick to recognise the potential to recoup what Vergueiro owed them 
and more through Angélica’s coffee production. In a shareholder meeting held around 
a year after the transfer, the bank’s chairman declared that in his opinion as ‘an old 
coffee planter’ the estate was ‘a very valuable property.’8 Cater would have been 
aware that in the year before Angélica came into the bank’s hands, it had produced 
5660 cwt, or approximately 290 tonnes, of coffee.9 The transferal occurred at a time 
of elevated global coffee prices and transport costs to the port at Santos would soon 
be reduced with the opening of a railway line to Campinas (some 90km from Rio Claro) 
in 1872.10 The Angélica property clearly had the potential to become a profitable asset 
in the bank’s hands but its future success would ultimately rest on whether its British 
owners could find sufficient labour to work it. 
                                                        
7 Taken from an 1872 description of the plantation in the prospectus for the Brazilian Coffee Estates 
Company, Limited. See The Examiner, 13 April 1872. This company will be discussed in Section II.  
 
8 The Bankers' Magazine, Journal of the Money Market and Commercial Digest, vol. 32 (London: 
Groombridge and Sons, 1872) p. 879. 
 
9 ‘Brazilian Coffee Estates Company, Limited’ The Examiner, 13 April 1872. 
 
10 B.R. de Magalhães, ‘Investimentos ingleses no Brasil’ p. 245.  
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The harvest of 1870 had been collected by 130 or so slaves attached to the property 
and the remnants of the European immigrant colony established by the Vergueiro 
family in the 1850s.11 Though the latter would remain on Angélica, as we observed in 
the previous chapter, Vergueiro’s slaves were excluded from the July 1871 deed.12 It 
is likely that the bank had already committed to free labour, for reasons discussed later, 
but this decision was not immediately so clear cut. During the negotiations with José 
Vergueiro during the final months of 1870, John Beaton had at least contemplated 
using slave labour on the plantation. In a letter to Vergueiro of 13th December 1870, 
Beaton outlined a draft proposal which, in addition to the transferal of Angélica, 
included a clause stipulating the hire of around 45 slaves ‘for not less than two years 
at wages to be agreed upon.’13 Vergueiro’s replies have not survived, so it is not clear 
whether he rejected this particular clause, or if the bank had a change of heart. 
Nevertheless, it shows that the bank was not averse to taking advantage of a loophole 
in the 1843 Act which allowed British subjects to continue to exploit slave labour 
through hiring instead of outright purchase. The bank would return to this strategy in 
the final years of its administration of Angélica.  
 
Even though the bank did not hire any slaves from Vergueiro, it seems that the labour 
force on the plantation was not entirely free during the first year of its administration 
under its new British owners. Following the transfer, the estate was placed under the 
                                                        
11 A European immigrant colony was established on Angélica in 1855. See. W. Dean, Rio Claro p. 94.  
 
12 The European immigrants would remain on Angélica but their debts were still payable to Vergueiro 
& Cia. See LBB vs. Vergueiro, 1875-1877, f. 172.  
 
13 J. Beaton to J. Vergueiro, 13 December 1870, BOLSA G5/1, ff. 62-63.  
 
 266 
management of Carlos Koch, a German who had been a director of immigrant colony 
at Ibicaba and had since acquired his own coffee plantation in the region.14  His 
management and poor record keeping attracted the criticism of the bank’s London 
secretary and by July 1872 Koch had broken his agreement and left the property.15 
The German left without settling the credit account he had with the bank, which 
London requested their Rio manager to follow up, writing ‘The debt of Mr. Coch is 
we observe 2:186$000 which must include the value of the slaves he purchased...’16 
Given the average price of a young male slave in Rio Claro in 1872 was 1:920$000, 
we can surmise that the slaves referred to were no more than two or three individuals 
and were probably purchased by Koch for domestic service rather than to work in the 
field. 17  Irrespective of the duties these slaves performed, their purchase by an 
employee of the a British bank, using its funds was surely sailing close to the wind in 
terms of the 1843 Act.  
 
The bank’s correspondence provides little indication of the labour used on the 
plantation during its first year of operation. A list of instructions sent to Mr. Whitaker, 
Koch’s proposed replacement, in December 1872 does make clear that an undefined 
number of colonists were certainly still tending to the coffee bushes allocated to them 
                                                        
14 See W. Dean, Rio Claro p. 121; Relatório apresentado ao Ministério da Agricultura, Commercio e 
Obras Públicas por João Pedro Carvalho de Moraes em execução das instrucções de 17 de março 
último (Rio de Janeiro: Typographia Nacional, 1870) p. 33. The first reference to Koch in the bank’s 
correspondence is from January 1872, see London HQ to Rio branch, 22 January 1872, BOLSA G1/5. 
Nb. Koch’s name is anglicised to Coch in the bank’s correspondence.  
 
15 London HQ to Rio branch, 29 May 1872, BOLSA G1/5; London HQ to Rio branch, 19 July 1872, 
BOLSA G1/5.  
 
16 London HQ to Rio branch, 20 September 1872, BOLSA G1/5.  
 
17 For the average price of male slaves, aged 15-29 in Rio Claro, 1843-1887, see Table 3.4 in W. 
Dean, Rio Claro p. 55.  
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during Vergueiro’s time.18 John Gordon, the Rio branch’s manager requested that 
Whitaker, the son of the British vice-consul-cum-planter discussed in Chapter 1, check 
the condition of the coffee bushes ‘under charge of the colonists, and also those 
cultivated by the Fazenda.’19 The latter half of this reference suggests the bank’s 
administrator had been paying for other labourers to tend to coffee bushes. A rare 
transcription of the plantation’s accounts by the bank’s London secretary states that a 
monthly average of 2:926$254 had been spent ‘working the Fazenda.’20 There is no 
evidence to suggest that part of this disbursement had been used to hire slaves and it 
could well be true that it was spent on the wages of free Brazilian labourers, 
camaradas, who as we will see in a following section, were present in fairly 
considerable numbers on the plantation.  
 
Section II:  The Brazilian Coffee Estates Company and a public commitment to 
free labour. 
 
Whether or not hired slaves were used on the plantation during the first year of British 
ownership, in April 1872 the bank made a public commitment to free labour. From 
the few references to the plantation in the bank’s correspondence during their first year 
of ownership, it is clear that the estate’s administration had been problematic. London 
headquarters, who by this period had taken over more control of the Rio branch’s 
business, complained frequently about the lack of accounts and other information from 
                                                        
18 The plantation had been under the temporary control of another German, J. Ernst Lorey following 
Koch’s departure. See Mr. Gordon to J. Ernst Lorey, 28 December 1872, BOLSA G5/1. 
 
19 Mr. Gordon to Mr. Whitaker, 28 December 1872, BOLSA G5/1. 
 
20 London HQ to Rio branch, 8 May 1872, BOLSA G1/5. 
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the estate.21 Given the practical difficulties of running an estate in the interior of São 
Paulo from not just the Rio branch but the far more distant London office, the bank 
decided to attempt to sell the property. However, instead of placing the property back 
on the open market the Bank’s management opted to establish a third-party company 
to purchase and administer the estate. On 12th April 1872 the Brazilian Coffee Estates 
Company was incorporated in London with the aim of raising £250,000 in initial 
capital in 25,000 shares at £10 each.22 As well as retaining a 20% stake in the new 
company, the New London and Brazilian Bank was also represented on two of the six 
seats at the board; John Beaton, the bank’s manager in London and William Freer 
Schönfeld, a board member of the bank. The remaining four seats were occupied by 
John James Aubertin, the former superintendent of the San Paulo Railway, the most 
successful British railway in Latin America;23 Lt. Gen. Sir G. St. Patrick, a veteran of 
the East India Company; Henry Roman Uhthoff of Messrs. Fesser, Uhthoff & Co. of 
London and Henry Drenkhahn, a merchant formerly based in Rio and now in 
Hamburg.24  
 
The stated purpose of the company was the ‘purchase and working of coffee and cotton 
estates in Brazil’ and it had ambitious plans for Angélica, which it had arranged to 
                                                        
21 On London’s increased vigilance over the bank’s business in Brazil after the mismanagement of the 
1860s at Rio, see D. Joslin, A Century of Banking in Latin America, p. 76. For London’s complaints 
about the lack on information from the estate see, London HQ to Rio branch, 22 January 1872, 
BOLSA G1/5; London HQ to Rio branch, 8 May 1872, BOLSA G1/5. 
 
22 Brazilian Coffee Estates Company: Memorandum of Association and Articles of Association 
(London: 1872) in TNA, BT 31/1709/6186. See also ‘Brazilian Coffee Estates Company, Limited’ 
The Examiner, 13 April 1872.  
 
23 R. Graham, Britain and the Modernisation of Brazil p. 60 
 
24 ‘Brazilian Coffee Estates Company, Limited’ The Examiner, 13 April 1872. 
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purchase for £126,000.25 Under the company’s management, land planted with coffee 
bushes would be expanded tenfold, from around 3km2 to just over 30km2. The 
company projected that once these bushes had reached maturity, the coffee crop from 
Angélica would reach over 4,500 tonnes, more than fifteen-times the size of the 
harvest from 1870. This incredible expansion would be made possible by the equally 
ambitious plans the company had for the estate’s labour force. In addition to 
purchasing the property, the Brazilian Coffee Estates Company would also acquire the 
privileges of a contract recently agreed between the bank’s John Beaton and the 
Brazilian government for ‘for the purpose of encouraging European Emigration to 
Brazil, in view of the abolition of slave labour throughout the Empire.’26 Under the 
terms of the contract of 6th September 1871, the company committed to import 10,000 
immigrants from Northern Europe over a period of five years.  
 
Table 5.1: Immigration Schedule stipulated in John Beaton’s Immigration 
Contract27 
 
End of Year Number of Immigrants 
1872 750 
1873 1250 
1874 2000 
1875 3000 
1876 3000 
  
Total: 10000 
 
                                                        
25 Ibid. 
 
26 Ibid 
 
27Brazilian Coffee Estates Company: Memorandum of Association p. 45.  
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These plans represented the new company’s, and indeed the bank’s, commitment to 
the exclusive use of free labour on the plantation. Though the plans were also guided 
by Brazilian immigration policy and free labour experiments that had taken place 
previously on Angélica, as well as neighbouring Paulista plantations, there is no doubt 
that anti-slavery considerations were crucial in the formation of the company’s plans 
for Angélica’s labour force. As British mining companies in Brazil had shown, the 
1843 Act did not prohibit British subjects from hiring slaves from other owners. 
Indeed, companies such as the St. John Del Rey Gold Mining Co. had exploited this 
loophole to employ slaves on contracts longer than the average life expectancy of an 
enslaved miner.28 Legally speaking, the Brazilian Coffee Estates Company could have 
followed the same path. The real issue was the impossibility of raising large amounts 
of capital for the formation of a new slaveholding company in anti-slavery Britain. As 
Kelly has observed, mining companies formed in the 1860s had realised this. The 
Montes Aureos Company, incorporated in 1862 for the purposes of gold mining in the 
north-eastern province of Maranhão, explicitly declared in its prospectus that ‘no 
slaves will be held by the Company or its servants.’29 In a sector as equally dominated 
by slavery, the Brazilian Coffee Estates Company had to publicly declare its allegiance 
to free labour in order to have any chance at attracting the investment it needed to 
begin operations. Investor opinion, rather than anti-slavery legislation, had a greater 
bearing on the company’s labour policy. 
 
                                                        
28 C. Evans, ‘Brazilian Gold’ p. 127.  
 
29 Daily News, 19 Dec 1861, cited in J. Kelly, ‘The Problem of Anti-slavery’ p. 202. Though as we 
observed in Chapter II, this short-lived enterprise did attempt to circumvent the 1843 Act and 
purchased slaves to be employed its operations. 
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Questions concerning the future of slavery and Brazil’s transition towards free labour 
also encouraged the company’s commitment to the use of free labour on Angélica. 
Though slavery continued to predominate in the coffee sector of Brazil’s south-eastern 
provinces, the national crisis of the institution had already begun around 1865. The 
loss of a political and ideological pro-slavery ally after the end of the U.S. Civil War, 
the increasing regional concentration of slave labour and ensuing episodes of slave 
resistance, as well as the end of the Paraguayan War in 1870 created a shift in national 
attitudes which would lead to the passing of the Law of the Free Womb (Lei de Ventre 
Livre) of September 1871. 30  This legislation signalled the eventual extinction of 
Brazilian slavery by declaring that no more slaves would be born in Brazil; the 
structural limit of the institution was now set at the lifespan of the remaining 1.5 
million or so enslaved people registered in the 1872 census. 31  It was these 
circumstances that the Brazilian Coffee Estates Company’s prospectus referred to 
when it talked of the ‘abolition of slavery throughout the Empire.’32 
 
In reality, the abolition of slavery would take another seventeen years and in the 
decade following the Law of the Free Womb it would be the coffee planters of São 
Paulo who would most take advantage of slavery’s last gasp. High coffee prices 
                                                        
30 R. Marquese, ‘Capitalismo, Escravidão e a Economia Cafeeira do Brasil no Longo Século XIX’ p. 
306. See also R. Salles, E O Vale Era O Escravo (Rio de Janeiro: Ed. Civilização Brasileira, 2008) 
pp. 68-69.  
 
31 The freedom of the children born to enslaved mothers was not immediate. The law obligated 
masters to care of these minors until the age of eight at which point they were given the choice of 
receiving compensation from the state or the labour of these ingênuos until the age of 21. Conrad has 
shown that the vast majority of slaveholders opted for the second option and ‘the great majority of 
surviving children undoubtedly remained, in conformity with the law, in a state of de facto slavery 
until they were freed along with the slaves on May 13, 1888.’ See R. Conrad, The Destruction of 
Brazilian Slavery p. 116.  
 
32 ‘Brazilian Coffee Estates Company, Limited’ The Examiner, 13 April 1872. 
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throughout the 1870s allowed these planters to purchase labourers in the inter- and 
intraprovincial slave trade. 33  In Rio Claro, the enslaved population continued to 
increase in this way almost until abolition.34 Nevertheless, in the same year of the 
transferal of Angélica to the bank, a small number of planters in the region turned once 
again to immigration schemes. In March 1871, after a period of slave unrest in the 
Paulista West, the provincial government authorised a fund of 600 contos for loans to 
assist planters interested in importing labourers from Europe. This modest initiative 
aimed to revive the experiments with European immigrant colonies which had been 
pioneered most famously by Vergueiro & Cia on Ibicaba and Angélica during the 
1840s and 1850s.35 Though these earlier schemes had ultimately failed, the organisers 
of the Brazilian Coffee Estates Company may well have been encouraged that 
important planters in Rio Claro such as the Baron of Porto Feliz and the Baron of 
Araraquara had moved to establish European immigrant colonies.36  
 
In specifying the origin of potential immigrants as ‘agriculturalists and farm labourers 
from the North of Europe’, the Brazilian Coffee Estates Company, as with previous 
schemes, was responding to the Brazilian government’s immigration policy.37 Since 
                                                        
33 Slenes estimates that between 1872 and 1881, between 94,900 and 99,900 slaves entered coffee-
growing regions of the centre-south. For these estimates and a discussion of the internal slave trade, 
see R.W.Slenes, ’The Brazilian Internal Slave Trade, 1850-1888: Regional Economies, Slave 
Experience and the Politics of a Peculiar Market’, in W. Johnson  (ed.), The Chattel Principle: 
Internal Slave Trades in the Americas (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004) pp. 325-353.  
 
34 W. Dean, Rio Claro p. 51.  
 
35 For a discussion of these schemes see Ibid pp. 88-123; E.V. da Costa, The Brazilian Empire pp. 
100-124.  
 
36 W. Dean, Rio Claro p. 117.  The important distinction being, however, that these neighbouring 
plantations would continue to exploit slave alongside free labour.    
 
37 See Article 2 of Beaton’s contract, in Brazilian Coffee Estates Company: Memorandum of 
Association and Articles of Association p. 45. 
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the country’s independence, Brazilian policymakers had shown a preference for 
immigration from northern and central Europe. This inclination was strongly 
conditioned by pseudoscience which placed white Europeans at the pinnacle of a racial 
hierarchy and black Africans at the bottom.38 Brazil’s white elite, imbued with this 
ideology, viewed European immigration as a means to dilute the pronounced African 
heritage that centuries of the slave trade had bequeathed on their new nation. For much 
of the nineteenth-century Germans in particular were idealised as the perfect 
immigrant by this elite. As Jeffrey Lesser notes, Germans ‘seemed indisputably white. 
They were farmers. They had a reputation for working hard.’39 Immigration schemes 
from government-sponsored small-holder colonies to the private and subsidised 
sharecropping experiments pioneered by the Vergueiros had all targeted German-
speaking immigrants.40 In the years preceding John Beaton’s contract, a small number 
of schemes had also begun to target British and Irish agricultural labourers. Though 
always few in number, immigrants from the British Isles were the third-largest 
nationality group entering Rio de Janeiro between 1864-1873.41 By committing to 
establish emigrant recruitment agencies in ‘England and Germany (particularly 
Alsace)’ the Brazilian Coffee Estates Company was replicating the efforts of both the 
state and private enterprise to promote northern European immigration to Brazil.42 As 
                                                        
38 J. Lesser, Immigration, Ethnicity, and National Identity in Brazil pp. 11-13.  
 
39 Ibid p. 52.  
 
40 Immigration schemes involving German-speakers from 1822-1870 are summarised in Ibid pp. 24-
44.  
 
41 Behind Italians and Portuguese. See O. Marshall, English, Irish and Irish-American Pioneer 
Settlers in Nineteenth-Century Brazil (Oxford: Centre for Brazilian Studies, University of Oxford, 
2005) p. 21.  
 
42 See Article 3 of Beaton’s contract, in Brazilian Coffee Estates Company: Memorandum of 
Association and Articles of Association p. 46.  
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we shall observe, like many of schemes that proceeded theirs, this British-led attempt 
to attract European immigrants to Brazil would end in failure.  
 
Section III: Free-labour experiments under the bank’s direction 
 
The first major hurdle the bank faced in supplying the Angélica estate with European 
labour was the failure of the Brazilian Coffee Estates Company to raise sufficient 
capital. In late May 1872 the bank’s London secretary informed Rio of the 
disappointing news. Nevertheless, he stated that he was still sanguine about raising 
enough investment to import a reduced number of immigrants on a modified 
contract.43  Despite remaining hopeful of resurrecting the company, at the bank’s 
annual meeting in October 1873 the chairman informed shareholders that the scheme 
had collapsed.44 Though the bank cited delays in the modification of their contract 
with the Brazilian government, the initial failure of the company to raise sufficient 
capital was at least in part related to the far from favourable image that emigration 
schemes to Brazil had amongst Europeans, and Germans in particular, in the early 
1870s. In deciding to keep hold of the estate and procure German labour at its own 
expense, the bank would soon encounter the problematic practical realties of 
promoting emigration to Brazil.  
 
                                                        
43 London HQ to Rio branch, 29 May 1872, BOLSA G1/5. For the company’s proposal to reduce the 
number of immigrants by half to 5000, see ‘Special Resolution’, 28 June 1872, in TNA, BT 
31/1709/6186.  
  
44 The Bankers' Magazine, Journal of the Money Market and Commercial Digest, vol. 33 (London: 
Waterlow and Sons, 1873) p. 1023.  
 
 275 
Though published in the month following the initial failure of the Brazilian Coffee 
Estates Company to attract sufficient capital, Constantine Phipps’s report Emigration 
to Brazil of June 1872 reflected many of the concerns held about Brazil as a suitable 
host for European labourers.45 Phipps, second secretary at the British legation in Rio 
de Janeiro, wrote the report in response to the increased attention emigration schemes 
to Brazil had garnered in Britain since the late 1860s.46 The author was very critical 
of the opportunities and protection available to European immigrants in Brazil and he 
concluded his report by discouraging prospective British emigrants from considering 
it as an option.47  
 
As the most recent agreement between a British agent and the Brazilian government, 
Phipps devoted special attention to John Beaton’s contract. His major criticisms were 
two-fold. Firstly, he argued that it would be difficult for an immigrant family to pay 
off their debt to the company in the stipulated period of four years.48 The capacity of 
indentured labourers to pay off their debts has been a point of contention in the 
literature. While Viotti da Costa’s analysis of the sharecropping contracts paints a 
pessimistic picture, Dean’s study of the same schemes suggests that a typical 
immigrant family was able to free itself of debt within a reasonable period.49 Beaton’s 
contract differed from these previous experiments in that instead of sharing the net 
                                                        
45 C. Phipps, Report by Mr. Phipps on Emigration to Brazil. Presented to Both Houses of Parliament 
by Command of Her Majesty, June 1872 (London: Harrison and Sons, 1872). 
 
46 On the activity of Brazilian agents in England and Ireland during this period see O. Marshall, 
English, Irish and Irish-American Pioneer Settlers  
 
47 C. Phipps, Report by Mr. Phipps on Emigration to Brazil pp. 26-27.  
 
48 Ibid p. 24.  
 
49 E. Viotti da Costa, The Brazilian Empire pp. 118-121; W. Dean, Rio Claro pp. 104-109.  
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profit with the planter, immigrants were to be paid a fixed rate ($600 per alquiere) for 
the coffee they produced. Indeed, other planters in the region had moved to these ‘por 
ajuste’ or piecemeal contracts after abandoning sharecropping.50 Phipps conceded that 
there were some advantages to this fixed rate payment system. Rather than the 
colonists having to wait to see what their share of the profits would be following the 
transport and sale of the crop, under Beaton’s contract the colonists’ accounts would 
be credited immediately following the harvest. This would remove the lack of 
transparency and the allegations of deceit on the part of planters which had plagued 
older sharecropping contracts.51 Nevertheless, basing his calculations on those of the 
experienced German consul, Phipps concluded that annual earnings of 1:290$000 per 
family would not be sufficient to cover yearly expenses of 1:010$000 plus their debt 
upon arrival of 750$000 over the four-year period. Immigrants would then be 
burdened with the purchase their house, land and trees at prices up to 800$000 (if 
purchased within four years) or 1:000$000 (if purchased afterwards). In the likely 
event they had been unable to save the amount required to purchase their land, they 
could also rent it from the company for 100$00 per year.52 Unfortunately, owning to 
a lack of data about the immigrants contracted by the bank and their debts, this chapter 
is unable to posit whether indebtedness was a factor in the failure of this particular 
experiment in European indentured labour.  
 
                                                        
50 W. Dean, Rio Claro pp. 115-116.  
 
51 C. Phipps, Report by Mr. Phipps on Emigration to Brazil p. 15. Disputes arising from the 
calculation of earnings are discussed in W. Dean, Rio Claro pp. 95-97.  
 
52 C. Phipps, Report by Mr. Phipps on Emigration to Brazil p. 24. For the terms of the contract see 
Brazilian Coffee Estates Company: Memorandum of Association and Articles of Association pp. 47-
48.   
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Phipps’ second major objection to Beaton’s agreement with the government also 
applied to what he saw as a deficiency in all immigrant labour contracts in Brazil. All 
contracts entered into by foreign workers were governed by the Locação de Serviços 
law of 1837 which in Phipps’ view afforded the immigrant little protection, placing 
them ‘utterly at the mercy of their employers and of the local authorities.’53 Under this 
law, a worker fired for just cause - including illness, drunkenness or ‘any injury done 
to the safety or honour of his employer of his family’ – was obliged to immediately 
pay what he owed to the contractor. If unable, he could be sent to labour on public 
works or to jail for up to two years. Any worker who absconded could be seized and 
forced to labour on public works until he had earned twice what he owed his 
employer.54 As Dean points out, this might mean the equivalent of a life sentence for 
the condemned and destitution for his family.55 Phipps was scathing of such ‘cruel 
provisions’ and invoked anti-slavery language in his critique, claiming immigrants 
could easily ‘find [themselves] in the position of a slave’ in the hands of an unjust 
contractor.56 For the author, while it remained unrepealed, this law would ‘act as an 
insuperable bar to any Brazilian immigration schemes succeeding in England of 
receiving the sanction of Her Majesty’s Emigration Commissioners.’57 
 
                                                        
53 C. Phipps, Report by Mr. Phipps on Emigration to Brazil p. 10. As Dean points out, their employers 
and the local authorities were often one and the same. For a short discussion of this law, see W. Dean, 
Rio Claro pp. 96-97.  
 
54 C. Phipps, Report by Mr. Phipps on Emigration to Brazil p. 9. 
 
55 W. Dean, Rio Claro p. 96.  
 
56 C. Phipps, Report by Mr. Phipps on Emigration to Brazil p. 10.  
 
57 Ibid p. 22.  
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While it would take another three years and the abject failure of the British colonies 
in Paraná for the Commissioners to formally advise against emigration to Brazil, 
authorities in many German states had acted sooner. 58  Phipps noted that his 
collaborator, Mr. Haupt, the German consul in Brazil, had reacted with surprise when 
learning that Beaton was hoping to recruit labour in Germany.59 Due to the treatment 
of immigrants on Paulista plantations, Prussia had severely restricted emigration to 
Brazil as early as 1859 and by 1871 recruitment activities in the whole of Germany 
were limited to the cities of Hamburg and Bremen.60 Moreover, the consul added that 
economic conditions in Germany were such that he expected emigration even to the 
United States to decrease, rendering it ‘highly improbable that any number of Germans 
will emigrate to Brazil.’61 
 
Though Beaton’s contract was no longer valid following the collapse of the Brazilian 
Coffee Estates Company, the bank nevertheless attempted to recruit emigrants in 
Germany at their own expense. They soon realised that the German consul’s 
pessimistic forecast would prove correct. After despatching their first consignment of 
some 30 immigrants from Hamburg in the autumn of 1873, the bank’s chairman 
admitted to shareholders that ‘owing, unfortunately, to what had recently been said 
                                                        
58 J. Lesser, Immigration, Ethnicity, and National Identity in Brazil p. 44. See also, ‘Caution to 
Emigrants: Government Emigration Board, United Kingdom, 1876’, in Ibid pp. 56-57. On the failure 
of British immigration to Brazil, see O. Marshall, English, Irish and Irish-American Pioneer Settlers, 
especially Ch. 8.  
 
59 C. Phipps, Report by Mr. Phipps on Emigration to Brazil p. 22.   
 
60 Lesser notes all German states applied a ban on emigration to Brazil following unification in 1871. 
However, Haupt’s comments and the bank’s future recruitment show that this ban did not apply to 
Hamburg and Bremen. See J. Lesser, Immigration, Ethnicity, and National Identity in Brazil p. 44; C. 
Phipps, Report by Mr. Phipps on Emigration to Brazil p. 23.   
 
61 C. Phipps, Report by Mr. Phipps on Emigration to Brazil p. 22.   
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about emigration to the Brazils, great difficulty was experienced in getting 
emigrants.’62 Privately the bank’s officials had been aware of this problem since as 
early as August 1872 when they lamented over the role that Phipps’ report had played 
in increasing prejudice against emigration to Brazil.63 In spite of these difficulties the 
bank managed to recruit another 172 Germans who arrived in Brazil in late December 
1873.64 In the following year the bank attempted to despatch more emigrants from 
Germany but, as the chairman told the shareholders, their plans were thwarted when 
the Prussian authorities prevented their departure.65 Aside from two families sent from 
Bremen via London in June 1874, it appears the bank were unable to supply the 
plantation with any more European labour after this decision. 66  A total of 214 
European immigrants sent by the bank between 1873-1874 fell well short of the 1200 
families which the Brazilian Coffee Estates Company had envisaged eventually 
working Angélica and was still a distance from Beaton’s projections for 750 
individuals by the end of 1872.67 As we shall see, the bank’s attempts to make do with 
                                                        
62 The Bankers' Magazine, Journal of the Money Market and Commercial Digest, vol. 33 p. 1023. 
 
63 London HQ to Rio branch, 2 August 1872, BOLSA G1/5.  
 
64 This figure is taken from the report of the President of the Province of São Paulo, see Relatório 
apresentado á Assembléa Legislativa Provincial de S. Paulo pelo presidente da provincia, o exm. sr. 
dr. João Theodoro Xavier em 5 de fevereiro de 1874. (S. Paulo: Typ. Americana, 1874) p. 15. 
Correspondence in the bank’s own archive, written shortly before the departure of this group, makes 
reference to only 151 emigrants, composed of ‘86 adults, 50 children and 15 infants.’ See London HQ 
to Rio branch, 19 November 1873, BOLSA G2/1.  
 
65 The Bankers' Magazine, Journal of the Money Market and Commercial Digest, vol. 34 (London: 
Waterlow and Sons, 1874) p. 921.  
 
66 These two families were composed of 11 individuals. See London HQ to Rio branch, 23 June 1874, 
BOLSA G2/2.  
 
67 Figures taken from statistics published in reports by the President of São Paulo. See Relatório 
apresentado á Assembléa Legislativa Provincial de S. Paulo (1874) p. 15; Relatório apresentado á 
Assembléa Legislativa Provincial de S. Paulo pelo exm. sr. dr. João Theodoro Xavier, presidente da 
província, no dia 14 de fevereiro de 1875. (S. Paulo: 1875) p. 87. A contemporary English-language 
guidebook on Brazil puts the number of German’s imported by the bank at 500, but the bank’s 
correspondence nor published shareholder meetings corroborate a number this high. See M.G. 
Mulhall and E.T. Mulhall, Handbook of Brazil (Buenos Aires, 1877) p. 228. On the company’s 
projections for the size of their labour force, see The Examiner, 13 April 1872.  
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this labour force would be significantly disrupted by unrest amongst the colonists and 
the competing interests of neighbouring plantation owners.  
 
The deterioration of relations with the plantation’s labourers and the local planter elite 
appears to have begun in earnest under the management of Alexander Scott Blacklaw, 
who arrived on Angélica around the same time as the first group of German 
immigrants in late 1873. After an initial two years beset with problems, the bank hoped 
that this Scotsman, ‘a first-class coffee-planter, a man of considerable experience’, 
would be able to turn around the fortunes of the Angélica estate. 68  Blacklaw’s 
experience was not in Brazil, but on plantations in the British colony of Ceylon, where 
coffee production, based primarily on indentured Indian labour, had undergone 
significant expansion since the 1850s.69 In appointing this outsider, the bank clearly 
hoped that Blacklaw would be able to reproduce the successes of Ceylon with 
indentured European labour in São Paulo.  
 
In spite of the faith shown by the bank’s management in Blacklaw, his administration 
of the plantation was not a successful one. G.A Crüwell, a friend of Blacklaw’s from 
Ceylon who visited the estate in early 1876, candidly declared that the colonist system 
on Angélica as a failure. 70  Echoing the complaints of other planters who had 
                                                        
 
68 The Bankers' Magazine, Journal of the Money Market and Commercial Digest, vol. 33 p. 1023. 
 
69 R. Wenzlhuemer, From Coffee to Tea Cultivation in Ceylon, 1880-1900: An Economic and Social 
History (Leiden: Brill, 2008) pp. 60-61.  
 
70 G.A. Cruwell and A.S. Blacklaw, Brazil as a Coffee-growing Country: its Capabilities, the Mode of 
Cultivation and Prospects for Extension (Colombo: AMJ Ferguson, 1878) p. 60.  
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experimented with European labour, Crüwell was quick to blame the unsuitability and 
dishonesty of these immigrants.71 Blacklaw toed a similar line: 
 
Mr Blacklaw was at first inclined to believe, after three years of 
experience, in the possibility of their labour being a succedaneum of slave 
labour for coffee estates in Brazil. Later experience, however, has changed 
his opinion owning to the general prevalence of coffee stealing among 
them and their general disinclination to repay advances, and he says that 
as regards coffee cultivation they have been proved no use, and that 
everyone who has tried them has lost money by them.72 
 
However, heeding Dean’s word of caution in giving these claims undue credit, it 
appears more likely that the failure the German colony lay, at least in part, with the 
inability of the British managers to deal with the immigrants and other workers on a 
contractual basis without resorting to violence and intimidation.73  While corporal 
punishment had been a complaint of European labourers on other Paulista plantations, 
it is perhaps more plausible that violence and intimidation under Blacklaw’s 
administration reflected the labour regimes which he had overseen in Ceylon.74  
 
The bank’s own correspondence, newspaper reports and local judicial records give an 
insight into a tumultuous and dangerous environment on the plantation during this 
period. Even before Blacklaw’s arrival, all was not well on Angélica. According to a 
                                                        
71 Ibid pp. 63-64.  
 
72 Anglo-Brazilian Times, 7 September 1878 
 
73 W. Dean, Rio Claro p. 110. 
 
74 A Swiss consular agent complained of immigrants suffering corporal punishment at the hands of 
overseers on a visit to Ibicaba in 1865. See E. Viotti da Costa, The Brazilian Empire pp. 120-121. 
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W.G. Clarence-Smith and S.Topik (eds), The Global Coffee Economy in Africa, Asia and Latin 
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local newspaper, his predecessor, Adolph Philipson, had enraged 300-400 local 
tradesmen in August 1873. After engaging their services for the construction of 
various building – likely houses for the arriving colonists, Philipson left the estate 
without paying the workers, who then threatened to destroy the fruits of their 
considerable labour.75 ‘This fact would have caused many deaths’, reported the same 
newspaper some time later, if it had not been for the intervention of two local 
gentleman, Joaquim Teixeira das Neves and Dr. Fonseca.76 One scandal then followed 
another as the following month a Prussian immigrant, Otto Scheer, was found 
murdered on the grounds of the estate.77 Although it is unclear whether Blacklaw had 
arrived by then, it is clear that the business of the plantation was in some state of 
disorder just two years into the Bank’s tenure.  
 
The woes of the plantation continued in 1874 with Blacklaw’s arrival seeming to 
coincide with a period of serious unrest. In March 1874, a local newspaper published 
an extraordinary series of allegations against the British managers of the plantation, 
starting: 
 
Fazenda Angelica: A sorry tale follows. From that we know, either the London 
and Brazilian Bank takes serious measures relative to the administration of this 
very important plantation, or all of it will go awry.78 
 
                                                        
75 Correio Paulistano, 13 August 1873.  
 
76 Correio Paulistano, 8 March 1874. 
 
77 Diário de São Paulo, 23 September 1873. 
 
78 Correio Paulistano, 8 March 1874. 
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The article then describes how the unrest and murder of the previous year were 
followed by a mass expulsion of 110 people from the estate who had been brought to 
the plantation by its previous owner. According to the author 54 of these people were 
fit for labour on the coffee plantation and that there now remained no-one to do nor 
direct the important work of coffee labour. Although it says no more about these 
people, the wider context provides a possible reason why such an expulsion would 
take place. The dates roughly coincide with the arrival of just over 200 German 
immigrants who would require accommodation. It is perhaps the case that the 110 
people expelled to make room for the immigrants were agregados or moradores - free, 
poor Brazilians who entered into sharecropping agreements in lieu of rent and who 
were often tolerated by landowners for political reasons.79 Given the Bank was not 
involved in politics in the same way as local elites, it is plausible that they were 
expelled as the administrator could see no reason to continue supporting them.  
 
The mass expulsion of these agregados was followed by allegations of mistreatment 
on the part of the British administrators towards the German immigrants. In July 1874 
the President of the province called for an investigation into the treatment of the 
colonists after having been informed of the use of ‘physical punishments condemned 
by [Brazilian] law, and even threatening the safety of said colonists’ by their British 
managers. 80  The German consular representative in Campinas also demanded 
information about the affairs of his countrymen on Angélica. 81  The President’s 
                                                        
79 See P. Eisenberg, ‘O homem esquecido: o trabalhador livre nacional no século XIX: sugestões para 
uma pesquisa’ in P. Eisenberg (ed) Homens esquecidos: escravos e trabalhadores livres no Brasil - 
séculos XVIII e XIX (Campinas, Unicamp, 1989) pp. 225-227. 
 
80 Letter by João Theodoro Xavier, 8 July 1874, transcribed in Arquivo Público e Histórico de Rio 
Claro (hereafter APHRC), Livro de Atas da Câmara Municipal de Rio Claro, Vol. 8, Book 9, Session 
16 July 1874.  
 
81 Correio Paulistano 11 July 1874. 
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allegations were likely based on information from the town’s chief of police who had 
been obliged to visit Angélica two months previously: 
Chief of Police - his excellency is seriously preoccupied with the affair at 
the Angélica plantation and it is good that it is thus so as to avoid 
lamenting great woe and losses. Just today the police of [Rio Claro] 
prevented a formidable act of disorder which had been planned; from what 
we have been informed, sooner or later there will be unrest which could 
be avoided by the dismissal of the two employees who take great pride in 
treating the colonists in a barbarous and improper manner.82 
 
Given the strength of José Vergueiro’s influence in the province, there is the potential 
that allegations against the bank were exaggerated by his political allies in order to 
tarnish the bank’s image during the on-going embittered legal battle between both 
parties. Nevertheless, in this case the bank’s correspondence and Crüwell’s 
sympathetic account suggest that Blacklaw and his subordinates regarded physical 
violence and intimidation as part and parcel of labour relations on the plantation. In 
the words of his friend, Blacklaw was ‘in the proud position of being the terror of the 
province’ having ‘defeated over and over again the crimp as well as the dishonest 
colonist.’ For Crüwell ‘there [was] nothing too black in the world that is not found in 
our Ceylon friend.’83 The bank’s London secretary showed himself to support an 
intimidating, if not violent, relationship between managers and these ‘dishonest 
colonists.’ On hearing that one of the first arrivals to the estate had absconded, he 
wrote: 
We trust the deserter was made an example of in order to deter others from 
following his lead, for it will not be at all reassuring to know that the people have 
it in their power to decline their engagements after our expense in shipping 
them.84 
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84 London HQ to Rio branch, 8 December 1873, BOLSA G2/1.  
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Moreover, Dean’s characterisation of the ‘English managers’ as ‘drunken 
incompetents who brutalised the workers’ appears to hold at least some truth in that 
the bank ended up dismissing a superintendent called Stewart for drunkenness.85 
There is no evidence to suggest that Stewart had been violent towards any of the 
estate’s labourers, but another manager, James Duirs died after a violent altercation 
with a Brazilian labourer in late 1875.86  
 
Violence was also one of the responses adopted by Blacklaw and his subordinates 
against neighbouring planters who the bank accused of fomenting unrest amongst the 
recently arrived colonists. In an environment in which labour was scarce and 
expensive, the purpose of these neighbours was to ‘crimp’ colonists or convince them 
to leave Angélica with the promise of better opportunities elsewhere. This was a major 
problem for the bank, with the chairman admitting in the annual general meeting of 
1874 that twelve families of the recently arrived cohort had been ‘inveigled away.’87 
Though shareholders were told that due to their conduct these families were ‘no loss’, 
based on a four-person family, this group represented nearly a quarter of all the 
European immigrants the bank had managed to recruit. Local court records indicate 
that Blacklaw brought a criminal case against two former employees, Carlos Koch and 
a Belgian called Carlos Held, who he accused of forcefully entering Angélica armed 
with guns and forcing fifteen colonists and their families to leave with them to the 
                                                        
85 W. Dean, Rio Claro p. 118; London HQ to Rio branch, 23 April 1875, BOLSA G2/3.  
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plantation owned by Silvério Rodrigues Jordão in Limeira.88  On another occasion, 
the estate’s managers took justice into their own hands. In February 1874, João 
Hilsdorf, another planter in the region, was caught allegedly inducing Germans to 
leave the plantation.89 Upon finding him, two British managers, ‘induced him to go 
into the house and there thrashed him.’90 For their part in the crime, James Duirs and 
Mr. Merriweather were eventually sentenced to twelve-months imprisonment in 
August 1875.91 While the bank’s London secretary was not pleased with the notoriety 
the case brought, nor the ‘enticing’ of Hilsdorf into the house, he agreed that if 
Hilsdorf was crimping ‘he ought to have been sent out of the colony and if abusive, 
corrected (!)’92 As with the labour force, violence was viewed as an acceptable form 
social relations on this British-owned plantation.  
 
Rather than simply a desire to procure much needed labour, the bank blamed the 
incursions of Hilsdorf and Koch, as well as other episodes of instability, on the 
powerful regional influence of José Vergueiro. The bank’s London secretary viewed 
their debtor ‘as the real actor, the others being mere puppets in his hands.’93 It was not 
just Vergueiro, he believed that the estate had been subject to ‘annoyances and 
outrages of all kinds’ because ‘the Fazenda [was] in the hands of foreigners.’94 Rather 
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than its foreign ownership per se, it was the bank’s experiment with an exclusively 
free labour force on one of the region’s most important plantations which may have 
caused anxiety amongst its neighbours. In the 1870s, wealth in the region was still 
predominately linked to the exploitation of slave labour. The potential of a successful 
free labour experiment, especially in the hands of the British, was a threat to the basis 
and expansion of this wealth. Irrespective of the extent to which the bank’s claims 
held true, the fact remains that their administration of the plantation until Crüwell 
declared the colony a failure in early 1876 was a volatile, and at times, violent 
environment. Whether this was the major contributing factor behind the experiment’s 
failure cannot be proven. Nevertheless, these conditions were surely not conducive to 
the flourishing of a successful labour regime which had already been strained by 
immigration restrictions and desertion.  
 
Section IV: Other Free Labour Solutions 
 
At the earliest signs that the bank’s plans for a European colony would be thwarted by 
German immigration restrictions in mid-1874, its London secretary sent instructions 
to Rio to sell the estate piecemeal in order to ‘relieve the bank of this great 
responsibility and liability.’95 Ironically one of the reasons it was unable to realise a 
sale was because potential buyers were put off by the presence of the colonists and 
their debts. Indeed, one interested purchaser, ‘a fazendeiro with 300-400 
slaves…expressed his determination not to have anything to do with colonists.’96 
While the bank quietly attempted to sell the Angélica through intermediaries such as 
                                                        
95 London HQ to Rio branch, 8 July 1874, BOLSA G2/2. 
 
96 Rio branch to London HQ, 23 August 1875, BOLSA G18/2.  
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the Banco do Brasil, Blacklaw continued to manage coffee production on the estate, 
which by June 1875 was operating with a debt of around 400 contos.97  
 
An undefined number of colonists continued to provide part of the labour but the 
manager had already began to look for other solutions. As mentioned previously, large 
numbers of free Brazilians lived on the estate’s grounds and in the surrounding area. 
Though these transient workers remain far less visible in the historical record than 
their immigrant counterparts, their presence on Angélica during the bank’s tenure can 
be glimpsed in local court records. For example, Salvador José de Freitas and 
Francisco Justinano Barboza, labourers on the estate and originating from Ouro Fino 
in Minas were witnesses at the trial of Carlos Koch and Carlos Held.98 Despite their 
numerical presence, Blacklaw was quick to dismiss these camaradas as a viable 
solution for plantation labour: 
 
[The Camarada] will submit to no regular discipline, only works when 
he likes, however much his absence may inconvenience his employer, 
is very difficult to obtain, and seldom can be got unless under heavy 
advance.99 
 
Blacklaw’s friend G.A. Crüwell was equally dismissive of these labourers, likening 
the camaradas to the Sinhalese population in Ceylon. Both groups ‘come to work 
when it pleases them and do away when to them it seemeth advisable to do so.’100 
                                                        
97 London HQ to Rio branch, 19 August 1875, BOLSA G2/3; London HQ to Rio branch, 9 September 
1875, BOLSA G2/3.  
 
98 Alexander Scott Blacklaw x Carlos Cach, Carlos Held, 1874, APHRC, Cartório Criminal, Processo 
nº 001/1874 ff. 23-26.  
 
99 Anglo-Brazilian Times, 7 September 1878. 
 
100 Crüwell does concede that this ‘independent, proud and vindictive’ class of labour are ‘very useful, 
chiefly in the management of cattle, horses and mules, as cart drivers, and so on.’ G.A. Cruwell and 
A.S. Blacklaw, Brazil as a Coffee-growing Country p. 64. On the roles played by the Sinhalese on 
 289 
Camaradas were itinerant labourers who were most typically employed on plantations 
in dangerous work such as the clearing of land where the planter did not want to risk 
his investment in a slave or indentured immigrant.101 Some also worked on plantations 
on longer term contracts but due to the harsh labour conditions degraded by slavery 
and the availability of alternative survival strategies many others were reluctant to 
submit to the type of labour regimes demanded by plantation owners.  
 
Following the collapse of the European colony scheme and his inability to attract 
sufficient numbers of free local workers for the length of contract required, Blacklaw 
began to look further afield for a solution to the labour shortage. Like his friend 
Crüwell, Blacklaw was convinced that Brazil had much to gain in following Ceylon’s 
example to import Indian indentured immigrants, known as ‘coolies,’ as a transitory 
solution to the perceived labour shortage on Brazil’s plantations.102 In fact, Blacklaw 
made a high-profile case for this type of temporary labour migration at the Agricultural 
Congress of 1878 in Rio de Janeiro, a five-day conference which convened the south-
east’s landed elite to discuss the future of Brazil’s most important economic sector. 
Invited as a special guest by the Minister of Agriculture, Blacklaw opened the final 
day’s proceedings with a detailed and impassioned defence of the benefits of Indian 
indentured labour. Based on his experience on coffee plantations in Ceylon and his 
study of labour transitions in other areas of the British Empire such as Mauritius and 
Jamaica, Blacklaw affirmed to the assembled planter elite that: 
                                                        
coffee plantations in Ceylon, see R. Kurian, ‘Labour, Race and Gender on the Coffee Plantations in 
Ceylon (Sri Lanka), 1834-1880’ p. 177.  
 
101 P. Eisenberg, ‘O Homem Esquecido’ p. 228.  
 
102 On Crüwell’s belief in the benefits of ‘cooly’ labour in Brazil, see G.A. Cruwell and A.S. 
Blacklaw, Brazil as a Coffee-growing Country p. 65.  
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[the Indian] is therefore, the race which, with more advantages than whites, suits 
[Brazilian] agriculture; it is this race which we need for service on our 
plantations.103 
 
Many of the Congress’ delegates would have been intrigued with what Blacklaw had 
to say; Asian, principally Chinese, indentured labour was a transitory solution under 
serious consideration by a significant minority of those in attendance, including the 
Minister of Agriculture, João Lins de Vieira Cansanção Sinimbu.104  
 
Blacklaw was likely unaware, but around the same time he was extolling the benefits 
of Indian labour, British officials were in the process of closing off the possibility of 
this indentured migration flow. Though most Brazilian proponents of ‘Asiatic’ labour 
had focused on resurrecting the failed Chinese immigration schemes of the past, the 
Viscount de Mauá, a self-proclaimed Anglophile, looked to labour transitions in the 
British Empire for a solution. In 1876, taking advantage of a legal loophole, he 
contracted and imported 186 Indians from the island of Mauritius to work on his sugar 
plantation in Macaé, Rio de Janeiro.105 On the collapse of this scheme after Mauá’s 
bankruptcy, British officials in Rio organised the repatriation of the labourers and 
denounced the scheme on anti-slavery terms. The colonial government in Mauritius 
then proceeded to close the legal loophole which had allowed their recruitment in the 
                                                        
103 Congresso Agrícola do Rio de Janeiro [1878] Anais. ed. fac-similar (Rio de Janeiro: Fundação 
Casa de Rui Barbosa, 1988) p. 258. 
 
104 On Sinimbu’s support of Chinese labour see J. Lesser, Negotiating National Identity: Immigrants, 
Minorities, and the Struggle for Ethnicity in Brazil (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999) pp. 25-29.  
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first place, thus extinguishing the possibility of Blacklaw’s proposals ever being 
practically adopted.  
 
Though Indian indentured labour would not provide the solution to the shortage of 
labour on Angélica or any other Brazilian plantation, Blacklaw was involved in 
another scheme based on similar long-distance migration flows. Like the migration of 
indentured Tamils from southern India to Ceylon, the flows of retirante migrants from 
the northeastern province of Ceará to São Paulo, a distance of over 2000km, were 
initiated by the onset of severe hardships in their homelands. In his speech at the 
Agricultural Congress, Blacklaw drew a direct comparison between the famine in 
southern India in the early 1840s that kickstarted seasonal migration to Ceylon’s 
coffee plantations and the droughts which had initiated the exodus of the Cearenses in 
1877-1878.106 It is not clear whether these similarities were purely coincidental or if 
indeed Blacklaw had played a part in advising the central government on this 
subsidised flow of migrants. Either way, Blacklaw and the Angélica plantation were 
amongst the largest single beneficiaries of Cearense labour. Dean estimates that some 
3000 retirantes settled in the Paulista West during 1877-1878 and that 600 of those 
were contracted by the manager of Angélica.107 However, Paulo Cesar Gonçalves’ 
estimate of at least 278, based on the colonist registration records in Rio de Janeiro 
and São Paulo, is closer to the 300 stated by Blacklaw in a letter published in a 
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newspaper in July 1878.108 The passage of the retirantes from Ceará to São Paulo was 
subsidised by the central government, whereas  
 
Sr. Scoth (sic) Blacklaw, bringing to the Angélica plantation owned by 
the Banco Inglez the Cearenses listed below, commits himself to give a 
house to each head of family and to pay the work of each person 
according to the price agreed with them.109 
 
Gonçalves observes that on other plantations in the region, the Cearenses were 
employed in the planting and care of immature coffee trees during an initial four-year 
period. This ancillary role had often been associated with other free Brazilian 
labourers on Paulista plantations. 110   However, the 300 migrants contracted by 
Blacklaw were involved directly in coffee harvesting, a role typically performed by 
slaves on most plantations.111 Though Blacklaw declared himself to be happy with the 
work of the migrants shortly after their arrival, a lack of source material makes it 
impossible to say whether this form of labour proved more successful over the longer-
term than previous experiments with European immigrants and local camaradas. The 
bank’s London secretary was far from optimistic, predicting that the Cearenses would 
inevitably be tempted away by the bank’s hostile neighbours.112 Nevertheless, for the 
sake of the bank’s prosperity he sincerely hoped that ‘this new form of labour may 
prove an exception to our past experience of the commodity “free labour”!’113 As we 
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shall observe in the following section, by the time the Cearense migrants arrived on 
Angélica, Blacklaw with the support of his superiors in Rio and London, had already 
given up hope of running an exclusively free labour operation. As on other plantations 
in the region, the arriving retirantes would begin their work alongside gangs of 
enslaved labourers. 
 
Section V: Slave Labour 
 
The date on which the bank quietly abandoned their commitment to the exclusive use 
of free labour is not clear. In a court document of March 1875, the bank’s lawyer was 
keen to impress on the judge that the Angélica was ‘the only establishment in this 
county which employs only free labour, completely rejecting slave labour.’114 Almost 
a year later, writing from Angélica on 6th February 1876, Crüwell stated that ‘slaves 
may not be employed on this property for certain reasons’ - an allusion to the bank’s 
earlier commitment and possibly to the provisions of the 1843 Act.115 However, in a 
letter dated just five days later the same author seems to suggest that hired slave labour 
had indeed been employed on Angélica. Discussing the failure of the European colony 
and the frustrations encountered in dealing with free Brazilian labour, Crüwell lists a 
third labour source: gangs of slaves owned by Confederate immigrants who settled in 
Brazil following the end of the Civil War. These Americans, owners of ten to a dozen 
slaves, as well as mules and ploughs, performed contract work on plantations. 
Importantly, ‘he also hires his slaves, and if that be preferred at a daily rate of pay’ 
                                                        
114 Alexandre Scott Blacklaw x Carlos Coch, Carlos Helder, 1875, APHRC, Cartório Criminal, 
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115 G.A. Cruwell and A.S. Blacklaw, Brazil as a Coffee-growing Country p. 60.  
 294 
Crüwell added. Here he suggests that Blackwell had either contracted the American 
or hired his gangs of slaves: 
With this sort of labour the European planter who does not wish to employ slaves, 
or who is prevented employing them, such as the Englishman, without losing his 
nationality, must work…116 
 
The author seems to be referring to the three forms of labour he listed, European 
immigrant, camarada and hired gangs of slaves. Crüwell appears to draw a distinction 
between the use of hired slaves and the purchase of their own. His reference to the 
Englishman being prevented without losing his nationality is an allusion to the 
provisions of the 1843 which made the same legal distinction between the hiring of 
somebody else’s slaves and the ownership of slaves purchased after its enactment.  
 
Whether or not slaves had been employed on the plantation before or during Crüwell’s 
stay in early 1876, the presence of enslaved workers on Angélica is clearer cut by 1877. 
In an intriguing note to the bank’s Rio branch in January 1877, the London secretary 
stated: 
Angélica: This advice is noted, we of course are not in a position to act in this 
matter but must leave it for decision on your side. The advance however is a risk 
which should be duly considered as in the event of death or sickness it would be 
lost.117  
 
Frustratingly, the original advice sent from Rio could not be located in the bank’s 
correspondence. Nevertheless, the reference to the loss of an advance on ‘death or 
sickness’ suggests that the writer could well have been referring to hired slaves. This 
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suspicion is confirmed by the following advert which appeared the in Diário de São 
Paulo during the month of May 1877: 
The Fazenda Angélica…requires slaves for hire of both sexes for service on 
the same plantation. Good treatment and moderate workload guaranteed. Well 
paid and part payment in advance. To respond and for further information 
please contact A.S Blacklaw.118 
 
That Blacklaw had managed to procure hired slaves from the adverts placed in May 
1877 was confirmed in the following month by José Vergueiro. In an article criticising 
the bank’s attempt to seize his Ibicaba plantation, Vergueiro lampooned the bank for 
the use of slave labour on Angélica, portraying its managers, and the British more 
generally, as hypocrites of the highest order: 
But the behaviour of these men seems hardly logical. These men, who should 
remember the violence exercised against Brazil because of slavery, when their 
government insulted the Brazilian nation, and their agents brutally entered our 
ports, disrespecting the authorities; and now forgetting all of this, and the 
sublime philanthropy that the English showed, and now it is these English who 
employ slave labour on their plantation at Angélica. Does English philanthropy 
only exist when it involves the interests and rights of others and not their own?119 
(emphasis in original) 
 
The use of slave labour on the plantation was now seemingly common knowledge in 
Brazil to the extent that Blacklaw referred to it in an article for the English-language 
Anglo-Brazilian Times newspaper in September 1878. Commenting on the high costs 
of slave labour, the plantation’s administrator mentioned that he had been paying 
£3,12s,0d for the monthly hire of each slave. Unfortunately, as with all references to 
slave labour encountered throughout this research, the author does not detail how 
many were hired at any one time or whether their presence was permanent or seasonal. 
The final mention of slave labour on Angélica occurred around the time the bank 
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finally found a suitable purchaser for the estate, after half a decade of attempts to sell 
the property. Just a month before the sale of Angélica to the Baron de Grão-Mogol in 
April 1881, John Beaton sent the following instructions to the Rio branch: 
 
Blacklaw: We have no time to write this gentleman tonight but please inform him 
that he must obtain without delay the further labour required for the estate: free 
labour is uncertain and difficult to domicile, he had better look after the hire of 
slaves even if he has to make an advance against them.120 (emphasis in original) 
  
Then, in the aftermath of the sale at the end of the following month, Beaton asked the 
Rio manager about the arrangements being made for the hired slaves.121 The costs 
incurred for paying off the contracts of the these slaves were ‘heavy’ in Beaton’s 
opinion, at 7:070$000.122 However, because this figure also included payments made 
to colonists it is impossible, again, to estimate the number of slaves on the property.123 
What this correspondence does unequivocally tell us, however, is that the use of slave 
labour was sanctioned by management in London and was not simply a case of a rogue 
administrator acting alone.  
 
London’s awareness is a crucial point. Not because it proves complicity in a crime – 
hiring was not illegal under the 1843 Act – but because it makes clear that the bank 
was intentionally less than transparent with their British shareholders. Summaries of 
the bank’s annual shareholder meetings between the years 1877-1880, when slave 
labour was certainly employed intermittently at least, either make no refence to slavery 
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or explicitly state that despite labour shortages ‘the Bank could not own slaves’ (1879) 
or ‘being an English company the Bank could not employ slaves’ (1880).124 In spite 
of these disingenuous statements distancing the bank from slavery, announcing the 
sale of the property at the 1881 shareholders’ meeting, the chairman performed an 
about-turn declaring: 
The Angelica estate had been sold on advantageous terms, and the bank 
now had not a single slave in its employment. Some slight disadvantage 
had, no doubt, arisen in the way of a difficulty in getting cheap labour.125 
 
Despite no crime having been committed, the bank’s management clearly regarded 
direct association with the use of slave labour as having the potential for reputational 
damage. The directors would surely have been well aware of the recent scandal which 
had rocked the St. John Del Rey Mining Company and would have been keen to avoid 
similar consequences. Of course, the charges against the mining company, of the 
illegal enslavement of the Cata Branca miners, were more serious than the bank’s legal 
use of hired slave labour. 126  Nevertheless, Vergueiro’s cry of hypocrisy in 1877 had 
already given the bank an indication of the criticism they might face if their 
entanglement with slavery were to become known to shareholders or the abolitionist 
press. As it was, with the plantation sold, the bank was happy to declare it had severed 
its connection, at least in its most direct sense, to Brazilian slavery.  
 
Concluding remarks: 
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This chapter has shown that what had long been characterised as British experiment 
in free labour on a Paulista plantation was only part of the truth. The London and 
Brazilian Bank did attempt to run the estate with a completely free labour force for 
around four years from the failed launch of the Brazilian Coffee Estates Company in 
1872. There is no doubt that British anti-slavery legislation and identity had an 
important impact on the administration of this plantation. Firstly, legislation restricted 
its managers from purchasing slaves and working the property in the same way as the 
vast majority of plantations in the region. Of course, they could hire slaves without 
violating this law but the prospect of raising large sums of capital in anti-slavery 
Britain encouraged them to pursue an exclusively free labour model. An analysis of 
the labour relations on the plantation suggests that this experiment failed for similar 
reasons to those on other Brazilian plantations around this period. In other words, an 
identification with British anti-slavery ideals did not necessarily lead to improved 
conditions for free workers. 
 
Upon the collapse of this model and with the estate becoming an increasing financial 
burden, the bank considered other coerced forms of labour. In an attempt to transfer 
his global experience of post-slavery labour solutions to Brazil, the estate’s manager 
briefly lobbied for Indian indentured labour. Though this plan did not bear fruit, it 
appears Blacklaw played an important role in the Cearense scheme, which shared 
some similarities with the seasonal migration flows of indentured labourers to Ceylon. 
Meanwhile, the bank had abandoned its earlier rejection of slavery without violating 
British anti-slavery legislation. From 1877, if not earlier, hired slave labour was 
present on the plantation, at least intermittently, until its sale in 1881. While aware 
that they were not breaking the law of 1843, the bank’s management were careful to 
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avoid divulging their entanglement with slavery to shareholders of the wider public in 
Britain. The bank felt it had more to fear from trial by public opinion than from the 
threat of anti-slavery legislation. In fact, their success in avoiding scandal, achieved 
through elision and obfuscation, is one of the reasons that this important case study 
has gone overlooked for so long. British anti-slavery had its limits and the bank was 
able to exploit this in the pursuit of profit in Brazil. 
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis set out with a dual purpose. Firstly, it aimed to explore the extent and 
diversity of British entanglement with slavery beyond the mining sector. In this sense, 
it hoped to reaffirm Brazil’s relevance to our historical understanding of Britain’s 
relationship with global slavery. While, to borrow a term from the organisers of the 
LBS Project, the ‘re-inscribing’ of this entanglement onto British history is a worthy 
cause in its own right, this thesis was also concerned with the reasons why this 
exploitative relationship was severed only by Brazilian emancipation rather than 
Britain’s own anti-slavery legislation. The purpose of this concluding chapter is to 
firstly provide a summary of the main findings of this research, stressing their original 
contribution of knowledge to existing scholarship in this area. The second section will 
discuss the potential to transpose the approach taken by this thesis onto regions and 
slave-economies outside the Brazilian context. A final section will then reflect on why 
the findings of this thesis and its wider approach to a historical problem might have 
some relevance for contemporary debates.  
 
Findings: 
 
Research into this theme began on the premise that the economic relationship between 
individual Britons and Brazilian slavery extended beyond the slaveholding in its literal 
sense. Findings accrued from a wide, albeit fragmented, source base justify the use of 
the concept ‘entanglement’ to describe the broad spectrum and multi-layered nature 
of this relationship. While it is true that a focus on slaveholding alone would not have 
captured this complexity, this is not to negate its importance as the most immediately 
visible aspect of these entangled interests. Following the location of a crucial but 
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hitherto overlooked source in the form of Palmerston’s census of 1848, this thesis has 
identified a diversity and extent to British slaveholding in Brazil that previous 
scholarship, with its focus on the mining sector, had not fully appreciated. An analysis 
of the data showed that, at the mid-century at least, an equal number of slaves were 
employed by British masters in agriculture and urban enterprise as in the goldmines 
of Minas Gerais. Though the census information no doubt represented an 
underestimation, it is true that British slaveholding is negligible when compared to 
Brazil’s total slave population. That being said, the findings do show that slaveholding 
was a fairly common practice at all levels of the small British expatriate communities 
in Brazil. It is also worth noting that despite their lack of critical mass, some British 
slave-worked enterprises were of regional or even national importance.  
 
Though the patchy coverage of available sources makes it difficult to talk about trends, 
it appears reasonable to suggest that the total number of British-held slaves decreased 
gradually over the course of the second half of the century. This can be attributed to 
various causes including the shifting demography of Brazilian slavery as well as 
changing patterns of British investment. In spite of this overall downward trend, it was 
still possible to trace the presence of slave labour in the types of industries identified 
by Graham as the agents of the supposed modernisation process which ultimately 
brought an end to slavery in Brazil.1 So while there were a significant minority of 
British subjects who were engaged in plantation agriculture, slaves were also 
employed by Britons in sectors such as railway construction, gas factories and other 
industrial settings. Complementing the better-known case of the mining industry, 
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these examples challenge the notion that industrial capitalism, with Britain at its centre, 
was physically and temporally separated from slavery.  
 
At the beginning of this research it was suggested that a sole focus on slaveholding in 
its literal sense would belie the multi-faceted connections between British investment 
and slavery. The findings of research into mercantile credit networks and banking 
finance prove that to be the case. The nature of the Brazilian credit market, and how 
transactions were recorded, means that much of this financial entanglement remains 
invisible to the modern historian. Nevertheless, by piecing together the fragmentary 
evidence found in notarial offices and judicial records, we have been able to ascertain 
that, while it might not have been a widespread practice, the acceptance and potential 
foreclosure on human collateral was a routine part of doing business in Brazil. Given 
their role as general importers and suppliers for both the illegal traffic and legitimate 
trade, it is perhaps not surprising that this was found to be in the case in British 
merchant credit networks of the 1830s and 1840s. Nevertheless, the material basis of 
these transactions had been neglected in favour of other historiographical concerns.  
 
Entanglement with Brazilian slavery was also a defining feature in the early operations 
of a British joint-stock bank, one of the symbols of modern financial capitalism. It has 
long been understood that British capital eventually reached Brazilian agricultural 
producers but the extent of the London and Brazilian Bank’s entanglement with 
slavery had been almost completely overlooked by business historians whose interests 
lie in other aspects of the bank’s operations. The bank was responsible for a significant 
injection of capital into Brazil’s most dynamic coffee-producing zone. These 
transactions initiated a deep and for the bank, frustrating, relationship with slavery that 
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would drag on until the eve of abolition in Brazil. Though at times these types of 
investments negatively affected the bank’s balance sheet, their impact on the lives of 
those enslaved individuals offered unknowingly as security could be devastating. 
Indeed, it is regrettable that the source material did not allow us to trace the fate of 
those, such as the slaves sold as part of the bank’s dispute with the Baron de Turvo, 
whose lives were irreparably altered by a bank manager’s decision to accept them as 
human collateral.  
 
To a large extent British entanglement with Brazilian slavery persisted until 1888 
because the British state proved incapable, and to an extent unwilling, to regulate 
British business activity across political borders. While it is true that in 1843 the state 
legislated against the types of entanglement considered here, it did so by assuming 
limited liability. As discussions at the World Anti-Slavery Convention in 1840 showed, 
opposition to slavery could create limitless responsibilities. To the disappointment of 
many abolitionists, the British state restricted its liability to the suppression of 
activities that could be directly linked to the promotion of the illegal slave trade, rather 
than the abstract notion of curtailing all British entanglement with slavery. Even then, 
the law enacted in 1843 was decidedly ambivalent, a characteristic that Eltis has 
identified as present throughout Britain’s wider campaign against the slave trade.2 At 
the heart of the ambivalence codified into this legislation was the difficulty faced by 
the state in reconciling other key tenets of Victorian political culture with its anti-
slavery ambitions. Though it proscribed the buying and selling of slaves in an attempt 
to sever British links to the buoyant illegal traffic, at the same time it was not applied 
retroactively. The respect of property rights, and especially with regard to the 
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traditions of British emancipation, clashed with anti-slavery to produce a law that 
legitimised slave property already held by Britons at the time of its enactment. In this 
sense, the law at once absolved British subjects of the historic crime of illegally 
enslaving Africans imported after the trade was prohibited by international treaty in 
1830 or by Brazilian law in 1831. Moreover, in addition to allowing Britons to retain 
the slaves they already owned, the 1843 Act left open the possibility of the future 
exploitation of new slave labour through other means, such as hiring. In this case the 
state assumed liability for the suppression of direct promotion of the slave trade while 
mitigating any potential damage to British trade and investment in Brazil’s slave-
economy. As observed throughout this thesis, the state can be considered successful 
in this respect. Though the 1843 Act did modify the behaviour of some British 
investors, it never prevented Britons from ultimately exploiting the labour and market 
value of the enslaved.  
 
While the limited scope of this legislation has been recently recognised by historians, 
the novel approach of this thesis was to trace its implementation in Brazil over a longer 
period than isolated case studies of the mining industry.3 There is no doubt that the 
application of the 1843 Act’s provisions was hamstrung by a combination of Brazil’s 
vast geography and the Foreign Office’s fairly limited resources. However, a critical 
reading of diplomatic correspondence suggests that ambivalent attitudes held by 
British officials in Brazil also hindered the law’s implementation. Anti-slavery duties 
were just one priority amongst many that some diplomats and consuls found difficult 
to reconcile in the performance of their role. As we observed in the case of William 
D. Christie, even the most zealous anti-slavery officials were known to occasionally 
                                                        
3 Especially, C. Evans, ‘Brazilian Gold’ and J. Kelly ‘The Problem of Anti-slavery’. 
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turn a blind eye to allegations of impropriety in order to save face and protect British 
prosperity. Understanding that ambivalence was embodied in British diplomats and 
consuls provides a more nuanced picture of the practical operations of Britain’s global 
anti-slavery network. Outside our immediate area of interest, it also reminds us that 
we should be cautious when generalising about the official mind of the state. As we 
have seen, the implementation of official policy was influenced by local conditions, 
competing priorities and individual judgment.  
 
Ambivalent officials more often than not remained silent on the issue of British 
entanglement with slavery. Though we observed the effective and vocal lobbying 
activities of British slaveholders during the reading of the 1843 bill, outside of these 
peaks of controversy, those who maintained economic interests in Brazilian slave 
labour often employed a rhetoric of silence, elision and obfuscation to mask their links 
to the institution. As we saw with the case of the London Brazilian Bank, even when 
their entanglement with slave mortgages brought them within the limited provisions 
of the 1843 Act, of greater concern was restricting the transmission of knowledge to 
shareholders and the wider public in Britain. British slaveholders in Brazil were aware 
that whether illegal or not, their actions would be deemed unacceptable in a society 
partly defined by its collective rejection of slavery. Nevertheless, the fact that so many 
Britons, in the words of George Pilkington, ‘breathed the miasma of slavery’, suggests 
that an opposition to slavery in the abstract often did not travel well when faced with 
the social and economic realities of life in Brazil.4     
 
 
                                                        
4 G. Pilkington, An Address p. 17.  
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Beyond Brazil? 
 
Though this thesis offers a comprehensive overview of various aspects of British 
entanglement with Brazilian slavery, there is still work to be done to fully understand 
this complex relationship. Limited time and financial resources meant that very little 
archival research was undertaken outside of Rio de Janeiro. If the data from 
Palmerston’s census is a fair gauge, we can expect that the entanglement in regions 
outside Brazil’s southeast is less concentrated. Nevertheless, as Chapter II shows, 
there are certainly pockets of interest, especially in the country’s northeast. Beyond 
slaveholding, there is also more work that could be undertaken into the regional branch 
operations of Brazil’s two British banks, in port-cities such as Santos, Salvador and 
Recife.  
 
Of equal interest and perhaps more pressing urgency is the need to understand British 
entanglement in other slave economies following emancipation in the West Indies. 
Although an appraisal of local source material would need to be conducted, there are 
encouraging indications that the methodology employed in this thesis could bear fruit 
if transposed onto other regions of the Americas. The presence of British slaveholders 
and the entanglement of British banking and mining companies with slavery in Cuba 
is not unknown in the historiography. Chris Evans’ history of British-owned mining 
enterprises at El Cobre has identified that slave labour was crucial to their operations.5 
Moreover, as discussed in Chapter I of this thesis, Kelly and Roldan de Montaud have 
                                                        
5 In 1841, a total of 728 slaves were employed by the Consolidated Cobre and Santiago mining 
companies. See C. Evans, ‘El Cobre: Cuban Ore and the Globalization of Swansea Copper, 1830-
1870’, Welsh History Review, 27:1 (2014), p. 123. 
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established that the merchant bank Barings & Co. had taken ownership of land and 
slaves in Cuba in the early 1840s. 6  Nevertheless, in much the same way as the 
Brazilian case, non-institutional slaveholders have thus far been written out of this 
history. However, that does not necessarily have to be the case. Palmerston also 
commissioned a census of British slaveholding in Cuba and Puerto Rico, which in a 
similar vein to its Brazilian counterpart, appears to have been overlooked in the 
literature. While not as detailed as their Brazilian equivalents, and sadly lacking the 
numbers of slaved owned, returns from British consuls in Havana, Santiago de Cuba 
and Puerto Rico list 70 individual Britons or British enterprises who employed slaves 
in a variety of urban and agricultural projects. 7  Much in the same way that 
Palmerston’s slave census provided an impetus for further investigation using 
Brazilian archives, these sources offer an interesting point of departure to deepen our 
understanding of British entanglement with Cuban slavery. Given the islands’ 
proximity to the British Caribbean, the first stage of a potential project might be to 
cross reference the names in the census with the LBS database.  
 
Venezuela would appear to be a less conventional choice than Cuba. Unlike both Cuba 
and Brazil, slavery in Venezuela had been far less central to the nation’s economy 
before it was finally abolished in 1854.8 Moreover, as a relatively small market, the 
country appears less readily in the imagination when considering British trade and 
investment in Latin America. Finally, given that Palmerston’s interest in British 
                                                        
6 See Chapter I 
 
7 Mr. Crawford to Lord Palmerston, 31 December 1848, in Correspondence on Slave Trade, 
Correspondence on Slave Trade, 1848-49 (Class B), P.P, 1128 pp. 303-304; Mr. Forbes to Lord 
Palmerston, 16 December 1848, in Ibid p. 320; Mr. Lindegren to Lord Palmerston, 4 December 1848, 
in Ibid pp. 327-328.  
 
8 R. Blackburn, The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery, 1776-1848, (London: Verso, 1988) pp. 363-365.  
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slaveholding was tied exclusively to its links to the illegal slave trade, the Foreign 
Secretary did not commission a similar census for Venezuela, where the traffic had 
long since disappeared.9 Nevertheless, and in spite of a lack of official instructions, an 
eager acting-consul by the name of Joseph Riddel composed his own short census, 
which he sent to the Foreign Secretary anyway. 10  In this case, nine of the ten 
slaveholders listed by Riddel, were proprietors of sizeable coffee, cocoa or sugar 
plantations. Though this is of interest in its own right, one case warrants particular 
attention here owing to its similarity to themes explored in this thesis and their 
implications for current-day debates. Amongst the British plantation owners was a 
British bank; Riddel informed the Foreign Secretary that in 1844 the Colonial Bank’s 
branch at Caracas had become the owner of a coffee estate in the surrounding province. 
The acting-consul added that the Villegas plantation and an unidentified number of 
slaves had been acquired by this British bank in much the same way as the London 
and Brazilian Bank took possession of Angélica. In this case an unnamed debtor had 
mortgaged their estate in 1842 to the bank who foreclosed on the property in lieu of 
repayment. 11  On one level the case is of interest as it provides further material 
evidence of the particular financial route to slave-ownership so vigorously defended 
by Mildmay and Ashburton in the face of the 1843 bill. However, as discussed in the 
following section, the Colonial Bank’s status as an institutional slaveholder has 
interesting implications for current and highly contested debates in modern society.  
 
                                                        
9 Venezuela abolished the slave trade in 1811 see H. Thomas, The Slave Trade: The Story of the 
Atlantic Slave Trade: 1440-1870 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997) p. 577.  
 
10 J. Riddel to Lord Palmerston, 18 May 1849, in Correspondence on Slave Trade, 1848-49 (Class B), 
P.P, 1291, pp. 435-437. 
 
11 Ibid p. 437.  
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Modern-day relevance 
 
Many of the Britons identified in this thesis as being entangled with Brazilian slavery 
in some way only appear as glimpses in the historical record. The legacy of their 
investments in slavery are hard to trace and most of them will remain lost to 
generations past. However institutional slaveholders, such as the London and 
Brazilian and Colonial banks have a very tangible link to the present. Both are in fact 
predecessor institutions of two of the UK’s major high-street banks. The London and 
Brazilian Bank was subsumed by Lloyds, whereas as the Colonial Bank was absorbed 
by Barclays in the early twentieth century.12  The scope of this thesis is not to offer 
recommendations or prescribe what action should be taken by these modern 
institutions to address, or indeed redress their inherited historical entanglement with 
slavery. Nevertheless, the evidence is stark: both of these institutions exploited the 
labour and financial market value of enslaved people in countries where the legacies 
of historical slavery are still very much a present-day problem. 
 
It should be noted that the last decade has witnessed a significant upswing in academic 
and public interest in the institutional legacies of slavery. In the UK, this owes much 
to the work of LBS Project in tracing the connections between modern day institutions 
and British colonial slavery. Indeed, Draper has identified predecessor banks of both 
Lloyds and Barclays as beneficiaries of slave compensation.13 Elsewhere, reflecting 
                                                        
12 On Lloyds, see Lloyds, ‘Bank of London and South America’ 
https://www.lloydsbankinggroup.com/Our-Group/our-heritage/our-history/lloyds-bank-
international/bank-of-london--south-america-bolsa/ [last accessed 23/09/2018]. On Barclays, see 
Barclays, ‘Barclays’ Historical Structure’ 
https://www.home.barclays/content/dam/barclayspublic/docs/AboutUs/History-in-Detail/Barclays-
History_Hi-Res.pdf [last accessed 23/09/2018]. 
 
13 N. Draper, The Price of Emancipation pp. 244-246. 
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trends in the Universities Studying Slavery movement in the United States, the 
University of Glasgow became the first British academic institution to publish a report 
on its economic links to historical slavery.14 With the University of Bristol a member 
of the same network, it is perhaps only a matter of time before other British institutions 
follow Glasgow’s lead.  
 
Whether or not modern banking institutions make the decision to publish similar 
reports is far less certain. Following Draper’s revelations in 2010 there is little 
evidence to suggest that implicated institutions will move in that direction. In fact, 
three years earlier Barclays had rebuffed accusations levelled against them of 
historical complicity in the slave trade via a predecessor institution, Heywoods Bank. 
In doing so, Barclays stressed its abolitionist heritage though the Quaker movement.15 
The crucial difference in the cases highlighted in this conclusion is that they occurred 
in the post-emancipation period, at a time when Britain had collectively rejected 
slavery. This point brings us back to a key concept underpinning this thesis; while this 
rejection may have been true in the abstract, its practical application and the realities 
of profit-making in Brazil, and elsewhere, proved markedly different. This thesis urges 
contemporary Britain’s collective memory to think not just in abstract terms, but to 
reflect on the complexities and inconsistencies in the nation’s anti-slavery history.  
 
                                                        
14 S. Mullen, S. Newman, ‘Slavery, Abolition and Glasgow University: report and recommendations 
of the University of Glasgow History of Slavery Steering Committee (2018) 
https://www.gla.ac.uk/media/media_607547_en.pdf [last accessed 27/09/2018]; See also ‘Universities 
Studying Slavery’ http://slavery.virginia.edu/universities-studying-slavery/ [last accessed 27/09/2018] 
 
15 The Observer, 1 April 2007, 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2007/apr/01/theobserver.observerbusiness1 [last accessed 
27/09/2018] 
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Appendix 1: Slave Census Returns 1848-1849 
 
Rio de Janeiro 
 
Name of Person or Establishment Number of slaves Place of Residence Nature of Business 
São João de Rey Mining Company About 900 Morro Velho, Minas Gerais Gold Mine 
Imperial Brazilian Mining Association About 400 Gongo Soco, Minas Gerais Gold Mine 
National Brazilian Mining Association 300 to 400 Cocais, Minas Gerais Gold Mine 
Mr. Richard Heath 25 Constancia, Organ 
Mountains 
Farming 
Mr. Constantine Fisher 45 Constancia, Organ 
Mountains 
Farming 
Mr. August Gibson 23 Island of Governador, Rio 
Bay 
Soap Boiler 
Mr. Robert Coates 24 Selenas Farming  
Mr. William Whitaker 35 to 40  São Paulo Sugar Planter 
Mr. Lescene 35 to 40  Tijuca, Rio Coffee Planter 
Mrs. Moke 80 Tijuca, Rio Coffee Planter 
Mr. George March 34 Organ Mountains Farming  
Mr. Robert Laurie About 80 Macaé Coffee Planter 
Dr. George Reid About 60 St. Antonio, Macaé Coffee Planter 
Heirs of Dr. McCormack About 50  Ilha Grande  Coffee Planter 
Heirs of Mr. Platt About 90 Boa Vista, Ilha Grande Coffee Planter 
60 other commercial houses and other 
establishments 
120 to 360 Rio de Janeiro Merchant Houses 
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Pernambuco 
 
Name of Person or 
Establishment 
Total Location Nature of Business 
McCalmont & Co.  4 Pernambuco Merchants 
James Crabtree & Co.  1 Pernambuco Merchants 
Russell, Mellors & Co.  4 Pernambuco Merchants 
Jas. Corkshott & Co. 2 Pernambuco Merchants 
Johnston, Pater & Co.  18 Pernambuco Merchants 
George Kenworthy & 
Co. 
1 Pernambuco Merchants 
Joseph Latham 3 Pernambuco Merchants 
Frederick Youle 7 Pernambuco Merchants 
Augustus S. Corbett 8 Pernambuco Merchants 
Nicholas Hartery 18 Pernambuco Merchants 
John Mathews 11 Pernambuco Merchants 
Henry Gibson 9 Pernambuco Merchants 
John Stewart 3 Pernambuco Merchants 
Edward H. J. Fox  4 Pernambuco Merchants 
Jones, Paton & Co.  2 Pernambuco Merchants 
William Collins Cox 3 Pernambuco Merchants 
Dr. Arbuckle 1 Pernambuco Physician 
William May 3 Pernambuco Surgeon 
Edward de Mornay 1 Pernambuco Civil Engineer 
D. W. Bowman 1 Pernambuco Engineer 
Christopher Starr 31 Pernambuco Domestic / Foundry 
Veitch Bravott & Co.  1 Pernambuco Chemists 
John Carroll 10 Pernambuco Gentleman Farmer  
John Dowsley 3 Pernambuco Ship Chandler 
Thomas Dowsley 3 Pernambuco Ship Chandler 
Mr. Scott 1 Pernambuco Engineer 
Mr. Jones 3 Pernambuco Engineer 
John Wilson 1 Pernambuco Shoemaker 
A. Short 1 Pernambuco Publican 
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Cont.       
M.F. Braga 1 Pernambuco Clerk 
W.H. Stepples 8 Pernambuco Clerk 
Mr. Stepples, senior.  5 Pernambuco Brazilian Service  
Joshua Gunston 1 Pernambuco Sexton  
John Donnelly 1 Pernambuco Tailor 
David Evans 2 Pernambuco Stable Keeper 
George Francis 1 Pernambuco Publican  
Richard R. Noble 4 Pernambuco Cotton Plantation 
William Raymond 1 Pernambuco Ship Chandler 
M. Middleton 1 Pernambuco Laundress 
William Purcell 9 Pernambuco Baker  
Thomas Purcell 1 Pernambuco Cabinet Maker 
James Burnett 1 Alagoas Merchant 
Arthur McHardy 2 Alagoas Physician 
Krukenberg & Dennis 4 Alagoas Merchant 
F.H. Mitchell 4 Alagoas Unknown  
Charles de Mornay 80 Alagoas Sugar Planter 
Dr. Berkhead 30 Alagoas Sugar Planter 
 
Maranhão 
 
Name of Person or 
Establishment 
Total 
John Clarke 3 
Bingham & Co. 4 
Ryder, Gunston & Co. 2 
T. B. Gunston 1 
Henry Season 6 
Ignacio Viega 4 
Execs. Wellstood & Co. 78 
Augustus Garcia 51 
William Wilson 14 
William Henderson 1 
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Bahia 
 
Name of Person or 
Establishment 
Total Nature of Business 
Edward Lane 1 Merchant 
Richard Latham  12 Merchant 
G.H. Pasche 1 Merchant 
John Andrews 5 Merchant 
Johnson Bielby 3 Merchant 
Alexander Fraser 1 Clerk 
Ellen Adamson 2  - 
G.E. Fairbanks 6 Physician  
John O'Dwyer 7 Tailor 
Isaac Anizalak 6 Merchant 
Albert H. Curry 6 Shopkeeper 
Edward P. Wilson 10 Merchant 
Edward Jones 6 Merchant 
William Byrn 2 Tinsmith 
John MacNair 3 Merchant 
James Dwyer 4 Merchant  
Matthew Falconer 26 Planter 
Henry S. Marback 12 Ship-Chandler 
Louis Barbet 2 Boarding House Keeper 
George Blandy 11 Planter 
Mary Ann Sullivan 2 Shopkeeper 
Bernard Byrne 1 Tin-plate worker 
 
Pará 
 
Name of Person or 
Establishment 
Total Location Nature of 
Business 
Archibald Campbell 50 to 60 Pará Unknown 
Henry Dickenson 35 Pará Unknown 
Others 20 Pará Unknown 
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Paraíba 
 
Name of Person or 
Establishment 
Total Location 
Carlile Holmes unknown Paraíba 
Edward Power unknown Paraíba 
Richard Rogers unknown Paraíba 
 
Rio Grande do Sul 
 
Name of Person or 
Establishment 
Total Location 
Mr. Thomas Messiter 20 Rio Grande 
Mr. Holland Davies & Co  2 Rio Grande 
Mr. James Law 1 Rio Grande 
Mr John Wilson 1 Rio Grande 
Mr. James Donovan 6 Rio Grande 
Mr. James Vaughan 2 Pelotas 
Dr. Robert Landell 21 Porto Alegre 
Mr. George Taylor 1 Porto Alegre 
Mr. Holland Davies & Co  2 Porto Alegre 
Mr. James Baxter 1 Porto Alegre 
Mr. William Stone 2 Porto Alegre 
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